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Memes, misperceived by us, subjects, as means 
of our communication, effectively run the show 
(they use us to reproduce and multiply them-
selves) […]. The true aim of the process, its end-
in-itself, is the development of the productive 
forces, and the satisfaction of our needs and de-
sires (i.e., what appears to us as the goal) is effec-
tively just the means for the development of the 
productive forces.









hat’s in a meme? The Internet proffers almost an infin-
ity of answers, mostly by way of examples, which go 
on to teasingly court and taskingly contort definition 
in myriad ways, leaving meming an enigmatic signifier — and 
memes sublime objects — to say the least.1 Prior to the Internet, 
the meme had another life, one which is reflected on briefly at 
the beginning of this collection (and nodded to throughout). 
Conceptually born into this world as an eminently adaptable el-
ement, it has to be remembered that this entails not only being 
adaptable to new conditions, but adaptable by them: the Internet 
1 
 This “theory meme” depicts the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who 
theorized the objet petit a, a little “object” that we desire, without knowing 




(with its ads and apps) has, transformationally and irrevocably, 
adapted the meme. 
In earlier, halcyon days of Internet theory, there was great 
hope — a sense of utopianism — in certain circles for what its 
near-infinite network could bring; it is often suggested now that 
this hope was a rose-tinted and premature misfiring (along the 
lines of the trope of the Internet being the greatest resource pool 
of, and tool for, knowledge, but getting used primarily for porn 
and funny pictures of cats…). But hope should not too readily 
be conflated with naïveté. Whilst a text like Gregory L. Ulmer’s 
Internet Invention (2003) is full of strange, businessy applications 
and a slightly archaic, ’60s-ish sense of cool, it launches from a 
precise understanding of new technologies — even something 
of a founding insight — particularly applicable to memes: “the 
Internet as a medium […] puts us in a new relation to writing.”2 
From this statement — steeped in the grammatology of the phi-
losopher of deconstruction, Jacques Derrida — comes the ex-
pansion: “the technology supports graphic imaging along with 
text: one writes with the whole page, so to speak—text, picture, 
layout. Moreover, there is an exact correspondence between the 
cut-and-paste tools and the collage and juxtapositional rhetoric 
of twentieth-century vanguard poetics.”3
From rebuses (coded picture-puzzles, or pictograms, which 
Sigmund Freud drew on as dream analogues) to readymades 
(the re-presentations of everyday items as defamiliarized works 
of art; most famously perhaps, Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917), a urinal signed with the name “R. Mutt”), memes have 
had an array of precursors throughout the history of inscrip-
tion — art, graphics, and writing (particularly in folk art and the 
avant-garde, for example, which Internet art seemingly draws 
on in equal measure aesthetically). Images are excerpted, recy-
cled, copy-and-pasted; memes often utilize stock photography, 
or “poor images,” fuzzier and less sharpened, unairbrushed, not 
photoshopped; paused frames, often of accidental facial expres-




sions overflowing with a particular emotion, or archly wry, or 
saturated in gormlessness; celebrities and Joe Bloggses alike.4
This collection of essays seeks to look at these images and 
elements known as memes, and at their means of production, 
and to think them through — their practices and politics — and 
to think through them, too. We aim to look at the work memes 
do — and what structures that work — and the uses to which 
they are put, culturally and politically; how they enter into the 
service of politics, how they politicize, what they produce, and 
what that production is for, or gets used for; and at the dialectic 
between online phenomena and irl (“in real life”) phenomena, 
how political entities, statist and governmental, interact with 
online culture, how they fail to, what of their ideologies seeps 
through into it, how these ideologies are modified by it, where 
hegemony lies in these regards; how to seize memes as future-
building blocks, what to head towards. 
In Akala’s Natives, he states:
[W]hile the overtly racist regimes have fallen, one only has to 
spend a little time on the Internet, looking at comments on 
videos or following social media threads about migrants, po-
lice brutality, terrorism or any other potentially racialised is-
sue to see that the idea of race and racial hierarchy is perhaps 
as strong as it ever was for many millions of people today.5
In this, this highlighted side of the Internet has begun to do the 
work of those racist regimes for them. This is so often, sadly, 
where that hope referred to earlier has ended up (in parallel, in 
4 The ex-Everton goalkeeper Neville Southall’s Twitter account — a 
wonderfully “woke” platform that he regularly gives over for use to 
LGBTQ+ activists, sex workers, international crises organizations, 
etc. — utilizes something of both the meme image (a football sticker-esque 
photograph of him goalkeeping with a large “1” on it is the profile picture) 
and its humor/seriousness (“I realise I am just a big cock really/People s 
[sic] voices must be heard/that’s my goal”) to get its progressive messages 
across. 




terms of memic presentation, we might trace the famous image 
of Barack Obama over the word “hope” ending up in Donald 
Trump and Pepe the Frog in the US). 
The essays in this collection analyze this state of affairs and 
envisage how to re-envisage things, reimagine them, reim-
age them. Bookended by two manifestos, the loose trajectory 
to the contributions’ presentation herein takes us from memic 
origins, through memic possibilities — imaginaries, utopias, ac-
tion plans — to online culture wars, and beyond (punctuated 
with occasional interludes and oddities). Dominic Pettman’s 
“Memtic Desire: Twenty Theses on Posthumanism, Political 
Affect, and Proliferation” sets the scene for memes, outlining 
the technological, virtual, human, and posthuman contexts of 
memic production and political affectivity. This is followed by 
Roy Christopher’s deliberation, in part a historicity that tracks 
memes from their conceptual origins in the work of Richard 
Dawkins to their prevalence on the Internet, which offers an in-
troductory overview to the work to follow. Bogna M. Konior’s 
“Apocalypse Memes for the Anthropocene God: Mediating 
Crisis and the Memetic Body Politic” is an astounding odyssey 
of a tabulation of trends in meme production that reflect on a 
truly cosmological scale, in which memes are like monads of 
a gargantuan conceptology, encompassing everything from the 
Anthropocene to the apocalypse.
Lightening the load, Jay Owens’s enlightening “Post-Authen-
ticity and the Ironic Truths of Meme Culture” delivers an astute 
assessment of how authenticity is revaluated in meming, how 
irony is marshalled, and gone beyond, and how new generations 
interact with the Internet: the teens of memes. My own con-
tribution looks at political and intersectional themes in memes 
through their reliance on form, content, and structure. Eric Wil-
son’s article specifically focuses on the theory of anthropological 
philosopher René Girard in relation to memes, relevance, and 
desire down through the Ages to the aegis of the Internet, and 
takes the form of something like an elegy-as-emoji.
Roisin Kiberd’s “Chaotic, Good” takes alignment charts, 
from the game Dungeons and Dragons, and their memed forms, 
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and relays them against the online categorization of people 
(ourselves as Internet users included). The next article, by Tom 
Whyman, keys his passion for The Simpsons into Internet cul-
ture, and extrapolates from it fascinating analyses of equally 
fascinating Simpsons’ practices (Simpsonswave music and seas 
of shitposting), exploring memic nostalgias for lost futures and 
the creations of alternative spaces. After this, we delve into the 
meme-making world itself with an insider interview with the 
admins of the Non-Existent Existentialist Memes (NEEM) group 
conducted by Angus Reoch, “fashioning a cap from a page of 
Camus,” as Joanna Newsom once put it…
Then, we hop into a corporate world quite distinct from that 
belonging to proletarian and lumpenproletarian memes pro-
ducers. Yvette Granata’s survey of memes takes into account 
their labor-power and that used to create them, and revolves 
around the American fast food restaurant chain Wendy’s’ weird 
foray into the realm of memes, looking to use meme magic in 
their advertising, but really rather forcing Pepe the racist frog to 
become their number one burger flipper. 
Patricia Reed’s “Meso-Memetics, Service Fetishism, and 
Deep Mediation” is a deep meditation on meme production, and 
its types of labor, relayed against Marxist and post-Marxist the-
oretic frameworks; in so many ways it thoroughly interrogates 
both elements of this book’s title. Scott and McKenzie Wark’s es-
say continues in a similar vein and carries over similar themes. 
Like Marx’s own second volume of Capital, its main preoccupa-
tion is circulation, and it uses this as a grid, on which it decodes 
meme magic and its fetishizations. Out of these groundwork 
essays come futural calls to oneiric possibilities of memic auto-
mation and the autonomization of means, and the memic rise 
of AI, in C_YS’s sci-fi-y “In the Future, the Means of Production 
Will Own Themselves,” and of machinic loving grace in Tom 
Hobson and Kaajal Modi’s imaginative work on Fully Auto-
mated Luxury Communism and Fully Automated Luxury Gay 
Space Communism, written specifically in relation to UK left 
politics and its online manifestations and momentum. 
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With the future firmly in view, it falls to the remainder of 
the collection to focus on the political present — the conjunc-
ture that gives us the alt-right, Donald Trump, Brexit, Jordan B. 
Peterson, and so on and so on — and to track it from the West 
out globally.6 Ian Parker’s ruminations on Donald Trump, and 
his mediatization, interrogate the very theory it relies on in an 
autocritique that holds up psychoanalysis, as a blanket applica-
tory force, to scrutiny along the intersecting lines of politics and 
class prejudice, etc., especially in relation to the “four discours-
es” — and the fifth — of psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan 
(his very own memes of a sort, known as mathemes). 
Using the work of philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, on iro-
ny, Giacomo Bianchino launches his piece by looking into in-
tentionality in relation to the creation of Pepe the Frog and 
spreads out into assessing comicality and irony, and its limits, 
(mis)interpretations, pitfalls, and productions. Beginning simi-
larly, Gabriele de Seta’s penultimate essay trajectorily shifts to 
show appropriations and reinterpretations of Pepe in China. 
Practices of reclamation and meaning/meming-shifting are at 
work in the phenomena being arrayed in the essay, which leads 
swiftly into the manifesto that brings this collection to a close 
before the concluding statements of the Afterword by Alfie 
Bown and Francis Russell, Seong-Young Her’s “Post-Pepe Mani-
festo.” Putting the height of Pepeism at its center, it calls for the 
abolition of private memic property, at a time now all the more 
pressing; for example, with reports emerging of copyright con-
trols threatening memes as we know ’em, Jim.7 The Afterword 
then takes us out, post_meme, post-meme.
6 While Peterson is currently the “intellectual” darling of this conjuncture, 
for an interesting summary of its recent ideologue antecedents, see Mike 
Wendling, Alt-Right: From 4chan to the White House (London: Pluto Press, 
2018), 17–39.
7 See, for example, “Memes ‘Will be Banned’ under New EU Copyright 
Law, Warn Campaigners,” Sky News, June 9, 2018, https://news.sky.
com/story/memes-will-be-banned-under-new-eu-copyright-law-warn-




Editorially, we have aimed to strike a balance between pres-
ervation of individual writing styles and introducing certain 
forms of standardization. We hope that the text reads fluidly and 
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Memetic Desire: Twenty Theses 
on Posthumanism, Political 
Affect, and Proliferation
Dominic Pettman
1. The human is always already posthuman.
The human is the animal that relies on technology in order 
to realize its humanity.
The “post-human” is thus an ontological category, more 
than a historical one. The very first humans were, from this 
perspective, as posthuman as we are today. We are ever us-
ing tools and prostheses to get ahead of ourselves. 
This perspective is known as “originary technicity” (see 
Bernard Stiegler, David Wills, and others).
2. Politics is built into the bones of (post)human culture.
See, for example, the bone which one chimp uses to beat the 
other at the beginning of Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey; 
or the bones used by our early human ancestors as tools for 
painting, adornment, or charms.




Technē being the ancient Greek word incorporating “art, ar-
tifice, making, fashioning, bringing-forth, revealing.”
4. Technology and politics stem from the same root in cyber-
netics.
Cybernetics comes from the ancient Greek word 
kybernētikē, meaning “governance,” especially through the 
metaphorical act of steering or navigation (kybernēsis). 
5. Art and politics are thus connected and mediated by tech-
nics.
Technics being the wider or deeper logic (social, economic, 
mechanical) nestled within technology itself. 
6. Different technological artifacts enlist humans in their 
campaign to come into existence. 
Just as different human groups favor specific media and 
technologies in order to realize their aspirations and ex-
press their affections.
7. We call “media” the manifold tools and assemblages that 
not only comprise the interface for our attempts at com-
munication, but that — perhaps more importantly — also 
engineer new “structures of feeling” (Raymond Williams).
8. Each new technological object or arrangement allows and 
encourages a new aesthetic orientation out of the detritus of 
former aesthetic materials, which in turn foster new affects. 
This happens by way of new vectors of proliferation. 
9. We call the volunteer maintenance staff of these new vec-
tors of proliferation “artists.”
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10. Proliferation in the posthuman context is largely an in-
stance of contagion and enthusiasm, obliging us to focus on 
what Hayden White calls “the content of the form” (that is, 
the ways in which the medium shapes and pre-determines 
the message). Such contagion occurs in different degrees 
of technical mediation, and the medium of enthusiasm can 
often be its own message. 
11. Analogue proliferation is at once amplified, accelerated, 
and complicated by digital proliferation. 
Think, for instance, of an irresistible rumor. Last century 
this would have been transmitted by word-of-mouth, and 
then perhaps picked up by radio or television. Today such 
rumors take on new textures, temporalities, scales, and im-
pacts by virtue of being distributed through the Internet. 
12. Some forms of proliferation depend on visibility within the 
attention economy (trending topics, hashtags, viral videos, 
political movements, etc.). 
13. Other forms of proliferation depend on the lack of person-
al, public, or political attention (computer viruses, Bitcoin, 
pollution, arms, etc.). 
14. Some forms of proliferation depend on a complex combi-
nation of both visibility and invisibility; contagion and ex-
communication (terrorism, extremism, state violence, etc.). 
15. The Internet — especially so-called “social media” — can 
be viewed as a planetary proliferation chamber, or global 
meme machine, communicating micro- and macro-enthu-
siasms on a scale and speed never seen before (and cancel-
ling earlier enthusiasms in the process). 
Memes are an idea, behavior, or style that spreads from per-
son to person within or across cultures.
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A meme is a “cultural unit” for carrying ideas, symbols, 
or practices that can be transmitted from one mind to an-
other through media.
Richard Dawkins considers memes to be something 
akin to cultural genes.
More specifically, however, memes have begun to de-
scribe those deliberately clunky images, with accompany-
ing text, designed to make us laugh, feel, and/or think, and 
that circulate primarily through social media, spreading 
like a virus.
An especially effective or popular meme is described as 
“dank.”
16. For example, the ideological identity-position known as 
being “pro-life” uses deliberate modes of image “pro-lifer-
ation” in an attempt to influence others into feeling indig-
nant righteousness: an affect that Spinoza classed as one of 
“the sad passions.” This in turn encourages an overdeter-
mined biopolitical relationship to women’s bodies, personal 
freedoms, medical technologies, etc. 
17. A propos, predatory professionalized proponents of the 
pro-life position misappropriate the proprietary prolifera-
tion of yet more proponents of pro-life propaganda, lead-
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ing — appropriately perhaps — to prolific ideological pria-
pisms beyond all propriety. 
18. We may go so far as to consider memes as a new folk-art, 
often given powerful signal boosts by corporate, political, 
and ideological interests. 
19. We thus live in the Golden Age of Memetic Desire.
“Memetic desire” is related to, but also distinct from, “mi-
metic desire,” made famous by theorist René Girard. (The 
latter identifies the origin of all desires as external to the 
desiring subject, whereby the rival or role model inspires 
desire, more so than the object upon which such desire 
eventually rests.)
Memetic desire also derives from elsewhere, but is not 
born in imitation, but rather infection or contagion. It re-
tains traces of the original and essential triangular structure 
(desirer–mediator–desired), but fractalizes this throughout 
the network — to the degree that a specific mediator can 
no longer be confidently ascribed. The subject is therefore 
less an ape of established ideological patterns, and more the 
reflex, medium, or host, through which memetic currents 
flow or grow. The human is revealed to be less an impres-
sionable marionette than an extension of the string. (Or bet-
ter yet, the tension which guides the connecting threads.)   
So to say, where the posthumans of the pre-Internet age 
desired what other people already found desirable (e.g., Don 
Quixote, Emma Bovary), the posthumans of today desire 
to be told what to desire — and indeed how to desire — by 
trending algorithms and recommendation engines (e.g., 
anyone of us in conversation with Siri, Echo, and others). 
Indeed, we ourselves now function as semi-organic nodes 
of the memetic network. 
20. The Golden Age of Memetic Desire is thus the dawning of 
an era in which our structures of feeling are liquified into 
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reflecting pools upon which bloom and float these sad and 
passionate “cultural units” of compressed affect; the blue-
green algae of the general intellect. 
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The Meme is Dead,  
Long Live the Meme
Roy Christopher
“This proud picture of human grandeur is 
unfortunately an illusion and is counterbalanced 
by a reality that is very different.”
 — C.G. Jung1
W
e’re all home for the holidays. Looking around the living 
room today at the family assembled there, most were 
clicking around on laptops, two were also wearing head-
phones, one was fingering a smartphone. The television was on, 
but no one was watching it. Each of us engrossed in his or her 
own digital experience, be it a game, a TV show, or some social 
meta-medium.
My friend Mark Wieman noted recently that the Long Tail 
has gotten so long and so thick that there’s not much left in the 
Big Head. As the Internet-enabled market supports a wider and 
wider variety of cultural artifacts with less and less depth of in-
terest, the big, blockbuster hits have had ever-smaller audiences. 
This wasn’t the case just a decade ago, and it certainly wasn’t two 





or even three decades ago. The audiences seem to decrease in 
proportion to the size of the screens. I have found this splinter-
ing more and more in the classroom as I try to pick somewhat 
universal media artifacts to use as examples. Even the biggest 
shows and movies I brought up this semester left most of my 
students out, and if I ever got into the stuff I actually like, I was 
greeted with little more than cricket sounds. The postmodern 
promise of individual viewpoints and infinite fragmentation is 
upon us.
Attempts to unify this splintering are nothing new. In the 
1990s, events like the X-Games and Gravity Games and websites 
like Hardcloud.com and Pie.com tried to gather long-tail mar-
kets that were too small by themselves into viable mass markets. 
It happened with the recording artists of the time like Sheryl 
Crow, Alanis Morissette, Dave Matthews Band, and Counting 
Crows. What was the label “alternative” if not a feeble attempt at 
garnering enough support for separate markets under one tenu-
ous banner? If you can get both the kids and their parents, you 
might have a real hit. As Mark Lewman writes, “this is teen cool 
and mom cool.”2 Then in the 2000s, sub-brands like Nike 6.0 
(in which the “6.0” referred to six domains of extreme activi-
ties: BMX, skateboarding, snowboarding, wakeboarding, surf-
ing, and motocross) tried again. Whatever the practitioners of 
such sports might share in attitudes or footwear, they do not 
normally share in an affinity for each other. We remain in our 
silos, refusing to cross-pollinate in any way.
If marketing can’t bring us together, mass tragedy will. In 
his 2009 novel, Neuropath, R. Scott Bakker describes the uni-
fying effect of news of a mass or serial murderer, in this case, 
“The Chiropractor” (so named because he removes his victims’ 
spines):
In these days of broadband it was rare for anything nonpolit-
ical to rise above the disjointed din of millions pursuing mil-
lions of different interests. The niche had become all-pow-
2 Mark Lewman, “The Coolhunter,” 2009. [url defunct]
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erful. The Chiropractor story was a throwback in a sense, a 
flashback to the day when sitcoms or murders could provide 
people a common frame of reference, or at least something to 
talk about when polite questions gave out.3
Regarding recent actual events of a mass and violent nature, 
Mark Follman at Mother Jones writes:
When I asked threat assessment experts what might explain 
the recent rise in gun rampages, I heard the same two words 
over and over: social media. Although there is no definitive 
research yet, widespread anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the speed at which social media bombards us with memes 
and images exacerbates the copycat effect. As Meloy and his 
colleagues noted earlier this year in the journal Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, “Cultural scripts are now spread glob-
ally… within seconds.4
Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka describe cultural scripts 
as “common sayings and proverbs, frequent collocations, con-
versational routines and varieties of formulaic or semi-formu-
laic speech, discourse particles and interjections, and terms 
of address and reference—all highly ‘interactional’ aspects of 
language.”5 Cultural scripts are the way our fragmented net-
works coalesce into unified interests and concerns.
The mainstream might not be much of a stream anymore. It 
seems now like culture is sliced and split among various niches, 
but in trial or tragedy that mist can condense into a wave as 
quickly as it needs to. The question is how?
3 R. Scott Bakker, Neuropath (New York: Tor Books, 2009), 71.
4 Mark Follman, “Inside the Race to Stop the Next Mass Shooter,” Mother 
Jones, Nov./Dec. 2015, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/
mass-shootings-threat-assessment-shooter-fbi-columbine/.
5 Cliff Goddard and Anna Wierzbicka, “Cultural Scripts: What Are They 





As you know if you’re reading this book, as originally conceived 
by Richard Dawkins, a meme is a unit of humanity, “a unit of 
cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation.”6 It is the smallest 
spreadable bit or iteration of an idea. Where some try to recon-
cile his original conception with the Internet version, I think 
we can call a moratorium on Dawkins’s original idea.7 This is an 
elegy for the meme.
Memes are based on genes, Dawkins’s original analogy con-
tends. He writes:
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes 
fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as 
genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from 
body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate them-
selves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a 
process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.8
Others have taken the idea, the “meme” meme, further. Kate 
Distin has perhaps taken up the idea most earnestly with two 
books, The Selfish Meme (2005) and Cultural Evolution (2011), 
the latter of which moved away from memes and looked closer 
at languages, written, spoken, and musical.9 In her book The 
Meme Machine (1999), Susan Blackmore distinguishes between 
memes that copy a product and memes that copy instructions.10 
Similarly, in The Electric Meme (2002), Robert Aunger extends 
the meme metaphor by adding phenotypes and conflating them 
6 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 192.
7 Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 
for example. 
8 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192.
9 Kate Distin, The Selfish Meme (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Kate Distin, Cultural Evolution (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).
10 See Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
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with artifacts.11 With Memes in Digital Culture (2013), Limor 
Shifman does a noble job attempting to reconcile Dawkinsian 
memes with internet memes.12
Distinguishing imitation or replication as a process of com-
munication, as well as integrating Everett M. Rogers’s closely 
related diffusion of innovations theory, Brian H. Spitzberg pro-
poses an operational model of meme diffusion. He writes, “com-
munication messages such as tweets, e-mails, and digital images 
are by definition memes, because they are replicable transmit-
ters of cultural meanings.”13
In his book of the same name, J.M. Balkin imagines memes 
as bits in a “cultural software” that makes up ideologies.14 In 
Genes, Memes, Culture, and Mental Illness (2010), Hoyle Leigh 
writes that “a meme is a memory that is transferred or has the 
potential to be transferred.”15 There’s even The Complete Idiot’s 
Guide to Memes, which only discusses Internet memes in one 
chapter of its 23, and as an afterthought (Appendix E).16
Both biological and cultural evolution require competition 
and collaboration, and no one knows at what level the selection, 
transfers, and changes happen: Genes? Individuals? Groups?17 
Where memetic theories are concerned, another major problem 
is one of scale. What size is a meme? Where are its borders? What 
do memes add up to? Like genes, germs, and viruses, Dawkins 
gave memes “fitness,” which means that a very “healthy” meme 
that grows big and strong can still be very negative and quite 
11 See Robert Aunger, The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think 
(New York: Free Press, 2002).
12 See Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture.
13 Brian S. Spitzberg, “Toward A Model of Meme Diffusion (M3D),” 
Communication Theory 24 (2014): 311–39, at 313.
14 J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003).
15 Hoyle Leigh, Genes, Memes, Culture, and Mental Illness: Toward an 
Integrative Model (New York: Springer, 2010), 91.
16 See John Gunders and Damon Brown, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to 
Memes (New York: Alpha, 2010).
17 See Spitzberg, “Toward A Model of Meme Diffusion (M3D).”
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dangerous.18 As Brodie told me, “memetic theory tells us that 
repetition of a meme, regardless of whether you think you are 
‘for’ it or ‘against’ it, helps it spread. It’s like the old saying ‘there’s 
no such thing as bad publicity.’”19 This is an overlooked aspect of 
memetics that also applies to Internet memes.20 Retweets might 
not equal endorsements, but they do strengthen the memes.
Another problem you may have noticed in the “meme” 
meme via the brief and selective literature review above, is that 
the genetic analogy is not universal. Some theorists prefer an 
analogy with viruses. As many aspects as they might share as 
useful metaphors, genes and viruses are not the same thing. 
Douglas Rushkoff ’s Media Virus! (1994), Richard Brodie’s Virus 
of the Mind (1995), and Aaron Lynch’s Thought Contagion (1996) 
all take up the virus analogy over the gene one.21 Maybe it’s a 
better model, as when something is “viral,” it spreads. When 
something is “genetic,” it doesn’t necessarily. Sure, genes are 
passed on, but viruses are inherently difficult to stop. Spread-
ing is what they do. This epidemiological view of culture has 
been most thoroughly explored by anthropologist Dan Sperber. 
His 1996 book, Explaining Culture, goes a long way to doing 
just that, using a naturalistic view of its spread.22 Some prefer 
to skip the memes altogether. Malcolm Gladwell, whose 2000 
bestseller, The Tipping Point, also takes an epidemiological view 
18 See Carol Cadwalladr, “Interview with Daniel Dennett: ‘I Begrudge Every 
Hour I Have to Spend Worrying about Politics’,” The Guardian, February 
12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/12/daniel-dennett-
politics-bacteria-bach-back-dawkins-trump-interview. 
19 Interview with the author, June 2, 1999.
20 Think here of Internet users reposting memes with which they do not 
agree and commenting to say so. Regardless of the context, the meme 
still spreads. That is, even if it is presented in a negative light, the meme is 
fitter, healthier, and stronger as long as it spreads.
21 See Douglas Rushkoff, Media Virus! Hidden Agendas in Popular Culture 
(New York: Ballantine, 1994); Richard Brodie,Virus of the Mind: The New 
Science of the Meme (Seattle: Integral Press, 1995); Aaron Lynch, Thought 
Contagion: How Belief Spreads Through Society (New York: Basic Books, 
1996).
22 See Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (New York: 
Blackwell, 1996).
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of culture and marketing but without ever mentioning memes, 
told me in 2002:
As for memetics, I hate that theory. I find it very unsatisfy-
ing. That idea says that ideas are like genes — that they seek 
to replicate themselves. But that is a dry and narrow way of 
looking at the spread of ideas. I prefer my idea because it 
captures the full social dimension of how something spreads. 
Epidemiologists are, after all, only partially interested in the 
agent being spread: they are more interested in how the agent 
is being spread, and who’s doing the spreading. They are fun-
damentally interested in the social dimension of contagion, 
and that social dimension — which I think is so critical — is 
exactly what memetics lacks.23
If memes are indeed analogous to genes, then the real power of 
memes is that they add up to something. I’m no biologist, but 
genes are bits of code that become chromosomes, and chromo-
somes make up DNA, which then becomes organisms. Plants, 
animals, viruses, and all life that we know about is built from 
them.24 “The meme has done its work by assembling massive 
social systems, the new rulers of this earth,” writes Howard 
Bloom. “Together, the meme and the human superorganism 
have become the universe’s latest device for creating fresh forms 
of order.”25
Perhaps that was true two decades ago, when Bloom wrote 
that, or three decades ago when Dawkins wrote The Selfish Gene, 
but the biases and affordances of memes’ attendant infrastruc-
ture has changed dramatically since. After all, memes have to 
replicate, and in order to replicate, they have to move from one 
mind to another via some conduit. This could be the oral culture 
of yore, but it’s more and more likely to be technologically ena-
23 Interview with the author, November 12, 2002.
24 See Elizabeth Parthenia Shea, How the Gene Got Its Groove: Figurative 
Language, Science, and the Rhetoric of the Real (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008).
25 Howard Bloom, The Lucifer Principle: A Scientific Expedition into the 
Forces of History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 101.
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bled. Broadcast media supports one kind of memetic propaga-
tion. The internet, however, supports quite another.
Units vs. Unity
Since the meme came on the scene, the mainstream has become 
less of a stream and more of a mist. Narrowcasting and narrow-
catching, as each of us burrows further into our own interests, 
we have less of them in common as a whole. 
Cultural divisions as such used to be framed as high versus 
low culture. New Yorker writer John Seabrook argues that we 
have evolved past such hierarchies into what he calls “nobrow 
culture.”26 Definitely erring on the high side, Seabrook doesn’t 
know Stormtroopers from Sand People. Depending on which 
side of the high/low fence you stand, he and his ilk have “conde-
scended and/or pandered” to you for far too long.27 The mono-
brow mixing of high culture’s concerns with low culture’s lack 
thereof only makes sense if there’s a market in the middle.
It’s never made much sense to describe something aestheti-
cally in terms of the mainstream, and now it makes less than 
ever. Working the ends against the middle trying to get the best 
of both worlds, so-called “nobrow culture” ends up with the 
bad of both without any of the good. Watered-down, diluted, 
widely disseminated, what’s left of the mainstream is the cul-
tural equivalent of the muddy, middle heartland viewed from 
an airplane window: flyover culture.
In our switch from television screens to computer screens 
and on to mobile screens, we fundamentally changed the infra-
structure by which memes spread. We gather together around 
the former big screens to watch passively, while we individually 
26 See John Seabrook, Nobrow: The Marketing of Culture and the Culture of 
Marketing (New York: Knopf, 2000).
27 Hal Foster, “Slumming with Rappers at the Roxy,” London Review of Books 
22, no. 18 (2000): 16–18.
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engage with the latter smaller screens also to watch passively but 
also to connect actively with each other.28
What Means These Memes
How are we to understand culture through a metaphor that’s 
based on another metaphor? Genes are figurative as well, a rhe-
torical tactic deployed simply to give a name to something.29 
Meta-metaphors are known as pataphors, and they are so use-
less as to be called a fake science by their originator Alfred Jarry. 
Pataphysics is to metaphysics what metaphysics is to physics. 
It’s one level up. “Pataphysics […] is the science of that which is 
superinduced upon metaphysics,” wrote Jarry, “whether within 
or beyond the latter’s limitations, extending as far beyond meta-
physics as the latter extends beyond physics.” He added, “Pata-
physics is the science of imaginary solutions, which symbolically 
attributes the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, 
to their lineaments.”30 If ever there were a scientific concept that 
proved pataphysical, it is sure to have been the meme. Virtual. 
An imaginary solution.
In her book, How the Gene Got Its Groove, Elizabeth Parthe-
nia Shea writes:
As a rhetorical figure, the ‘gene’ moves from context to con-
text, adapting to a broad range of rhetorical exigencies (from 
the highly technical to the intensely political to the ephem-
eral and the absurd), carrying with it a capacity for rhetorical 
work and rhetorical consequences. As the examples in this 
book show […] the rhetorical consequences of the figure 
of the gene often include the assertion of boundaries, with 
28 See S. Craig Watkins, The Young and The Digital: What the Migration to 
Social Network Sites, Games, and Anytime, Anywhere Media Means for Our 
Future (New York: Beacon, 2009), passim.
29 See Shea, How the Gene Got Its Groove.
30 Alfred Jarry, Exploits & Opinions of Dr. Faustroll, Pataphysician 
(Cambridge: Exact Change, 1965), 21–22.
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authoritative knowledge on one side and playful language, 
stylistic devices, and rhetoric on the other.31
Sound familiar? Memes only work if they move. If they are units 
of culture then in order to build and maintain that culture, they 
have to move.32
Memes are what supposedly make us different from all other 
species in that we can deny our biological genes because of our 
cultural memes.33 As we’ve seen, memes have been touted as 
units of thoughts, belief, ideology, memory, learning, influence, 
and, of course, culture. As media theorist Douglas Rushkoff told 
me in 1999:
I’ve been into memes off-and-on since Media Virus! (1994), 
and I still think they’re an interesting way to understand 
culture. But meme conversations spend much more time 
explaining memes than they accomplish. In other words, 
the metaphor itself seems more complex than the ideas it is 
meant to convey. So, I’ve abandoned the notion of memes 
pretty much altogether.34
Even in the 1990s, the web’s salad days, the concept was so belea-
guered by explanation that one of its major champions dropped 
the idea. Rushkoff continues:
I remember I was doing an interview about Media Virus! for 
some magazine, and it was taking place at Timothy Leary’s 
house. And he overheard me mention memes, and the jour-
nalist asking me to explain to him what ‘memes’ are. After-
wards, Timothy teased me. ‘Two years you’ve been carrying 
31 Shea, How the Gene Got Its Groove, 3.
32 See Greg Urban, Metaculture: How Culture Moves Through the World 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001); E.M. Rogers, 
Diffusion of Innovations, 5th edn. (New York: Free Press, 2003)
33 See Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings 
of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).
34 Interview with the author, June 2, 1999.
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on about memes,’ he said. ‘If you still have to explain what 
they are every time you mention them, it means they just 
haven’t caught on. Drop ‘em.’35
Now everyone knows what a meme is. One is far less likely to 
have to explain what memes are as you are what they aren’t. For-
get it. An Internet meme is a meme now. Dawkins’s idea has 
been hi-jacked by the jacked-in.
Ludwig Wittgenstein once said there was no such thing as 
a private language.36 The presumption being that language, the 
prime mover of ideas if ever there were such a thing, only works 
if it is shared. The same can be said of culture. It only works 
if it is shared. If memes never add up to anything larger than 
memes, the concept is dead, and so is its culture.
35 Ibid.
36 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. 
Anscombe (Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 1953). Conflating the 
idea further, Daniel Dennett says that “words are memes that can be 
pronounced” (Daniel Dennet, “Daniel C. Dennett: Religion’s Just a 
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Apocalypse Memes for the 
Anthropocene God: Mediating 
Crisis and the Memetic Body 
Politic
Bogna M. Konior
The End Times 
When the ax came into the forest, the trees said:
‘The handle is one of us.’
 — Alice Walker, Possessing the Secret of Joy1 
H
uman thought, whether in word or meme, has long been 
molded by the fact that the Homo sapiens are a species 
of ape, living on a rock surrounded by a deafening void, 
circling around a slowly dying star. Philosophy trades in re-ar-
ticulating this matter, from Nietzsche’s poetic vision of humans 
as “clever animals,” whose knowledge cannot save them from 
the universe’s relentless entropy, to Ray Brassier’s recent attempt 
at unbinding philosophy from the paralysis of unthought so-





lar extinction.2 “A refounder of future ruins, if you like,” writes 
François Laruelle, “that’s the best definition of philosophy.”3 This 
ostensibly cosmological problem casts its shadow over human 
affairs. It is historically ubiquitous to believe that things are not 
only worse now than they had been before but that, despite our 
cosmic insignificance, our times are the most significant of all: 
the end times. Who would not want to witness the end of the 
world, to feel that one dies without regret, leaving nothing be-
hind? In 1995, Jean Baudrillard wrote: 
Imagine the amazing good fortune of the generation that gets 
to see the end of the world. This is as marvellous as being 
there at the beginning […]. Let us therefore apply ourselves 
to seeing things — values, concepts, institutions — perish, 
seeing them disappear. This is the only issue worth fighting 
for.4
The desire for destruction, apocalypse, and disintegration takes 
different forms, from eschatological to bloodthirsty. “There are 
no breaks on this train!” proclaims a popular meme series that 
pictures the President of the United States as the alt-right mas-
cot Pepe the Frog, helming what can be identified as “the rape-
train,” which in this memeplex functions as a symbol of joyful, 
unstoppable victory through destruction. The Pursuit of the Mil-
lennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of 
the Middle Ages outlines how medieval Christendom abounded 
in apocalyptic movements, where the book of Revelations was 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Truth and Lie in the Extra-Moral Sense,” The 
Portable Nietzsche, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1997), 42–46; Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and 
Extinction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
3 François Laruelle, quoted in “Laruelle: Concept-Collider,” fragilekeys 
(blog), December 10, 2017, https://fragilekeys.com/2017/12/10/laruelle-
concept-collider/.
4 Jean Baudrillard, Fragments: Cool Memories III, 1990–1995, trans. Emily 
Agar (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 33–34. 
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considered indispensable to political comprehension.5 The ISIS 
Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State shows how the cataclysmic vision of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi echoes violent Christian millenarian movements in 
the 16th century; and in Divine Destruction, journalist Stephanie 
Hendricks studies contemporary Christian Dominionists, who 
believe that climate change should not be stalled but acceler-
ated in order to bring about the Second Coming of Jesus and the 
beginning of God’s Kingdom on Earth.6 No breaks on the plan-
etary train! Physicist Stephen Hawking and engineer Elon Musk 
present us with an atheist version of the Final Judgment, warn-
ing that accelerated technological progress will bring about an 
artificial intelligence singularity and a de facto end of the human 
species once the ai realizes how immoral or inefficient humans 
are.7 In the Greco-Christian narrative, ever since Apollo spat in 
the mouth of the oracle Cassandra, history has been filled with 
prophets of doom to the extent that, as Justin Clemens percep-
tively writes, “a certain apocalypticism is perhaps a condition 
for […] thinking as such.”8
If, as we can read in a quoted passage in Richard Dawkins’s 
The Selfish Gene, “memes should be regarded as living struc-
tures […] when you plant a fertile meme in my mind you liter-
ally parasitize my brain,” then a prominent subspecies of these 
5 Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians 
and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992). 
6 Will McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday 
Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015); Stephanie 
Hendricks, Divine Destruction (New York: Melville House Publishing, 
2005).
7 See, for example, Rory Cellan-Jones, “Stephen Hawking Warns That 
Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind,” BBC, December 2, 2014, http://
www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540; Melia Robinson, “Elon Musk 
Thinks Artificial Intelligence is Ultimately More Dangerous than Nuclear 
Weapons,” Business Insider, March 12, 2018, http://www.businessinsider.
com/elon-musk-ai-more-dangerous-than-nuclear-weapons-sxsw-2018–3.
8 Justin Clemens, “After After Finitude: An Afterword,” in Aesthetics after 
Finitude, eds. Baylee Brits, Prudence Gibson, and Amy Ireland (Victoria: 
re.press, 2016), 229. 
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brain parasites that we call “memes” — units of digital culture 
with substantial cultural and now also political capital gained 
through circulation — feeds on various strains of apocalyp-
ticism.9 While eschatology remains indispensable to diverse 
cultures, these days it is especially visible in English-language 
memes, also for the fact that they are the most visible on the 
Western Internet, whose social media interfaces are provided 
largely by American corporations. An early sign was the first 
wave of disaster memes that rose just after the dust of the World 
Trade Center fell. Analyzing 398 of these “collage jokes,” as she 
labels them, Giselinde Kuipers suggested that they were a cop-
ing mechanism for dealing with an exceedingly “unreal and 
fiction-like” world by deploying humor.10 These images were, 
for example, of King Kong fending off terrorist planes on top 
of the World Trade Center, with a caption: “Where was King 
Kong when we needed him?” or of Osama Bin Laden in an 
advertisement for “Taliban Airlines: Exploring New Destina-
tions!” Similarly, one of the first viral videos was about the end 
of the world, uploaded to YouTube shortly after the website’s 
launch, the light-hearted “End of Ze World” (2003) by Fluid, 
which generated millions of views and has since warranted a se-
quel, “End of Ze World… Probably For Real This Time” (2018), 
which laments neo-Nazism, Donald Trump, the refugee crisis, 
terrorism, nuclear danger, climate change, and Twitter as pos-
sible signs of doom. While the original is hardly political, deal-
ing rather in harmless humor based in national stereotypes, the 
sequel addresses global news headlines through the lens of crisis 
clothed in campy digital aesthetics. 
Nowadays, in the meme-heaven that is Reddit, users chart 
“end-of-world scenarios that frighten you the most,” which in-
clude solar flares, sex comets from Neptune, overpopulation, 
nanotechnology, famine, nuclear war, super viruses, infertility 
9 N.K. Humphrey, quoted in Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 192. 
10 Giselinde Kuipers, “Media Culture and Internet Disaster Jokes: Bin Laden 
and the Attack on the World Trade Center,” European Journal of Cultural 
Studies 5, no. 4 (2002): 450–70, at 468.
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and, of course, “that we run out of memes.”11 The anxiety-ridden, 
left-leaning in its focus on ecological overshoot subreddit r/col-
lapse, with around 60,000 members, includes a monthly meta-
thread in which users note down the signs of downfall around 
them, from crumbling infrastructure to rising unemployment. 
On some days, they discuss Ted Kaczynski’s neo-Luddite books, 
on others, they pick at major headlines, such as “Doomsday 
Prep for the Super Rich” (New Yorker) or “Silicon Valley Billion-
aires are Preparing for the Apocalypse with Motorcycles, Guns, 
and Private Hideaways” (Business Insider).12 A corresponding r/
LateStageCapitalism channel, with 260,000 members, is devot-
ed to “zesty memes […] that critique [and mock] the decay of 
western capitalist culture” as it is “digging its own grave.”13 The 
subreddit also links to dozens of other channels, from apoca-
lyptic fiction to survival guides. Lagging well behind is a young 
channel r/Cowwapse, which describes itself as “an antidote to 
the fear-mongering and doom-porn of these subreddits” and fo-
cuses mainly on climate change denial (“Snow in Sahara Desert 
for third time in 40 years”) as well as on celebrating free markets 
and “the unprecedented equality of the 21st century.”14 The in-
famous r/The_Donald has in excess of half a million members, 
and labels itself a “national suicide prevention lifeline,” celebrat-
ing how Donald Trump’s election stalled the disaster toward 
which his supporters believed America had been heading.15 The 
alt-right alike relies on a reactionary civilizational decline narra-
tive, as Angela Nagle writes, a testament to a long line of collapse 
thought that ties decadence to doom.16 
As Matt Goerzen writes in “Notes Towards the Memes of 
Production,” for years “memes were perceived as a negligible 
11 See Reddit, s.v. “collapse,” https://www.reddit.com/r/collapse/. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Reddit, s.v. “LateStageCapitalism,” https://www.reddit.com/r/
LateStageCapitalism/.
14 See Reddit, s.v. “Cowwapse,” https://www.reddit.com/r/Cowwapse/.
15 See Reddit, s.v. “The_Donald,” https://www.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/.
16 Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: The Online Culture Wars from Tumblr and 
4chan to the Alt-right and Trump (Hants: Zero Books, 2017), 63–64. 
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artefact until meme magic elected Trump.”17 Memes are now the 
focal point of an increasingly visible debate about the state of 
contemporary political divisions and the online cultural iden-
tity war. Circulated mainly within the sphere of American poli-
tics that is simultaneously a forum of global digital pop culture, 
they are associated with the alt-right’s strategy of trolling while 
“bypassing the dying mainstream media and creating an Inter-
net-culture and alternative media of their own.”18 Yet, while Na-
gle writes that the alt-right successfully built its “transgressive” 
aesthetics by arguing that “we are not ‘five minutes to midnight’ 
as the anti-immigration right had long claimed but well past 
midnight,” the desire to grapple with or inhabit apocalypticism 
is present across the political spectrum.19 From Afro-pessimism 
to queer negativity, there is a rising conviction that, as an anon-
ymous graffiti in France proclaimed to the world a few years 
ago, “another end of the world is possible.”20 One meme, for ex-
ample, contrasts neo-reactionary philosopher Nick Land with 
Afro-pessimist philosopher Frank Wilderson III, denouncing 
the first as a “techno-commercialist” who advocates a “thirst 
for annihilation but [is] scared of Islam [and] not at all ready 
for meltdown,” while praising the latter’s work as a “total apoca-
lyptic epistemic World negation […] unflinching paradigmatic 
dissatisfaction with humanity,” calling him a “doomsday scion 
who brings about Afrofuturist singularity.”21 Marxist scholar and 
science-fiction writer China Miéville alike advocates that pro-
gressives should embrace “a strategy for ruination […] a state 
17 Matt Goerzen, “Notes Towards the Memes of Production,” Texte zur Kunst 
106 (2017): 86–107, https://www.textezurkunst.de/106/uber-die-meme-der-
produktion/ 
18 Nagle, Kill All Normies, 41. 
19 Ibid., 102.
20 A photo can be found here: Le Comptoir, “Une autre fin du monde est-elle 
possible?” Le Comptoir, May 29, 2017, https://comptoir.org/2017/05/29/
une-autre-fin-du-monde-est-elle-possible/.
21 The post uses a “virgin versus chad” meme format in which an 
unsuccessful male introvert is compared with an attractive but crude one. 




of an undefeated despair because it’s done, this is a dystopia, a 
worsening one, and dreams of interceding don’t just miss the 
point but are actively unhelpful.”22 
Next to this apocalyptic cultural capital on both sides of the 
political spectrum are memes that do not connect easily with 
the existing political options. An interest in annihilation, at least 
on the surface, might be the attractor between diffuse political 
factions, which often share very little apart from their collapse 
drive. This interrogation happens alongside the debates around 
posthumanism, transhumanism, automation, extinction, and 
climate nihilism that have been drawing increased academic, 
political, cultural, and scientific attention over the last two dec-
ades. Pondering abstraction, dehumanization, and disintegra-
tion, they play out against the recent Euro-American history 
of “a not merely ‘non-political’ but a ‘post-political’ generation 
grappling with its own politicisation under the aegis of austerity, 
neoliberalism, and financial-managerial political corruption,” 
and — we should add — the growing realization of geological 
peril on top of that.23 Questions about humanity, agency, and 
the very scale at which “politics” must be thought emerge as the 
main problem of this apocalyptic inquiry. Twitter’s meme cul-
ture, for example, is created by humans and bots alike and thus 
circulating memes on Twitter is a different form of meme com-
mentary than if we were doing so on predominately “human” 
social media like Snapchat. A recent joint study at the Center 
for Complex Networks and Systems Research at the University 
of Indiana and the Information Sciences Institute at the Uni-
versity of Southern California estimates that up to 15% (around 
50 million) of Twitter accounts are not human.24 Outsourcing 
human agency to machines and experimenting with a nonhu-
22 “A Strategy for Ruination: An Interview with China Miéville,” Boston 
Review, January 8, 2018, http://bostonreview.net/literature-culture-china-
mieville-strategy-ruination.
23 See Metahaven, Can Jokes Bring Down Governments? Memes, Design and 
Politics (Moscow: Strelka Press, 2014), 44.
24 Onur Varol et al., “Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, 
and Characterization,” arXiv, 2017, https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.03107.
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man vision of politics informs this variant of apocalyptic meme 
culture. Anonymous account @dogsdoingthings, for example, 
generates dismissive commentaries of human affairs: “Dogs 
exiting political discourse, preferring instead to lie prone for-
ever in puddle of ooze,”25 or “Dogs asserting there is no such 
thing as history and citing the preceding eons of nothingness 
as evidence.”26 Add to that the general reputation of Twitter as a 
grim, soul-crushing place. Musician Mikel Jollett described it as 
such: “Instagram: My life is a party. Snapchat: My life is a quirky 
tv show. Facebook: My life turned out great! Twitter: We’re all 
going to die.”27 Aside from Twitter, many loosely distributed 
memes cultivate an appetite for void and a desire to relinquish 
human agency. Take two of the most popular memes featuring 
r/surrealmemes’s emblematic “Meme Man,” a bad 3D model of 
a human face. The first one introduces him as an open source 
figure for an unknown transformation: “meme man is a conduit 
through which tortured souls may channel their rage and mis-
ery into something more […] an entity which resides in the un-
space between this world and the next.”28 Another portrays him 
opening a gift, inside which is an all-encompassing obliteration 
that splits his face into pieces. “Thank you,” he responds.29 
How can we understand this proliferation of apocalypticism 
in contemporary meme cultures? Slavoj Žižek writes that we 
indeed live in the end times, marked by the ecological crisis, 
the biogenetic revolution, accelerating social inequality, and 
struggles over resources.30 All of this is happening against the 
background of sweeping technological changes, which, as Alvin 
25 See @dogsdoingthings, Twitter, February 23, 2018, 5:20pm, https://twitter.
com/dogsdoingthings/status/967071664356937728.
26 See @dogsdoingthings, Twitter, August 22, 2017, 9:35pm, https://twitter.
com/dogsdoingthings/status/900078876398931968.
27 See @Mikel_Jollet, Twitter, January 8, 2017, 9:35am, https://twitter.com/
Mikel_Jollett/status/818149100717621248.
28 See Know Your Meme, s.v. “Meme Man,” http://knowyourmeme.com/
photos/1090174-meme-man.
29 Ibid.
30 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: Verso, 2010).
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Toffler wrote, provoke a cultural “future shock […] the dizzy-
ing disorientation brought on by the premature arrival of the 
future […] a product of the greatly accelerated rate of change 
in society.”31 While apocalyptic memes can be explained by the 
medium’s inherent — often ironic — humor, they are also the 
evidence of grappling with the insufficiency of politics at this 
moment of perceived crisis. Some express panic about civiliza-
tional decline, some joke about doom becoming our status quo. 
Others still wrestle with abstraction and, perhaps unwillingly 
informed by the possibility of actual extinction in the era that 
has been called the Anthropocene, challenge the idea of suffi-
cient human agency. Dehumanization, anonymity, and doom 
are symptomatic not only of what the current (Western) politi-
cal sphere on the Internet styles itself to be, but also of a larger 
shift in experiencing the inefficiency of human politics. Vari-
ous theories of film and media already predicted this moment; 
tending toward posthumanism, they informed proto-meme 
theories of technologically mediated forms of anonymous or 
virtual political subjectivity. This legacy could explain online 
collapse cultures, and account for the rise of a specific strand 
of dehumanized apocalypticism, which can only be understood 
alongside a larger reconsideration of human agency in the age of 
socio-geological crisis that is the Anthropocene. 
The Medium Is the Apocalypse
“There is no other world, but it can’t be this one.”
 — @mckenziewark, January, 17, 201832
Barry Vacker, director of the Center for Media and Destiny af-
filiated with Temple University, writes that “media technologies 
can be divided into cosmic media and social media, while the 
31 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), 13. 




media content itself can be understood in terms of memes.”33 For 
him, all media within this duplet, from telescopes to television 
screens, can loop apocalyptic messages because they contrib-
ute to revising prevalent forms of human subjectivity, placing 
it either within the context of the cosmos or the perpetually ex-
panding and contracting network society. The Internet features 
prominently in his argument, as it represents both the destruc-
tion of stable meaning due to its multiple information flows, 
and a foreshadowing of the biological end of the human species, 
where the predictions about the singularity to come true. The 
link between the beginning of the “dehumanizing” industrial 
revolution and the ascent of moving image technologies, which 
prefigured digital images, is evident in cinema studies through 
the linkage of the train and the film projector.34 Both symbolize 
not only the onset of the age of technological innovation and 
environmental pollution, but a change in perception itself: to 
be able to perceive the world in movement while ourselves re-
maining stable and still, whether from the window of a moving 
train or on the cinema screen, changed the very speed at which 
people viewed reality. No longer, as it was in Renaissance paint-
ing, was the human eye the holy perceiver and meaning-maker 
for which the whole universe arranged itself geometrically and 
purposefully. Early cinema theorists, such as Jean Epstein and 
Dziga Vertov, wrote that alongside the telescope and the micro-
scope lens, the inhuman cinema lenses participated in decen-
tralizing the human ego, displacing it from its position at the 
center of the universe.35 As Jacques Aumont writes, these tech-
33 Barry Vacker, The End of the World — Again: Why the Apocalypse Meme 
Replicates in Media, Science, and Culture (Philadelphia: Center for Media 
Destiny, 2012), 5.
34 See Jacques Aumont, “The Variable Eye, or Mobilization of the Gaze,” in 
Image in Dispute: Art and Cinema in the Age of Photography, ed. Dudley 
Andrew (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 31–259. 
35 Dziga Vertov, Kino-Eye: The Writings of Dziga Vertov, ed. Annette 
Michelson, trans. Kevin O’Brien (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1984); I wrote about Epstein’s nonhuman cinema 
theory in Bogna Konior, “Towards Nonhuman Personhood: Reading Jean 
Epstein’s Cinema Essays,” in Filmmakers’ Theory: Contributions to Cinema 
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nological changes were not only reconfiguring how people ex-
perienced spatio-temporality but morality itself, producing new 
desires such as “the desire for acceleration or the wish to sever 
roots.”36 It is within this genealogy that we understand media 
as a crucial component in posthumanist debates. If, following 
Marshall McLuhan, we agree that the medium is the message 
and that every medium destroys some form of subjectivity to 
introduce another, we can also repeat after Vacker: “the medium 
is the apocalypse.”37 
While this linear story bypasses alternate options both with-
in and outside of the “West,” it could partially account for why 
apocalyptic memes express both a sense of aggrandizement and 
a desire to relinquish control at the same time. It would be a way 
for humans to deal with what Vacker describes as the paradoxi-
cal effect of the media: a sense of insignificance that they pro-
duce by exposing the negligibility of humans within the world, 
as the telescope and the microscope did, and a sense of impor-
tance within a networked system that we experience as center-
ing on us, as social media are purported to do. The train, the 
symbol of this accelerating, schizophrenic industrial modernity 
appears in one popular meme. Already mentioned, the “Rape 
Train” is a reference to a tactic used in Call of Duty, when the 
player creates a string of zombies following him and eventually 
stacking up to be easily defeated. When it became apparent that 
Donald Trump had a legitimate chance of winning the election, 
it mutated into a “Trump Train,” which celebrated the supposed 
accelerating destruction of “the elites,” often represented by the 
Democratic Party, or the “fake news” media. This genre is de-
cisively about asserting control rather than relinquishing the 
centrality of human agency, yet its interest in destruction and its 
unintended connection to accelerated media modernity, where 
humans exist as mere carriers of an unstoppable force, make it 
Theory, eds. Manuela Penafria et al. (Covilhã: Labcom Books, 2016), 
117–38. 
36 Aumont, “The Variable Eye,” 235. 
37 Marshall McLuhan, The Medium is the Message: An Inventory of Effects 
(London: Penguin Books, 1967); Vacker, The End of the World, 7. 
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a part of a larger apocalyptic tendency in memes, or, as some 
would argue, in the Internet at large. 
Digging into the decentralized, leaky archive of viral digital 
culture, we might uncover a pervasive sense of crisis and anxi-
ety around new forms of political subjectivity that informs early 
investigations into the politics of the Internet. In 2002, the In-
stitute for New Culture Technologies in Austria, led by Konrad 
Becker, hosted a tactical workshop, “Dark Markets: Infopolitics, 
Electronic Media and Democracy in Times of Crisis”, with guid-
ing questions like “has the Internet still its digital potential to 
foster a ‘network democracy from below’” or “can the Internet 
be reclaimed as a digital commons”?38 The conference marked 
a rapid decline of trust in the ideals of global democracy once 
ecstatically arisen with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and 
then quickly put to rest as the project of the free market guided 
by the EU, NATO, and the IMF was already turning into a “disas-
ter,” signaled by, among others, “the rise of Europe’s populist and 
‘culturalist’ right,” “global warming and the Kyoto treaty drama” 
and “the astonishing roller coaster ride from dotcom mania to 
plummeting stock markets.” The conference already questioned 
whether anything like an “electronic democracy” can exist but, 
nevertheless, in a then-popular spirit of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy, advocated for a “rhizomatic” decentralization of 
digital networks and “a rigorous involvement and implementa-
tion of social movements into technology.” The becoming-net-
worked of the human species was only about to begin, and while 
many watched with uneasiness the decentralization of markets, 
the idea of a decentralized, subversive, anarchic digital politics 
held sway in the early 2000s. Crisis in consequence of techno-
logical advancement could model forms of political subjectivity 
that were considered productive precisely because of their de-
individualizing form.
This decentralized political subjectivity is connected to the 
ideals of anonymity and cyber-utopian virtual realities that were 




prominent in early Internet scholarship. Throughout the 1990s, 
the promise of these ostensibly non-hierarchical spaces was 
their ability to erase any physical manifestation of identity and 
central control — where, under strings of avatars, we would be 
able to escape the scanning gaze of repressive social structures, 
which befall us because our bodies appear to others in terms of 
ethnicity or sex. In “The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic,” Thomas 
Foster outlines how the idea of posthuman or machine body 
appears in tandem with a machinic desire: desire for machines 
or desire to be like one.39 Anonymity, mutability, and invisibility 
that online spaces afforded were the revolutionary horizon for 
feminist critiques, such as in the novels of Melissa Scott, which 
saw emancipatory potential in the diffused world of alternative 
and virtual realities, where utopias could be constructed anew, 
and identity would no longer be defined by what we cannot con-
trol: the racialized and sexed ideologies projected onto our bod-
ies.40 As Donna Haraway noted, “social subjects who are already 
[used] to thinking about their bodies as constructed, usually by 
others, and therefore available to reconstruction” would be most 
incited by the freedom from bodily determinism that living in 
the meatspace forces on us.41 It was the left-leaning, posthuman-
ist space of socially transgressive and technologically inclined 
science fiction that advocated for a maximum subtraction of 
physical markers of identity by engaging the medium of the In-
ternet. 
In the early 2010s, it was still argued that politics could be 
projected into an endlessly mutable digital space, where basic 
social and political terms would have to be remodeled. Heather 
Brooke’s The Revolution Will be Digitised: Dispatches from the 
Information War argues that technology will break down social 
39 Thomas Foster, “‘The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic’: Posthuman Narratives 
and the Construction of Desire,” in Centuries’ Ends, Narrative Means, ed. 
Robert Newman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 276. 
40 For example, Melissa Scott, Burning Bright (New York: Tor Books, 1994).
41 In Foster, “‘The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic’,” 281.
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divisions by creating an even playing field.42 Yet, as Nagle no-
ticed, this kind of anti-establishment, DIY online culture “that 
cyberutopian true believers have evangelized for many years” 
has taken a specific political form in the meme magic of the 
alt-right, who embrace “the freewheeling world of anonymity 
and tech” but reinforce a reactionary order of things, rather 
than creating a mutable space for a new social order.43 In their 
Kickstarted book, Neoreaction: A Basilisk, Elizabeth Sandifer 
also notices that the “neoreactionary” (by their own designa-
tion), racist-libertarian movements connected to the alt-right 
aped the cultural techniques of the left to portray themselves as 
rebels, while evoking the aesthetics of “Basilisks, Cthulhu, and 
shuddering voids of inescapable reality.”44 
Memes, as is common knowledge by now, became a tool of 
choice in this new cultural war. Despite the resulting claims that 
“the left can’t meme,” discussed also in this collection, the politi-
cal potential of memes themselves was first celebrated by left-
leaning scholars, and not so long ago. Considering contempo-
rary digital culture in times of austerity and in a post-financial 
crisis Europe, which they describe as “the Pandora’s box of dis-
astrous consequences,” in Can Jokes Bring Down Governments?, 
the Metahaven collective believe that jokes, including memes, 
can operate outside of state power because they disrupt what 
counts as political reality management, that is, what counts 
as reasonable within public political discourse.45 Discussing 
Anonymous, the Arab Spring, the Cute Cat Theory of Digital 
42 Heather Brooke, The Revolution Will be Digitised: Dispatches from the 
Information War (Portsmouth: William Heinemann, 2011). 
43 Nagle, Kill All Normies, 18. In Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker, 
The Exploit: A Theory of Networks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007), the authors also describe how the utopian idea of a 
decentralised network society turned out to be perversely hostile to the 
kind of utopias that scholars once ascribed to it; instead, it turned into a 
new model of control, with governments and corporations alike adapting 
to this mode of distributing power.
44 Elizabeth Sandifer (with Jack Hartman), Neoreaction a Basilisk: Essays On 
and around the Alt-Right (Eruditorum Press, 2016), 54. 
45 Metahaven, Can Jokes Bring Down Governments?, 9.
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Activism, and 4chan’s trolling of the Church of Scientology in 
2008, they go as far as to suggest that memes can be an alterna-
tive to representative democracy: an idea previously advocated 
by scholars who saw the Internet as a permissive space where 
those who could not access real political representation could 
nevertheless claim it.46 In this vision, memes could have been 
the realization of Jürgen Habermas’s ideal of the public sphere, 
a non-legislative space of communication for the people, which 
Habermas dates back to the eighteenth century and the ideals of 
the Enlightenment in Europe.47 
Before the alt-right became the most visible dealer of memes, 
there were at least three noticeable traditions of proto-meme-
politics on the left: one in the 1990s, which celebrated the anon-
ymous, mutable spaces of the Internet as a way of erasing op-
pressive identities; the other two in the early 2000s, when the 
Internet was portrayed both as a disruptive space of nonsensi-
cal humor, and an accessible public sphere. And yet, Goerzen 
writes that it was the neo-Luddite thinking on the left, which 
forgot its own roots in political techno-experimentations, that 
led to the right reappropriating the techniques of the avant-
garde, such as provocation, anonymity, and irony to advocate 
for a return to a paleo-libertarian value system. This is true 
enough — equally visible in Internet scholarship are works that 
lament its ascent as the end-all of politics. Hubert Dreyfus’s On 
the Internet builds on Søren Kierkegaard’s impressive hatred of 
the daily press — “Europe will come to a standstill at the Press 
and remain at a standstill as a reminder that the human race has 
invented something which will eventually overpower it”48 — to 
argue that a disembodied experience characteristic of the online 
46 Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 
119–51. 
47 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans 
Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
48 Søren Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, Vol. 2: F–K, ed. and trans. 




sphere is in itself a political catastrophe.49 For Dreyfus, anonym-
ity and information overload turn everyone into a dilettante and 
a nihilist. Kierkegaard despised the principle of equivalence that 
the daily press introduced into information flows. He found the 
idea that God was “equally concerned with the salvation of hu-
manity and the fall of one sparrow” the expression of utmost 
nihilism, an annihilation of political relevance and concern.50 
We can only imagine his outrage at Mark Zuckerberg’s famous 
claim that “a squirrel dying in your front yard may be more rel-
evant to your interests right now than people dying in Africa,” 
a comment that prefigured the trouble he was about to get in 
after Trump’s victory, when Facebook had to withstand a lot of 
criticism pertaining to its information bubbles.51 Dreyfus alike 
tells us that because of the Internet, there is nothing worth dying 
for — everything matters equally, invading your attention span 
with equal force. Stands are to be taken no more! Flow of infor-
mation postpones action indefinitely, memes drown us in their 
self-replicating digital flood, rabbit holes down subreddits tear 
you away from practice and insert you into an information-pro-
ducing machine, until you are nothing but an ever-sharpening 
set of refined “views on issues.” You have become an epistemo-
logical halo, trapped in the apparatus of the Internet, which pro-
duces knowledge but stalls action. This process, as Dreyfus tells 
us, rests in the fact of the Internet’s “deindividualized” and “ab-
stract” nature, detached from local practices.52 Kierkegaard pre-
dicted that this abstract, mediated public sphere will proliferate 
apocalyptic prophecies, proposing that humans, overwhelmed 
by the nihilism brought on by the media, will refuse ethical 
thought entirely, prioritizing instead involvements in the aes-
thetic sphere, where the goal is to “make enjoyment of all pos-
sibilities the center of their lives.”53 He would probably say that 
49 Hubert Dreyfus, On the Internet, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2008), 73.
50 Ibid. 79.
51 Eli Pariser, “When the Internet Thinks It Knows You,” New York Times, 
May 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/23pariser.html.




it is not the content that makes memes apocalyptic but rather 
that all aesthetic production that the media sphere necessitates 
is hopelessly rooted in the annihilation of ethical concern. The 
medium is the apocalypse. 
These traditions — one pro-Internet, the other anti — disa-
gree primarily on the points of abstraction and dehumaniza-
tion. Starting from the same point — the Internet is abstracting 
and disrupting politics — they arrive either at a utopian vision, 
in which digital spaces become materials out of which a new 
politics can be borne, or generate a dystopian disengagement 
with politics as humanity is increasingly trapped in aesthetics. 
Habermas was immediately critical of how the public sphere 
worked, complaining that it deteriorated into mediocrity and 
conformism, but he still believed in rescuing it. Kierkegaard, 
however, predicted that for media nihilism to occur, “a phantom 
must first be provided, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an 
all-encompassing something that is a nothing, a mirage — this 
phantom is the public.”54 Of course, for him, this was an entirely 
deplorable fact, a monstrous, occult uprising of unethical and 
perversely aesthetic nihilism. Any type of harm can be waged in 
the name of “the people” as they are but a phantom, delighted by 
aesthetic speculation and detached from localized practices. A 
faceless online army, we could say, spewing apocalyptic prophe-
cies, entertaining themselves with unethical, aesthetic nihilism, 
is precisely what Kierkegaard feared that the media would pro-
duce. 
Given the failed utopianism of techno-anarchism on the one 
side, and the dystopian relativism of the memetic public sphere 
on the other, could a different opening still be created within 
this phantom politics? Rather than demonizing the phantom 
nature of meme politics, Tiziana Terranova suggests that “meme 
theory” is an appropriate way of understanding all technological 
mediation, precisely because “what Dawkins’ theory allows is 
the replacement of the individual by the unit” and if we should 




because of its “immense productivity of the multitude, its ab-
solute capacity to […] mutate.”55 Putting forth the possibility of 
collapse as productive, she believes that such technologies en-
able “an acceleration of history and an annihilation of distance 
within an information milieu, it is a creative destruction” which 
allows for social reconstruction.56 Perhaps the desire to erase 
oneself, to anonymize the Internet, to thrust ourselves — as a 
phantom public — into destruction is not an entirely aesthetic 
project but, as any legitimately nihilist drive, speaks to a deep-
er impulse toward a revaluation of what counts as political in 
the first place. Could this phantom subjectivity that the media 
called into existence be also a specter of reformation?
Memes of the Anthropocene
“the question that once seemed to be: are 
you happy? has been replaced with: can you 
breathe? neither can be answered”
 — @atlajala, August 2, 201757
Konrad Becker notices that “disorganization creates crisis cults 
or projective systems resulting from culture strains.”58 The Glob-
al Financial Crisis in 2008, which was, in fact, a doom event 
with disastrous consequences, surprisingly did not provoke a 
surge in meme production.59 In the same year, however, there 
were dozens of apocalyptic memes related to the Large Hadron 
Collider particle accelerator and the possibility of creating a 
black hole that could swallow our universe. A status-indicator 
single site, active until today, titled “Has The Large Hadron Col-
55 Tiziana Terranova, Network Culture Politics for the Information Age 
(London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2004), 124, 118.  
56 Ibid., 2–3.
57 See @atlajala, Twitter, August 2, 2017, 5:54pm, https://twitter.com/atlajala/
status/892911463009992705.
58 Konrad Becker, Tactical Reality Dictionary: Cultural Intelligence and Social 
Control (Vienna: Edition Selene, 2010), 44.
59 To the best of my knowledge.
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lider Destroyed The World Yet?” was launched. In 2012, there 
was a flood of catastrophic memes, this time devoted to the Ma-
yan calendar, including images depicting the Nibiru Cataclysm, 
a theory of planetary collision first proposed in 1995 by Nancy 
Lieder who claimed to have received the prophecy from aliens. 
The theory was so popular that it compelled NASA to inform the 
Internet that Nibiru actually did not exist. Like the memes com-
menting on a doomsday scenario from just a year before fabri-
cated by Christian preacher Harold Camping (The May 21, 2011 
Rapture), the overall tone was mockery — as if we were going 
to die! Grumpy Cat, the Internet’s favourite cynical retort at the 
height of the mid-2010s obsession with animal reaction memes, 
provided a subtle celebratory tone: “The world is ending in De-
cember? Good.” In 2016, when Donald Trump ran for President, 
the “This is Fine” meme brought another brand of ironic defeat-
ism to the table. Sourced from K.C. Green’s Gunshow comics, 
this continually popular meme portrays a dog sitting at a ta-
ble amidst burning flames, assuring himself that everything is 
fine — “this is fine, I’m okay with the events that are unfolding 
currently” — as the fire engulfs his house and eventually melts 
his face off. Elite Daily collected several end of the world memes 
to honor the end of 2017, which joke about Hurricane Ophelia in 
London and the possibility of a nuclear war.60 Donald Trump’s 
inauguration inspired many memes which equated it with no 
less than the coming of the beast.61 The unintentionally ominous 
picture of Trump, Saudi king Salman, and Egyptian president 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi touching a mysterious glowing orb, origi-
nally posted by @SaudiEmbassyUSA, was widely circulated and 
drew comparisons to Lord of the Rings and Marvel universe vil-
lains. The Church of Satan retweeted the photo, clarifying that 
60 Thea Glassman, “5 End of the World Memes to Honor Going into 2018,” 
Elite Daily, December 19, 2017, https://www.elitedaily.com/p/5-end-of-the-
world-memes-to-honor-going-into-2018–7523572.
61 Jay Hathaway, “‘Here’s the Livestream of Trump’s Inauguration’ Meme 





it was not a Satanic ritual.62 John Hodgman tagged conspiracy 
theorist Alex Jones in his retweet, asking him to “pay attention” 
as — it was implied — the orb was clearly about to jumpstart a 
communist-reptilian reckoning.63 It is not only the alt-right that 
trades in the aesthetics of civilizational decline. 
In 1922, shortly after the October revolution, Russian histo-
rian Yevgeny Tarle wrote that “revolution is foremost a death, 
then a life; we risk forgetting that not far under the elegant car-
pet of our cabin there is a dark and fathomless abyss.”64 Based 
in his conviction that crisis was temporary, his strategy was to 
advocate for a calm resistance to the sway of the unknown, for 
asserting, rather than overthrowing the persuasions of the olden 
days. Or, the Internet would say, keep calm and carry on. Yet, 
what if crisis is not a transitory stage but the rhythm to which 
society marches without break? What if crisis is perpetually 
but unequally distributed? Mark Fisher uses the term “capital-
ist realism” to describe how capitalism manages to ostensibly 
unhinge itself from economy, where Karl Marx defined it chiefly 
through the production of surplus value, to encompass the past 
and the future, as if it was the only thing that ever existed and 
the only one that ever will.65 To sustain this tautology, capitalism 
trades in producing and maintaining crisis as its main cultural 
currency, thus naturalizing itself as the only alternative. Achille 
Mbembe describes a similar mechanism underlying necro-po-
litical states, which must maintain a sense of danger — you have 
no idea of the threat that is underway! — to justify large-scale 
physical violence toward (typically racialized) populations.66 
Necro-political nation-states must then maintain both the sense 
62 See @ChurchofSatan, Twitter, May 22, 2017, 2:41am, https://twitter.com/
ChurchofSatan/status/866453928535236608.
63 See @hodgman, Twitter, May 21, 2017, 11:56am, https://twitter.com/
hodgman/status/866367178248945664.
64 Yevgeny Tarle, quoted in Paul Dukes, Minutes to Midnight: History and the 
Anthropocene Era from 1763 (London: Anthem Press, 2011), 70.
65 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (London: Zero 
Books, 2009).
66 Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” trans. Libby Meintjes, Public Culture 15, 
no. 1 (2003): 11–40.
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of crisis and the fantasy of protection at their hands to stay in 
power. The difference now is that instead of analyzing how capi-
talism manages culture and crisis within the nation state, we 
should be charting a far more encompassing, planetary necro-
politics parallel to what is called the Anthropocene. The power 
fantasy that it produces is not security but inevitability. 
First coined by the Dutch chemist Paul J. Crutzen in 2000, 
the term “Anthropocene” gained currency in 2007, when paleo-
biologist and stratigrapher Jan Zalasiewicz requested that the 
Geological Society of London’s Stratigraphy Commission re-
view the case for a new geological epoch to replace the currently 
prevailing Holocene. While climate change and the Anthropo-
cene are often conflated, in 2009 Nature published an article in 
which a team of scientists led by Johan Rockström of the Stock-
holm Resilience Centre list several different factors that, if ac-
celerated by humans, would lead to the 6th global extinction.67 
Climate change is only one of them, alongside ocean acidifica-
tion, stratospheric ozone depletion, global freshwater depletion, 
biodiversity loss, changes in nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, 
industrial agriculture, chemical pollution, and atmospheric aer-
osol loading.68 Although these phenomena are environmental, 
the Anthropocene denotes their civilizational origin: industrial 
capitalism and fossil fuel extraction, the global slave trade, the 
Great Acceleration, and the bombing of Hiroshima and Naga-
saki have all been suggested as the starting points of this geo-
sociological, or socio-geological era.69 This prophecy of doom, 
67 Biologist Scott Gilbert compares it to a K-T event such as the Cretaceous-
Tertiary boundary and the extinction of non-avian dinosaurs 66 million 
years ago, or the Permian-Triassic extinction that wiped out more 
than 90% of all species 252 million years ago, in Donna Haraway et al., 
“Anthropologists Are Talking — About the Anthropocene,” Ethnos 81, no. 3 
(2016): 535–64. 
68 See Johan Rockström et al., “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity,” Nature 
461 (2009): 472–75.
69 See Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin, “Art and Death: Lives Between 
the Fifth Assessment & the Sixth Extinction,” in Art in the Anthropocene: 
Encounters Among Aesthetics, Politics, and Epistemologies, eds. Heather 
Davis and Etienne Turpin (London: Open Humanities Press, 2015), 5; 
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however, grounded as it is in the scientific consensus, does not 
inspire apocalypticism in memes in the same way that every-
day political headlines do. Climate change memes are popular 
but are rather didactic tools for educating the masses about the 
prescience of the subject, or deceiving them into climate change 
denialism.70 
If the Anthropocene informs apocalyptic memes, it does so 
in a less direct way. Precisely because the points of contestation 
discussed here are abstraction, phantom politics, and posthu-
manism, the Anthropocene as an organizing principle must tell 
us something about the vectors of dehumanization and doom 
that we currently inhabit. This extends beyond portraying cur-
rent events as apocalyptic into a symptomatic denouncing of 
the importance of humanity as such. As a counterpart to Red-
dit’s collapse channels mentioned in the introduction, r/antina-
talism and r/vhemt are devoted to antinatalism and voluntary 
human extinction movements, where human hubris is harshly 
criticized.71 Discussions there are resentful, defeatist, and often 
angry. Annihilation, some users argue, is what humans deserve, 
exhibiting a sentiment similar to the many millenarian move-
ments throughout history. However, they advocate rather for a 
definite death of the whole human species as a moral duty — the 
Earth is already overpopulated and full of suffering — rather 
than a political purge of unworthy groups. In an indirect paral-
lel to these are r/surrealmemes memes, where humans are often 
portrayed as a funnily insignificant element of a much more 
interesting and alien universe.72 A popular meme titled “Com-
pared to him, they are nothing” portrays humans devoured by a 
Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin, “Defining the Anthropocene,” Nature 519 
(2015): 171–80.
70 See, for example, Madhuri Sathish, “11 Hilarious Climate Change Memes 
to Quiet The Naysayers Who Keep Denying It’s Real,” Bustle, August 19, 
2015, https://www.bustle.com/articles/105138–11-hilarious-climate-change-
memes-to-quiet-the-naysayers-who-keep-denying-its-real.
71 See Reddit, s.v. “antinatalism,” https://www.reddit.com/r/antinatalism/; 
Reddit, s.v. “vhemt,” https://www.reddit.com/r/vhemt/.
72 Reddit, s.v. “surrealmemes,” https://www.reddit.com/r/surrealmemes/.
67
Mediating Crisis
presumably alien octagon, with a caption “They run, for he con-
sumes their entire existence.” Another, “Sentient beings be like,” 
pictures a gigantic humanoid face in a meditative-hallucinatory 
state, with a caption “Yes, we observe the memes, but do we 
even fucking exist?” An “exploding brain” meme, in which each 
panel describes a more mind-blowing revelation than the last, 
begins with “confused screaming,” moves through “revolution 
and reform are two sides of the same utopian coin” and “await-
ing ‘the collapse’ as if it were a singular event […] is merely a 
crude inversion of utopia” to end again at “confused screaming.” 
Neither of these memes are didactic about geo-social problems. 
Yet, the Anthropocene is “a social imaginary that has exceeded 
its intended categorization and whose parameters delimit ways 
of thinking about the world well beyond the confines of geo-
scientific debate.”73 On the level of politics and culture, this 
catastrophic narrative marks the moment when we are collec-
tively redefining our idea of the “human” and the types of social 
agency that this figure might have in the times when our species 
seems both powerful enough to bring about our own destruc-
tion through technological expansion, and at the same time not 
powerful enough to save itself, or to even at a minimum provide 
a model of industrial society that would not be based in rapidly 
accelerating social inequality and political polarization. 
Alexander Galloway writes that the Anthropocene narrative 
is a contemporary form of amor fati to which the allegedly ra-
tional moderns have surprisingly succumbed.74 Karl Marx wrote 
about the strange “ghost dance” of capitalism, where material 
conditions are reduced to an abstraction, while the intangible is 
made into something concrete — subjects become objects and 
objects become subjects, commodities seem more alive than the 
workers whose labor creates them.75 Marx described how the 
73 Davis and Turpin, “Art and Death,” 7.
74 Alexander Galloway, “Warm Pride,” October 29, 2014, http://
cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/warm-pride 
75 See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work 
of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: 
Routledge, 1994), 153. 
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ruling classes mask the actual ways in which they organize la-
bor, thus giving the impression of the market itself as a sentient 
being, separate from human agency. Galloway’s concept of the 
“warm pride” can be understood as an extension of this condi-
tion in the context of the Anthropocene and the climate, where 
humanity’s global geological agency is masked by a theoretical 
and aesthetic scaling down of humans to just one being among 
many others: 
Like the “landfill” trashcan, the concept of the Anthropocene 
teeters with postmodern vertigo. It indicts mankind for its 
fiduciary failings, only to promulgate a new historical narra-
tive with mankind at the center. Tell me I failed, then put me 
in the spotlight. Remove agency, then assign it again. Which 
is it? Are we special or aren’t we? Are we special enough to go 
toe to toe with the planet? Or are we merely another desiring 
machine, no different from the lowly mouse, or the deoxyri-
bonucleic acid? […] [Contemporary theory would often tell 
us that] we’re impactful in matters of existence, but periph-
eral in matters of ontology, [it says,] I may display hubris to-
ward the natural world, provided I subscribe to annihilation 
at the level of being; [it is the] pride of place in geological 
history within a declension narrative that only ends one way 
[— in collapse].76 
This thought spells out a paradox, an asymmetry in line with 
Vacker’s diagnosis that it is the combination of both decentral-
ising and narcissistic effects of cosmic and social media that 
makes all media forms prone to apocalypticism. In this context, 
it is hardly surprising that apocalyptic memes are plentiful on 
the Western Internet — through colonialism, Western European 
culture was “the first memetic global pandemic.”77 The Anglo-
Saxon colonial empire at the center of the Industrial Revolution 
that led us to the Anthropocene is now generating apocalyptic 
76 Galloway, “Warm Pride.” 
77 Sandifer, Neoreaction a Basilisk, 174. 
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signifiers, because it is — perhaps — witnessing its own end. If 
everyday events in the West provoke apocalyptic panic, it is be-
cause the empire cannot picture itself as peripheral to history 
and so it embraces apocalypticism to turn inevitability into a 
comforting thought, removing unknowns by predicting the end. 
This could account for many of the doom-memes that relate 
quite visibly to current political events. However, if the Anthro-
pocene maps both a recognition of the power of colonial indus-
trial societies and an embarrassment at any suggestions that this 
power could be used to erase its own ill effects, political agency 
in itself becomes one of the most important questions. The ways 
in which less obviously political memes inhabit the aesthetics of 
collapse could signal a shift in how (post)human agency is expe-
rienced against the background of a looming extinction event, 
which — despite its specific historical origins — interpellates hu-
manity at large as the subject. 
Such warm pride turns the Western Internet into an apoc-
alyptic space of dank dystopia, where anonymously sharing 
doom memes becomes a commodified version of cyberpunk 
utopia and its failed promise of equalising facelessness. If for 
Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro the An-
thropocene announces that for the first time in known history 
that a dominant geological form — humans — is self-aware, the 
proliferation of apocalyptic memes signifies the desire of that 
force for its own dissolution achieved by memetic automation 
and dehumanization of political subjectivity.78 Within this sub-
missive fantasy, the scale of current and coming geo-social dam-
age is experienced as far too great to comprehend, much less 
to act on. Humans are insignificant and anonymous in the face 
of planetary collapse. Abandoning themselves to anonymous, 
ever-replicating networks of doom memes provides the solace 
of discarding the idea of a sufficient human agency, alongside 
any values that this species-being may confer, including what is 
coded as political or ethical. Humans, newly clothed in a self-
78 Deborah Danowski and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, The Ends of the 
World (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2016), 33. 
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chastizing impulse and perceiving themselves as just one ele-
ment of the ever-expanding planetary cyberspace, are but sur-
vival bunkers for memes, who spread their power both across 
the biological space of the human organism, planting and rep-
licating ideas, and the digital space of the Internet, where they 
travel as image. Becker already diagnosed this desire to renounce 
human agency by filtering it through media networks, writ-
ing that memes “[live] off humans, eating brain when they do 
not battle themselves in memetic cannibalism, preying on each 
other like flip-flop cellular automatons.”79 In his dystopian novel 
World War Z, only one of hundreds of literary and visual dysto-
pias that have flooded popular culture over the last two decades, 
Max Brooks describes how, in order to survive a zombie apoca-
lypse, some humans started impersonating zombies, convincing 
themselves that if they could become like those who want to eat 
them, they will not be eaten.80 (They all died.) Relinquishing the 
idea of a sufficient individual, human presence within the global 
crisis narrative could function in a similar way — withdrawing 
humanity into these surreal, fatalistic, apocalyptic memes cor-
responds to the general experience of human politics as either 
heading toward grotesque failure or being insufficient as a rule. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that apocalyptic memes 
translate into passivity or that they want no part in construct-
ing the future. They map — at times with pleasure and curiosity 
rather than fear — both the decline of the Western empire and 
the global reckoning with the crisis of the Anthropocene. Crisis 
cults function as a way of identification with a set of values, even 
if this value is the mutual agreement on the impossibility of the 
present and coming world. In this world that is “increasingly 
unthinkable,” to use Eugene Thacker’s term, either on the level 
of perceived political catastrophe and civilizational decline or 
on the planetary scale of the Anthropocene, the way that these 
memes grapple with the insufficiency of human politics is val-
79 Becker, Tactical Reality Dictionary, 30.
80 Max Brooks, World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War (Danvers: 
Crown Publishing Group, 2006).
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id.81 How is it at all possible to think about politics unless they 
are scaled up to a planetary level, where the dehumanizing ab-
stractions of capitalism, the laments about civilization decline, 
and the extractions of what used to be called “natural” converge? 
Apocalyptic memes do not provide an answer but they do ex-
press a crisis in the conventional experience of human agency in 
an orderly world, and as such a willingness to pose the question. 
81 Eugene Thacker, In the Dust of this Planet: Horror of Philosophy, Vol. 1 
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5
Post-Authenticity and the 
Ironic Truths of Meme Culture
Jay Owens
Media Isn’t Really Real
I
n the last couple of years, fakery seems to have accelerated. 
The term “fake news” appeared out of next-to-nowhere in 
November 2016 (fig. 1).
doi: 10.21983/P3.0255.1.06




The press has published myths, falsehoods, and exaggera-
tions for about as long as there has been a press — and even the 
term “fake news” dates back to the 1890s, the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary reports.1 Lying is, surely, as old as humanity.
But the term has twisted. “Fake news,” as used in the last 18 
months, doesn’t really mean “fake” in the conventional sense of 
the word — as in unreal, or incorrect, or false news. As used by 
the US President, the most mainstream and fact-checked news 
media is “fake” if he disagrees with it. The term means some-
thing more like “troublesome news,” or “news I vehemently 
disagree with, and wish to discredit.”
The US President helped spur 29 million tweets about “fake 
news” in the last year, keeping the topic always present in public 
discourse (figs. 2 and 3).
Meanwhile, in the UK, “fake news” becomes a political point-
scoring exercise in headlines such as: “Theresa May’s ‘Fake News 
Unit’ Announcement Has Itself Been Branded ‘Fake News’.”2 
Your boy Kafka is proud.
The work of making real news: the fact-checking and trian-
gulating processes by which news organizations ensure their 
coverage is accurate, and professional principles of integrity; 
journalists talk about this continually on Twitter. Yet is the mes-
sage getting through?
1 See “The Real Story of ‘Fake News’,” Merriam-Webster, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/the-real-story-of-fake-news. 
2 See Mikey Smith, “Theresa May’s ‘Fake News Unit’ Announcement Has 
Itself Been Branded ‘Fake News’,” Mirror, January 30, 2018, https://www.
mirror.co.uk/news/politics/theresa-mays-fake-news-unit-11940423. 
Fig. 2. Tweets by us President Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump.
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Public trust both is and isn’t holding up.
Kantar’s 2017 Trust In News survey finds that people still be-
lieve in the principle of “real news”: Across the USA, UK, France, 
and Brazil, 73% of people agreed that quality journalism is key 
to a healthy democracy.3 The reputational impact of the “fake 
news” issue has been predominantly borne by digital and social 
media channels: 58% now trust social media coverage of politics 
and elections less and 41% trust online-only news sources less. 
Traditional TV and print media channels have held up compara-
tively well.
However, the stat to remember is that only slightly more than 
half (56%) believe what they read overall is true “most of the 
time.” The principle of a shared factual reality among the general 
public has become tenuous, and cannot be taken for granted.
Last month, an anonymous academic posted to Reddit say-
ing: “I’m a college philosophy professor. Jordan Peterson is mak-
3 See Kirsty Cooke, “‘Fake News’ Reinforces Trust in Mainstream News 
Brands,” Kantar, October 31, 2017, https://uk.kantar.com/business/
brands/2017/trust-in-news/. 





ing my job impossible.”4 They report how a minority of students 
who have been reading and watching “internet outrage mer-
chants” come into class no longer merely disagreeing with some 
of the ideas taught “that I’m used to dealing with; it’s the bread 
and butter of philosophy”) —  but newly angry, deeply hostile, 
and believing in complete fabrications about what feminist or 
postmodernist or Marxist philosophy entails. “To even get to a 
real discussion of actual texts it takes half the [class] time to just 
deprogram some of them.”
As danah boyd pointed out at SXSW Edu this year, attempts to 
increase media literacy in schools can often backfire. Examining 
the credibility of a Fox News article in class risks being perceived 
by working class or evangelical youth as an “elite” attack on their 
values. Teaching young people to make sense of the informa-
tion landscape without exacerbating distrust is, boyd fears, very 
difficult: “when youth are encouraged to be critical of the news 
media, they come away thinking that the media is lying.”5
In 2004, a previous Republican presidency gave us the con-
cept of the “reality-based community,” a term meant as pejora-
tive: why be so short-sighted as to limit your vision to the way 
things were, rather than what the Administration’s actions made 
possible?6
“We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own 
reality,” the unnamed official (generally understood to be Karl 
Rove) said.
4 See annoyed_professor, “I’m a College Philosophy Professor. Jordan 
Peterson Is Making My Job Impossible,” Reddit, March 24, 2018, 
16:20 gmt+1, https://www.reddit.com/r/enoughpetersonspam/
comments/86tnz7/im_a_college_philosophy_professor_jordan_peterson/. 
5 See danah boyd, “You Think You Want Media Literacy…Do You?” Points, 
March 9, 2018, https://points.datasociety.net/you-think-you-want-media-
literacy-do-you-7cad6af18ec2. 




So this present state of things isn’t really new. Kurt Andersen 
dates the rise of this present “truthiness” back to the 1960s, and 
the rise of an “it’s all relative” mode of thinking.7 And yet.
Technology Is Warping Reality in New Ways
The post-authenticity of fake news isn’t solely a technological or 
media problem, but a social one, symptomatic of declining trust 
in a shared civic project. Nonetheless, new media technologies 
really aren’t helping.
In the last year or two,
• Technologies have become available to fake people’s voices, 
so that you can appear to make them say anything you want. 
In 2016, Adobe released a tool, VoCo, which needed 20 min-
utes of audio to train on.8 In May 2017, Lyrebird, a Montreal-
based AI startup, claimed to be able to synthetically mimic 
any person’s voice based on just 60 seconds of speech.9
• Faking video has also become accessible. In March 2016, re-
searchers from the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, the 
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, and Stanford Universi-
ty presented a novel approach for creating fake videos —  e.g., 
making Putin smile, or George W. Bush appear to lipsync to 
ridiculous material. Through capturing the facial expressions 
of a source actor on a webcam, and using facial mapping, 
they demonstrate they’re able to manipulate and re-render a 
YouTube video photorealistically.
7 Kurt Andersen, “How America Lost Its Mind,” The Atlantic, September 
2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/how-
america-lost-its-mind/534231/. 
8 See Matthew Gault, “After 20 Minutes of Listening, New Adobe Tool 
Can Make You Say Anything,” Motherboard, November 5, 2016, https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgkxp/after-20-minutes-of-
listening-new-adobe-tool-can-make-you-say-anything. 
9 Bahar Gholipour, “New AI Tech Can Mimic Any Voice,” Scientific 




The Face2Face team note that “computer-generated vid-
eos have been part of feature-film movies for over 30 years. 
[…] These results are hard to distinguish from reality and it 
often goes unnoticed that the content is not real.” What’s new 
is the way the technology is newly mass-accessible: now, “we 
can edit pre-recorded videos in real-time on a commodity 
PC.”10
• Where video goes, porn is first to take advantage. In De-
cember 2017, Samantha Cole of Motherboard reported that 
“AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked.”11 She 
reports how a Redditor by the name of deepfakes worked out 
how to combine celebrity facial images from Google image 
search, stock photos, and YouTube videos, with porn videos, 
using open-source neural-network “deep learning” library 
Keras and TensorFlow.
A month later deepfakes turned the process into an 
app — and Vice reported that “We Are All Truly Fucked,” as 
the faceswap porn trend swept Reddit.12 It then got banned, 
but you know, that horse had already bolted.
• Various smaller events, too. The ongoing march of fake social 
media followers and fake “likes,” as reported most recently in 
the New York Times’s snazzy longread investigation “The Fol-
lower Factory,” a somewhat late-to-the-party but nonetheless 
welcome dig into the entirely fictional world of celebrity and 
10 See, for a demonstration, Matthias Niessner, “Face2Face: Real-time Face 
Capture and Reenactment of RGB Videos (CVPR 2016 Oral),” YouTube, 
March 18, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohmajJTcpNk. 
11 See Samantha Cole, “AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All Fucked,” 
Motherboard, December 11, 2017, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/
article/gydydm/gal-gadot-fake-ai-porn. 
12 See Samantha Cole, “We Are Truly Fucked: Everyone Is Making AI-





influencer social media metrics.13 More fake metrics over on 
Trip Advisor, too, as Oobah Butler of Vice made his garden 
shed the #1 rated restaurant in London.14
Again, none of this is new exactly — in 1917, two young 
girls went down to a stream at the bottom of a garden in 
Cottingley, England, and took some photographs of fair-
ies which traveled the world (fig. 4).15 Doubtless some wily 
courtier seeing some opportunity for gain painstakingly in-
scribed fake news on a Sumerian stone tablet.
13 See Nicholas Confessore et al., “The Follower Factory,” New York Times, 
January 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/
technology/social-media-bots.html. 
14 Oobah Butler, “I Made My Shed the Top Rated Restaurant on Trip-
Advisor,” Vice, December 6, 2017, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/
article/434gqw/i-made-my-shed-the-top-rated-restaurant-on-tripadvisor. 
15 See Rosa Lyster, “The Cottingley Fairy Hoax of 1917 Is a Case Study in How 
Smart People Lose Control of the Truth,” Quartz, February 17, 2017, https://
qz.com/911990/the-cottingley-fairy-hoax-of-1917-is-a-case-study-in-how-
smart-people-lose-control-of-the-truth/. 




Fig. 5. Which ones did you date? Source: Paste Magazine. See Kate 





Fig. 6. Gotta catch 
them all. Source: 
Paste Magazine. See 
Brittany Joyce and 
Sarah Lawrence, 
“The Evolution of 
the Hipster 2010–









Yet, something is up — something in culture has moved, quite 
recently, and now the world is different: the pace and extent of 
fakery has accelerated. It’s not just happened in media, it’s hap-
pened in pop culture too.
In Fashion, Authenticity Imploded Some Time around 2015
“Authenticity” was the defining value of the late-stage hipster.
How the hipster transformed from trucker-cap-clad 2000s 
nu-rave machine to bearded artisanal flannel shirt connoisseur 
is recorded in various lifestyle magazine features — best and 
most visually in Paste Magazine (figs. 5, 6)
Though, seeing as this is my generation we’re talking about, 
I might also comment that we just grew up and slowed down 
a bit (the UK government also made mephedrone — the “white 
powder that smells faintly of cat piss [which] defined the UK’s 
party scene from 2008 to 2010” — illegal.16)
Rewind eight years, to 2010. In this period, as smartphones 
and digital media took over our lives, the dominant aesthetic 
of middle-class consumption — fashion, interior decor and life-
style — went the other way: rough-hewn, wholesome. Authen-
tic. God, do you remember the beards? And the flannel, and 
the workwear, and the artisan everything: coffee, bread, burgers. 
Ostentatious unpretentiousness: cocktails in mason jars, wine in 
tumblers, and ridged, deeply textured wooden tables and walls. 
Flower crowns and neo-boho festival fashion.
Driving this trend was a small magazine — print, of course, 
published on heavyweight matte paper stock — run out of Port-
land, Oregon, called Kinfolk. The visual language it defined 
spread far and wide (fig. 7).
Summer Allen noticed just how much of a template this look 
was:
16 See JS Rafaeli, “The Story of Mephedrone, the Party Drug That Boomed 





I started the The Kinspiracy tumblr after I noticed a pattern 
emerging from dozens of Instagram users — my own person-
al Beautiful Mind moment. It was suddenly so clear: Every 
account cultivating that Kinfolk look seemed to follow a spe-
cific formula. Every account had a photo (or several) of the 
following: A latte with a foam leaf design, a fresh piece or two 
of citrus, a glimpse of a pair of small feet — often in a well-
worn pair of boots — an ice cream cone, weather permitting, 
some glasses here and there, twine, the occasional fixed-gear 
bike. And always, in every damn account, Kinfolk.17
The “authentic” look wasn’t just shaping people’s Instagram 
feeds, but real-world spaces and places too in a feedback loop 
between social media and IRL that journalist Kyle Chayka called 
AirSpace:
It’s marked by an easily recognisable mix of symbols — like 
reclaimed wood, Edison bulbs, and refurbished industrial 
lighting — that’s meant to provide familiar, comforting sur-
roundings for a wealthy, mobile elite, who want to feel like 
they’re visiting somewhere “authentic” while they travel, but 
who actually just crave more of the same: more rustic interi-
17 Summer Allen, “Wood, Citrus, Lattes, Feet, Twine, Repeat: The Kinfolk 
Kinspiracy Code,” Gawker, March 31, 2015, http://gawker.com/wood-
citrus-lattes-feet-twine-repeat-the-kinfolk-1693115156. 
Fig. 7. From left to right: Instagram users @MaryHoagland,  




ors and sans-serif logos and splashes of cliché accent colours 
on rugs and walls.18
Later, Chayka was blunter about his frustrations — tweeting in 
October 2017 that “‘authenticity’ is the plague of the 21st cen-
tury,” in a thread about the cynical falseness of so many of its 
iterations.
The contradictory appeal of AirSpace was best summed up 
by artist and designer Lauren Schwulst: “it’s funny how you want 
these really generic things but also want authenticity, too.”19
The authentic aesthetic is too clearly a facsimile, too obvi-
ously a template rolled out by the operations directors of VC-
funded Millennial Pink-branded startups and Airbnb mega-
hosts putting the same framed inspirational quotes in every 
identikit, resident-displacing condo. Airbnb rebranded in 2014 
with a campaign about how you can “belong anywhere,” a pro-
foundly inauthentic claim that strips belonging of all meaning.
Around 2015 there was a wave of articles about how “the 
hipster” was, finally, dead as a cultural archetype (“Why Lon-
don decided to move on from beards, beanies and fixie bikes” 
was the title of a Richard Godwin article in the Evening Stand-
ard20) — and “authenticity” as a cultural value expired along 
with it:
The typology has become a caricature and the terms once 
associated with it — craft, artisan, making — have also become 
cartoonish. When McDonald’s boasts about artisanal chicken 
18 Kyle Chayka, “Same Old, Same Old: How the Hipster Aesthetic is Taking 
Over the World,” The Guardian, August 6, 2016, https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2016/aug/06/hipster-aesthetic-taking-over-world. 
19 Lauren Schwulst, quoted in Kyle Chayka, “Welcome to Airspace: How 
Silicon Valley Helps Spread the Same Sterile Aesthetic Across the World,” 
The Verge, August 3, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/3/12325104/
airbnb-aesthetic-global-minimalism-startup-gentrification. 
20 Richard Godwin, “Death of the Hipster: Why London Decided to Move 





(complete with “artisan chicken” and “artisan roll”) you know 
the message has gone awry.21
What came next? “Minimalist brands” was one answer from 
marketers — but that mood didn’t last.22 In Spring 2016, Demna 
Gvasalia shocked the fashion press with bootleg anti-fashion 
at Vetements — selling meta-referential hoodies, DHL-branded 
T-shirts, and reworked secondhand jeans for hundreds and 
thousands of Euros.23 Meanwhile, in the hipper echelons of de-
sign we’re back to postmodernism, with 1980s Memphis Group 
21 Daniela Walker, “The Hipster is Dead, Let’s Start an Anti-authenticity 
Movement,” Campaign, September 29, 2015, https://www.campaignlive.
co.uk/article/hipster-dead-lets-start-anti-authenticity-movement/1366143. 
22 See Ed Silk, “Authenticity as We Know It Is Dead as Brands Go Minimalist 
to Express Their Craft and Quality,” The Drum, February 12, 2016, http://
www.thedrum.com/opinion/2016/02/12/authenticity-we-know-it-dead-
brands-go-minimalist-express-their-craft-and-quality. 
23 See Jake Woolf, “There’s an $800 Hoodie That’s Selling Out Everywhere,” 
GQ, February 22, 2016, https://www.gq.com/story/vetements-hoodie-buy-
sold-out-price.




aesthetics and terrazzo replacing Insta’d-out white marble (if 
the pages of Elle Decoration and the graphic design of Chayka’s 
Studyhall journalist co-op is anything to go by).24 “Authenticity” 
and the desire to focus on the perceived, more-real “essence of 
things” is no longer in vogue: surface and clever references are 
all.
Something similarly playful is happening, I argue, in how the 
post-Millennial “Generation Z” present themselves online.
Generation Z Are Pioneering Post-authentic Social Media
Back in 2010, Mark Zuckerberg made the case for the single, 
real-name Facebook account as the “authentic” way to do social 
media, and sought to impose this model of self-presentation 
on hundreds of millions of users, with Facebook’s controversial 
(and partially rolled-back) “real names policy” (fig. 9).25
But authenticity became a performance, as we started to 
speak to audiences of hundreds and thousands beyond our 
“real” pools of friends and family, and “likes” and follower 
counts trained us to create the kinds of content that would be 
24 See http://studyhall.xyz/. 
25 See Dave Lee, “Facebook Amends ‘Real Name’ Policy after Protests,” BBC, 
December 15, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35109045. 
Fig. 9. Quote from Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg.
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the most popular, over the realistic depictions of our day-to-day. 
Our Instagram feeds professionalized: the quality of photogra-
phy got better, the captions wittier. The relationship to our real 
lives became more complicated
The ur-point of this, for me, is the #liveauthentic hashtag on 
Instagram (fig. 10): a compendium of the most Kinfolk-perfect 
depictions of an enviable foodie, travel lifestyle, Rise-filter tinted 
for that “golden hour” glow.
Meanwhile, young people were reporting that looking right 
in social media was stressing them the hell out.
A survey from the Girl Guides Association in the US last year 
found that teenage girls weren’t just seeing social media risks 
like their parents did, as a place where they might be threatened 
Fig. 10. Instagram #liveauthentic stream.
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by bullying and “stranger danger.” Instead, their second biggest 
worry online was the pressure of “comparing my self/life to oth-
ers.” Their sixth biggest concern, “how I look in photos” (fig. 
11).26
Social media has, after all, dramatically changed the field of 
social comparison, from operating mostly at the transient, real-
world social scale of a few hundred people around you at your 
school and in your neighborhood, to one that’s media-scale, 
global, and permanent. Eric Herber, then a 17-year-old in high 
school, wrote in 2015:
When I post a photo on Instagram I know that just about 
every person I am connected to in the real life will see my 
photo, decide whether or not to like it, and then judge me 
subconsciously.
26 See Girlguiding, “Girls’ Attitudes Survey 2017,” 2017, https://www.
girlguiding.org.uk/globalassets/docs-and-resources/research-and-
campaigns/girls-attitudes-survey-2017.pdf. 




Because of this, Instagram is seen as a huge stressor for 
many teenagers.
Your Instagram defines who you are.27
Teenagers, being young and adaptable, have modified their so-
cial media behaviors to fit this new landscape accordingly.
An 18-year-old American high school student, interviewed 
by journalist Justine Harman, details the heavily strategized so-
cial media management playbook she and her peers use:
27 Eric Herber, “Finstagram: The Instagram Revolution,” Medium, February 
10, 2015, https://medium.com/bits-pixels/finstagram-the-instagram-
revolution-737999d40014. 
Fig. 12. Instagram accounts @hahoop and @hoonhap, via Mic.com.
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I would never post twice in one day because if I am expecting 
to get 200 likes on a picture, I have to post sparingly.
First you have to edit the picture, make sure no one in 
your friend group is already posting it, send it to your friends 
for approval, think of a clever caption, and then post it at a 
time of day that will hopefully afford you the most amount 
of likes.
Yes, it’s insane. But this is what girls do.28
As a result, Finstagram.
What? Fake Instagram, for trash pics and the outtakes reel of 
your main, hyper-curated Instagram account (fig. 12).29
Finstagram has been a thing since, ah yes, January 2016: co-
incidentally or not, just after hipster “authenticity” died.
28 Justine Harman, “The Crazy Way Teens are Hiding Their Imperfections 
Online: Finstagram,” Elle, July 9, 2015, https://www.elle.com/culture/tech/
a29243/finstagram/. 
29 See Taylor Lorenz, “The Secret Instagram Accounts Teens Use to Share 
Their Realest, Most Intimate Moments,” Mic, March 3, 2017, https://mic.
com/articles/175936/the-secret-instagram-accounts-teens-use-to-share-
their-realest-most-intimate-moments. 




Freed from having to maintain a singular, authentic, official 
identity, it turns out young people feel they can be a lot more 
real on their fake accounts.
Snapchat offers the same promise too: ephemeral social me-
dia. It’s digital “safe space” in the real sense of that word: setting 
boundaries and expectations in order to make difficult things — 
here, your imperfect, unfiltered self — possible to speak about.
The Meme Generation
“Generations” are a bullshit marketing concept, right? Except 
all of us looking at the remarkable teenagers of Parkland High 
School and their astonishing media campaigning ways are also 
aware that damn, something’s different about kids today.
For the last two or three years I’ve been doing a bit of work 
for a tech company client on understanding first Millennials 
and then Generation Z: what are they doing, how are they dif-
ferent, and what makes them tick. For Generation Z — born in 
2000 onward — there are two interesting, seemingly opposite 
cultural tendencies in play.
Fig. 14. Finsta tweets.
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On the one hand, they’re the Sensible Generation. Every 
measure of risk-taking behavior is down, across the US and 
Europe: drinking, smoking, drug use, early sexual activity, and 
teenage pregnancy.30 Spurred on by the prospect of massive edu-
cational debt, they try harder in school and have heart-break-
ingly modest and, well, sensible aspirations for their future lives.
On the other hand…
Let me introduce you to a cultural goldmine. In September 
last year, an AskReddit thread enquired, “Teens of Reddit, what 
is considered cool right now?”31
The answers are brilliant:
17 here. The word “lit”, trap music, being “THICC”, Vans, 
Converse, Gucci flip flops, chokers, crop tops, ripped jeans, 
bomber jackets, Kendrick Lamar, acrylic nails, going to the 
gym, athletic clothing, taking aesthetic pics of your dog or 
yourself or both together, being “relationship goals”, grinding 
at school dances, prom, being confident, being smart, being 
artistic, ooh and MEMES!!!!!
idk what else but those are the basics lol.32
30 See Sarah Kliff, Soo Oh, and Sarah Frostenson, “Today’s Teens Use 
Hallucinogens/Watch Television/Fight/Drink/Use Heroin/Have Babies/
Use Meth/Binge Drink/Carry Weapons to School Less than You Did,” Vox, 
June 9, 2016, https://www.vox.com/a/teens. 
31 rasras4, “Teens of Reddit, What Is Considered Cool Right Now?” Reddit, 
September 9, 2017, 16:55 GMT+2, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/
comments/6z23rj/teens_of_reddit_what_is_considered_cool_right_now/. 
32 Majestichuman, Comment on rasras4, “Teens of Reddit, What Is 
Considered Cool Right Now?” Reddit, September 9, 2017, 20:20 GMT+2, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/6z23rj/teens_of_reddit_
what_is_considered_cool_right_now/dms4g57




The most up-voted answers stressed irony as a fundamental ori-
entation (fig. 16).
Youth culture today, in two words: Sensibleness, and Memes. 
Seriousness, and taking nothing seriously.
Teenagers may be shifting away from posting Facebook 
status updates — partly because Facebook is where your mum 
and your aunties are hanging out — but one part of Facebook is 
thriving: Groups. Zuckerberg emphasized Groups in his “Build-
ing Global Community” strategy last year, with a putatively 
civic-minded goal to “strengthen people’s online and offline 
connections.”33 But he probably wasn’t thinking of groups like 
these (fig. 17).
Frequented mostly by an audience under 25, many of these 
groups are just sharing funny, ironic, meme-y content. Roots lie 
in what was called Weird Facebook — as documented by Jordan 
Pedersen in 2014, the group Shit Memes then had 30,000 fol-
lowers, and was one of the bigger groups around.34 Prior to that, 
Internet meme culture in the period 2008–2012 was being heav-
33 Mark Zuckerberg, “Building Global Community,” Facebook, February 16, 
2017, https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-
community/10154544292806634/. 
34 Jordan Pedersen, “Inside the Inscrutable World of Weird Facebook,” Daily 
Dot, August 5, 2014, https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/weird-facebook/. 




Fig. 17. Meme groups on Facebook
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ily driven by 4chan /b/ board, as Whitney Philips notes in This 
Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things.35 
But in the last couple of years, the Facebook meme group 
really took off. Articles started being written like “The Rise of 
Weird Facebook: How the World’s Biggest Social Network Be-
came Cool Again (and Why It Matters)” and “The Future of 
College is Facebook Meme Groups.”36
College and university meme groups are particularly inter-
esting spaces, because here the seriousness and the memeyness 
of the present generation of youth culture intersect, to often 
startling degree.
Sometimes it’s simply very educational, such as in groups 
like NUMTOTs: New Urbanist Memes for Transit-Oriented 
Teens, with 70K+ members.37 This group mixes an irrepressible 
35 Whitney Philips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2015), xx.
36 See Hudson Hongo, “The Rise of Weird Facebook: How the World’s 
Biggest Social Network Became Cool Again (and Why It Matters),” New 
York Magazine, February 25, 2016, http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/02/
weird-facebook-became-cool-again.html;  Paris Martineau, “The Future 




Fig. 18. NUMTOTs’s mapping of their intersecting obsessions, from 
peak transit to Elon Musk. Design: Mitchell Sheldrick.
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repurposing of other internet meme forms, from dog meme vo-
cabulary where every thing is a “boi” — “sad reaccs only for this 
r e p l a c e m e n t b o i” replacement bus service — with con-
temporary meme formats such as the recent American Chopper 
meme made into a debate about Shinkansen vs. Maglev trains, 
alongside serious discussion about the reforms needed to the 
transportation systems and urban planning of American cities.38
One testimonial notes: “I joined this group expecting memes 
and all I got was the equivalent of a bachelor’s in urban plan-
ning.”
But teenagers are using humor and irony — through the form 
of memes — to find ways to face up to and discuss deeper stress-
es and anxieties, too.
38 See Martin Belam, “Meme Explained: Why Do I Keep Seeing the 
Same Two Angry Men on Social Media?,” The Guardian, April 6, 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/06/meme-explained-
why-do-i-keep-seeing-the-same-two-angry-men-on-social-media; 















My alma mater, the career-obsessed cultural desert that is the 
London School of Economics, has a good line in memes which 
are almost entirely about the pressures students face in their 
studying and to get a good job (read: a banking or consultancy 
job) after graduation (fig. 19).
The LSE Memes admin gives barbed benedictions to its anon-
ymous contributors: “may they become one of our top banking 
lizard overlords,” “may their hourly consultancy rate collapse a 
small country’s economy,” and “may she get an unconditional 
offer from Rothschild so none of this matters.” The irony here 
is complex, capturing the students’ ambitions and their doubts 
and their critics, all at once.
Meanwhile, groups like Nihilistic Memes (1.9M followers) 
and Dank Memes (890K followers) are some of the biggest in 







Facebook, trafficking in — again — a kind of doomy empathy 
(fig. 20).39
What’s going on? Paris Martineau interviewed some of the 
founders of college meme groups for New York Magazine last 
year.40 The admins emphasize the empathetic function of the 
communities they have created: “my friends and I always say 
that memes come from a place of stress and anxiety,” notes 
Ephraim Sutherland, co-founder of Yale Memes for Special 
Snowflake Teens.
And “before the page, I had never seen anyone get together 
and talk about these issues,” Tril of UC Berkeley Memes for Edgy 
Teens recalled. “now, I feel like people aren’t afraid to talk about 
them out in the open.”
So through humor, and exaggeration, and irony — a kind of 
truth emerges about how people are feeling. A truth that they 
may not have felt able to express straight. And there’s more com-
munity here as in many of the more traditionally civic-oriented 
Groups Zuckerberg’s strategy may have had in mind.
But why memes?
The formal properties of the meme make it a particularly ef-
fective format for delivering an indirect payload of empathy.
A major vector in meme content in the past couple of years 
has been “relatability” — from the “Common White Girl” @girl-
posts Twitter account (fig. 21) celebrating the small failings of 
the everyday basic bitch (now suspended for stealing tweets), 
to reaction GIFs turning particularly expressive gestures into 
reusable, quotable forms (and particularly appropriating the 
emotional labor of black women, as Lauren Michele Jackson 
noted last year41). In consuming these memes — in liking and 
39 See https://www.facebook.com/nihilistmemes/, and https://www.facebook.
com/PlaceForMemes/. 
40 See Martineau, “The Future of College is Facebook Meme Groups.” 
41 Know Your Meme, s.v. “Common White Girl,” http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/common-white-girl; Julia Reinstein, “Twitter Just Suspended a Ton 
of Accounts Known for Stealing Tweets,” Buzzfeed, March 10, 2018, https://
www.buzzfeed.com/juliareinstein/twitter-dory-girlposts-suspended-
accounts-tweetdecking; and Lauren Michele Jackson, “We Need to Talk 
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sharing — the social media user is participating in a moment of 
commonality. They’re saying, “I am like this too.” These memes 
are predicated on a recognition of common human similarities.
Meme formats — from the recent American Chopper dialec-
tic model to the “Exploding Brain,” “Distracted Boyfriend,” and 
“Tag Yourself ” templates — are by their very nature iterative and 
quotable. That is how the meme functions, through reference to 
the original context and the memes that have gone before, cou-
pled with creative remixing to speak to a particular audience or 
topic or moment. Each new instance of a meme is thereby auto-
matically familiar and recognizable. The format carries a meta-
message to the audience: “this is familiar, not weird.” And the 
audience is pre-prepared to know how to react to this: you like, 
you “haha” emoji, and you tag your friends in the comments.
The format acts as a kind of Trojan Horse, then, for sharing 
difficult feelings — because the format pre-primes the audience 
to respond in a hospitable mode. There isn’t that moment of 
feeling stuck about how to respond to your friend’s big emotion-
al disclosure, because she hasn’t made the big statement quite 
directly, but through irony and cultural quotation — distanced 
about Digital Blackface in Reaction GIFs,” Teen Vogue, August 2, 2017, 
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs. 
Fig. 21. Tweet by Twitter account @girlposts.
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through memes typically using stock photography (as Leigh Al-
exander notes) rather than anything as gauche as a picture of 
oneself.42 This enables you the viewer to sidestep the full inten-
sity of it in your response, should you choose (but still, crucially, 
to respond). And also to DM your friend and ask, “hey, are you 
alright?” and cut to the realtalk should you so choose, too.
So a space is created, to talk about being stressed and over-
whelmed and unsure of the meaning of anything we do — space 
which is, I believe, more open than it has been in the past. As the 
mod of UC Berkeley Memes for Edgy Teens says, this “gets the 
conversation going, as I don’t think it would have even started 
without it.”43
And this is how memes help people speak truths.
What Does “Authenticity” Mean, Anyway?
“Thrown, in spite of myself, into the great world, without 
possessing its manners, and unable to acquire or conform 
to them, I took it into my head to adopt manners of my 
own, which might enable me to dispense with them.”
 — Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Confessions44
The concept of personal authenticity arises as part of Enlight-
enment rationality and a new, distinctively modern conception 
of the self. Rousseau argued that authenticity is diminished by 
the need for the esteem of others; one’s guide to conduct in life 
should come not from social pressures or external rules (e.g., 
the Church), but rather a source within — the sovereign, ration-
al individual.
42 Leigh Alexander, “The Many Faces of ‘Distracted Boyfriend’: On Stock 
Photography Memes and the Illusion of Reality,” Medium, September 29, 
2017, https://medium.com/s/i-o/the-many-faces-of-distracted-boyfriend-
299836ba4c89. 
43 See Martineau, “The Future of College is Facebook Meme Groups.” 




Twentieth-century philosophers — Sartre, Heidegger — rec-
ognized that this was perhaps a little more difficult than Rous-
seau claimed: the external world and its influences is inescap-
able and not straightforward to slough off, and nature and 
society shape us as much as our own choices. And so authentic-
ity must always be negotiated in complex interdependency with 
its opposite — that is, you were never really authentic in the first 
place.
That tension is what meme culture is negotiating: these un-
expected, witty truths emerging through the most inauthentic, 
borrowed, or stolen stock photograph content possible.
Because people still want to tell the truth about their lives, 
and the world: absolutely nothing has changed there.
What is changing, I argue, are the cultural formats people are 
using for discussion — the carrier waves for this signal. This is 
where “authenticity” isn’t a useful claim any more, having been 
wholly co-opted and commodified into its opposite. Culture 
and the way we communicate — shaped by media affordanc-
es — have got more complex and ironic and multi-layered than 
that.
It turns out, even people who share fake news stories are try-
ing to tell a kind of truth too.
At SXSW Edu this year, technology researcher danah boyd 
argued that we’ve been rather uncharitable in our analyses of 
why people share fake news. The assumption is that people re-
ally believe the claims they share — that is, they’re ill-informed; 
that is, they’re stupid. It turns out not to be quite so simple:
Yet, if you talk with someone who has posted clear, unques-
tionable misinformation, more often than not, they know 
it’s bullshit. Or they don’t care whether or not it’s true. Why 
do they post it then? Because they’re making a statement. 
The people who posted this meme [fig. 22] didn’t bother to 
fact check this claim. They didn’t care. What they wanted 
to signal loud and clear is that they hated Hillary Clinton. 
And that message was indeed heard loud and clear. As a re-
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sult, they are very offended if you tell them that they’ve been 
duped by Russians into spreading propaganda. They don’t 
believe you for one second.45
The people sharing this story are seeking to tell a kind of moral 
truth through metaphor and cultural quotation (the person 
shown in the picture is in fact performance artist Marina Abra-
movic). Not entirely unlike our meme-ing teens on Facebook.
What I’ve sought to argue in this essay, then, is that we are 
indeed living in an a strange, surface-centric moment in popu-
lar, digital culture right now — where the original “essence of 
things” has indeed become somewhat unfashionable (or just less 
entertaining). Social and media technologies, optimised for the 
diffusion of highly emotive, reaction-generating content, en-
courage a rapid trade in attention-grabbing ideas, over slower-
burning systematic, contextualized thinking.
Yet, even as “authenticity” as a claim and as an aesthetic 
feels outdated, deeper forms of “realness” in our communica-
45 See boyd, “You Think You Want Media Literacy…Do You?” 
Fig. 22. Source: Truthfeed. See Amy Moreno, “Breaking: Clinton 
Foundation Paid Occult ‘Spirit Cooking’ Priestess 10K For 





tions still persist. People are still seeking to communicate their 
deepest personal truths: their values, hopes, and fears with each 
other. Through sharing media, we’re still creating community.
Nonetheless, the kind of truth in play is changing form: 
emotional and moral truths are in ascendance over straightfor-
wardly factual claims. Truth becomes plural, and thereby highly 
contested: global warming, 9/11, or Obama’s birthplace are all 
treated as matters of cultural allegiance over “fact” as tradition-
ally understood. “By my reckoning, the solidly reality-based are 
a minority, maybe a third of us but almost certainly fewer than 
half,” Kurt Andersen posits.46 Electorates in the US and Europe 
are polarizing along value-driven lines — order and authority 
vs. openness and change.47 Building the coalitions of support 
needed to tackle the grand challenges we face this century will 
require a profound upgrade to our political and cultural leaders’ 
empathic and reconciliation skills.
46 See Andersen, “How America Lost Its Mind.”
47 See Eric Kaufmann, “It’s NOT the Economy, Stupid: Brexit as a Story 
of Personal Values,” LSE (blog), July 7, 2016, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
politicsandpolicy/personal-values-brexit-vote/. 





So perhaps to say that this post-authentic moment is one 
of evolving, increasingly nuanced collective communication 
norms, able to operate with multi-layered recursive meanings 
and ironies in disposable pop culture content…is kind of cold 
comfort.
Nonetheless, author Robin Sloan described the genius of the 
American Chopper meme as being that “THIS IS THE ONLY MEME 
FORMAT THAT ACKNOWLEDGES THE EXISTENCE OF COMPETING 
INFORMATION, AND AS SUCH IT IS THE ONLY FORMAT SUITED TO 
THE COMPLEXITY OF OUR WORLD!”48
May it yet save us.
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The Work of Art(iculation) 
in the Age of Memic 
Rhythmicality: Memes between 
Form, Content, and Structure
Dan Bristow
I
n the preface to the first edition of his Critique of Pure Rea-
son, Immanuel Kant states:
If we measured the size of a book, not by the number of its 
pages, but by the time we require for mastering it, then it 
could be said of many a book that it would be much shorter if 
it were not so short. On the other hand, if we ask how a wide-
ranging whole of speculative knowledge that yet coheres in 
one principle can best be rendered intelligible, we might be 
equally justified in saying that many a book would have been 
clearer if it had not tried to be so very clear. The reader does 
not arrive quickly enough at an overview of the whole, and 
the bright colours of illustrations hide and distort the articu-
lation and organization of the system, which, after all, matter 
most if we want to judge of its unity and solidity.1
1 Immanuel Kant, “Preface to the First Edition,” in Critique of Pure Reason, 




Similar criteria could be applied in a critique of pure memage: 
in any meme-building exercise, brevity and clarity are requisite, 
but can also naturally come at the cost of a fuller appreciation 
of a situation’s complexity, which mightn’t be open to so reduc-
tive a rendering; a well-crafted meme will jostle but should ul-
timately balance correlatively with its wider contextualization, 
which it will also offset in some catchy, critical, or farcical way, 
although it is of course this that might misconstrue further 
problematics inherent in that upon which it is a commentary 
(none of which it might be too bothered by), in its quest for 
virality; if misjudged, a meme will fail in its intended purpose, 
remaining pat and static — although, of course, a meme can 
easily run off from authorial grasp, as Pepe has proven — and 
endlessly be de- and reterritorialized.2 Thus, a meme in part is 
a play between reduction, reductiveness, and also often irreduc-
ibility; that is, a meme can encompass that kernel, or bit, that 
sticks, that resonates, that may illuminate — however fleetingly, 
or only introductorily — the principle in which its subject mat-
ter coheres (however temporary this phenomenon of coherence 
itself might prove be upon the dank waves of discursivity).3 The 
emphasis.
2 Even in terms of the articulation of the spread of memes, and of memic 
popularity, something of a dichotomy can be seen between the terms most 
commonly used to describe this: the disease-laced, parasitic “virality,” and 
the equality-couched (re)distributive “shareability.”
3 I have in previous work relayed this against “sinthomic” processes in 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, conceptualising the sinthome as a sort of 
empty signified, or memic blank, in which a “little bit of real” can get stuck 
and effloresce enjoyable meaning, or myriad meanings (“enjoymeants”). 
An early instance that chimes with this current work can be found in EDA 
Collective, “The Sinthomic Blank in Future Bass and Dubstep,” in Twerking 
to Turking: Everyday Analysis, Volume 2 (Alresford: Zero Books, 2015), 
158–59. In this vein, much in the way of memes and the analysis of their 
modes of operation can be run through a musicological lens, from the 
(formal) units into which musical measurement is divided, to practices 
like that employed by the band The Books, of selecting instances of “found 
sound” (as the content) to construct their songs around (which can 
perhaps be likened to practices involved in shitposting); see their collected 
works: The Books, A Dot in Time (New York: Temporary Residence 
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ur-meme is rhythmical — like a beat, or measure, or, better still, 
like a riddim, as utilized in reggae and dancehall music — over 
which the memic message may dance (to put this in Nietzs-
chean terms: the Apollonian opens out onto the Dionysian), but 
the argument to be made here will posit that this is not simply 
a matter of form, or forms, being filled with content, but some-
thing more dialectical, structural. 
The object of the brief analysis ahead will thus be to look 
at memes, alongside other instances of internet activity — com-
ments, for example, into which memes are often post-
ed — through the spectral lens of three interconnected catego-
ries: form, content, and structure. Its aim will be to postulate 
some of the ways in which the subject matter of these activities 
gets spectralized through such means (that may in fact amount 
to — however consciously or unconsciously — methods) of rep-
resentation. For example, let’s take a “meme” (approximating 
more the Dawkinsian sense here; as something that has been 
reduced into a transferrable bit, or kernel) to begin at; that of 
sexism: what might sprout out of just this decontextualized, 
memically presented phenomenon — that is, excerpted here as 
only something like a trigger word — might be instances of frag-
ile male egoic fears over just what behaviors men are “any longer 
permitted,” and the attendant victim blaming and berating that 
comes with these attitudes; essentialist universalizations based 
on psycho-social and medico-nominative promulgations of sex 
and gender, and the misapprehension of the ideologies underly-
ing these; structuralist accounts of how sexism is inscribed in 
the very contours of systematicities that format and formulate 
how sex and gender are experienced by modern and historical 
subjects. From the structuralist position that this essay launches 
from, form and content will come to be conceived as something 
like sides, both unified to, and separated from, each other by 
structure, or structures, understandings, or apprehensions, of 
which may be able to rein back in from other sides biases or 
Limited, 2012). For more on memic-musical crossings, see Tom Whyman’s 
chapter on the online art of The Simpsons in this collection.
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prejudices rigid adherence to them can give rise to. This is not 
say that structuralism is something like “neutrality,” or a claim 
to some inherent truth, but that it can be utilized as a principle 
for apprehending and contemplating division, contradiction, 
and antagonism, and that it is in the thus dialectically material-
ist place of these that it takes up its very position. For each cate-
gory we will take up discussion of a topic that makes it regularly 
into meme posting and online activity in the political realm: for 
form, feminism; for content, racism; and for structure, capital-
ism.
Form
   “The Queen being the Queen isn’t an 
emancipatory feminist fact.”
 — Dawn Foster, Lean Out
In her extremely insightful short tract Lean Out (2015), Dawn 
Foster exposes a great deal of what we might term “formalist 
feminism” (including corporate feminism, choice feminism, 
lifestyle feminism, etc.), encompassed for Foster in the project 
and projected image of Sheryl Sandberg, and her book — the ti-
tle of which Foster of course flips — Lean In (2013). Its subtitle, 
Women, Work, and the Will to Lead, sums up its stance: if wom-
en will it, it will come; success is achievable in the workplace, 
top positions are available to women, if the requisite effort is 
put in. Just look at this case in point: Sandberg made it to Chief 
Operating Officer (COO) of Facebook. But because one woman 
has, doesn’t mean all women can, which is what the argument 
seems to boil down to.4
4 Although they’re brilliant for young readers, and a very welcome 
publishing event, this is something that Elena Favilli and Francesca 
Cavello’s Goodnight Stories for Rebel Girls books, for example — and 
probably necessitously, given the complexity to be communicated 
to a younger audience who are less likely to have had, or to 
have been parentally more protected from, directly oppressive 
experiences — structurally elide. Such subsequent publications as The 
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An inspirational message tacked on to a professional corpo-
rate photograph mightn’t tend to be what we first think of in 
terms of dank meme stashes, but such of Sandberg exist (quot-
ing her “if you’re offered a seat on a rocket ship, don’t ask what 
seat. Just get on” soundbite, for example), and are no doubt 
shared, most likely on “professional networking” social media 
sites like LinkedIn, where they’ll be posted with the intention 
of chivvying along the aspiration-shy into becoming better lad-
der climbers, while they really partake of a form of policing dis-
sent — from those who might bemoan the fact that however far 
they’ve leant in, it hasn’t worked out for them — and any poten-
tial break-ins of emotional, or political (not business-minded 
politics, that is), subjectivity, through a sort of accidental, or un-
Good Guys: 50 Heroes Who Changed the World with Kindness, which 
focuses on compassionate men only, not only ride the bandwagon, and 
miss the point, but can only seem a tad reactionary.




conscious, user-generated, and mob/mod-moderated, panopti-
cal surveillance (fig. 1).
The form that this takes in corporate feminism is that if she 
could, you can; in corporate egalitarianism (in other words, 
the sovereign rule of individualism, in emulation of the “free” 
market economy), if they could, you can (and if you don’t, that’s 
down to you): nothing else should be considered (e.g., the con-
ditions into which one was born, opportunities, nepotism, etc.). 
The ideological maneuver of the formalism at work here has 
repackaged and re-presented — even sold (such professional 
networking sites often offer a paid premium service boasting 
of boosting success rates) — a universalized individual as an 
individualized universal; that is, they make out such successful 
figures to merely be individuals who have achieved the univer-
sally achievable, and then attach this to a social cause as an add-
on: advancements made in feminism, “social mobility,” “self-
makeable success,” etc. This (self-help 101) formula is simple: 
“because a woman, so all women”; because a worker got a pro-
motion — perhaps even jumped a class boundary — all workers 
can, because a success was self-made, all successes can be. 
What is occurring is the transposition of an individual con-
tent into a universal form. Foster explains this in the confused 
conflation of feminism with anything that pertains to women, 
or even a particular woman, in the phenomenon of “choice fem-
inism [that] states that any choice is feminist purely by virtue 
of having been made by a woman: that she is in a position to, 
and has, made a choice is thereby feminist. There’s little analysis 
paid to what this means for women in society as a whole.”5 A 
part — which in this instance happens to be of the correctly cor-
responding gender — is mistaken for, or wilfully construed as, 
the whole. This is what feeds into how feminism becomes appre-
hended by its antagonists. Most often male (though also anti-
feminist female) resentment becomes stoked up by the idea — a 
tautological extension of its original — that because a woman 
is a woman, they can do this and that, and may even be un-
5 Dawn Foster, Lean Out (London: Repeater Books, 2016), 61–62.
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fairly favored to. (This finds voice, for example, in a supposedly 
meritocracy-advocating railing against “equal opportunities” in 
employment law: memes along these lines contain such mes-
sages as, “Discrimination against women is wrong/Discrimina-
tion against men is equal opportunity,” or Morpheus from The 
Matrix saying, “What if I told you/the term ‘equal opportunity’ 
has become a euphemism for: ‘straight white males need not ap-
ply’” (figs. 2, 3). There then may also arise the paranoid male fear 
that women have become untouchable, a priori, by any criticism 
or reprobation — not to mention, in its creepiest manifestation, 
sexually; misrecognition of what consent, and conversation, is 
being paramount to this — because of their status as women 
(which completely misrecognizes the culturally promulgated 
and then unquestioningly assumed possessive right to — or 
something like unpaid debt from — women; women’s bodies, 
and minds). And yet this can also extend into paranoiacally 
checking oneself for hallmarks of anti-feminism (and this is the 





kind of formalism that can get mobilized by liberals; for exam-
ple, against the straw man of universalized “brocialism”6). In her 
6 While there are of course actual ‘Bernie Bros,” the construal of all 
Sanders supporters being such is preposterous. On this, Angela Nagle 
is illuminating: “while the alt-right regard the Guardian [sic], BBC and 
CNN as the media of ‘the left,’ espousing ‘Cultural Marxism,’ it became 
obvious when the possibility of any kind of economically ‘left’ political 
force emerged that liberal media sources were often the most vicious 
and oppositional. Liberal feminist journalist Joan Walsh called Bernie 
Sanders’s supporters ‘Berniebot keyboard warriors,’ while Salon [sic] was 
one of the main propagators of the Berniebro meme with headlines like, 
‘Bernie Bros out of control: Explosion of misogynist rage…’ and, ‘Just like 
a Bernie Bro, Sanders bullies Clinton…’ Meanwhile Vice, a magazine that 
made its brand on the most degenerate combination of vacuous hipster 
aesthetics and pornified transgression, published things like ‘How to spot 
a brocialist.” Before the elections The Guardian [sic] newspaper ran a piece 
with the comically cultish wording: ‘Time to hail Hilary Clinton — and 
face down the testosterone left.’ Despite overwhelming evidence of Bernie’s 
popularity among young women, the myth was relentlessly peddled until 
it passed into the realm of Internet truth. The old liberal establishment 
then weighed in; for example, when feminist Gloria Steinem claimed 
that these numerous female Bernie fans were merely trying to impress 
their male peers. In the UK, an almost identical phenomenon occurred 
when the British liberal media establishment, in particular The Guardian 
[sic], joined forces with their more youthful online offspring in smearing 
Fig. 3. Source: Imgflip. See https://imgflip.com/i/18ri2u.
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book, Foster effortlessly puts paid to these notions with these 
statements: “criticism of any woman isn’t anti-feminist purely 
because she is a woman: women occupy all sections of society 
now. The Queen being the Queen isn’t an emancipatory feminist 
fact. Margaret Thatcher harmed more than helped women by 
becoming Prime Minister.”7
A reduction to, and reliance on, form in these instances is a 
cruel and dominative, often unconscious, circular logic that yet 
will regularly misrecognize itself — if not more insidiously moti-
vated — as a clear, logical response to progressive social change. 
Feminism in these instances is mistaken for, and distilled into, 
formalism. This distillation is handy for those who want to criti-
cize feminism, as through characterizing it as formalist makes 
it appear illogical. Cunningly and connivingly, form is relied 
upon in this maneuver, while it is railed against, and anything 
beyond it (that might surface in terms of content — particular 
women’s experiences, which are formally subsumed into grand 
and overarching narratives about those types of experience — or 
structure, which might hint at other, outside forces at work) is 
constrained to silence and the shadows.
Content
“It’s clear that equality doesn’t quite cut it. Asking for a 
sliver of disproportional power is too polite a request. I 
don’t want to be included. Instead, I want to question who 
created the standard in the first place. After a lifetime 
of embodying difference, I have no desire to be equal. I 
want to deconstruct the structural power of a system that 
marked me out as different. I don’t wish to be assimilated 
into the status quo. I want to be liberated from all negative 
Corbyn and his supporters as being motivated primarily by this nefarious 
tide of brocialism, despite his squeaky-clean track record on women’s 
issues in the UK.” See Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online Culture Wars 
from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right (Alresford: Zero 
Books, 2017), 43–44.
7 Foster, Lean Out, 79.
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assumptions that my characteristics bring. The onus is 
not on me to change. Instead, it’s the world around me.”
 — Reni Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White 
People about Race8
Racism, like sexism (most overtly, yet not exclusively), operates 
along formalist lines: it reduces anything and everything that 
is subjectively individual to an “ineluctable modality” (to use 
James Joyce’s famous words), to the color of one’s skin (or an-
other racial marker). It is of course, and it can only be, those on 
the receiving end of it that will know this best.9 While present-
ing in form is obvious, racism does a better job at hiding behind 
content (whether its hosts in such circumstances wittingly know 
8 Reni Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People about Race 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 184.
9 In the introduction to Mike and Trevor Phillips’s Windrush — published 
on the fiftieth anniversary of the Empire Windrush’s arrival on British 
shores in 1948 — they discuss the fact that “few black British people can 
be in any doubt that the majority of their fellow citizens take the colour of 
their skins to be a characteristic which defines what they are and what they 
can do,” and how this has affected citizenship status: “if we were engaged 
in a struggle, it wasn’t about our ‘acceptance’ as individuals. Instead, it was 
about our status as citizens, and it seemed obvious that if our citizenship 
was to mean more than the paper on which it was written, it would be 
necessary for the whole country to reassess not only its own identity, 
and history, but also what it meant to be British.” See Mike Phillips and 
Trevor Phillips, Windrush: The Irresistible Rise of Multi-Racial Britain 
(London: HarperCollins, 1998), 5. The Windrush scandal, that broke over 
the course of 2018 (another significant anniversary), clearly indicates the 
retardation that this reassessment has met with, with governmental policy 
still operating along fundamentally formalist racist lines in its intentional 
creation of a “hostile environment” that would lead to deportations to 
meet target figures. (One resultant meme — utilizing a homophonic play 
on words — shows a back-and-forth between former Home Secretary, 
and architect of these scandalous policies, Prime Minister Theresa May 
and then-Home Secretary (who resigned in light of the scandal, and fell 
on May’s Sword) Amber Rudd: ‘‘One of my constituents is going to the 
Caribbean”/“Jamaica?”/“Yes.’’ It is featured in Paul Sorene, ‘Windrush 
Children Only Became Visible When They Became Criminals,” Anorak, 
April 17, 2018, http://www.anorak.co.uk/449047/politicians/windrush-
children-only-became-visible-when-they-became-criminals.html.
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it — or rather, understand it — or not). Content is what often gets 
mobilized and deployed against anti-racism, and is, in the deep-
est sense, reactionary. Race itself might remain untouched — is-
sues pertaining to race unacknowledged — in conversations os-
tensibly on the topic, due to this maneuver; for example, if in 
flagging up elements of the structural racism of white people 
and institutions, it gets met with a “but” (the famous “but” that 
always implies a little more than meets the eye in matters of rac-
ism; i.e., in the commonplace “I’m not racist, but…”), we can 
often provide the translation: “but I’m not racist, so that notion’s 
invalid.” What is probably often missed, even by the (supposed) 
defendants, in this defense, is the fact that it defends beyond it-
self. In this unnecessary retort, the individual is (perhaps unwit-
tingly) universalizing, deflecting not only from oneself, but, due 
to recourse to this method of defense, from the structure(s) un-
der critique. In relation to clashes stoked by racism in the city of 
Nottingham in the UK in 1958, Reni Eddo-Lodge talks of “white 
resentment towards the city’s black residents [being] rife, and 
black resentment at white resentment […] simmering.”10 What’s 
occurring, absurdly, in these abovementioned content-fueled 
reactions, are thus manifestations of white resentment at black 
resentment at white resentment.
As she delineates time and again in her extraordinary book 
Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People about Race, when 
conversations go this way, the original topic is quickly gotten 
away from; the focus most often becomes the injured ego of the 
other party; racism and race dissolve away, and “reverse rac-
ism” — a perennially memed concept — rears its head. In the 
added chapter to the paperback edition, “Aftermath,” Eddo-
Lodge discusses the book’s publication, and the waves it ended 
up making. Even before its release, she discusses how the title 
(taken from the name she gave to the 2014 blog post that in 
many ways launched the project) and the cover were received: 
“when I posted the cover to social media, roughly a year before 
publication, the shares were out of control, and the anticipation 
10 Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People about Race, 23.
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was palpable. Much of this response was thanks to that cardinal 
sin — judging a book by its cover.”11 The cover portrays the title 
in black against a white background, except for the words “to 
white people,” which are debossed into the white of the cover 
(and appear in white on white on the spine) (it is hoped that 
handholding through metaphorical decoding here should be 
unnecessary).12
Like a red rag to a bull, the attention came in droves. It en-
thralled some, and sent others into a rage. In amongst the 
praise were early signs of ire from white people; some lec-
tured me about segregation, or told me Martin Luther King 
Junior would never approve of my work. Others admonished 
me for my prejudice.
[…] This was the scenario an east London bookseller re-
layed to me after I visited her shop to sign books. An elderly 
white man had entered the shop, saw the book in the win-
dow, and, shaking with rage, proceeded to make a scene at 
the counter, angry because ‘it wouldn’t be allowed the other 
way round’. ‘He was so angry, I couldn’t speak to him’, she told 
me. Then there was the young black man who, on reading 
the book in public, had to endure the displeasure of a white 
woman approaching him to let him know that the book he 
was reading ‘really didn’t help the conversation’. White mid-
dle class people can be particularly calculated with their dis-
comfort.13
11 Ibid., 231.
12 In an earlier, and probably quite inadequate, essay, I briefly explored 
similar ways in which Audre Lorde has shown up the social hiddenness of 
whiteness and racism in her work (the word “white,” for example, being 
always lowercase in contrast to the always capitalized signifier “Black”). 
See Daniel Bristow, “New Spellings: Auto-orthographies in Zami and 
Vanity of Duluoz,” Life Writing 11, no. 3 (2014): 275–92.
13 Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People about Race, 
231–32.
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In a meme, Dr Evil from the Austin Powers film franchise looks 
quizzically to camera with this statement superimposed: “I no-
ticed that you hate racism and openly protest against it/But you 
are being racist by accusing anyone who’s white of being racist.”14 
(Whether the substitution of “anyone” for “everyone” was delib-
erate or unconscious, it nonetheless highlights the racism out 
of which the meme originates.) The (very personal) instances 
of offense taken in the quotation above accord to these “reverse 
racism” lines: the first seems unabashedly racist in identifying 
something as racist and then bemoaning that “it wouldn’t be 
allowed the other way round”; the second in denial, specifically 
of structural racism, in suggesting that it is not “helping the con-
versation,” but not asking by whom this “conversation” has been 
set; if it’s even really taking place; or why it should be a “conver-
sation” at all, as if whether racism is valid or not is, and should 
be, up for debate.
As Eddo-Lodge simply and unequivocally puts it: “racism 
does not go both ways. There are unique forms of discrimination 
that are backed up by entitlement, assertion and, most impor-
tantly, supported by a structural power strong enough to scare 
you into complying with the demands of the status quo. We have 
to recognise this.”15 The elision of the structural in not thinking 
privilege — hallmarked in “entitlement,” “assertion,” and “pow-
er” — can only make the content claim show its disingenuous-
ness. We arrive back at the assumed meritocracy (as if it is the 
unchallengeably societally inherent order of things), and the 
kind of sentiment that underwrites the memes that champion it 
(a meme supposedly in sympathy with Rachel Dolezal — the for-
mer president of the National Association for the Advancement 
14 This meme and the one (of Rachel Dolezal) mentioned below are featured 
and discussed in Tabi, “Memes as Racialized Discourse,” Medium, 
December 28, 2017, https://medium.com/digital-sociology-at-vcu/memes-
as-racialized-discourse-ef73e23798d5. For another analysis of a racist 
meme that utilizes the idea of “reverse racism,” see my “Refugees and the 
Racism Crisis,” in EDA Collective, Politactics: Political Conversations from 
Everyday Analysis (Alresford: Zero Books, 2016), 88–92.
15 Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People about Race, 98.
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of Colored People who lied about being black, and identifies as 
“transracial” — puts over a picture of her the words: “When you 
have to lie about being black/Just to get a job”). Eddo-Lodge 
deftly puts paid to these notions:
The underlying assumption to all opposition to positive dis-
crimination is that it just isn’t fair play.
The insistence is on merit, insinuating that any current 
majority white leadership in any industry has got there 
through hard work and no outside help, as if whiteness isn’t it 
its own leg-up, as if it doesn’t imply a familiarity that warms 
an interviewer to a candidate. When each of the sectors I 
mentioned earlier have such dire racial representations, 
you’d have to be fooling yourself if you really think that the 
homogeneous glut of middle-aged white men currently clog-
ging the upper echelons of most professions got there purely 
through talent alone. We don’t live in a meritocracy, and to 
pretend that simple hard work will elevate all to success is an 
exercise in wilful ignorance.16
What can be discerned in these supposedly meritocracy-advo-
cating responses is the fact that content mobilizes itself to mili-
tate against its perceived accusers (non-structurally-informed 
content feels persecuted), which it singles out in any sugges-
tion that form (structurally co-opted form, that is) may have 
had a part to play in one’s success, privilege, power, attainment 
of private property, etc. — down to whatever last vestige can be 
hierarchically held onto against another. Its range of memic 
tropes — from “I’m alright, Jack” to “wan’t me, guv” — want to 
be seen to be de-logicizing, and thereby delegitimizing, discus-
sions that touch on race and (structural manifestations of) rac-
ism (by appearing to quarantine racism off as a purely formal 
prejudice that others may have, and which one’s own content 
thus entirely resists (“nothing to do with me”), thus mistaking 
the opposite of racism as (passive) non-racism, as opposed to 
16 Ibid., 78–79.
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(active) anti-racism). But these contented tropes — in both the 
senses of relying on content and resting on laurels — are really 
rather purposefully evading any dialectical engagement with 
the issues at hand.
Structure
“At this point, it may be useful to try to identify some of the 
important characteristics and implications of a structural 
approach to symbolic systems and cultural forms. First, 
meaning does not arise in the world, it is not there waiting 
to be discovered. Meaning is not something which is out 
there in the world apart from language which language, 
acting simply like a mirror, reflects. The world is what it 
is, and societies use the instrumentality of symbolism to 
make certain relations in the world intelligible to them. 
They have to impose a system of meaning on the world. 
[…] Meaning and intelligibility are articulated onto the 
world. It is not given or already present in the world and 
then simply expressed or reproduced through language.”
 — Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies 198317
Memes present an indeterminate face; their messages, if in ear-
nest, often verge so much on the absurd that it is difficult to tell 
if they’re irony or iron-fistedness. Indeed, with many memes, 
satire is in the irony of the beholder.18 The range of responses in 
typical comments sections (encompassing earnestness, gullibil-
ity, failure to “get” the joke, trolling) is indicative here. Memes 
become, and are infinitely open to becoming, overdetermined. 
As cultural creations, in their origination they are steeped in 
meaning (or even attempts at anti-meaning, amongst certain 
17 Stuart Hall, Cultural Studies 1983: A Theoretical History (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016), 66.
18 See Jay Owens’s article above and Giacomo Bianco’s below for more on 
how irony is marshalled, and is inherent, in relation to memes.
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avant-gardists), but — to use Stuart Hall’s words above — mean-
ing and intelligibility are also articulated onto memes.
Hall outlines in a series of lectures newly collected as Cultural 
Studies 1983 some vital lessons about capitalism, hegemony, and 
(prefiguring to some extent Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersection-
ality) the crossovers between different struggles: gender, race, 
class. Fundamentally, culture is presented by Hall as operating 
on the plane of articulation: 
The relationship between social forces and ideology is ab-
solutely dialectical[.] It is the articulation, the nonnecessary 
link between a social force which is making itself and the 
ideology or conceptions of the world which make intelligible 
the process they are going through, which begins to bring 
onto the historical stage a new social position and political 
position, a new set of social and political subjects.19
In the Internet age, the memic field is one on which the process 
of articulation plays out. Capitalism is a complex structural and 
structuring system that, like the meme itself, thrives on its in-
determinacy, as it does on its crises.20 That is to say, the less it 
can be made sense of, the more mystically essential and neces-
sitous it can seem. Plenty of pro-capitalist or anti-socialist reac-
tion memes will sarcastically juxtapose pictures of unidentified 
Western suburban streets with those of (equally unidentified) 
rundown “foreign” slums, presented in a sort of “no-brainer-
between-these-alternatives” manner, without any questioning 
of, e.g., population demographics; whether comparable streets 
and areas exist vice versa, and in what proximity to each other; 
where — if that’s the case — has greater inequality or larger di-
19 Hall, Cultural Studies 1983, 145–46.
20 The structure of capitalism is a sublime force, incalculable (it demands so 
many different sets of sums, so variegated an array of economic approaches 
to the very idea of doing the maths, in its current metastases) in its 
massiveness. Often it is whimsicality that is the only thing that can look 
in the face of the sublime, hence…Cats Against Capitalism (and similar 
Facebook groups, Twitter feeds, memes, etc.).
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vides between rich and poor, and what sections of society might 
be affected by these divides (racially, in terms of gender, etc.); 
whether what we see on the “non-capitalist” side is in fact an ef-
fect of global(ized) capitalism; whether there’s an amount of glee 
taken in the implicit conclusion that the pro-capitalist memer 
(and their intended audience) belongs to the suburban and not 
the slum scene, and if this is indicative of class prejudice, etc. 
(figs. 4, 5). As both Foster and Eddo-Lodge delineate in their 
books, while there are important differences in respective inter-
sectional struggles that must be respected, capitalism is a struc-
turing force that more often than not doesn’t respect these, and 




which can separate society along not only class lines, but within 
these, further along gender and race lines (Foster: “women have 
been disproportionately affected by austerity, with single moth-
ers and pensioners particularly affected”; Eddo-Lodge: “in the 
wake of the 2015 summer budget, analysis from race equality 
think tank the Runnymede Trust found that 4 million black and 
minority ethnic people would be worse off as a result of it, that 
BME people were over-represented in areas hit by the budget, 
and that race inequality will worsen over time because of it”).21
21 See Foster, Lean Out, 20 (her data is taken from Tracy McVeigh, “Spending 
Cuts Hit Women Worse, Says Report,” The Guardian, September 21, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/sep/21/spending-cuts-women-
report, and the Women’s Budget Group report), and Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m 
No Longer Talking to White People about Race, 192.
Fig. 5. Source: Ballmemes. See https://ballmemes.com/i/socialism-vs-
capitalism-la-ideal-s-para-regalos-prestamos-joyas-20705320.
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Hall identifies “an interdiscursive field generated by at least 
three different contradictions (class, race, gender), each of which 
has a different history; a different mode of operation; each di-
vides and classifies the world in different ways.”22 In memes we 
see concretised ways in which the world gets cut up into ele-
ments of its ideological representation; snapshots of thought 
within the conjunctural articulation; “ways in which class, race, 
and gender are articulated with one another to establish par-
ticular condensed social positions[, which are] by definition 
overdetermined.”23 It is on the plane of articulation that their 
overdetermination is hegemonically fought over. As Hall states: 
“the domain of culture and ideology is where those new posi-
tions are opened and where the new articulations have to be 
made. And in that domain, people can change and struggle.”24
Memes are bits lodged in the cultural, and are part of the stuff 
that makes it up. Seizing the memes of production means that 
we need to see resistance as the continual practices of work-
ing on the cultural domain and opening up cultural possibili-
ties. […] The conditions within which people are able to con-
struct subjective possibilities and new political subjectivities 
for themselves are not simply given in the dominant system. 
They are won in the practices of articulation which produce 
them.25 
What Hall articulates most pertinently is a properly structural 
analysis that favors neither form nor content in highlighting the 
22 Hall, Cultural Studies 1983, 150.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 190.
25 Ibid., 206. One example of the memic jostling for socially just articulation 
can be seen in Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing (1989), in Buggin Out’s 
(Giancarlo Esposito) campaign to have black heroes featured on Sal’s 
(Danny Aiello) Wall of Fame in his Famous Pizzeria, and in Smiley’s 
(Roger Guenveur Smith) symbolic seizure of the wall, redistributing 
its representation with Martin Luther King Jr. and Malcolm X, after 




irreducibility of difference (which sustains intersectional unity), 
and the politics that can arise out of such an analytic: 
It is necessary […] to acknowledge the irreducibility of one 
contradiction to another. Different contradictions have dif-
ferent effects in the social field, and it is the tendency to re-
duce one to the other that is the theoretical problem. For this 
reason, the suspension of the capitalist mode of production 
in a particular society will not guarantee the liberation of 
blacks, women, or subordinate classes.
[…] The only alternative is a Marxist politics which rec-
ognises the necessary differentiation of different struggles 
and the importance of these struggles on different fronts, 
that is to say, a Marxist politics which understands the na-
ture of a hegemonic politics, in which different struggles take 
the leading position on a range of different fronts. Such […] 
rejects reductionism in favor of an understanding of com-
plexity in unity or unity through complexity.26
What memes can and do teach us is that the very dialectic be-
tween form and content is structural, and in its effects is mate-
rial. Thus, while — as Hall puts it, apropos of the above — “the 
mode of production does not command every contradiction,” 
the mode of articulation can come to positively alter the con-
tradictions if seized successfully.27 In terms of the work of 
art(iculation) in the age of memic rhythmicality, then, we are 
such stuff as memes are made on, and it is in memes that one 
source of such articulable potential resides. 
∴, carpe meme.
26 Hall, Cultural Studies 1983, 84–185.
27 Ibid., 185.
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An Emoji for René Girard: 
Memes, Memesis, and the 
Apocalypse of the Eternally 
Irrelevant
Eric Wilson
“Of all the sorrows which afflict mankind, the 
bitterest is this, that one should have consciousness 
of much, but control over nothing.”
 — Herodotus
“Men think themselves free simply because they 
are conscious of their actions and ignorant of 
the causes by which they are determined.”
 — Benedict de Spinoza
“I have given a name to my pain.”
 — Friedrich Nietzsche 
“All desire is a desire for being.”




“‘This is my first chance to do some work 
that actually means something.’
‘Means “something” to who? You had a career, Dad, before 
the third comic book movie. When people began to forget 
who was inside that Bird costume. You’re doing a play 
based on a book written sixty years ago for a thousand 
rich old white people whose only concern is where they’re 
going to go for their cake and coffee when it’s over. Nobody 
gives a shit but you. And…let’s…face it…Dad…you 
are not doing this for the sake of Art, you are doing this 
because you want to feel relevant again. Well, guess what? 
There is an entire world out there where people fight to be 
relevant every single day and you act like it doesn’t exist! 
Things are happening in a place that you ignore, a place 
that—by the way—has already forgotten about you. I 
mean, who the fuck are you? You hate bloggers, you mock 
Twitter, you don’t even have a Facebook page. You’re the 
one who doesn’t exist! You’re doing this because you’re 
scared to death, like the rest of us, that you don’t matter. 
And you know what? You’re right. You don’t. It’s not 
important—okay? You’re not important—get used to it…
…Dad?’”
 — Michael Keaton and Emma Stone discussing the problem 
of being relevant in Alejandro Gonzalez Iñárritu, dir.,  Bird-
man, or (The Unexpected Virtue of Ignorance) (2014)
“
Il existe à la base de la vie humaine, un principe d’insuffisance,” 
as Georges Bataille would say. Living under the aegis of so-
cial media, the central question of Existenz has become: 
what does it mean to be “relevant”? The answer is: being rel-
evant means Being-Model-for-Other. The underlying problem 
for us is that “the disappearance of the subject [is], more or less, 
the mirror image of the disappearance of the real.”1 If the real 
question, as Jean Baudrillard darkly hints, has never been the 
1 Jean Baudrillard, Why Hasn’t Everything Disappeared?, trans. Chris Turner 
(London: Seagull Books, 2009), 26.
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nature of reality but the value of reality, then our entire histori-
cal predicament can justifiably be denoted as the post-human: 
the irreversible disappearance of the traditional ontological ref-
erent (the Self) into the annihilating domain of pure virtuality. 
We should have seen this coming.
It is not as though we hadn’t been warned. The first sign 
(excluding for now those prophesized by Jacques Ellul) came 
with the publication of Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spec-
tacle in 1967. Within the soulless heart of Debordean society 
lies the detritus of the wholesale collapse of politics into mass 
media, yielding us the hegemony of “spectacular power” which 
is subsumed within the onto-politics of the integrated spectacle, 
the cultural reification of media as the sole arbiter of “truth”: 
“the whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of 
production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation 
of spectacles. All that once was directly lived has become mere 
representation.”2 We call these “modern conditions of produc-
tion” late capitalism, under which there has been a parallel col-
lapse within the political economy of use value into exchange 
value. For Baudrillard, Debord’s very approximate successor, 
the integrated spectacle has been superseded by integral real-
ity, the collapse of the integrated spectacle into social media; 
if the Society of the Spectacle was the sign of what we call the 
post-modern, then integral reality is the sign of the successor 
state of the post-human which brings in its wake its own form 
of political economy, what I call post-human capitalism: the 
collapse of post-use exchange value into simulation, or what 
Baudrillard refers to as “The Code.” “Everything within pro-
duction and the economy becomes commutable, reversible and 
exchangeable according to the same indeterminate specularity 
as we find in politics, fashion or the media”3 — which, although 
perfectly “real” is, paradoxically, utterly “impossible” (or un-
2 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Zone Books, 1995), 12.
3 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Ian Grant (London: 
Sage Publications, 1993), 16.
140
Post Memes
bearable), for, as Baudrillard assures us, a “world of total, in-
stantaneous, perpetual communication is unthinkable and, in 
any case, intolerable.”4 Which nonetheless happens to be exactly 
where we now find ourselves. Unknowingly, we, as the denizens 
of integral reality, are fundamentalists of a sort, the devotees of 
the “only true fundamentalism,” which, “giving rise to the only 
true terror, is the fundamentalism of a fluid, mobile technoc-
racy, the technocracy of flows and networks, of an inexorable 
dissemination and mental diaspora: a fundamentalism without 
foundations.”5 We are fanatical in our commitment to the evacu-
ation of the grounds of our being and by our fruits (signs?) the 
world shall know us:
— The despair of having everything
— The despair of being nothing
— The despair of being everybody
— The despair of being nobody6
The orthodox left, both political and cultural, hates, and therefore 
fears, simulation7 — “the precession of models and images,8 the 
stratagem that erases the boundaries between the true and the 
false” — precisely because it constitutes a particularly decadent 
form of inauthenticity, a “flight” from the (allegedly) natural, 
but in fact unbearably integral world.”9 The continuing fascina-
tion with the neo-Foucauldian model of the panoptical surveil-
lance state (the-one-who-sees-everything) is nothing more than 
nostalgia, reflecting the longing for an enemy that can be identi-
4 Jean Baudrillard, The Agony of Power, trans. Ames Hodges (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2010), 45.
5 Jean Baudrillard, Carnival and Cannibal, trans. Chris Turner (London: 
Seagull Books, 2010), 48. Emphasis in the original.
6 Baudrillard, The Agony of Power, 87.
7 See Jean Baudrillard, The Divine Left: A Chronicle of the Years 1977–1984, 
trans. David L. Sweet (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014), generally.
8 For René Girard, the two are identical. See Jean-Michel Oughourlian, The 
Mimetic Brain, trans. Trevor Cribben Merrill (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2016), 68, and below.
9 Baudrillard, Carnival and Cannibal, 87–88.
141
An Emoji for René Girard
fied and fought against — the restoration of “authentic” reality 
(and the reality principle) in the face of an alien domination (it 
also goes without saying that the One who sees everything can 
also be blamed for everything — a universal scapegoat. More on 
that below.) The hegemony of “The Code” however — the sum 
total of that absence of autonomy that is our “every-thing” — re-
duces this lingering leftist pseudo-theological piety to post-met-
aphysical hash: “the real itself is still what it is, but there is no 
longer any sense in thinking it, or in reflecting on it, as such.”10 
The political catastrophe here is that domination (control) has 
been replaced by hegemony (“The Code”) rendering all forms of 
social critique obsolete through the voiding of the master refer-
ent of authenticity: “contemporary hegemony […] relies on a 
symbolic liquidation of every possible value. The terms ‘simu-
lacrum,’ ‘simulation’ and ‘virtual’ summarize this liquidation, in 
which every signification is eliminated in its own sign, and the 
profusion of signs parodies a by now unobtainable reality.”11 We 
are left, in “truth,” with nothing other than the continuous and 
high-speed circulation of models and images — which prove to 
be horrifyingly reversible. Even worse — the universal and im-
mediate circulation of the model is the only means left to us of 
validating the reality of the self; that is, of being “relevant.”
But in truth none of this is new. We have all been here before. 
We have simply chosen to forget that the post-human is directly 
pre-figured within the pre-human.
When I teach my introductory course on Law, Literature, and 
Cinema, I offer my students the extra bonus, at no additional 
cost, of learning from me the secret(s) of literature.12 Working 
10 Baudrillard, The Divine Left, 42.
11 Baudrillard, The Agony of Power, 35.
12 The most brilliant exposition of this that I know of is Tom McCarthy’s 
appropriately titled Tintin and the Secret of Literature (London: 
Counterpoint, 2008). This section is a re-working of my earlier discussions 
in Eric Wilson, “Warring Sovereigns and Mimetic Rivals: On Scapegoats 
and Political Crisis in William Golding’s Lord of the Flies,” Law and 
Humanities 8, no. 2 (2014): 147–73; Eric Wilson, “The Ballad of Ed and 
Lewis: Conflictual Mimesis and the Revocation of the Social Contract in 
James Dickey’s Deliverance,” Law and Humanities 10, no. 1 (2016): 115–60.
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on the defensible premise that literature is any written work that 
instils a specifically aesthetic, or literary, response within the 
reader, I identify at least three of literature’s secrets (although I 
am certain that there are more than just three). Somewhat to my 
surprise, I came to understand that all of the three secrets were 
central to the literary scholarship of René Girard (1923–2015). 
The first secret is that literature is subversive; to paraphrase 
Jim Thompson, the first rule of writing is that nothing is what 
it seems. In Girardian terms, subversiveness is not a question 
of mis-perception; at issue is the nature of “commonsense” re-
ality as a myth which is (etymologically) a “lie” that causes to 
remain hidden a truth that is unspeakable but capable of ex-
plaining everything — literature-as-subversion, -as-revelation. 
The second secret is that subversiveness of literature lies with 
the centrality of doubles to the narrative drama. The double may 
signify either the external (exoteric) relationship between the 
protagonist (“the self ”) and one or more of the other characters 
(e.g., Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness; The Secret Sharer) or 
the internal (esoteric) relationship among the contending parts 
of the sub-divided, or “split” personality of the protagonist (e.g., 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground; The Brothers 
Karamazov). Here, literature is reflecting the social conscious-
ness of early hominids:
Our hypothesis makes it logical to imagine that the rigor-
ous symmetry between the mimetic partners[,] the living 
obstacle13 of the model that is automatically transformed into 
a rival[,] must bring about two things among man’s ances-
13 Girard uses the word “obstacle” in two different senses: (i) as shorthand 
for the external mediator, the person or thing that acts as a circuit-
breaker of escalating mimetic rivalry; and (ii) the pathologized version 
(a “mimetic paroxysm”) of an “ordinary” mimetic rivalry contaminated 
by metaphysical desire, in which mimetic rivalry “increases to the point 
that the subject is no longer interested in anything but the rivalry 
itself ” — which is psychosis. See Jean-Michel Oughourlian, The Genesis of 
Desire, trans. Eugene Webb (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2010), 12, and below. Both senses will be used in this essay.
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tors, little by little: the ability to look at the other person, the 
mimetic double, as an alter ego and the matching capacity 
to establish a double inside oneself, through processes like 
reflection and consciousness.14
The third secret is that the plot, or drama, of the novel is driven 
by an escalating rivalry over mimetic desire that eventually ex-
plodes into full-scale mimetic conflict. For Girard, the arche-
typal plot of all literature is that the self (protagonist) will model 
its relationship to the other (double) on the basis of imitation 
(mimetic rivalry) that will narratively culminate in the self at-
tempting to either replace and/or destroy the double (mimetic 
conflict):
Rivalry does not arise because of the fortuitous convergence 
of two desires on a single object; rather, the subject desires 
the object because the rival desires it. In desiring an object the 
rival alerts the subject to the desirability of the object. The 
rival, then, serves as the model for the subject, not only in 
regard to such secondary matters as style and opinions but 
also, and more essentially, in regard to desires.15
The rivalry that mimetic desire unleashes will, in the end, as-
sume the most extreme and grotesque form of the violent, or 
“monstrous” doubles who are the signifiers of the crisis of un-
differentiation: as the rivals intensify their mimetic struggle 
they effectively become identical, triggering a pathological crisis 
of identity which can only be resolved through an act of extreme 
violence, whether physical, emotional, or symbolic.16 Utilizing 
14 René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, research 
undertaken in collaboration with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy 
Lefort, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer (New York: Continuum, 
1978), 284, 285. Emphases in the original.
15 René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 145.
16 See ibid., 143–68. “Violence is the process itself when two or more partners 
try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire 
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a series of anthropological assumptions, Girard speculates that 
the logic of social formation is exchangeable with the logic of 
literary narrative.17 As mimetic rivalries are to be proscribed be-
cause of their ultimately violent consequences, the mimetic ri-
vals must displace, or discharge, their common violence against 
a convenient surrogate victim that serves as the transference 
object of the violence — the scapegoat.18 Girard explains the 
“magical” efficacy of the scapegoat by identifying two variants 
of mimetic desire: divisive acquisitive mimesis, which leads two 
or more individuals to desire the exact same object at the same 
moment in time, and unifying conflictual mimesis, which in-
duces all of the parties to the conflict to settle upon a common 
rivalry, or enemy, whom they all wish to “strike down.”19 His-
torically, the ritualistic enshrinement of the scapegoat, or sacri-
ficial, mechanism was the domain of religion, which is anthro-
pologically grounded upon the intermediary of the surrogate 
victim — the one who must die so that the community may live 
by being spared the apocalypse of the unlimited conflict of the 
monstrous doubles:20
To understand human culture it is necessary to concede that 
only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohi-
bition and the diversion of those forces in the direction of 
through physical or other means.” René Girard, cited in Vittorio Gallese, 
“The Two Sides of Mimesis: Mimetic Theory, Embodied Simulation, 
and Social Identification,” in Mimesis and Science: Empirical Research on 
Imitation and the Mimetic Theory of Culture and Religion, ed. Scott R. 
Garrels (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2011), 88.
17 See Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 3–31; Oughourlian, The Genesis of 
Desire, 81–106.
18 See Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 93. The 
preferred term of evolutionary psychologists is “emissary victim.” The 
concept is identical. See Zoey Reeve, “Mechanisms of Internal Cohesion: 
Scapegoating and Parochial Altruism,” in How We Became Human: 
Mimetic Theory and the Science of Evolutionary Origins, eds. Pierpaolo 
Antonello and Paul Gifford (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2015), 161–86.
19 See Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 26. 
20 See ibid., 48.
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ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the recon-
ciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. Religion is nothing 
other than this immense effort to keep the peace. The sacred 
is violence, but if religious man worships violence it is only 
insofar as the worship of violence is supposed to bring peace; 
religion is entirely concerned with peace, but the means it 
has of bringing it about are never free of sacrificial violence.21
In other words, hominization is the by-product of the scapegoat 
mechanism.22 Against Freud, we did not invent civilization in 
order to prevent murder — rather, we invented civilization in 
order to create the pre-conditions for a certain kind of murder: 
the sacrificial killing that postpones the apocalypse of unlim-
ited mimetic rivalry, the ritualistic slaying that guarantees the 
victory of conflictual mimesis over acquisitive mimesis. Girard’s 
thesis is not a theory of religion but a theory of the genesis of 
civilization that is grounded upon ritualistic human sacrifice 
(or, even more subversively, the ritualistic sacrifice of “the hu-
man”); as Jean-Michel Oughourlian has observed, Girard’s 
“theory of religion is simply a particularly noteworthy aspect of 
a fundamental theory of mimetic relations,”23 for it is in primi-
tive societies that “the mimetic crisis culminates in a phase of 
unbearable un-differentiation that is resolved by the violence of 
the sacrifice,”24 and it is religious thought that led early human-
21 Ibid., 32. For the integrative function of Religion, see Oliver Dietrich 
et al., “The Role of Cult and Feasting in the Emergence of Neolithic 
Communities: New Evidence from Gobekli Tepe, South-Eastern Turkey,” 
Antiquity 86 (2012): 674–95, passim.
22 “All systems that give structure to human society have been generated 
from [the scapegoat mechanism]: language, kinship systems, taboos, 
codes of etiquette, patterns of exchange, rites, and civil institutions. Thus 
a theory of sacrifice has produced a comprehensive account of human 
social formation, religion, and culture.” See Burton Mack, “Introduction: 
Religion and Ritual,” in Violent Origins: Walter Burkert, René Girard, and 
Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation, ed. Robert G. 
Hammerton-Kelly (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 7.
23 Jean-Michel Oughourlian, cited in Girard, Things Hidden Since the 
Foundation of the World, 44. 
24 Michel Treguer, cited in ibid., 68.
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kind to “make the victim the vehicle and transforming agent 
of something sacred—mimesis—which is never conflictual or 
undifferentiated except in so far as it is spread throughout the 
community; its concentration in a victim makes it a pacifying 
and regulating force, the positive mimesis found in ritual.”25 But 
this same process audaciously “doubles” as Girard’s theory of 
literature: every literary depiction of human drama, which is al-
ways a form of social phenomena, is ultimately about envy.26 As 
for both Georges Bataille and Jean-Paul Sartre, the essence of 
the human dilemma is the absence of an essential self — anthro-
pological non-being. “The human subject does not really know 
what to desire, in the last resort”; thus, the human subject “de-
sires being, something he himself lacks and which some other 
person [the ‘model’] seems to possess. The subject thus looks to 
that other person to inform him of what he should desire in or-
der to acquire that being.”27 The entirety of human desire, the li-
bidinal dimension of man’s social existence, is subsumed under 
mimesis — “desire itself is essentially mimetic, directed toward 
an object desired by the model,” from which comes rivalry, “the 
mimetic nature of conflict, which is to say the ultimate absence 
of any object proper to it.”28 Rivalry, therefore, is the flipside of 
the crisis of un-differentiation, that potentially boundless state 
of existential anguish in which no one is anything in particu-
lar because all inhabit the universal space of absent identity, a 
hellish crisis of the collective of the loss of personal differences 
that triggers an avalanche of reciprocal and escalating violence; 
“sameness is the terrible war in which twins [or ‘monstrous dou-
bles’] are personally engaged, right up until the moment when 
one manages to kill the other […] When it spreads it becomes 
25 Ibid., 48.
26 See René Girard, Desire, Deceit and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary 
Structure, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976).
27 Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 343; Girard, 
Violence and the Sacred, 146.
28 Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, 31; Girard, 
Violence and the Sacred, 146.
147
An Emoji for René Girard
the famous war of all against all of which Hobbes spoke.”29 The 
un-differentiated are devoid of relevance and the sameness of 
this un-differentiation reduces society to the zero condition of 
chaos — a “virtual” apocalypse.
Hence, Girard’s radically anti-secularist proposition that re-
ligion is the true foundation of society.30 Much of Girard’s work 
constitutes a highly unorthodox form of legal anthropology, a 
hybridization of both Durkheim’s functionalist sociology of re-
ligion and Freud’s cultural criticism, primarily Totem and Taboo. 
The key marker demarcating the boundary between the modern 
and the pre-modern is a judicial one: the substitution (or not) of 
a reified and de-personalized rule of law that denies the cathar-
sis of a direct and spontaneous communitarian will-to revenge: 
[I]f we compare societies that adhere to a judicial system with 
societies that practice sacrificial rites, the difference between 
the two is such that we can indeed consider the absence or 
presence of these [judicial] institutions as a basis for distin-
guishing primitive societies from “civilized” ones.31 
The foundational, but thoroughly repressed, continuity between 
the archaic and the post-archaic is a classic trope of Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Yet, Girard largely eschews the Freudian theory 
of instinct, or drive (Trieb), finding greater utility in the appli-
cation of psychoanalysis to the collective (impersonal) dynam-
ics of cultural formation; in effect, the translation of Freud’s late 
metapsychology into the referential terms of Durk heim’s notion 
of function: “the purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony 
to the community, to reinforce the social fabric. Everything else 
derives from that.”32 For Girard, the “fundamental truth about 
violence” is that, “if left unappeased, violence will accumulate 
29 René Girard, The One by Whom Scandal Comes, trans. M.B. DeBoise (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014), 104–5.
30 See Girard, Violence and the Sacred, generally. See also Michael Kirwan, 
Discovering Girard (Chicago: Cowley Publications, 2005), esp. 43–50. 




until it overflows its confines and floods the surrounding area. 
The role of sacrifice is to stem this rising tide of indiscriminate 
substitutions and redirect violence into ‘proper’ channels.”33 Key 
to the success of the sacrificial mechanism is its status as ritual, 
which is invariably a “re-enactment of a ‘prior event’.”34 Since 
every ritual is a re-enactment, its governing logic is mimesis, 
the ritual is both a representation of and a substitution for an 
earlier crisis of violence. But this governing logic is anti-repre-
sentational: under the sign of substitution, all differences are 
abolished and any one thing can be traded for and replaced with 
any other thing.35 In Girard’s case the vital ritualistic dimension 
of the sacrificial mechanism is the mimetic evocation of an ear-
lier act of killing that was successful in resolving social crisis:
[T]he sacrificers […] are striving to produce a replica, as 
faithful as possible in every detail, of a previous crisis that 
was resolved by means of a spontaneously unanimous vic-
timization. All the dangers, real and imaginary, that threaten 
the community are subsumed in the most terrible danger 
that can confront a society: the sacrificial crisis. The rite is 
therefore a repetition of the original, spontaneous ‘lynch-
ing’ that restored order in the community by reestablishing, 
around the figure of the surrogate victim [the scapegoat], 
that sentiment of social accord that had been destroyed in 
the onslaught of reciprocal violence […]. In the scapegoat 
theme we should recognize the very real metamorphosis of 
reciprocal violence into restraining through the agency of 
unanimity.36
33 Ibid., 10.
34 See Mack, “Introduction: Religion and Ritual,” 8.
35 According to Girard, “it is not possible to resolve the problem of violence 
with the surrogate victim without at the same time elaborating a theory of 
the sign and signification.” See Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation 
of the World, 99.
36 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 94–95, 96.
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Every ritual bears the traces of a double movement: the re-invo-
cation of the past event and the projection of that earlier event’s 
cathartic effect into future time. The “prior event” that all ritual 
killings represent through mimetic substitution is a collective 
murder, an act of mob violence. “‘Sacrifice’ then becomes a term 
that can be used to refer to the complex phenomenon of the col-
lective killing of a human victim, its mythic rationalization, and 
its ritualization.”37 The necessary precondition for the histori-
cal survival of the community is the successful exorcism of the 
unclean spirit of revenge. This is secured through the periodic 
enactment of the rituals of the machinery of sacrifice, which is 
itself the mimetic repetition of an earlier killing of a designated 
victim (the scapegoat) which successfully broke the cycle of re-
tributive violence. 
To summarize: the pre-human (the hominid) became the 
human (in hominization) by re-directing the violence un-
leashed by mimetic conflict — a war of all against all over mod-
els — against a sacrificial victim who was the reified substitute of 
an original that is now absent.
Sounds great — but is it “true”?
Oughourlian, a psychoanalyst and a self-proclaimed devo-
tee of Girard, has done the most to translate Girardian theory 
into the terms of meta-psychology; the result is interdividual 
psychology, a post-Freudian innovation that owes as much to 
Marcel Proust as it does Girard. To summarize: mimetic rivalry 
“is always rooted in one of the two following claims: the claim 
of the self for the ownership of its own desire; and the claim of 
desire for its anteriority, its seniority over the other’s desire, the 
other desire that has generated it, on which it is modelled.”38 The 
failure of either claim reduces the self to no-one; in truth, we are 
37 Mack, “Introduction: Religion and Ritual,” 8.
38 Jean-Michel Oughourlian, “Desire Is Mimetic: A Clinical Approach,” 
Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 3 (1996): 43–49, at 
43. “The desire that constitutes the self is itself modelled on, copied from, 
inspired by, and communicated by the other. It is the other’s desire that 
causes the desire to appear that will engender the self.” See Oughourlian, 
The Genesis of Desire, 98.
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all “legion.” Crucial is the temporal dimension of mimesis: mi-
metic rivalry, in both its latent and manifest form, is embedded 
within the structural parameters of psychological time, which is 
incommensurable with linear (non-reversible) physical time. In 
Oughourlian’s notation, conflict follows a strict pattern of mi-
gration from two nodal points, N and Nʹ:
The constitution of the self in physical time can be summed 
up by a linear vector going from the past toward the future. 
Desire D [the model] mimetically elicits the birth of desire d 
[the subject], which, in turn, brings self s [the ‘habitual self ’; 
habitus] into existence. Such is the real sequence of events 
that unfold in physical time going from the past to the fu-
ture. But this sequence has no meaning on the psychological 
level, for it unfolds completely without the knowledge of all 
the protagonists.39
The signature feature of nodal point N is “the self ’s claim to the 
ownership of its desires” — which is, of course, an illusion:40
The self, at point N, in the most banal and normal case, can-
not survive unless it is persuaded that it is the owner of its 
desire. The simplest solution for the self consists in forgetting 
the otherness of the desire that constituted it and in consid-
ering that this desire truly belongs to it. In reality, it is not a 
matter of mere forgetting because if one forgets something, 
this implies that one once knew it. It is in fact a matter of ac-
tive mis-recognition, though at this stage remaining peaceful 
and non-adversarial.41
39 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 39.
40 Ibid., 38. “Consciousness, like the self, is a function of the relation 
to otherness. The self as such is a mythic notion.” See Jean-Michel 
Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire: The Psychology of Hysteria, Possession, 
and Hypnosis, trans. Eugene Webb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1991), 198.
41 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 39.
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Amnesia is our truth. “Forgetting preserves harmony in the 
self and keeps it in existence […]. Forgetting presides over 
the constitution of the self at the moment of its creation”; the 
new self s is always “built on the overlooking of the otherness 
of desire.”42 In a perfect inversion of Sartre, it is not the case 
that man is condemned to be free — it is ten times worse than 
that. Man is condemned to eternally “forget” (mis-recognize) 
that he is a slave (unconditionally un-free) precisely because the 
phenomenological basis of his sense of Being — his Self — is the 
by-product of a set of processes, psychical and social, which are 
intrinsically mimetic in nature. 43 “This otherness with which 
we are saturated and that constitutes us is the human condition; 
but it is very difficult to accept. Its mis-recognition is initial and 
necessary to the maintenance of the self in its existence.”44 Para-
doxically, to the extent that we are real (or relevant) we are false, 
not truly of ourselves — which takes us directly into the domain 
of Saint Augustine and the true meaning of “original sin”; that 
we are depraved not because we are positively evil but because 
we are unable to (self-)author the good. And, just to turn the 
screw one more time, the logic of mimetic relationships must 
necessarily lead to mimetic conflict — or violence, physical and/
or symbolic. “What is the clinical expression of mimetic desire? 
Rivalry. What I see every day in my practice is not mimicking, 
nor copying, nor learning; it is rivalry.”45 Why? When viewed in 
42 See Ibid., 74, 76.
43 For “mimesis to function in the constitution of the self in desire, it is 
essential that the desire gradually forget its mimetic origin, forget even as 
it comes from the other [Desire D] that it belongs to the other, in order, 
precisely, to feel itself autonomous, to exist as such, to constitute a self. 
Desire, as Hegel said, negates the desire of the other.” Oughourlian, The 
Puppet of Desire, 232–33.
44 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 45. Oughourlian follows Girard in 
illustrating N with the Teacher/Pupil relation; I would replace this with the 
Celebrity/Nobody. “While the model becomes circumfused with divine 
light, his follower sees himself relegated to the shadows, a mediocrity, 
abandoned and non-existent” — that is, a Nobody. We might call this “The 
Day of the Locust” syndrome.
45 Oughourlian, “Desire Is Mimetic,” 43.
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meta-psychological terms, the relationship between model and 
subject is fraught with peril. Firstly, just as with language, desire 
is never private or personal, it is always public and collective: 
both language and desire partake, in equal degree, in “other-
ness.”46 The mis-named “self ” is, in truth, the “collective self of a 
collective desire, which is to say of a purely mimetic, contagious, 
irresistibly attractive, violent, labile desire; plural somnambu-
lism […] [a] merging of desires, mimetic hypertrophying, dis-
solution of each person’s self—such is the crowd.”47 (Here we are 
not far from a wholly phenomenological rendition of Marx’s 
fetish of the commodity). Secondly, the model actively “wishes 
to be copied” for a model with no imitators fails to qualify as a 
“model” (just as the master “needs” slaves); for the hierarchically 
subordinate subject, “identifying with a model is consolation 
for not possessing all his or her belongings, since one [thereby] 
becomes that model.”48 But then so does everyone else — “imi-
tative desire is always a desire to be Another” — which is both 
intolerable and unsustainable, rendering every social relation 
inherently unstable.49 Compounding that toxic brew which is 
community is our own private “hermeneutic of suspicion”: at 
all times we are dimly aware that the model, vampire-like, es-
tablishes her relevance through the semi-voluntary alienation 
of our own — “the imitator often […] envies the model because 
the model is […] seeing his [the model’s] role as a possession to 
be jealously guarded.”50 In other words, the Girardian constant 
of inter-individual relations is an a-symmetrical reciprocity with 
the result that the subject “is torn between two opposite feel-
ings toward his model — the most submissive reverence and the 
46 See Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, 14. The other of this other-ness is 
nothing other than the archaic victim: “human consciousness takes shape 
as attention is fixed on the other and particularly that special Other who is 
the scape-goat victim, the fountainhead of all signifiers, the transcendental 
signifier.” Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire, 39.
47 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 75.
48 Ibid., 47.
49 Girard, Desire, Deceit and the Novel, 83.
50 Giuseppe Fornari, A God Torn to Pieces: The Nietzsche Case, trans. Keith 
Buck (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 38. 
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most intense malice. This is the passion we call hatred […]. Only 
someone who prevents us from satisfying a desire that he him-
self has inspired in us is truly an object of hatred.”51
The raw core of interdividual psychology is phenomenol-
ogy52 (“it is desire that gradually brings the self into existence 
by constituting it as a self-of-desire”53) and the critical factor is 
the subject’s varying experiences of the incompatible modali-
ties of Time: the irreparable dis-junction between the psycho-
logical time of forgetting and the physical time of “irrelevance,” 
for it is within psychological time that “self s declares itself the 
bearer and owner of desire d at nodal point N and desire d is 
[only later] scandalized to discover a desire D identical to itself 
and bearing on the same object, whose belatedness it will as-
sert at nodal point Nʹ.”54 (Note how this temporal dis-junction 
replicates perfectly the quantum-like temporality of the Inter-
net, which is global instantaneity.55) Conversely, nodal point 
Nʹ, “representing the self ’s claim to anteriority over the other’s 
desire, which was responsible for inspiring and generating it” 
is the spawning ground of both neurosis and psychosis, which 
for Oughourlian are quintessentially mimetic in nature.56 “At 
nodal point Nʹ […] desire d will assert its anteriority [coming 
earlier in time] with respect to desire D. Such that self s, which 
51 Girard, Desire, Deceit and the Novel, 10–11. Naturally, this mimetic 
a-symmetry of relevance reflects an ontological a-symmetry: the model 
(desire D) is more “real,” more replete with Being, in a manner in which 
self s (desire d) never is.
52 See Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire.
53 Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, 98. This might be re-phrased as: 
“I desire; therefore, I AM [THAT AM].” The vital nexus of mimesis with 
psychosis lies with metaphysical desire; see above, n. 13. “The focus 
[of metaphysical rivalry] becomes the business itself of the rivalry and 
antagonism between individuals vying for the unlimited good of more-
potent-being or identity.” Reeve, “Mechanisms of Internal Cohesion,” 163.
54 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 39.
55 Somewhat unhelpfully, Oughourlian writes: “it seems to me that memory 
[…] obeys the laws of quantum physics.” See ibid., 41. He would perhaps 
have been more convincing if he had said that memory obeys the laws of 
Proustian narrative.
56 Ibid., 38. 
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is in [physical] reality the self-of-desire d, will lay claim loud 
and clear to the possession of the object of the two desires d and 
D.”57 In the final analysis, our mimetic “illness of desire”58 is not 
orientated towards “power” (pace Nietzsche) but towards Being 
(“psychological subjectivity”59) along with its necessary attrib-
ute, autonomy (“self-grounding”). The neurotic/psychotic root 
of mimetic crisis, the ultimate ground of mimetic rivalry and 
violence, is the subjective awareness of self s that it is phenom-
enologically “un-real,” that it does not really exist.60 Clinically, 
this uncannily resembles the classic definition of (what used to 
be known as) hysteria and which presents us with an unsolv-
able double-bind.61 Without exception, self s is alienated within 
psychological time: “the whole psychological sequence will con-
stitute a new time—psychological time, the time of memory, 
the only time that has any meaning for the subjectivity of hu-
man beings, the only one that appears true and in accord with 
57 Ibid., 39–40. See also ibid., 107: “all normal, neurotic, and psychotic 
phenomena exist in a continuum due to the gradual exacerbation of the 
mimetic mechanism […] Neurotic phenomena are essentially due to a 
claim at nodal point N and psychotic phenomena to a claim at nodal point 
Nʹ, the two claims always being present.”
58 Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, 104.
59 Ibid., 101.
60 “If one accepts the hypothesis of mimetic desire, it becomes clear that we 
must abandon the idea that the self is the source of desire. Rather, it is 
the movement of desire that gradually engenders in a subject a dynamic 
structure that is both changing and persisting and that can be designated 
as the ‘self ’.” Ibid., 98. And, because of the intolerable nature of its 
phenomenological “prison” self s will have to rebel in order to establish 
the truthfulness of its sense of “being a being”: “self-individuation is a 
process originating from the necessity of disentangling the Self from 
the [Otherness] dimension in which it is originally and constitutively 
embedded.” Gallese, “The Two Sides of Mimesis,” 102.
61 “When the classical [19th-century] studies of hysteria said that the hysteric 
‘suffers from memories,’ it was only the plural that was incorrect: it is a 
single, unique memory, always the same one essentially—the memory 
that brings back to the subject an awareness of the otherness of ‘his own’ 
desire” — or lack of relevance. See Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, 108.
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reality.”62 Psychological time, within the unstable dynamics of 
mimetic relationships, operates as a kind of mystification:
The physical time has no psychological reality although it is 
accessible to intelligence and therefore cognitive reality, but 
only when the first step toward wisdom is taken, that first 
step being the questioning or the recognition or the begin-
ning of the recognition of the precedence [in physical time] 
of the other’s desire, its priority over my desire, and therefore 
the non-ownership of “my” desire.63
But to attain this wisdom the first thing that self s must do is to 
admit her total and complete irrelevance — which is tantamount 
to committing phenomenological “suicide.”64 A no-thing cannot 
become a some-thing by renouncing its nothingness which is its 
being. Or, as the saying goes: Everybody wants to go to Heaven, 
but nobody wants to die.65 Hence:
Rivalry is recurrent, it repeats itself. The repetition syndrome 
identified by psycho-analysis is mimetic for two reasons: 1) 
because it is always the clinical expression of a rivalry and 
that rivalry is always mimetic; 2) because it reproduces itself, 
62 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 40.
63 Ibid. Again, note the family resemblance to hysteria: “hysteria is one 
particular mode of [the] misunderstanding of interindividual relation and 
of the mimetic nature of desire.” Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, 109. 
For Oughourlian, hysteria is not an illness: rather “it is a particular form of 
misunderstanding of the interindividual relation, a certain type of reaction 
to mimetic conflict. It is a phenomenologically varied manifestation of a 
certain dialectic of desire, a multiform expression of desire’s pretension to 
its own priority and anteriority.” Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire, 183.
64 Self-awareness of our mimetic condition “requires us to re-think in the 
most fundamental way the notions of the subject and of desire and, despite 
all our shared beliefs, to renounce the glorious but mythic autonomy with 
which we have adorned humanity—to renounce, too, the pleasure we 
experience through being the playthings of those hidden mechanisms.” 
Ibid. 20.
65 “The vanishing of self s, the ‘habitual self,’ is equivalent to a ‘ritual death’.” 
Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 196.
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duplicates itself, imitating the circumstances of the first rival-
ry and always looking for an impossible victory. That victory 
is impossible, since it stems from a situation which mimics 
the circumstances of defeat. But those circumstances are the 
only ones of interest, since the only battle worth winning is 
the one that has every chance to be lost.66
Sisyphus had it easy. We have it much worse, as there are no 
gods to impose the limit of the absolute upon us and to main-
tain the “natural” relationship between Self and model. The fatal 
logic of substitution condemns us to eternal frustration.
But it was not always so. Girard argues that, historically, there 
are two ways to mediate mimetic rivalry: external and internal. 
Historically, external mediation corresponds to class-based so-
cieties; as Wolfgang Palaver explains, “as long as social differ-
ence or any other form of differentiation is present to channel 
mimetic desire, its conflictual dimension remains contained.”67 
When external mediation prevails, the model can operate as an 
effective obstacle to the proliferating mimetic desires of the sub-
ject by precluding the possibility of true rivalry — a serf can nev-
er be “like” a knight (that is, Don Quixote can imitate the model 
of Amadis of Gaul, but not Sancho Panza68). Internal mediation, 
66 Oughourlian, “Desire Is Mimetic,” 43.
67 Wolfgang Palaver, René Girard’s Mimetic Theory, trans. Gabriel Borrud 
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013), 59.
68 Similarly, Quixote can never enter into mimetic rivalry with Amadis (as 
opposed to mere imitation) because the latter’s insurmountable status 
as the “ideal” enables “him” to act as an external mediator: Amadis is 
the supreme “real” although he is totally un-real. See Oughourlian, The 
Genesis of Desire, 20–21. Cervantes brilliantly demonstrates that the 
affective power of the mediator stands in an inverted relationship to his 
ontological status — the less real it is as the “Ideal” the more powerful he 
becomes. What Cervantes presents us with is a double-edged Girardian 
practical joke: in a manner that prefigures the drama of the enactment of 
his dis-order (the “quest”), Quixote’s original error lies in his mis-taking 
(or, even better, re-naming) the false for the real: he “reads” (interprets) 
the chivalric romances of Amadis as historical accounts. Ergo, when he 
imitates (“actualizes”) the un-real Ideal, he does not technically suffer 
a delusion. Rather, he substitutes the world-view of the un-real but 
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by contrast, is a sign of the egalitarian society (i.e. the abolition 
of obstacles) in which mimetic conflict is resolved through the 
direct competition between the model and the imitating/envi-
ous subject, spawning interminable violence, physical and sym-
bolic.69 Crucially, the efficacy of external mediation rests upon 
the absence of direct and immediate communication (both spa-
tial and temporal) between social actors. The true catastrophe is 
when rigid social hierarchies begin to break down and give way 
to proliferating “democratic” choices: as “the metaphysical dis-
tance between desiring subject and model diminishes—the key 
component of internal mediation—the potential for rivalry and 
violence increases. The more negligible this distance becomes, 
the more probable it is that mimesis will end in rivalry and 
violence.”70 Commenting on Girard, Stefano Tomelleri writes 
that it is “where social differentiation has practically disap-
peared [that] the power of mimesis is most destructive.” Hence:
While the social distance between individuals gradually de-
creases, the mutual imitation of individual desires grows. In 
contemporary society, the transition from external media-
tion to internal mediation increases the person’s illusion that 
all-powerful mediator for the perceptual consensus of the everyday and 
then behaves accordingly (“they might be giants”), indicating that he has 
entered into the realm of simulation: “generalized imitation has the power 
to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality; at once 
orderly, stable, and totally illusory.” See Jean-Pierre Dupuy, “Naturalizing 
Mimetic Theory,” in Mimesis and Science, 209. Quixote’s problem is not 
cognitive but libidinal; with Quixote/Amadis, we are moving away from 
“ordinary” mimesis to a state more akin to possession, which Girard 
understands as “an extreme form of alienation in which the subject totally 
absorbs the desires of another.” Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 165. What 
social media presents us with, in stark contrast, is the Girardian dilemma 
of hyper-potent electronic models whose mimetic affectivity is in direct 
relationship to their lack of “reality”: the more un-real it is, the more 
mimetically powerful it becomes. The digitalized models of social media 
can never act as mediators precisely because they can never be mis-taken 
for the real. See below, n. 88.




he or she has a unique, autonomous, and individual desire, 
whereas actually differences among people are progressively 
disappearing. Everyone feels legitimated to compare him- or 
herself to others and to desire what the other has, indepen-
dently of any distinction in terms of social role, job or group 
of reference.71
The scapegoat mechanism is Girard’s own onto-political “rem-
edy” for the eternal failure of the community to restrain the 
paroxysms of mimetic crisis and the epistemological key to the 
scapegoat is the logic of substitution: a new victim can be sacri-
ficed as one member of an un-broken series of replicants of the 
original. But this same process of substitution — that which re-
introduces the “breaking effect” of objective difference into the 
community through the binary opposition between society and 
scapegoat — is the same mechanism of political economy that 
drives ressentiment, the onto-phenomenological foundation of 
“bourgeois morality” and, therefore, of the politics of moder-
nity. The “secret” of consumerism is that we can all replace each 
other through the accumulation of the external accruements of 
the Other. Tragically for the fetishizing consumer, “ressentiment 
is a symptom of internal mediation. It arises from the illusion of 
infinite freedom within a mimetic context. It is an invasive emo-
tion that does not just affect private life, but also dominates the 
public sphere.”72 Just as there is a dis-junction between physi-
cal (objective) and psychological (objective) time, so there is an 
equally powerful and parallel dis-junction between private and 
public desires: “society seems increasingly individualistic, but 
an analysis of mimetic ressentiment shows that an individualist 
mentality also arises from the logic that leads to ressentiment.”73 
It is a question of illusion again:
71 Stefano Tomelleri, Ressentiment: Reflections on Mimetic Desire and Society 
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People [imagine] realizing an individualist and authentic de-
sire when in reality everything needs a mediator in order to 
find a new desire, a need that is increasingly exaggerated by 
the paradoxical combination between growing competition 
among equals and an equally arising social inequality. All are 
thus condemned to a fundamental dissatisfaction that leads 
to a desire that finds no rest.74
Receiving its classic contemporary expression in the eponymous 
work published by Max Scheler in 1912, ressentiment is “a self-
poisoning of the mind,” the result of the long-term repression of 
otherwise normal emotional faculties whose denial lead to the 
obsessive (mimetic?) indulgence of “certain kinds of value delu-
sions and corresponding value judgments” which, like the Tenth 
Commandment, include but are not limited to “revenge, hatred, 
malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite.”75 Broadly follow-
ing Nietzsche (and Moses), Scheler views ressentiment as seek-
ing natural expression through the antithesis of public reason, 
the “spirit of revenge,” the thing “most suitable source for the 
formation of ressentiment. The nuances of language are precise. 
There is a progression of feeling which starts with revenge and 
runs via rancor, envy, and impulse to detract all the way to spite, 
coming close to ressentiment.”76 In our era of Post-Human Capi-
talism and the abolition of all traditional (and presumably legit-
imate) forms of relationships of external mediation, the specific 
form that revenge is most likely to assume will be envy; “while 
each has the ‘right’ to compare himself with everyone else, he 
cannot do so in fact. Quite independently of the character and 
74 Ibid., 93–94.
75 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. Lewis B. Coser and William W. 
Holdheim (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2010), 25.
76 Ibid., 25. The Mosaic linking of envy with both resentment and violence 
runs like a vein through Girardian scholarship. Compare Gil Bailie on 
this point: “when I speak of […] mimetic desire[,] the word ‘desire’ means 
the influence of others.” […] The mimetic passions include jealousy, envy, 
covetousness, resentment, rivalry, contempt, and hatred.” Gil Bailie, 
Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads (New York: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 1995), 112.
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experiences of individuals, a potent charge of ressentiment is 
here accumulated by the very structure of society” — the “system 
of free competition,” as Scheler calls it is but in fact a phenom-
enological version of Marx’s notion of capitalism as the substitu-
tion of contractual relationships for natural ones.77 Important to 
note here is that Scheler does not restrict envy to the frustrated 
coveting of “objects” (fetishized commodities) alone but extends 
it equally to the unbridled competition for social capital (“val-
ues”) now wholly unregulated by external mediation, yielding 
the ultra-toxin of existential envy. Paradoxically, envy, owing to 
its existential rather than materialistic nature, operates to re-
duce the acquisitive impulse rather than to strengthen it. The 
outcome, however, is lethal: envy “leads to ressentiment when 
the coveted values are such as cannot be acquired and lie in the 
sphere in which we compare ourselves to others. The most pow-
erless envy is also the most terrible. Therefore, existential envy, 
which is directed against the other person’s very nature, is the 
strongest source of ressentiment.”78 Even worse, existential envy 
operates in a wholly mimetic fashion, a near-exact parallel of 
Girard’s concept of violence-as-contagion.
Through its very origin, ressentiment is therefore chiefly con-
fined to those who serve and are dominated at the moment, 
who fruitlessly resent the sting of authority. When it occurs 
elsewhere, it is either due to psychological contagion — and the 
spiritual venom of ressentiment is extremely contagious — or to 
the violent suppression of an impulse which subsequently re-
volts by “embittering” and “poisoning” the personality.79
77 Scheler, Ressentiment, 28. Emphases in the original.
78 Ibid., 29, 30.
79 Ibid., 27. This is wholly consistent with Girard’s notion of Modernity as 
“the universalization of internal mediation”; we collectively lack social 
domains of existential privacy resulting in the construction of “beliefs 
and identities [that] cannot but have strong mimetic components.” See 
René Girard, Pierpaolo Antonello, and Joao Cezar de Castro Rocha, 
Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture (New York: 
Continuum, 2008), 240.
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Which sounds like a “troll.” Girard’s relationship with Schel-
er is complex; although he critiques the latter for his failure to 
situate the elements of ressentiment into a social dynamic, he 
concedes that “everything becomes clear, everything fits into a 
coherent structure if, in order to explain envy, we abandon the 
object of rivalry as a starting point and choose instead the rival 
himself, i.e., the mediator, as both a point of departure for our 
analysis and its conclusion.”80
Why, then, is the will-to-revenge so central to human affairs? 
The answer, according to Girard, is that the sheer ferocity of 
violence, both physical and symbolic, is structurally embedded 
within the form of its transmission, which is best understood as 
a form of contagion:
Why does the spirit of revenge, wherever it breaks out, con-
stitute such an intolerable menace? Perhaps because the only 
satisfactory revenge for spilt blood is spilling the blood of 
the killer; and in the blood feud there is no clear distinction 
between the act for which the killer is being punished and 
the punishment itself. Vengeance professes to be an act of re-
prisal, and every reprisal calls for another reprisal. The crime 
to which the act of vengeance addresses itself is almost never 
an unprecedented offense; in almost every case it has been 
committed in revenge for some prior crime.81
But what, precisely, is this “prior crime”? It is nothing other than 
mimesis itself; the very thing that creates us (or, through which 
we are created) is, in a cosmically paradoxical fashion, the very 
thing that prevents us from ever becoming real — or relevant. 
The loss of amnesia, the recovery of the memory of insufficien-
cy, calls forth the demand for vengeance against the reality that 
condemns us to irrelevance. “The infinite or absolute outcome 
of desire is tragic: to recognize that one can never fill in the gap 
between oneself [the irrelevant] and the model-rival [the rele-
80 Girard, Desire, Deceit and the Novel, 13.
81 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 14. 
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vant] is to realize that the model can never be reached; thus does 
it become an obstacle.”82 Historically, however, there has been a 
catch: a mimetic-rival is not the same as a mimetic-obstacle, for 
the latter is governed by external mediation:
Faced with the obstacle, which is to say the rival who is al-
ways already there, who is so to speak insurmountable, the 
“normal” attitude consists in renouncing competition with 
the other and in re-directing one’s desire in a more construc-
tive [agonistic?] direction, in accepting one’s own limits as 
well as those imposed by social structure (for example, by 
the law). Renunciation is at the foundation of all hierarchical 
societies. This is because renunciation shows desire its im-
possibility. The obstacle is there, absolute. The mediator [of 
desire] is always external, even if he is right in front of you.83 
Fortunately for us, mass media has changed all of that. Un-
der the shadow of consumption, freedom has been reduced to 
“choice.” From a Girardian perspective, the illusory “trick” of 
consumerism (a.k.a. “advertising”) is not to mimetically seduce 
us into all wanting the same thing; rather, it is to collectively 
hypnotize all of us into believing that we are radically individu-
alistic, while desiring exactly the same thing.84 It is by this means 
that post-human capitalism is able to indefinitely postpone a fa-
tal crisis of un-differentiation within technological society: the 
mirage of freedom-through-consumption imposes a deadly veil 
of ignorance over the abject reality of our total lack of authen-
ticity.85 Unfortunately for us, there is a fatal flaw — as always. 
82 Oughourlian, The Mimetic Brain, 84.
83 Ibid., 84–85.
84 See Girard, Antonello, and de Castro Rocha, Evolution and Conversion, 
77–83.
85 Predictably it was the Pied Piper of Pop Art, Andy Warhol, who expressed 
it best: “What’s great about this country is that America started the 
tradition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same thing as the 
poorest. You can be watching TV and see Coca-Cola, and you can know 
that the President drinks Coke, Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you 
can drink Coke too. A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get 
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The crucial weakness lies within the Derridean-style “pun” (via 
iterability) that links Baudrillard’s integral reality with Girard’s 
mimetic rivalry: the reversibility between “model” and “image,” 
both of which are signified within social media by the meme. 
For Baudrillard, the master-sign of the transition from capital-
ism to late capitalism (and onward to post-human capitalism) 
is the replacement of the “serial” (the hall-mark of industrial 
production) with the “model” (the signifier of the hegemony of 
the “The Code”). For Girard, the “model” is the libidinal object 
of desire that is, weirdly, always absent because never original: 
our desires are fake because they are really someone else’s. The 
meme encapsulates both meanings perfectly: as an electronic 
image that is endlessly circulated, it qualifies as a “model” (Ba-
udrillard); as an image that is endlessly circulated, it establishes 
both itself and its author as a “model” (Girard). After Facebook, 
the only way to prove our being-relevant is not by claiming the 
anteriority of our desire (which is now not merely impossible 
but objectively inconceivable); rather, it is to use the seemingly 
“democratic” platform of social media as a template through 
which to self-author ourselves as models by circulating imag-
es — electronic pictographs. Even better (worse?) is that we are 
no longer confined to the limits of the traditional (“natural”?) 
community; thanks to the global absence of external media-
tion we are now directly integrated into a universal community 
that creates an unbridled domain of unstable mimetic relation-
ships.86 To the best of my knowledge, neither Girard or Oughou-
larian contemplate the mimetic dilemma that presents itself to 
you a better Coke than the one the bum on the corner is drinking.” Andy 
Warhol, cited in Girard, Antonello, and de Castro Rocha, Evolution and 
Conversion, 91n11. Integral reality places all of its bets on staving off a final 
mimetic reckoning through the deranged but brilliant gimmick of getting 
the Rich (desire d) to model their own desires on the Poor (desire D).
86 Oughoularian expresses this in Dostoevskyian terms: “if nothing is 
forbidden, everything is thus permitted and this leads to a transformation 
of the world: everyone can take anyone whatsoever for a model and 
thus immediately for a rival.” Jean-Michel Oughoularian, Psychopolitics: 
Conversations with Trevor Cribben Merrill, trans. Trevor Cribben Merrill 
(East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2012), 54.
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us: the need for the model (Desire D) rather than self s (desire 
d) to claim possession of the anteriority of his/her/its desire, to 
prove that he or she is the “real” model.87 We post ourselves as 
the model to prove our relevance and in so doing de-personalize 
ourselves through the annihilating integration into the nameless 
community; as we know by now, the “claim to originality […] 
prepares the way for resentment.”88 The more that the model is 
circulated through unmediated communication the more un-
real the model/image becomes, precisely because the meme be-
longs to no one — exclusivity of both possession and originality 
has been abolished in advance. The cosmic-level horror of social 
media is that it electronically imitates the primitive, which is 
the anteriority of the modern, and that the meme is the perfect 
simulation of the scapegoat mechanism as pure symbolic vio-
lence. The Girardian will-to-revenge is the mimetic equivalent 
of Nietzsche’s eternal return of the same: the “same” that returns 
eternally is nothing other than the imitation of an archaic “lost” 
time now re-enacted in the present through a purely digitalized 
scapegoat mechanism.89
87 The closest example that I can think of is Girard’s nomination of anorexia 
as an outstanding example of how self s, via external mediation, enters 
into a direct competition with the model with the pre-meditated intent of 
replacing her. Once victory is attained, the starving imitator “becomes” the 
new model who must then continuously prove her model status through 
un-ending performances of self-mortification — until the true end is 
reached. See René Girard, Anorexia and Mimetic Desire, trans. Mark R. 
Anspach (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013).
88 Oughourlian,The Mimetic Brain, 81.
89 For Nietzsche as himself the ultimate victim of psychotic mimetic rivalry 
(“metaphysical desire”) and, therefore, of ressentiment, see Fornari, A 
God Torn to Pieces. The artfully concealed truth of the grandiosely self-
proclaimed Truth-Sayer was the metaphysical desire to-be (zu sein) the 
anti-Wagner. See above, n. 13. The “case of Nietzsche” revolves around 
Richard Wagner’s embodiment of the dual nature of the obstacle: his 
elevated cultural status should have operated as a form of external 
mediation with the young Nietzsche (as Amadis the Gaul did with Don 
Quixote) but instead, the composer was reconstituted by the philosopher 
as an object of metaphysical desire, unconsciously revealing the psychotic 
nature of Dionysus-Zagreus re-born (it should not be forgotten that 
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The meme: the neo-primitive pictograph that overcomes all 
obstacles.
The killing joke of René Girard: “Let’s all come together in 
order to make a…difference!”
The mimetic psychosis: an egalitarian community of models.
Diagnosis? 
The apocalypse of the eternally irrelevant.
Prognosis? 
Unlimited.
the “pet” name of Cosima Wagner, Richard’s spouse, was Ariadne/
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riefly, for a single day in 2018, it appeared to the world that 
hell had been canceled.
In March of this year an interview was published with 
Pope Francis, written by 93-year-old reporter and La Repubblica 
editor Eugenio Scalfari. Asked where “bad souls” go after death, 
the pope was quoted as replying: “a hell doesn’t exist, the disap-
pearance of sinning souls exists.”
Almost immediately the Vatican scrambled to discredit Scal-
fari’s interview. They denied the meeting had ever been author-
ized, and pointed out Scalfari’s habit of conducting interviews 
with important public figures without taking notes or making 
recordings. They issued a statement ordering that “no quotation 
of the article should be considered as a faithful transcription of 
the words of the Holy Father.” 
In the months since, the Pope’s denial of hell has been rel-
egated to Internet rumor. The story appears as an entry on Sn-
opes.com, where it has been given the rating “UNPROVEN.” 
What are we to believe, those of us zealous and fragile enough 
to worry about one day waking up in hell? Was the cancelation 
of hell fake news? And if not, how did the pope arrive at this 
decision? 
If hell doesn’t exist — and never did — perhaps we should go 




Let us make hell a place on earth. Hell is on the Internet. Hell 
is social media.
* * *
For as long as I can remember, morality has appeared to be 
deeply out of fashion. The Internet, especially, is meant to have 
broadened our horizons beyond morality; the dream of the cy-
ber-hippies was a technological new age, a hivemind dwelling 
on an elevated plane, where users would coexist in harmony. 
Yet the Internet is full of reductive moral judgment. It speaks 
in binaries, because it is built on binary code. We rush to de-
fine ourselves with hashtags and labels. We express ourselves in 
solidarity and hate. We swipe left or swipe right, and post hearts 
or snake emojis under Instagram posts made by famous peo-
ple, because very few people are motivated to post online about 
things they feel ambivalent towards. Rather, people have “feel-
ings” and “feels”; good things are “pure,” while bad things, like 
hell, are “canceled” (if you’re a drag queen, these things can also 
be “deceased”). Images can be “cursed” or they can be “blessed.” 
Other things are “woke,” though that term is rarely used seri-
ously anymore. The opposite of “woke” is “problematic,” a self-
defeating term which by definition fails to identify the problem.
On social media, a block list or trigger warning provides 
a moral framework for those unsure which opinion to hold. 
Memes, too, offer guidance in the form of semi-satirical com-
mentary. One such meme is the alignment chart.
The alignment chart comes from Dungeons and Dragons, the 
name of which will likely cause certain readers to roll their eyes. 
In its first 1974 edition, Dungeons and Dragons (D&D) allowed 
players to choose between three alignments: lawful, neutral, and 
chaotic. They are as they sound, intended as a prompt for creat-
ing characters as part of the game’s collaborative fiction. 
By 1977 a new alignment axis was introduced: that of good 
and evil. It wasn’t until the fourth edition of the D&D handbook 
that the axes evolved into nine clearly delineated options:
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Lawful Good, Neutral Good, Chaotic Good
Lawful Neutral, True Neutral, Chaotic Neutral
Lawful Evil, Neutral Evil, Chaotic Evil
Switching alignments during a game incurs penalties, although 
dungeon masters, who lead D&D gameplay, are looked down on 
if they enforce an alignment too harshly. Some plot twists can 
make a character’s alignment spontaneously change, like finding 
a cursed item, or sudden demonic possession. Alignments don’t 
always feature in other tabletop games, and by the game’s fifth 
edition in 2014 they became optional. This corresponded, oddly 
enough, with the rise of the alignment chart as meme.
The TV Tropes page for “character alignments” features a 
warning:
Due to the controversial nature of this trope, and not to men-
tion, it’s considered shoe-horning to categorize people with 
these kind of tropes, there will be no real life examples under 
these circumstances, since it invites an Edit War.1
* * *
Wherever images are shared on the Internet, you will find align-
ment charts. Wherever there is variety, diversity, nuance, you 
will find people who want to divide things into categories.
Let’s begin with nations, which are categorized in one of the 
oldest alignment charts. On this chart Sweden is labelled as law-
ful good. The UK is lawful neutral. Israel is somehow true neu-
tral, and Iran is lawful evil. The US, interestingly, is judged to be 
chaotic neutral.
Another very old alignment chart categorizes websites. Twit-
ter is lawful good, Wikipedia is true neutral, 4chan is chaotic 
neutral, and the Pirate Bay, bearing the tagline “Information is 





free,” is chaotic good (Facebook, intriguingly, is nowhere to be 
seen).
The bulk of alignment memes are about pop culture, includ-
ing Nintendo games (Smash Bros is lawful evil, Zelda is chaotic 
neutral), paint software (MS Paint is neutral evil, Photoshop is 
true neutral, despite its monthly subscription fee) and charac-
ters from The Room (Lisa is chaotic evil, Tommy is apparently 
lawful good). From here we move into more arcane territory: 
a number of alignment charts examine Internet culture itself, 
including expressions of amusement (“kek” is apparently lawful 
evil, “lol” is true neutral, “lel” is chaotic neutral and “lmao” is 
chaotic good) and frog memes (Dat Boy is chaotic good, Pepe is 
chaotic evil, and “Tea Lizard” Kermit is neutral evil).
2016 saw a rush of US election alignment charts, which com-
monly classified Donald Trump as chaotic evil. Some, from 
4chan and outlets like the subreddit /r/The_Donald, list him as 
chaotic good. Hillary Clinton is most often a neutral, either law-
ful neutral or neutral evil depending on who made the meme. 
There is one alignment chart I’ve found which features Ted Cruz 
as chaotic evil. Under his name, the artist has placed a line of 
Wingdings symbols instead of a quote. The picture of Cruz is in 
black and white, but his eyes glow with a fiery red.
* * *
As a meme, the alignment chart has never quite peaked in pop-
ularity. This has, very likely, guaranteed its longevity. Another 
factor is its versatility: it’s a structure, a “meta-meme” rather 
than an end in itself, which collates and critiques other memes 
in turn. Like the “Starter Pack” meme, or the Political Compass, 
it is a way to make sense of internet culture from within. 
The alignment chart endures because of its near-endless ca-
pacity for customization; it is literally an empty grid, waiting 
to be filled with pictures. Like a YouTube video thumbnail, or 
a picture in the Daily Mail’s sidebar of shame, it crams multi-
ple images into a single frame. The nine characters who per-
sonify the alignments don’t have to come from the same book, 
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TV show, or fandom. They don’t even have to all be fictional, 
or all real. Sometimes they speak volumes about the taste of 
the person who made them — for instance, there’s a surplus of 
Alignment Charts originating on 4chan which combine charac-
ters from South Park, Family Guy, The Dark Knight, and Super 
Mario, outlining the cultural diet of a 2012-era teenage boy.
Google Trends shows a spike in interest in the alignment 
chart around 2012. It fell again soon after that, but its popularity 
has climbed steadily upward again over the last six years. The 
reddit community /r/AlignmentCharts was formed in 2010, and 
in 2012 an empty alignment template was posted to Polyvore.
The alignment chart closely resembles demotivation pictures, 
another elderly meme, and is, in a sense, simply a “demotivation 
collage.” Sometimes the images have a quote from the character 
below their assignation, explaining the creator’s reasoning for 
categorising them this way. But increasingly they don’t; they just 
post a picture and leave it at that.
The chart format was never official to Dungeons and Drag-
ons — instead it originated online, becoming commonplace on 
DeviantArt and later Tumblr. KnowYourMeme.com cites the 
earliest known example as a 5×5 alignment chart, which ap-
peared on DeviantArt in 2011.2 It included two extra horizon-
tal categories — “social” and “rebel,” and two extra vertical ones 
(“moral” and “impure”), and featured an assembly of figures 
taken from TV (Family Guy’s Peter Griffin, Arnold, of Hey Ar-
nold fame, and The Simpsons’ Ned Flanders) and film (Rocky, 
Hannibal Lecter, Darth Sidius, and, likely the most commonly-
named Chaotic Evil character of all time, Heath Ledger’s Joker). 
It features, in my opinion, one of most accurate true neutrals of 
all: Wilson, the ball from Cast Away.
* * *




There are almost as many alignment charts about food as there 
are about every other kind of alignment chart put together. 
As children we’re told about the food pyramid. As adults 
we’re told about the keto diet, the paleo diet, about the benefits 
of veganism and the moral superiority of kale. It follows, then, 
that foods would be sorted by their “chaotic” spirit and inher-
ent virtue. Intentional or not, food is the form of morality we 
practise daily.
One of the best-known food alignment charts brings to mind 
the habits of good housemates and bad ones; the chart is about 
different ways to store bread. Once opened, putting a loaf of 
bread in a bread bin is deemed lawful good. Tying up the bag 
with a rubber band is true neutral. Tying a knot, however, is 
lawful evil (this one I don’t understand — my parents taught me 
and my younger brother to do this, and it seems to preserve the 
bread just as well as a rubber band).
Other charts concern themselves with condiments. New-
man’s Own salad dressing is lawful good, as the company gives 
its profits to charity, while canned tomato sauce is chaotic evil. 
There’s also a biscuit alignment chart. Thin Mints are chaotic 
evil (this chart was clearly made by an American), and “Toffee-
tastics” are chaotic neutral. Even the vegetable aisle can be navi-
gated with an alignment chart: carrots, apparently, are lawful 
good, while mushrooms are chaotic evil. 
My personal favourite is a chart titled “I Can’t Believe It’s Not 
an Alignment Chart.” It’s about butter substitutes, and each box 
on the chart is filled with a creamy yellow tub held close to the 
camera. Most of the pictures are grainy and poorly lit; furtive, 
somehow, as though taken undercover in the fake dairy aisle of 
a Walmart, late at night. In the neutral good box is a tub marked 
“You’d Butter Believe It.” Neutral evil is “Unbelievable: This is 
Not Butter.” The chaotic evil box is filled by a tub scrawled with 
what could be Comic Sans. It says “What, not butter!” That the 
creator of this chart skipped over Memories of Butter, another 




Do food alignment charts reveal a neurosis with which we 
treat food, an impossibility of ethical consumption contrasted 
with the marketing of foods as distinctly “good” and “bad”? 
Would anyone even want to consume a “lawful” food? Is con-
suming “chaotic” produce somehow aspirational? (I, for one, 
view Monster Energy drink as chaotic, a shot of pure, caffein-
ated “dragon energy.”)
These charts, all of them made by ordinary web users (I have 
yet to see an “official” food alignment chart put out by manu-
facturers as marketing), reflect how we have internalized the 
morality of food advertising — the “naughty” chocolate bar, the 
“clean” protein, and the “dirty” burger — even as it is critiqued 
with self-awareness and humor.
* * *
In the D&D handbook, players are advised to choose a good 
or lawful good alignment (“playing an evil or chaotic evil char-
acter disrupts an adventuring party and, frankly, makes all the 
other players angry at you,” the fourth edition says). Similarly, 
in online commentary the neutral alignments are those which 
attract the most criticism. Neutral evil is sometimes called “the 
jerk alignment,” and all five of the neutral alignments, which 
cross the board and occupy the most space, are regarded with 
a degree of distrust. A neutral good character can be a pacifist, 
but lacking in conviction or loyalty, while a lawful neutral char-
acter is an unimaginative bureaucrat. True neutral can imply 
that a character works to preserve balance, but it can also imply 
that they’re apathetic and vacuous. A chaotic neutral character, 
meanwhile, is exciting but inconsistent and self-interested. Cha-
otic neutral is the favorite alignment of edgelords. 
Perhaps it’s too difficult to trust a centrist, however “lawful” 
or “chaotic” they might be. Even if a character succeeds at play-
ing with “true” neutrality, to those on either side of them they’re 
only working to maintain a vacuum.
In life, as in tabletop games, the glory goes those who are 
most vocal about holding strong opinions. This tendency has in-
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creased in the era of Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, and Instagram. 
To be bombarded daily with information and opinion, as most 
social media users are, requires discernment and a keen sense 
of self, a “personal brand.” Millennials, a magpie generation, are 
offered the world but burdened with the task of sorting through 
it, like so many NSA agents reading other people’s emails. 
The alignment chart speaks to this dilemma. It boils online 
discourse down to its essence: pop culture, pictures, and un-
complicated judgment. 
* * *
Pinterest attributes a certain quote to Dante, but I am unwill-
ing to judge for certain if it’s true. The quote reads: “the darkest 
places in hell are reserved for those who maintain their neutral-
ity in times of moral crisis.”
Certain parts of pop culture play a role in keeping the idea of 
hell alive. Horror films, of course, tend to dwell on the concept; 
there’s Drag Me to Hell, the (criminally underrated) As Above So 
Below, Insidious (hell, here, is a place where they play Tiny Tim), 
and the Hellraiser franchise, for starters. Hell also appears fre-
quently in Futurama, Spawn, Hellboy, and occasional episodes 
of South Park. 
Hell also features prominently in video games. Devil May 
Cry is loosely based around the Divine Comedy, while in Saint’s 
Row 3: Gat Out Of Hell, the hero flies around an open-world 
hell, equipped with weapons inspired by the seven deadly sins. 
Two well-regarded indie titles, Limbo and Pinstripe, send their 
protagonists through the darker locales of the afterlife, and 
there is even a PS3 game titled Dante’s Inferno. Classics of the 
“hell game” genre include the Doom series and 1987 ZX Spec-
trum title Soft and Cuddly, which features an intricately drawn 
neon portrait of Alice Cooper as its closing image, with the cap-
tion “Go to Hell.”
I cannot help but think, sometimes, that the reason hell en-
dures as the muse of geek culture, even now after it has fallen 
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out of fashion, and after even the Pope is rumored to have given 
up on it, is that hell corresponds with an enduring black-and-
white morality, one which serves as the muse of pop culture. It’s 
something we don’t speak about out loud very often, perhaps 
because we can’t, but which thrives in the silence between laptop 
user and screen. It drives people to segment pop culture and 
everyday life into “alignments,” for the purpose of entertain-
ment and instruction. 
* * *
There are nine alignments. Conveniently, there are also nine cir-
cles of hell.
At the entrance to Dante’s hell is the “Vestibule of the Fu-
tile,” where the opportunists, the “uncommitted” and “pusillani-
mous” suffer. Those who were too cautious in life, too cowardly 
or neutral to take sides and make their opinions known, are 
cursed to chase after a moving banner which they will never 
grasp. While doing this, they are also tormented and stung con-
stantly by wasps. Their tears and blood and pus drip onto the 
ground, and the bilious mixture is feasted upon by maggots. It’s 
a vision beyond the imagining of even the most sadistic game 
designer, even Soft and Cuddly’s teenage punk progenitor John 
George Jones.
By placing this particular form of torture at the entrance to 
hell, Dante is playing a trick on the reader. He’s daring you to 
make up your mind, and choose to believe in his narrative or 
not to. He’s asking you to decide where you’re aligned.
A similar tactic, more crudely executed, occurs with align-
ment chart memes: even the avowedly “neutral” risk finding 
themselves placed on the chart. According to Dante, you’re im-
plicated, and subject to judgment, simply by bearing witness. 




When you type the word “millennial” into Google, you’ll quick-
ly find the term “millennialism,” or “chialism.” In eschatology, 
millennialism is a belief popular with certain sects within Chris-
tianity that there will be a golden age of righteousness, lasting 
for 1000 years, before the Final Judgment and the World to 
Come. Heaven will be a place on earth, for a time, but after that 
the world will end. 
Millennialism finds its inspiration in the Book of Revela-
tions, in a verse which describes an angel descending from the 
heavens, holding the key to a bottomless pit. He seizes the devil, 
throws him into the pit and locks the door. Then John, the nar-
rator, writes:
Then I saw thrones, and those seated on them were given 
authority to judge. I also saw the souls of those who had been 
beheaded for their testimony to Jesus and for the word of 
God. They had not worshiped the beast or its image and had 
not received its mark on their foreheads or their hands. They 
came to life and reigned with Christ a thousand years. (The 
rest of the dead did not come to life until the thousand years 
were ended.)3
Sometimes I think mine is the most judgmental generation. Not 
in its consistency, but its frequency. Judgment itself is a trend. 
The institutions which once did the judging for us have crum-
bled and fallen away. This is almost certainly good. But what has 
followed is a frenzy of mediated judgment as sport.
Personally, I don’t trust my own judgment. For me, at least, 
polarities of judgment have always been a symptom that some-
thing is wrong.
There’s a psychological tendency called “splitting,” developed 
by Ronald Fairbairn as part of object relations theory.4 It de-
scribes exaggerated black-and-white thinking, often in relation 
3 Rev. 20:4 (New International Version).




to whether a person is good or bad. In relationships, someone 
“splitting” will view another person as all good or all bad, as 
completely perfect or inherently flawed, or even evil. This cre-
ates instability of emotions, extreme reactions, and an interpre-
tation of love as something dangerous, violent and damaging. 
Depressed people are prone to splitting. So are people with 
narcissistic personality disorder, or borderline personality dis-
order. You can apply splitting to yourself, or to the outcome of 
something requiring effort. It’s a shortcut for making sense of 
the world, albeit in a way that causes harm rather than making 
life easier. 
I’m one of those who, when depressed or under stress, turn 
inward with extremes of judgment. On those days, social media 
becomes impossible, as does any kind of writing work requiring 
certainty in one’s opinions. Twitter, especially, appears to me as 
a scrolling feed of other people’s judgments, a torrent of stran-
gers and distant acquaintances telling me they feel very strongly 
about something, that it’s good or evil — usually evil, though 
they don’t go so far as to use that word — and that I should be-
lieve this too. On those days I have to avoid social media en-
tirely, because I start to think of myself as profoundly flawed. By 
withholding judgment, I try to be sane.
All of the judgments, the alignments listed in this essay, were 
made by others. None are my own. This is because I have made 
a career in evasion; words provide me with space to be slippery. 
But I have invented an alignment for myself: I am awful neutral. 
If hell exists, I am surely condemned to the Vestibule of the Fu-
tile.
I have noticed a certain tendency, when people apply the 
alignments to themselves: they’ll almost always call themselves 
“chaotic,” whereas other people are considered lawful. In this 
sense, the alignments reveal something about the nature of ex-
istence. Invariably, other people seem to have a method, while 




Early in its existence, Dungeons and Dragons itself became the 
subject of a number of moral panics. In 1979 it was first linked, 
in media coverage, to the disappearance of James Dallas Eg-
bert III, a teenage boy who had never played the game. Later, 
in 1982, an anti-occult advocate named Patricia Pulling blamed 
the game for the suicide of her son, Irving, and claimed he had 
been placed under a D&D curse. Pulling filed lawsuits, pro-
duced campaign leaflets about Satanism and tabletop gaming, 
and founded Bothered About Dungeons and Dragons (BADD), a 
one-person campaign group.
The subsequent decades saw media coverage, academic re-
search and fiction continue the debate around the morality 
of Dungeons and Dragons. Commentators appeared on news 
channels, claiming that when burned, D&D game pieces emit-
ted a screaming sound. The game was linked to murders, sui-
cides, and satanic ritual, and in 2004 was even banned from 
Waupun Prison, Wisconsin, based on the belief that it was en-
couraging gang violence.
It remains to be said that D&D gives players the option to 
remain unaligned. No one is obliged to morally self-determine, 
just as, it goes without saying, none of the alignment charts 
shared on social media claim to be 100% correct. They’re based 
on opinion, on the individual creator’s personal judgment.
It’s in the interest of every social network that we, as us-
ers, continue to think in terms of polarities. “Black-and-white 
thinking” lends itself to data categorization, and marketing, and 
profiling. Ambivalent users are harder to advertise to, and are 
less likely to stir up debate. They get in the way of “growth,” by 
thinking outside the platform. 
This mode of thinking surfaces in categorization memes, and 
in the alignment chart most of all. Social media, as a concept, is 
relatively young; we’re still in the early phase, where we’re drunk 
on information. From behind the screen we love to play the di-
agnostician, and charts and labels and hashtags are satisfying 




Alignment memes reveal in even the most “chaotic” dis-
course a latent morality, one we’re aware of enough to joke 
about, and to apply to comic books and tubs of fake butter, but 
of which we are reluctant to let go. 
In such a climate, even decrying our tendency to judge be-
comes yet another opinion, one which generates further debate. 
The opinion machine continues to operate, making more mon-
ey for Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and their ilk. This leaves me 
with a quote from Simone Weil’s On the Abolition of All Political 
Parties, which found its way to me through the Instagram feed 
of Pamela Anderson, shared on October 12, 2017:
Nearly everywhere — often even when dealing with purely 
technical problems — instead of thinking, one merely takes 
sides: for or against. Such a choice replaces the activity of the 
mind. This is an intellectual leprosy; it originated in the polit-
ical world and then spread through the land, contaminating 
all forms of thinking. This leprosy is killing us; it is doubtful 
whether it can be cured without first starting with the aboli-
tion of all political parties.5
A reply below reads “♡ ♡ ♡ ♡.”
5 Simone Weil, On the Abolition of All Political Parties, trans. Simon Leys 
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Oh, They Have the Internet on 
Computers Now? 
The Online Art of The Simpsons
Tom Whyman
L
ast September, having finally secured my first real salaried 
academic job, I finally cleared all of my old stuff out of my 
old room in my parents’ house, since I was now finally able 
to rent a space big enough to contain it.1
There were a lot of belongings there, stashed in boxes piled 
high to the ceiling, crammed into the cavities running along 
the sides of the walls. Books, clothes, CDs, LPs, cassette tapes, 
things to play them on, musical instruments, paintings, furni-
ture, ornaments — some brilliant, in great condition, but mostly 
junk, grimy, half-broken — acquired for the most part while 
I was studying for my undergraduate degree in Manchester, 
during which I spent a lot of time trawling charity shops and 
other repositories of junk, fascinated with these objects despite 
their crappiness. During this period of my life the whole world 
seemed to be opening up before me, a world I had been largely 
unaware of growing up a bored, depressed teenager in an iso-
lated Hampshire suburb, a world of sensory and aesthetic pos-
1 This chapter was written in the summer of 2018. Some claims may have 




sibility, and each of these objects — insofar as they were unlike 
anything I had seen for sale on the high street, or in a shop-
ping center — seemed to contain a new sort of possibility within 
them.
So of course I absolutely had to have a home-made clock 
designed to look like an advertisement for the Liverpool-Man-
chester Railway Company; of course I couldn’t live without that 
painting we saw for sale in a café of some fishermen with horse’s 
heads asleep in a boat; naturally I needed those 17 full LPs of The 
Good Soldier Svejk being read in its entirety in Czech; yes I prob-
ably would wear that grey boiled-wool jacket where the buttons 
were made out of old Austrian coins for some reason.
Going through these boxes, which took me a few days, was 
a strange, at times meditative, at times uncanny, at times just 
physically gruelling experience — opening them up, rifling 
through them, deciding what to keep and what not to, trying 
to sort everything out, apply some sort of a system. And at the 
same time, constantly being struck by the significance of these 
things — layers of meaning which had once been alive for me, 
but which I had now forgotten. Oh, this painting, I bought that 
the day we —; oh wow I had forgotten about this, she gave this 
to me after — … and so on. I spent that whole period somehow 
temporally displaced, constantly slipping down little holes of 
nostalgia which threw me back from the present to the — or so 
it felt — much richer world of the past.
But not all of these objects of significance were things that I’d 
bought. A lot of it was stuff I’d collected — old beer mats, tourist 
maps, train tickets. One box just contained a huge amount of 
receipts. Sometimes it was possible to attach meaning to this 
stuff — a lot of the beer mats, for example, had doodles or sweet 
messages scribbled on them. But at other times it was impossi-
ble. Why had I kept all these receipts? Did they really once hold 
any sort of significance for me? In being caused by these objects 
to remember myself, I was also becoming aware that there were 
aspects of my life I had completely forgotten.
There were also a lot of boxes full of things I had creat-
ed — CDs by various bands I’d been in at one time or another; 
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loose scraps of watercolor paintings I’d done as a teenager, oscil-
lating between the surreal and the diaristic; print-outs of bad 
novels I’d never finished. Amongst these objects was a mysteri-
ous brown envelope addressed to the house I’d lived in during 
my second year of university. In it I found a scrap of paper ad-
dressed to me from the BBC:
Dear Tom,
Thank you for sending us your idea/proposal. We’re sorry, 
but we can only consider full word processed narrative dra-
ma and comedy scripts. Please find enclosed our guidelines 
to clarify. We do recommend you visit our website www.bbc.
co.uk/writersroom for more detailed guidelines. You may 
also find it useful to visit the BBC commissioning website 
www.bbc.co.uk/commissioning. We hope that if you have 
something that meets our requirements you’ll consider send-
ing it to us.
Good luck with your writing,
BBC writersroom.
Below this scrap of paper, attached with a paperclip, was a letter 
I’d written to the BBC, dated 3/12/08:
Dear the BBC,
Hello. My name is Tom Whyman. The other day I came up 
with an idea which, with your co-operation of course, could 
make both of us VERY rich indeed.
This idea is The Simpsons. You may have heard of The Simp-
sons from travellers to this country from the United States. 
The Simpsons is one of (if not the) longest-running show(s) 
in US television history. Approximately 69 million viewers 
tune in to watch Homer, Bart, Lisa, Marge and Maggie’s an-
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tics each week, and the show has been running for 420 sea-
sons.
Clearly this is a show ripe for adaptation for the UK market. 
The show’s premise is universal — a family of jaundiced, ani-
mated characters are led on a series of wacky adventures by 
a mentally handicapped patriarch, while the family’s daugh-
ter continues her sure-fire successful campaign to be their 
nation’s president in the “B” story each week. There is not a 
man, woman or child in this country alive today who can-
not relate to this premise, and so it stands to reason that you 
should listen to my idea.
My Crazy Family is the UK adaptation I have worked out of 
The Simpsons. My Crazy Family centres on The Lohans, an 
everyday family living in some unspecified suburb in the 
present day (although they never use computers and if they 
do they never have the internet except in one episode but 
it doesn’t look like the internet at all). Estes is the idiot fa-
ther figure, Midge his loyal wife, Bert their “cool” son, Becky 
the always-right genius daughter, and Peggy is a baby. Estes 
works not in any NUCLEAR PANNER PLANT but in high-level 
customer complaints for BT. All these details are slightly dif-
ferent, but the beauty of the series is it hardly requires any 
ideas at all — The Simpsons has 992 episodes currently and 
a further 14 currently in development, so we can just steal 
ideas from that.
My spec script, for an episode entitled “This Wacky Life,” is 
based on the episode of The Simpsons where Marge has an 
affair with her bowling instructor. In it, Midge has an affair 
with her darts instructor named Jack. I hope you will find it 
as entertaining to read as I had fun writing it.
I hope to go into production immediately. I can quit my job 
at any point to start executive producing the series. I will 
need 12 writers, an animator, and a full-time secretary/per-
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sonal assistant, as well as central London office space NOT in 
the BBC building (to prevent corporate interference). If you 




Attached to this letter is a 24-page script, which mostly follows 
the plot of the Seasons 1 Simpsons episode “Life on the Fast 
Lane,” although the dialogue is intercut with numerous refer-
ences to gags from later episodes of The Simpsons, crude sex-
ual innuendo, sub-Beckettian monologues to-camera, and (for 
some reason) a lot of trivia about birds. 
Also included are a series of deliberately child-like drawings 
(which, as far as I can tell from the BBC’s notes, were the reason 
my script was returned to me “unconsidered,” as opposed to be-
ing picked up and making us all millionaires), depicting among 
other things “Estes saying his catchphrase” (“Mugah Mugah,” 
which I guess was a reference to Homer trying to get Lisa to 
Fig. 3.
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establish “Bucka Bucka or Woozle Wozzle” as her catchphrase in 
the episode “Bart Gets Famous”) (fig. 1); “Jack and Mimsy [sic] 
Have an Affair’ (which superficially resembles the scene from 
“Life on the Fast Lane” where Jacques and Marge have brunch, 
although the Jacques character is screaming) (fig. 2); and “Bert 
Is Killed By The Laugher-Bird” (in which a melted Bart-crea-
ture, which resembles the crappy Bart-snowman he builds out 
of “the snow left under the car” in the episode “Marge Be Not 
Proud,” lies motionless on the ground, presumably after having 
been killed by a large bird) (fig. 3). In each of these drawings, a 
smiling sun appears in the top left-hand corner, a clear reference 
to Homer’s “and this happy little character is the sun,” that he 
draws on the “blueprints” for his dog house in the episode “Bart 
the Lover.”
Feelin’ Fine
Why did I make this thing? Well, I suppose on one level this 
was a prank, aimed at the BBC. But this can’t possibly be the 
whole story: after all, it seems strange to go to all this effort just 
to get a rise out of an audience of (probably) one single human 
individual, who if I’m lucky might have found the material I’d 
sent them funny enough to pass it round the office (“oh look, 
this is a weird one, what should we send them back?”), but who 
more likely than not will have just been mildly annoyed. On a 
personal level, I must have been getting some sort of creative 
fulfilment just inherent to making art (or something like it) out 
of scrambled-up bits of old Simpsons episodes.
Certainly I am not the only person who has ever been driven 
to make art in this way, mangling and distorting The Simpsons 
to make it weird — or, perhaps better, to throw its pre-existing 
weirdness into greater relief. In around 2011, a figure emerged 
called “Chris (Simpsons artist),” a writer and cartoonist who 
first rose to prominence by posting bizarre, half-mutilated ap-
proximations of Simpsons characters he had drawn on MS paint. 
Thus: Homer appears with a heart-shaped face and multiple 
eyes with a nose that looks like a foot, yelling “spook town” (fig. 
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4); Bart has a hand growing out of his head — the hand is catch-
ing an egg, and Bart is saying “I have got it” (fig. 5). Chris has 
since branched out, and now mainly focuses on other charac-
ters — I particularly like his mopey, teenage Thomas the Tank 
Engine, head in hands with human limbs, moaning “why was 
I born a train.”
Chris has picked up a big enough following to be described 
in FHM as “the internet’s Picasso.” By contrast, a 2017 VICE arti-
cle by Giacomo Lee surveys the distinctly more underground 
world of “Simpsons zines.”2 These subterranean publications 
range from comic books re-contextualizing characters and situ-
ations from the show (Scott Carr’s “The City of New York vs. 
Hammer Sonpsims,” “a very crude and absurd” re-imagining of 
the episode where Homer leaves his car at the bottom of the 
World Trade Center; Erms’s “Just Say ‘Yes’ To Saying ‘No’ To 
2 Giacomo Lee, “The True Spirit of ‘The Simpsons’ Lives On in These 
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Saying ‘Yes’ to Soft Drugs,” which looks a bit like if The Simpsons 
had been mangled up by R. Crumb) to collections of “found art” 
from the show itself (book designer Oliver Lebrun’s “A Pock-
et Companion to Books from The Simpsons’), to works which 
in some way celebrate, send up or otherwise comment upon 
broader cultural responses to the series — for instance Tim Bell’s 
“Homage to Homer,” a collection of photographs of people in 
fancy dress as Homer Simpson.
Not all Simpsons art is strictly visual. Okilly Dokilly are a 
metalcore band from Phoenix, Arizona known for dressing up 
as Ned Flanders and performing songs inspired by his charac-
ter in the show (titles include “White Wine Spritzer” and ‘God-
speed Little Doodle”). They claim to play music in the genre of 
“Nedal,” which they describe as “not as fast as Bartcore, and a 
little cleaner than Krusty Punk.”
Are You Hugging the TV?
But probably the most prominent genre of music inspired by 




enon in 2016 — at least to the extent where there was a fairly sub-
stantial article about it on Pitchfork.3 Well, I call Simpsonwave 
a genre of music. In truth, it is probably best understood as a 
genre of video art, although it is closely associated with a style of 
music — namely vaporwave, that style of electronic music which 
emerged in the early 2010s chopping and screwing 1980s and 
’90s mall muzak, infomercial jingles, home computer sound ef-
fects, and the likes — glitching, lilting, and saturated with nos-
talgia.4 Important vaporwave artists include Macintosh Plus, 
Saint Pepsi, Black Banshee, James Ferraro, and Daniel Lopatin 
aka Chuck Person (better known for the more classical electron-
ica he makes as Oneohtrix Point Never).
In his seminal 2016 video “How to Simpsonwave,” YouTuber 
FrankJavCee describes the genre as follows:
The concept of Simpsonwave is simple. Take footage of early 
episodes of The Simpsons, preferably seasons 1–6…5 Now, 
edit some [vapor]wavey music to the footage. If you’re un-
talented at crafting your own musical creations, this is totally 
fine. Just rip-off some other vaporwave producer… Next, add 
a dream-like filter and VHS distortion to the entire video to 
represent the adult longing for a childhood they thought they 
had. If you’re really fucking fancy you can chromakey certain 
parts of the cartoon and overlay modern effects or even al-
ternative scenes to better showcase the brain synapses some-
times crossing in memories, creating phantoms of times that 
probably never even existed in the first place. Once you’re 
done be sure to name it something vaporwavey by using that 
aesthetic wide text generator with a name like “Simpsonwave 
1995.”
3 See Kevin Lozano, “What the Hell Is Simpsonwave?” Pitchfork, June 14, 
2016, https://pitchfork.com/thepitch/1188-what-the-hell-is-simpsonwave/.
4 I think it still could probably be argued that Simpsonwave is a genre of 
music, in the same way that northern soul is a genre of music — defined by 
its later appropriation.
5 FrankJavCee probably should have said 1–8 (or possibly 9), where the cut-
off point for “classic” Simpsons is more usually located.
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To give one example. The Simpsonwave video “ダレ カ (Some-
body that I used to know) – VAPORWAVE CHILL REMIX” 
by LoneDev opens with the scene from the episode “Hurri-
cane Neddy,” where Ned Flanders — having seen his house get 
knocked down twice within the space of about a week — loses 
his temper at his friends and neighbors. The scene has a VHS 
filter over it with the word “AUTO” in the top-right corner, to 
make it look as if it has been shot as a shaky home video, an un-
pleasant memory no-one should have ever documented (fig. 6). 
As in the episode itself, Ned walks away from the crowd of well-
wishers he has just yelled at, with his family following him. He 
gets in his car, alone, and drives off. At this point, the color fil-
ter changes, briefly saturating the image with purples and blues 
before turning mostly pink. In addition to the VHS crackle, a 
snowfall effect is added to make it look as if Flanders is driv-
ing through a snowstorm, or through space. Footage of Flanders 
driving then loops endlessly, as the video’s music — a vaporwave 
remix of “Somebody That I Used To Know” by Gotye — plays.
Another example, the video “CRISIS” by Lucien Hughes, the 




a rather more complex narrative. Over the track “Decay” by 
HOME, a montage of clips tells a story in which Homer is seen 
experiencing — and working through — some sort of deep emo-
tional crisis, probably associated with the death of his mother. 
Homer’s grief initially causes him to isolate himself from his 
family, endangering his marriage as he binges on alcohol to the 
point of having to dance outside Moe’s for beer money and ap-
parently has an affair. But, by the end of the video, by talking 
through his problems he is able to reconcile with Marge and 
Lisa.
The video has a complex structure that is partly non-linear, 
with events Homer is experiencing in the “main” run of the nar-
rative triggering “memories” which are then presented to the 
viewer — for instance at one point, as he sits in bed with another 
woman, Homer breaks down and cries and thinks about his first 
kiss with Marge, which we then see. This image of Homer in bed 
with another woman is also one of a series of repeated motifs. 
At various points, Homer is seen running down the street and 
yelling (fig. 7); Homer is also regularly seen slouched in a couch 
listening to a tape player on headphones (fig. 8). This latter motif 
Fig. 7.
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could also be read as a framing device, since in the video’s first 
scene Homer is seen sitting down on the couch with the tape 
player and turning it on. The music then begins, and the image 
of Homer sitting on the couch fades into one of Homer sitting 
on the trunk of his car watching the stars — which is presumably 
also a recollection. All of the scenes in the video have their color 
palette altered, and VHS crackle and other effects added.
A third example, “Millhouse 1992” by midge, opens with the 
scene from the episode “Bart’s Friend Falls In Love” in which 
a recently-dumped Milhouse is standing forlorn at the top of 
the climbing frame in the school playground, “a broken man… 
it’s recess everywhere but in his heart.” The scene abruptly cuts 
away, and the music starts: “I’ll Be Wait For Sadness Comes 
Along” by Chrome Sparks. 
The viewer is then presented with a rapidly jumping se-
ries of clips featuring Milhouse from various episodes of The 
Simpsons — with scenes from the episode “Summer of 4ft. 2,” 
in which the family vacation with Milhouse at Ned Flanders’s 
beach house, given especial prominence. In amongst these clips, 




not feature Milhouse at all, in which Lisa is being bounced up 
in the air on a sheet by the new “cool” friends she makes at the 
beach — fireworks bursting in the sky behind her, the very im-
age of happiness (fig. 9). At around the 30-second mark, we re-
turn to the image of Milhouse on the climbing frame, before he 
disappears from the video entirely, and we are left for the final 
34 seconds (of what is a video just 1 minute 6 seconds long) 
with a loop of Lisa bouncing in the air. And yet Milhouse is 
still present, because what has come before can leave us in no 
doubt that what we are seeing is his memory, of Lisa whom he 
loves — a memory in which he is absent, and Lisa is all the hap-
pier for it — and with that memory comes the knowledge that 
he will never be able to share in her happiness, hence his desola-
tion. Part of what differentiates this video from the others I’ve 
looked at is that midge — who Hughes interestingly cites as a 
key influence6 — manages to achieve this poignant effect with-
out overlaying any VHS crackle or altering the colors.
6 See the interview with Hughes, in Lozano, “What the Hell Is Simpons-
wave?” Although it is understandable that Hughes’s videos — which 
Fig. 9.
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Everything Looks Bad If You Remember It
In Retromania, his sprawling, at times brilliant study of pop 
culture and nostalgia, the music critic Simon Reynolds cites 
vaporwave pioneer James Ferraro as the creator of a genre he 
prefers to call “hypnagogic pop” — that is, pop “relating to the 
state immediately before falling asleep,” a term coined by The 
Wire writer David Keenan:
Keenan noticed that memory-mangled traces of eighties 
music were starting to flicker through the hallucinatory haze 
spewed out by all these groups: crisp funk bass and span-
gly guitar parts redolent of the slickly produced rock ’n’ 
soul “yacht rock” of that decade […] the taught sequenced 
rhythms and bright digital synth sounds of eighties Hol-
lywood soundtracks […]. Ferraro suggested that all these 
eighties sounds seeped into the consciousness of today’s 
twenty-something musicians when they were toddlers fall-
ing asleep […]. He speculated that their parents played music 
in the living room and it came through the bedroom walls 
muffled and indistinct.7 
While this origin story may be somewhat fanciful, what is nice 
about it is the way in which it helps to capture what is perhaps 
most central to vaporwave — its enchanted atmosphere, at times 
dreamy and at times haunting, of millennial nostalgia for the 
world of our childhood.
One of the interesting things about vaporwave is that it is of-
ten presented as an “ironic” movement, its practitioners making 
are generally speaking, much more fully realized — have received more 
attention thus far, in many ways midge’s channel is the more interesting of 
the two. Hughes tends to cut Simpsons clips up to form poignant narratives 
somewhat independent of anything that actually happens in the show. 
By contrast, midge’s videos tend to draw out existing themes from The 
Simpsons and accentuate their significance. See the discussion of midge’s 
video “Homer’s Website” in relation to the concept of hauntology below.
7 Simon Reynolds, Retromania (London: Faber & Faber, 2011), 345–46.
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music which is not really “supposed” to be good — which I think 
stems from the fact that vaporwave music is in large part created 
out of bits of musical junk: crappy, tacky, “commercial.” But this 
seems strange when we compare vaporwave to what is prob-
ably its nearest equivalent for Generation X, Boards of Canada’s 
classic 1998 record Music Has The Right To Children. As with 
vaporwave, the music of Boards of Canada is interwoven with 
bits of cultural detritus their listeners would have been able to 
recall from childhood: analogue synth tones reminiscent of sev-
enties wildlife documentaries and BBC “TV for schools”; samples 
from Sesame Street and old documentaries; a cover photo which 
depicts a family on holiday, wearing clothes typical of the 1970s, 
the image washed out to the point where all the faces had been 
erased. In Music Has The Right To Children, all of this serves to 
invoke a deep and haunting sense of nostalgia almost exactly 
analogous to that associated with vaporwave.
The crumbly smudges of texture, the miasmic melody lines, 
the tangled threads of wistful and eerie seemed to have an 
extraordinary capacity to trigger ultra-vivid reveries that 
felt like childhood memories. I would experience a flood of 
images that were emotionally neutral yet charged with sig-
nificance, a mysticism of the commonplace and municipal: 
playgrounds with fresh rain stippling the swings and slides; 
canal-side recreation areas, with rows of saplings neatly plot-
ted, wreathed in morning mist; housing estates with identical 
back gardens and young mums pegging damp wind-flapped 
sheets on clothing lines as clouds skidded across a cold blue 
winter sky. I was never sure if these were actual memories 
from my childhood in the late sixties and early seventies or 
false ones (dreamed or seen on television).8
But Boards of Canada have always been presented (quite right-
ly) as serious musicians making music that is both seriously sin-
8 Ibid., 331–32.
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cere and seriously good. So why does vaporwave feel the need to 
ironically distance itself from itself?
The answer, as far as I can tell, hinges on an important gen-
erational difference. We millennials have come of age in an in-
creasingly precarious world, for the most part unable to aspire 
to any of the things that we have been brought up to think would 
make us “real” people, like our parents: a stable professional job, 
home ownership, a family. Correlatively, this has produced in us 
a sense that our proper comportment toward the world — and 
toward ourselves, including I suppose our own memories — is 
one of disassociation, of disinvestment. If you’re not “really” try-
ing, and you don’t “really” care, then you can’t “really” fail, can’t 
“really” be hurt by your various inevitable disappointments. The 
name “vaporwave,” it is worth noting, has its root in “vapor-
ware,” a term from the computer industry meaning a product 
that is announced but, for whatever reason, is never released, 
never in fact comes to exist. What better term for the music of 
a generation of half-persons, who can’t even become substantial 
enough to sincerely express their own anguish at the fact of the 
arrested development that is preventing them from becoming 
the people who, they have always been told, they ought to be?
Can I Borrow a Feeling?
It is with this in mind that the power of Simpsonwave becomes 
apparent. In a video attempting to make sense of the genre, “Is 
Simpsonwave a joke?” a YouTuber called “This Exists” contrasts 
the “deliberate and manufactured nostalgia” of vaporwave with 
“the actual real nostalgia of seeing Lisa’s trip to Ned Flanders’ 
beach house on the fourth of July,” effectively claiming that the 
former only becomes “emotionally resonant” when it is paired 
with the latter.9 It is perhaps more accurate to say: given that 
vaporwave is constructed out of fragments of millennial child-
hood memories, vaporwave could never really be fully itself un-
less it also incorporates The Simpsons.
9 Compare the discussion of the video “Millhouse 1992” above.
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After all, when I think back to my childhood, what really 
formed me? I grew up in a town I barely knew, in a suburb too 
distant from anywhere for a child to walk there. I dreaded going 
to school each day, where I would sit restless and bored, waiting 
to be allowed out. I found shops overwhelming, I had no idea 
why anyone would want to go to — I don’t know — the big Tesco, 
which was full of things I had no concept of what it would be 
like to want or need. I always felt sad, except when I was “overex-
cited,” in which case I was probably about to be told off. 
The only times I really felt happy, when I felt like myself, was 
when I was playing computer games (anything from the Final 
Fantasy series, over and over again), or watching The Simpsons 
(on VHS tapes we’d recorded off the TV, on repeat). And then 
when we weren’t playing, or watching, me and my brothers were 
ranking, which for The Simpsons meant ranking every episode 
(we had a four-tier system, on which — for some reason — the 
absolute gold standard was the season 3 episode “Homer 
Alone”). We had a big book, a sort of guide to The Simpsons, 
I guess, which listed every episode from seasons 1–8, and gave 
you facts about them, allowing you to trace the references (al-
most my entire pre-university cultural education came from 
that book). I came to know them all intimately, and a good dec-
ade and a half on from that book’s final disintegration nothing 
from those first 8 series has yet left my head.
Whenever I watch The Simpsons nowadays, which is not 
necessarily all that often, I know all the scenes, all the lines al-
ready — I can hear what is coming ahead of time. Whenever I 
read or hear something, that uses the same words or has the 
same cadence as a line from The Simpsons, I’ll immediately 
make the association, and if I’m with someone I’ll feel com-
pelled to voice the joke (if I’m by myself, I’ll probably just laugh 
out loud). Recently, my partner made me watch the film Jaws, 
which I’d somehow managed to avoid seeing before, and at least 
half the shots were immediately, uncannily familiar — because 
at some point The Simpsons had ripped them off. And although 
I think I am probably a slightly extreme example, I do not think 
any of this will be entirely unfamiliar, at least to anyone who is 
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roughly the same age as me (I was born in 1988). The Simpsons 
is in our language, it is under our skin; it has colored our souls, 
it has irreducibly shaped the way we experience the world. And 
so I will always experience The Simpsons in everything — in this 
sense, I will always be haunted by it. Simpsonwave, as an exten-
sion of vaporwave, brings this out masterfully.
But of course — it must also be noted — Simpsonwave does 
this in a deliberately ironized way. On at least one level, its crea-
tors are doing something they know (or think they know) to 
be incredibly stupid — cutting up clips from an old cartoon 
show and overlaying it with a style of electronic music that is 
itself performatively ironic despite (of course) the real sincere 
connections that also bear on it. As art, Simpsonwave thus al-
lows both producers and audiences to maintain themselves in 
an ironized subjectivity distanced from whatever feelings they 
might be “really” experiencing, disassociated from whatever 
they “really” have at stake in the world. It is in the space this 
opens up, between life and art, that this Real is able to manifest 
itself: a sincerity that is only possible if it is simultaneously dis-
guised.
So I Tied an Onion to My Belt, Which Was the Style at the 
Time
That said, when it comes to music and nostalgia, we probably 
ought to be careful. For Reynolds in Retromania, as for his late 
friend Mark Fisher in Ghosts of My Life, contemporary pop 
culture’s overindulgence of nostalgic impulses is in some sense 
symptomatic of a political culture in which, to put this point 
as Fisher does (via Franco “Bifo” Berardi), “the future is be-
ing slowly cancelled”: where what Fisher calls “capitalist real-
ism” — that is, the ideological myth that there is “no alternative” 
to neoliberal capitalism, a myth which has its roots in the post-
Soviet “end of history” — prevents people in general from being 
202
Post Memes
able to envisage any possibility of a different, better world which 
might come-to-be in time.10
This context lends itself to the prevalence of a “formal nostal-
gia” in which artists feel compelled to cling to established, rec-
ognizable forms because they are unable to produce anything 
genuinely new.11 For Fisher, formal nostalgia is most obviously 
dominant in popular music:
This is quickly established by performing a simple thought 
experiment. Imagine any record released in the past couple 
of years being beamed back in time to, say, 1995 and played 
on the radio. It’s hard to think that it will produce any jolt in 
the listeners. On the contrary, what would be likely to shock 
our 1995 audience would be the very recognisability of the 
sounds: would music really have changed so little in the next 
17 years? Contrast this with the rapid turnover of styles be-
tween the 1960s and the 90s: play a jungle record from 1993 
to someone in 1989 and it would have challenged them to 
rethink what music was, or could be.12
Fisher identifies a number of material reasons for this. On the 
supply-side, “neoliberal capitalism has systematically deprived 
10 See Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Alresford: 
Zero Books, 2008), and Mark Fisher, Ghosts of My Life: Writings on 
Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures (Alresford: Zero Books, 2014), 
6–7. In what follows, I will discuss Fisher and Reynolds’s views together, 
almost as if they were a single author. It may be that I am not entirely 
justified in doing this, but certainly there are clear cross-currents: both 
reference each other frequently when discussing pop music, retro, and 
nostalgia — and Reynolds even mentions that they started using the term 
“hauntology” (more on which below) simultaneously (see Reynolds, 
Retromania, 328); indeed, I am not really sure it is possible to understand 
what Reynolds is talking about when he invokes the term “hauntology” in 
Retromania without reading Fisher’s “The Slow Cancellation of the Future” 
first. If their views are not strictly speaking identical, then they do at least 
seem to have been borne out of the same conversation.
11 See Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, 7–8.
12 Ibid.
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artists of the resources necessary to produce the new.”13 Whereas 
during eras of great innovation in popular music (the 1960s, the 
post-punk ’80s), the welfare state “constituted an indirect source 
of funding for […] experiments […]. The subsequent ideological 
and practical attack on public services” from the Thatcher years 
onward “meant that one of the spaces where artists could be 
sheltered from the pressure to produce something that was im-
mediately successful was severely circumscribed.” Artists — es-
pecially if they are not from well-off backgrounds — must im-
mediately conform to the demands of the marketplace or risk 
destitution. “If there’s one factor above all else which contributes 
to cultural conservatism,” Fisher adds, “it is the vast inflation of 
rent and mortgages.”14
But audiences themselves also suffer from the effects of pre-
carity. 
As Berardi has argued, the intensity and precariousness of 
late capitalist work culture leaves people in a state where 
they are simultaneously exhausted and overstimulated. The 
combination of precarious work and digital communications 
leads to a besieging of attention.15 
The typical austerity-capitalist subject is obliged to work them-
selves to exhaustion just to be considered minimally function-
ing at their jobs (a situation which I’m sure will be familiar to 
any early-career academic).
Meanwhile during any break from work, our attention is 
bombarded by a vast stream of stimuli from the various inter-
linked platforms which dominate the instruments with which 
we navigate the world — our computers, phones, and smart TVs. 
24-hour news and the endless stream of commentary surround-
ing it on Twitter; the lives of others on Facebook and Instagram; 






Spotify, Netflix, Amazon Prime. Everything is always there, but 
we lack either the time or the energy to ever take any of it in, to 
have any real understanding of any of it. In this context, Fisher 
claims, consumers will eschew new experiences in favor of old 
forms which, like pornography, offer “the quick and easy prom-
ise of a minimal variation on an already familiar satisfaction.”16 
This means that artists who stick to “classic” styles are able to 
dominate the marketplace — Fisher’s examples include Adele 
and the Arctic Monkeys.
Of course, as both Fisher and Reynolds are well aware, all es-
tablished art forms — and popular music is no exception — have 
always been, at least to some extent, in conversation with their 
own pasts. And indeed, this conversation has at times led to the 
birth of new forms. Reynolds in particular notes that revolu-
tionary movements have often “constructed narratives around 
‘paradise lost and paradise regained’ scenarios,” and discusses at 
some length how this revolutionary-reactionary impulse fuelled 
punk — which set itself stale, mannered prog with “a concerted 
effort to turn back the clock to […] fifties rock ’n’ roll and sixties 
garage.”17
Thus it seems that nostalgia itself cannot possibly be the real 
problem. Rather, what Fisher in particular seems to object to is 
the way in which nostalgia has become intertwined with anach-
ronism, “the slippage of discrete time periods into one another.”18 
Whereas in the past, retro music would have been marketed as 
such, contemporary retro cultural products typically disavow 
any explicit reference to the past.19
Take someone like the stupendously successful Adele: al-
though her music is not marketed as retro, there is nothing 
that marks out her records as belonging to the 21st century 
either. Like so much contemporary cultural production, 
16 Ibid., 15.
17 Reynolds, Retromania, xxvii, 240.
18 Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, 5.
19 See ibid., 12.
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Adele’s records are saturated with a vague but persistent feel-
ing of the past without recalling any specific historical mo-
ment.20
The result is a music which is supposed to strike listeners as 
having a non-specifically “classic” feel, blurring the past into the 
present and, with this, eliminating any radical potential the past 
ever had. Adele’s music communicates a piece of distinctively 
capitalist realist ideology: the thought that things can never be 
different, because in truth they were always the same.
What? It’s Not Maggie’s Birthday?
Of course it must be noted that, as a show, The Simpsons is 
saturated with anachronism. Most obviously, since it began in 
1989, none of The Simpsons characters have really aged. Bart has 
been 10 for almost 30 years, Lisa 8, Maggie 1. Homer and Marge, 
weirdly, have aged, although only slightly: Homer was originally 
referred to as 34, and has since been described as 36, 38, 39, and 
40; Marge and Homer met in high school, where they were in 
the same graduating class, so they are canonically the same age 
(or near enough). 
This has distorted the show’s chronology, particularly in re-
lation to cultural time. In early episodes (“The Way We Was” 
from Season 2), Homer and Marge’s teen years were depicted as 
having taken place in the 1970s. By the mid-1980s, Homer and 
Marge had two children — and in 1985, Homer would achieve 
brief success as a member of the Grammy award-winning bar-
bershop quartet The Be Sharps (“Homer’s Barbershop Quartet,” 
Season 5). By the episode “Homerpalooza” (Season 7), Homer 
would be so stuck in a dad-rut behind the times that he has nev-
er heard of blockbuster ’90s acts like The Smashing Pumpkins 
and Nine Inch Nails. But in a later episode (“That ’90s Show,” 




no children, and Homer is in fact a member of a grunge band 
who become nationally famous, Sadgasm. 
This distorted chronology has also affected episodes in which 
the show “flashes forward” to events in the family’s future. For 
instance, the episode “Lisa’s Wedding” from Season 6 is largely 
set in the year 2010, when Lisa (in the episode, at least) is 23. 
Technically, if we assume all new Simpsons episodes are set in 
the year they first aired, this is (at the time of writing) the year 
today’s Lisa was born. If she really is to succeed Donald Trump 
to the presidency, then she had better hope some laws (either on 
term limits or age restrictions) change soon.21
However, it may not necessarily be true that The Simpsons’ 
2018 (say) is really the same year as our 2018. In part because the 
fundamental dynamics of the show have not changed since 1989, 
it has failed to respond to various real social changes — either in 
the economy, or to do with technology. If they really lived in 
our 2018, then Homer and Marge really would need to take up 
(and — what really would be novel — keep) all those new jobs 
that often drive the episodes’ plots, just out of basic necessity: a 
lower middle-class family of five could never possibly survive in 
post-crash America on just one income, especially if any of them 
ever suffered a health scare.
Meanwhile, the show has a long history of failing to respond 
in a convincing way to technological developments associated 
with computing and the Internet. In middle-period episodes 
such as “Das Bus” (season 9), where Homer starts an online 
business, and “The Computer Wore Menace Shoes” (season 
12), where Homer buys a computer and starts spreading gos-
sip online, the show does an OK job of satirizing certain trends 
around the early Internet, but fails badly at capturing either its 
look or feel; it also fails to depict in a realistic way how people 
actually use these technologies (contrast this with the adept way 
in which early episodes of the show depict the family watching 
TV).
21 Although, see my essay, “President Lisa Simpson,” The Baffler, October 4, 
2017, https://thebaffler.com/latest/president-lisa-simpson.
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A final way in which The Simpsons can be considered anach-
ronistic is the simple fact that it continues to exist as a going 
concern at all. Simpsons fans like me typically have an obsessive 
knowledge of the first nine or ten seasons, the canon of a show 
which flourished from 1990 to around 2000, before — let’s not 
beat around the bush — it got rubbish and all the fans stopped 
watching. And yet, The Simpsons has continued to produce 
around 22 new episodes a year, persisting in this state of living-
death for longer than it was ever “really” alive.
Um… It’s Like, Uh… Did Anyone See the Movie Tron?
On one level, of course, Simpsonwave could also be accused 
of slipping into anachronism. After all, these videos are essen-
tially mash-ups of clips which were created for the most part 
in the 1990s, with a style of electronic music that is much more 
contemporary.22 And indeed at least some of the videos self-
consciously attempt to make the clips somehow “about” vapor-
wave, or at any rate the experience of listening to it (see for in-
stance Lucien Hughes’s “SUNDAY SCHOOL,” where Bart has 
his walkman confiscated at church while listening to Macintosh 
Plus, before going off into a sort of vaporwave-induced reverie 
soundtracked by Black Banshee). Arguably, this elides the past 
into the present just as the show itself does.
But on another level, Simpsonwave could be understood as 
helping to correct various anachronisms exhibited by the show. 
For one thing, the use of vaporwave — a style of music which, 
although produced during the 2010s, is drenched with millen-
nial childhood nostalgia — helps contextualize the clips, and 
thus our understanding of the show overall, within a specifically 
1990s temporality. This helps erase some of the damage done to 
The Simpsons canon by its persistence since 2000.
22 As has already been noted above (in the quote from FrankJavCee), few 
if any Simpsonwave artists use clips from recent episodes — and with 




A video such as “Homer’s Website” by midge could be read as 
an attempt to redeem The Simpsons’ technological illiteracy, pre-
senting us with an alternative vision of the show’s development 
in which Homer and the family embraced the Internet age.
“Homer’s Website” opens with a scene from “The Computer 
Wore Menace Shoes.” A hefty, 90s-style home computer sits in 
a garbage can outside 742 Evergreen Terrace. We hear Marge 
yelling: “Homer, bring that back in the house!” “Fine,” Homer 
grudgingly replies. In the next scene — a clip from the same 
episode — Homer, having brought the computer back inside, is 
now sat hunched over it at the coffee table in his living room 
(which incidentally, has always struck me as a singularly weird 
place to put a computer). Whereas in the episode itself, the audi-
ence would have then seen Homer engaging with a wholly un-
convincing approximation of what the Internet was supposed to 
look like (a mostly blank window, free of anything resembling a 
navigation toolbar, containing an animation of “Dancing Jesus,” 
fig. 10), in midge’s video we hear the familiar Windows start-up 
noise, before Homer is seen loading up Windows XP (fig. 11).
Fig. 10.
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As the music associated with the video begins (the track is 
uncredited, so I am unsure who it is by), the 3D Homer from 
“Treehouse of Horror VI” is seen dancing among various ob-
jects, including a rotating ESC key and a 3D dolphin (possibly a 
reference to the early-’90s Sega MegaDrive game “Ecco the Dol-
phin”). A montage of clips then depicts Homer — amongst other 
things — lost in the 3D world; falling through time screaming 
and clutching a toaster; and looking pensively on as a flood of 
static containing the words “VIRTUAL EXODUS” bursts into 
his kitchen (fig. 12). After around a minute of this, the music and 
video come abruptly to a halt. 
With midge’s video, we finally witness (although admittedly 
only briefly) a version of The Simpsons ready to embrace the 
disorienting, decentring, and indeed liberating power of new 
technology. The computer, erupting “back into” The Simpsons’ 





In Memory of a Real Tree
“Homer’s Website” can thus be understood as engaging in a 
form of what Fisher and Reynolds call “hauntology.” This term 
is lifted from Jacques Derrida in Specters of Marx, where it puns 
off “ontology” — the study of what can be said to exist. Haun-
tology, by contrast, is concerned with what is present but non-
existent, like a ghost. Fisher specifically conceives of hauntology 
as “the agency of the virtual, with the spectre understood not as 
anything supernatural, but as that which acts without (physical-
ly) existing.”23 Drawing on the work of Martin Hägglund, Fisher 
distinguishes between two sorts of hauntological relationships: 
on the one hand, to “what is no longer,” on the other, to “the not 
yet.”24 From this:
We can provisionally distinguish two directions in hauntol-
ogy. The first refers to that which is (in actuality is) no lon-
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ger, but which remains effective as a virtuality (the traumatic 
“compulsion to repeat,” a fatal pattern). The second sense of 
hauntology refers to that which (in actuality) has not yet hap-
pened, but which is already effective in the virtual (an attrac-
tor, an anticipation shaping current behavior). The “specter 
of communism” that Marx and Engels had warned of in the 
first lines of the Communist Manifesto was just this kind 
of ghost: a virtuality whose threatened coming was already 
playing a part in undermining the present state of things.25
In Reynolds’s description, hauntology is:
A term that critic Mark Fisher and I started bandying around 
in 2005 to describe a loose network of mostly UK artists, cen-
tral among them the musicians on the Ghost Box label (The 
Focus Group, Belbury Poly, The Advisory Circle et al.) and 
their kindred spirits Mordant Music and Moon Wiring Club. 
All of these groups explore a zone of British nostalgia linked 
to television programming of the sixties and seventies.26
Later, they would also apply the term to dubstep producer Bur-
ial, whose (much better-known) work Reynolds describes as 
“hauntological dance music,” saturated with a nostalgia not nec-
essarily for childhood but rather for the lost golden age of rave.27 
For Fisher, what the canon of hauntologists share is:
Not a sound so much as a sensibility, an existential orienta-
tion. The artists that came to be labelled hauntological were 
suffused with an overwhelming melancholy; and they were 
preoccupied with the way in which technology materialised 
memory — hence a fascination with television, vinyl records, 
audiotape, and with the sounds of these technologies break-
ing down. The fixation on materialised memory led to what is 
25 Ibid.




perhaps the principle sonic signature of hauntology: the use 
of crackle, the surface noise made by vinyl. Crackle makes 
us aware that we are listening to a time that is out of joint; it 
won’t allow us to fall into the illusion of presence.28
In my view, what Fisher and Reynolds call “hauntology” is thus 
best understood as a set of techniques which allow artists to in-
voke nostalgic sentiment while resisting an anachronism which 
would blur historicity into the present. This allows them to in-
voke the past in a way which holds fast to its radical potential, 
even against a general tendency toward (merely) “formal” nos-
talgia. 
In particular, what Fisher is interested in is the way in which 
hauntological art can allow us to envisage an alternative “trajec-
tory” toward a better future, associated for him with the “popu-
lar modernism” of the 1970s. The artists on the Ghost Box label, 
who he and Reynolds rate, invoke this trajectory by focusing on 
the tropes of “brutalist architecture, Penguin paperbacks, and 
the BBC radiophonic workshop.”29 Just think for instance of the 
band name “Belbury Poly,” which invokes a now-lost set of edu-
cational institutions. But this art is not simply focused on the 
past and its possibilities in a morbid, resigned way. Indeed, it 
does not even attempt to invoke the past in a way that is accurate: 
after all, at the time a lot of this stuff would have seemed pretty 
crappy. The true power of hauntology is in invoking “what is not 
longer” in order to bring out of it “the not-yet” — possibilities 
of what, if only the world had been slightly different, could have 
been.
Vaporwave and its more developed form, Simpsonwave, are 
of course concerned with an entirely different set of tropes — but 
they are no less hauntological for it. Both are recognizably haun-
tological by virtue of the techniques they employ — VHS crackle, 
Windows start-up sounds, etc. These techniques are used to 
create musical and visual artworks which allow millennials to 
28 Fisher, Ghosts of My Life, 21.
29 Ibid., 22.
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imagine a version of the world of our childhood — a different 
version of it, perhaps, a version that was less empty — which did 
not culminate in the 2008 financial crash and the advent of aus-
terity capitalism; a world in which the post-Soviet “end of his-
tory” combined with the utopian promise of the early internet to 
produce an easy-credit life resplendent with consumerist won-
der. In this sense, they are true millennial hauntological art.30
We Were Sitting in Barney’s Car Eating Packets of Mustard, 
You Happy?
But it could be argued that online Simpsons art also achieves 
something that is more than simply derivative of what Fisher 
and Reynolds describe. Simpsonwave in part grew out of — and 
remains closely associated with — the “Simpsons Shitpost-
ing” Facebook group. Founded by Geddy Johnson in 2015, at 
the time of writing, “Simpsons Shitposting” has over 200,000 
members. An anarchic, volatile space, “Simpsons Shitposting” 
is the largest and most prominent forum dedicated to the shar-
ing of Simpsons memes, with images and other media originally 
posted to the page often going viral elsewhere.31 The forum’s no-
30 The vision they present is, of course, much less obviously “leftist” than the 
clearly statist vision of Fisher’s ’70s hauntologists — millennial hauntology 
might thus be thought not to share the radical potential Fisher sees in it. 
I’m not quite sure what to say about this here. One point I’d like to make is 
that we millennials are nothing if not Thatcher and Reagan’s children, and 
if we are to achieve anything “radical” in any direction we must come to 
terms with how our infancy has configured our desires.
31 The group seems to enjoy manufacturing crises. In 2016, the group 
ostensibly “almost shut down” after Johnson sold it to some “Macedonian 
scammers” because he needed $3,500 for “dick surgery”; the following 
year the admins claimed they had sold the group to Buzzfeed, turned 
off member posting and flooded the group with memes of “Smithers 
Dabbing”; at the time of writing its name has just been changed to 
“[omitted] Shitposting” on the basis that the admins have received a cease 
and desist letter from the legal representatives of Matt Groening, who 
has had “significant emotional distress” inflicted upon him by the group’s 
“frequent use of the term ‘Lowmer’,” about which more below. It is hard to 
know which if any of the crises have been real.
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toriety can be evidenced by the treatment it has been given on 
sites like Wired and The Onion AV Club; it has also inspired a 
number of imitators — both Simpsons-based (Twitter’s “Ireland 
Simpsons Fans” account) and otherwise (“It’s Always Sunny In 
Philadelphia Shitposting,” “Frasier Shitposting,” “Evangelion 
Shitposting,” etc.).32
The concept of the “shitpost” is significant here. According to 
“Know Your Meme,” the term “shitpost” was originally coined 
in 2007, at which point it referred to “utterly worthless and in-
ane posts on an internet message board” — particularly when 
these posts were of such a high volume as to make the forum 
unusable by others.33 However, according to Google Trends, the 
phrase was barely used until around the latter half of 2015, when 
usage suddenly spiked.34 A 2016 Independent article attributes 
this spike to Donald Trump, who of course announced his can-
didacy for president at around this time. Many of Trump’s earli-
est supporters were “ironybros” trolling forums with shitposts 
in support of him, often featuring the now-notorious Pepe the 
Frog.35 
But personally I don’t quite buy this narrative. After all, 
Simpsons Shitposting was founded in 2015 as well, and Google 
Trends clearly identifies the closest related topic to “shitposting” 
to be “The Simpsons — American sitcom.” What is also clearly 
true is that although the definition of the term “shitpost” em-
32 See Brian Raftery, “The Homeric Odyssey of the Web’s Strangest Simpsons 
Site,” Wired, May 22, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/05/homeric-
odyessy-webs-strangest-simpsons-site/; Randall Colburn, “Read This: The 
Story Behind the Internet’s Weirdest Simpsons Fan Group,” AV Club, May 
23, 2017, https://news.avclub.com/read-this-the-story-behind-the-internet-
s-weirdest-sim-1798262202.
33 See Know Your Memes, s.v. “shitposting,” http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/shitposting.
34 See Google Trends, s.v. “shitposting,” https://trends.google.com/trends/
explore?date=all&q=Shitposting.
35 See Andrew Griffin, “Shitposting: What Is the Bizarre Online Behaviour 
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ployed by “Simpsons Shitposting” and its imitators is in some 
sense related to the original coinage, it is nevertheless qualita-
tively distinct. After all, the term “shitpost” originally referred to 
a nuisance — but the whole point of Simpsons Shitposting and 
other related pages is, well, to shitpost. As the page’s mission 
statement has it:
A freeflowing definition.
A simpsons shitpost has no regard for quality nor is it de-
fined by how shit it is.
Post because you want to.
Post what you want to.
No agenda.
No ulterior motive.
No care for how terrible it may be.
No care for how many likes it may garner.
NO NSFW
NO EDGELORDS
Just shitpost the simpsons.
Art is Subjective.36
Here, then, the shitpost is defined not simply by its low quality, 
nor by how annoying it is for others. It is defined rather by a 
sort of indifference, both to quality (“A simpsons shitpost has 
no regard for quality […] Post because you want to. Post what 
you want to”) and to reception — either positive or negative 
(“No care for how terrible it may be. No care for how many likes 
to it may garner […] NO EDGELORDS”). This invites users 
to produce a high volume of memes based on whatever hap-
pens to come into their head (“No agenda […] Just shitpost the 
simpsons”).
In practice what this means is that the page produces an al-
most constant stream of memes of wildly varying quality fea-
turing characters and situations from The Simpsons (and, as 




with Simpsonwave, this means: almost exclusively from earlier 
episodes of The Simpsons). It would be hard to give a complete 
survey of these memes — almost as hard as it would be to exag-
gerate (or to estimate) their sheer volume. Here, I want to move 
Fig. 13.
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toward an understanding of them primarily by focusing on the 
sort of connections which different sorts of Simpsons shitposts 
draw.
One set of Simpsons shitposts draws connections between 
the show and the wider world, including the news. An example 
of this would be the post in fig. 13. This meme uses the form of 
the “am I so out of touch? No, it’s the children who are wrong” 
bit from the episode “The Boy Who Knew Too Much,” to make 
it look as if Principal Skinner is commenting on the woeful re-
action of the political and media establishment to the political 
upheavals of 2016. Depending on what has been in the news 
recently, the “Simpsons Shitposting” page is typically flooded 
with similar (although not always as funny) memes — another 
example, satirizing the UK media’s treatment of Jeremy Corbyn, 
is given in fig. 14. Meanwhile, the post given in fig. 15 relates one 
of Troy McClure’s songs from the Planet of the Apes musical that 
he stars in in the episode “A Fish Called Selma” to the revolu-




A second set of Simpsons shitposts draws connections be-
tween images from the show and other memes. The image 
in fig. 16 transposes a scene from the episode “Homer and 
Apu” — in which Jimbo Jones gets confused about his identity 
Fig. 15.
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while “rehearsing” an impromptu scene with the actor James 
Woods — onto the well-known “Distracted Boyfriend” meme. 
A much more ambitious example of this category of shitpost 
is given to us by YouTube user The Chewanator. His master-
ful video “Steamed Hams but it’s All Star” uses autotune to set 
the well-known scene from “22 Short Films About Springfield” 
in which Skinner cooks dinner for Superintendent Chalmers to 
meme staple “All Star” by Smashmouth. 
“Steamed Hams,” it is worth noting, has now effectively be-
come a meme all of its own, enjoying a life at least somewhat 
independent of the “Simpsons Shitposting” page. On YouTube, 
there are a vast range of “Steamed Hams but its…” videos, rang-
ing from the implicitly Simpsonwavey “Steamed Hams But It’s 
On VHS and When Someone Says ‘Steam’ or ‘Ham’ it Suffers 
from Generation Loss” by Mitchell Hang, to the hellishly trippy 
“Steamed Hams but you’re on bath salts at 60fps” by postalgbv. 
Recently, the meme most likely peaked with “Steamed Hams 
But It’s Voiced By Jeff Goldblum,” where the website Gamespot 
managed to get the actual actor Jeff Goldblum to do all of Skin-




Also included in this second category of shitposts would be 
posts which play off memes associated with the group itself. The 
image given in fig. 17 is a version of the “delet this” meme, which 
users often comment under posts they disapprove of (though 
probably more often jokingly than sincerely).
Two All-Beef Patties Special Sauce Lettuce Cheese Pickles 
Onions on a Sesame Seed Bun
But the third sort of Simpsons shitpost that I want to identify 
is, to my mind, by far the most interesting one. This category 
of shitpost draws connections between the show and itself, riff-
ing jokes from one scene into an otherwise unrelated one. The 
post given in fig. 18 transposes a gag from the episode “Homer 
the Heretic” — in which Ned Flanders throws an unconscious 
Homer out of his burning house onto a mattress on the ground 
below, only for Homer to bounce off the mattress and back into 
the house through the ground floor window — into a gag from 
the episode “Homer Loves Flanders,” in which Homer appears 
menacingly in the Flanders’s family yard through the hedge. The 
Fig. 17.
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weirdness of the transposition is accentuated by the fact that, 
in the latter scene, Ned is bouncing a basketball — which in the 
post makes it look as if the rhythm of his bounces is also causing 
the unconscious Homer to move.
The post given in fig. 19 takes as its basis a scene from the 
episode “Itchy and Scratchy: The Movie,” using this to present to 
us a world in which “Chanel suits” (of the sort Marge purchases 
in the episode “Scenes from the Class Struggle in Springfield”) 
have for whatever reason become a playground fad which Bart 
is excluded from. Fig. 20 imagines a world in which Manjula, 
Apu’s wife has (apparently) had an affair with the pumpkin-
headed man from “People Who Look Like Things,” a throwaway 
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gives birth to a pumpkin-headed baby, Apu shoots and kills the 
pumpkin-man. 
When these posts work best, it is like some new neurons have 
just been connected in your brain, allowing you to see shapes 
you’d never previously been able to comprehend. To fans of the 
show, the rhythms of these old Simpsons jokes are so utterly 




ing out new ways in which they can be looped back into each 
other. The examples given above are just three instances of the 
countless possibilities associated with this material that could 
be — and still are being — explored.
This category of shitpost lends itself to the instantiation of a 
canon of tropes. In fig. 21, we see some examples of the “Dud-
face” trope. This trope has its basis in the episode “Summer of 
Fig. 21.
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4ft 2,” where Homer, Marge, Bart, and Milhouse are playing a 
game called “Mystery Date.” After Homer draws “the captain 
of the football team” (presumably the best “mystery date” in 
the game), Bart — much to his parents’ amusement — gets “the 
dud” (who seems to be the worst one). Homer’s glee is height-
ened as he realizes that the “dud” character looks almost exactly 
like Milhouse — and we see his face distinctively brighten at this 
dawning knowledge (fig. 22).
The “Dudface” trope thus involves something (anything) 
opening to reveal (or somehow otherwise revealing) “the Dud,” 
before somewhere Homer’s face, usually transposed onto an-
other character, “brightens” at the sight of it. Thus these memes 
have the Dud appearing behind the door in Ned Flanders’s 
rebuilt house; in the mirror a distressed Mr. Burns is using to 
check if Homer is still in the corridor; on Tattoo Annie’s back, 
etc. A similar logic operates behind the “lemonface” trope, 
which is taken from an image in the episode “Lemon of Troy” 
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One of the most prominent tropes on the “Simpsons Shit-
posting forum” is “Lowmer” (fig. 25; some examples of Lowmer 
memes in figs. 26 and 27). This trope takes as its basis a still from 
the scene in the episode “Rosebud” in which Homer is fanta-
sising about Mr. Burns giving him “my own recording studio.” 
In his fantasy, as he clowns around on the microphone, Homer 
gets very low to the ground, and for a split second he is drawn 
as a strange, distortedly “low” version of himself. This version 
of Homer would have been almost impossible to identify in 
1993 when the episode originally aired. However, thanks to the 
“Frinkiac” search engine, it is now much easier to discover these 
odd bits of old animation.
Launched in February 2016 by Paul Kehrer, Sean Schulte, 
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every episode from the first seventeen seasons of The Simpsons, 
containing every microsecond-long frame together with accom-
panying text from the script. Since Frinkiac first appeared, it has 
become an invaluable tool for the creation of Simpsons memes 
of whatever sort. In my view, search engines such as Frinkiac 
ought to be understood as a new sort of technology — they are 
to the shitpost what drum machines, samplers, and turntables 
were to early hip-hop.37 On the one hand, Frinkiac simply makes 
it much easier to mass-produce Simpsons memes. But moreover, 
as the popularity of images such as “Lowmer” testifies, Frinki-
ac makes possible a sort of Simpsons “crate-digging,” in which 
weird and rare animations can be lifted from individual clips, 
then re-contextualized as the building blocks for shitpost jokes. 
37 There have since been equivalents launched for Futurama and Rick & 
Morty, and obviously it would be possible to imagine something analogous 




Well Seymour, I Made It. Despite Your Directions
I want to conclude this essay with two rather bold claims. To un-
derstand the first claim, recall first the problem Fisher sketches 
in “The Slow Cancellation of the Future.” Under current con-
ditions, artists are unable to “produce the new.” One material 
reason for this is economic precarity. Another is a distinctively 
digital, “Internet-age” form of overstimulation, in which we are 
constantly assaulted with new content that we have neither the 
time nor the energy to understand.
What I want to suggest is that the shitposting form — pio-
neered by the Simpsons Shitposting forum — constitutes an aes-
thetic response to digital overstimulation. As I have described 
above, “Simpsons Shitposting” presents users with an intensely 
high volume of posts. These posts for the most part play off ma-
terial that is very familiar: old Simpsons gags, which have, as I 
have established, been hard-wired into many fans’ brains since 
childhood. Each post uses this material to draw new connec-
tions with other things: including the news, popular culture, 
and other memes. Taken together, then, these posts could be 
understood as an attempt to draw a map of everything, index-
ing everything in existence to something that happened in The 
Simpsons. Now, of course, this map could never be possessed 
in total by any one individual, could never be surveyed in its 
entirety. But even being able to access small chunks of it could 
help individuals feel anchored in a world otherwise rendered 
incomprehensible (thus meaningless) by its sheer intensity. The 
shitpost, then, is the new art form we as late capitalist subjects 
need to help us unconceal our world: the art of overstimulation.
The second claim I want to make hinges on a distinction that 
I believe it is possible to make between art that is about The 
Simpsons, and art that is in the medium of “Simpsons.” Most of 
the examples I have discussed above fit into the former catego-
ry: from the work of Chris (Simpsons artist) to Simpsonwave. 
These artworks play with characters and themes from the show, 
often recontextualizing them in interesting ways; they thus have 
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The Simpsons as their subject matter. Most Simpsons shitposts, 
too, are “about” The Simpsons in exactly this way. 
But when it comes to something like the “Lowmer” trope, 
I’m not so sure. Recall that this is an image which is only able 
to make its way into the consciousness, even of dedicated fans of 
the show, with the advent of the Frinkiac search engine — which, 
as I have argued, can be understood as a sort of tool for mak-
ing Simpsons memes. It thus strikes me as being in some way 
analogous to what Fisher in Ghosts of My Life describes as be-
ing definitive of jungle music — the “strange metallic excres-
cence that was produced when samples were slowed down and 
the software had to fill in the gaps” — a new sound, produced 
through new timestretching technology, that previously “no hu-
man could play.”38 Often, it is through these weird technological 
side-effects that new genres and forms are produced.
Perhaps something similar could be identified here. Con-
sider the possibility of a Simpsons-based art which nevertheless 
does not have The Simpsons as its primary content. Just as there 
can be paintings which are not strictly speaking about painting 
itself, so we can imagine a category of Simpsons shitpost which 
spins frictionless from any events or jokes in — or indeed, as-
sociated with anyone’s primary experience of — the show. This 
must all remain very speculative for now. But as Simpsons Shit-
posting and indeed the shitposting form as such develops, I an-
ticipate this becoming increasingly the case.
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began my correspondence with the crew behind Non-Ex-
istent Existentialist Memes after years of lels, tags, and un-
expected philosophical reflection. The home of deliberately 
esoteric and non-denominational politics, NEEM is a breath 
of fresh air in the crowded sphere of “philosophy memes,” 
where often the joke was the smug knowledge that the reader 
had studied philosophy at university. Instead, NEEM’s work at-
tacks the presumption of knowledge itself, offering deliberately 
contradictory arguments and explanations, obscure medieval 
metaphysics, and a deep engagement with Chinese and Indian 
thought. And photos of people and animals in predicaments, 
because…the absurd.
Undoubtedly, however, the page is most famous for its end-
less interpretations of Albert Camus’s memeable phrase, “we 
must imagine Sisyphus happy,” so much so that it prompted a 
self-critique — “Holy Shit! Is that a Motherfucking Camus ref-
erence???” Jean-Paul Sartre’s oeuvre also gets a minor workout 
from the page and its readership, however the jokes quickly 
move on. For an existentialist meme page, one admin shares 




tialist memes as they would be “non-existent.” To the extent 
there is any articulated vision behind the page, NEEM’s drive 
to both widen and deepen social and philosophical dialogue is 
more important than any commitment to a particular doctrine.
Where much liberal discourse around online dialogue cent-
ers on its capacity to entrench us into particular camps and 
identities — something the NEEM crew themselves express their 
concerns over — little attention has been paid to the deeply lib-
erating potential of being encountered repeatedly with differ-
ing, opposing, and even ersatz opinions. At a time when any 
purported marketplace of ideas — physical and digital — is im-
mediately crowded out with native advertising, corporate spon-
sorship, reactive think pieces and political echo chambers, the 
idea that online platforms like Facebook could actually play host 
to philosophical discussion is both anachronistic and yet more 
urgent than ever.
I began my interaction with the crew in April 2018, perform-
ing one of the more fittingly absurd tasks of my writing career: 
Facebook messaging a meme page to request an interview. For-
tunately, the three core admins agreed, under the condition of 
pseudonymity.
Angus: So could you please tell me a bit about yourself, like your 
country, academic background, and your interest in philosophy, 
politics, and memes?
Edwin: We’re all from the United States, though with different 
ethnic backgrounds. JT for example is Chinese; I’m a typical 
American mix of European ancestry. We’re all recent college 
graduates as well. Funny thing is none of us actually have phi-
losophy degrees, I’m probably the closest with a B.A. in Asian 
Studies.
My interest in philosophy actually with Eastern philoso-
phy, which you can definitely tell from the page. In university 
I mostly took classes on “Eastern” religions, such as Daoism, 
Buddhism, and Islam. I’m also really into art, but I could never 
draw a straight line so I went with art history instead. As for pol-
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itics, I was initially really into that kind of stuff, but my interest 
waned over time. Now I mostly just see it as a source for memes. 
That’s not to say I don’t have political views, but I tend to think 
expending political energy is a waste of time for most people. 
Also my own views change so much based on new information 
that I spent so much time bouncing around ideologies.
JT: I’m the growth hacker admin of NEEM and made the high 
impact memes that grew the page to 595k [now 597k]. I studied 
Buddhism, Platonism, Islam, and Christian theology in Uni. I 
also launched the marketing campaigns, T-shirt designs, and 
our Instagram initiative. I’m the “delivery, execution, and copy 
editing” side of Neem. Edwin was the big boi who conceived of 
the idea of NEEM and he was the one who babies it while it was at 
a humble 100 follower base. I don’t remember exactly but I think 
I joined when we had 5k followers.
Dan: Like the others, I am from the northeastern United States 
and we all went to the same high school. Both of my parents 
emigrated from Ethiopia. In high school, my main academic in-
terest was in neuroscience but I majored in computer science in 
college, specifically focusing on AI and machine learning/deep 
learning. However, my intellectual interests have always been 
broad and since late high school I loved learning about and dis-
cussing philosophy, theology, politics, science, society, culture, 
and so on. I went to college on the West Coast and experienced 
a mild culture shock, and this experience primed me to key in 
on some of the more subtle yet persistent fundamental differ-
ences in how people think, believe, evaluate, socialize, and ex-
press themselves. I have always been more interested in learning 
as opposed to opining, and apart from fundamental principles, 
I rely on to guide my life, don’t have many strong political or 
philosophical views.
Angus: What was it that brought you into memeing as a mode of 
philosophical expression? Was it out of a natural urge to stir the 
pot and shitpost, or was there genuine intellectual intention? A 
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page with a name like “non-existent existential memes” seems like 
it has more intent than most.
Edwin: I’m an old-school *chan guy. Nowadays all the *chans 
are either dead or just bad, but that was where all my initial in-
spiration came from. I think the real birthplace of “intellectual” 
memes was on 4chan’s /lit/ back in the earlier 2010s. My own 
personal home was Krautchan for the longest time, but they 
went down for good (RIP). I’ve loved memes forever, though. 
They’re basically the best medium for extremely niche humor. 
You can’t really make a funny TV show about early 20th-century 
philosophy, but you can definitely make memes about it. 
Another great thing about memes compared to traditional 
media is they’re inherently social and easily accessible. Anyone 
can make a meme, anyone can edit a meme, anyone can enjoy 
a meme. You just go into any online community and that’s how 
people communicate. There’s no Corporate Overlord pulling the 
strings, no censor to get through, no software, skills, or training 
required. 
I really enjoy playing Devil’s advocate, and that shows through 
in our content. Anyone who makes memes will tell you they just 
do it for their own amusement, I don’t think we’re different. But 
part of that amusement to me was also developing ideas. When 
you type out 200 words for some “long-form” meme (the really 
TL:DR ones), it really helps you develop your own thoughts. I 
think this comes from the fact that memes were initially just 
a shortcut in online discussions, and that’s what they end up 
being used as typically. So anytime I want to develop my own 
thoughts, I just make a meme; then you can reuse it whenever 
you get into an argument! 
One thing I think our page does well is just showing a ton of 
underappreciated viewpoints. It’s not that I literally think Chi-
nese alchemy is real like some of our memes say, but it’s a funny 
position to take. Same with things like “The burden of proof is 
bad.”
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I love the name because while it hints at what you can expect 
from our content, it’s ultimately a meaningless nonsense phrase, 
but when you think about it, it describes the content perfectly. 
Dan: I’ve been into memes since middle school when the first 
what I guess you could call prehistoric ones came out on Fa-
cebook. I just always found them hilarious, illuminating, and 
infectious — modern lowbrow (sometimes highbrow?) art. Peo-
ple may intentionally or unintentionally create “memeable” mo-
ments, but for whatever reason they resonate. I did not even 
consider creating memes until junior year, when JT and Edwin 
told me they needed more OC and asked me to join as an ad-
min. To me memeing feels like creating digital art because you 
have to think of your audience, collective knowledge, the pool 
of allusions you can rely on, forms, symbols, wordplay, themes, 
and so on. I used to write short stories and novellas of sorts in 
middle school so I have a lot of experience thinking about and 
creating narratives and, especially for my longer-form memes, 
try to encapsulate a little vignette.
The main reason I started memeing was for laughs. My first 
meme, I believe, was an Albert Camus Tinder bio, and my first 
few memes after that were mostly for lols too. Once I started re-
alizing how my memes and the memes of my fellow admins were 
resonating with fans and I started having greater ambitions for 
the significance of my memes, then I started to take my memes 
a bit more seriously. I must admit I even had some moments 
where I was inspired to make some completely genuine intel-
lectual and aesthetic statements with my memes. Most of my 
memes are still for lols because they’re often easier to make and 
come to me more readily, but, as I’ve started reading and think-
ing more about the main underlying philosophical/theological 
material for our page, refined my craft, and debated with my 
fellow admins over meme ideas and execution, I’m a bit more 
inclined to at least incorporate some greater meat in my memes. 
I also very much enjoy sometimes intentionally creating con-
troversial (and a blend of serious and humorous) philosophi-
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cal memes and observing the uproar in the comments from the 
supporters of the philosophical viewpoint I undermined or at-
tacked (my fellow admins are especially good at doing this, even 
when we don’t necessarily even strongly disagree with the side 
we attacked or have a strong opinion either way). In fact, many 
of these memes promote some very intense and serious discus-
sion, and it was then that I realized a lot of our fans took our 
work quite seriously, maybe even more seriously than we did 
sometimes. Nevertheless, I always loved seeing their reactions 
and sometimes even arguing with and learning from them.
Angus: NEEM is quite a unique page, combining more commonly 
understood Western existential themes with a deep appreciation 
of Indian and Chinese philosophy, as well as some genuinely ab-
surdist content which is difficult to describe in a textual format 
(people and animals in predicaments, non-sequiturs, etc). How 
did you come to combine these various elements?
JT: My answer is that we always try to veil our beliefs whenever 
possible and try to make ironic memes that can be appealing no 
matter what angle you view it from. Often we might even make 
a meme that, on a surface level, seems to be totally disagree-
able with what we believe, though the inner layer of that meme 
is actually the truth. In the past we used to propagandize our 
ideologies much more often but I now discourage our admins 
from doing this, since it’s much more fun when no one knows 
what the admins believe. We also sometimes go full propaganda 
mode on beliefs that we ourselves disagree with, to keep it fresh. 
A lot of the memes related to Sufism, Hinduism, Platonism, 
and Buddhism come directly from moments in time when I was 
attending classes on those subjects. I was thinking about those 
ideas all the time so it was natural for me to fuse them with con-
temporary meme formats. 
Edwin: We’re all pretty cosmopolitan guys, and I was always big 
into exploring the ”foreign Internet.” Like, what are Japanese 
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people doing on 2ch? What’s a Nigerian forum like? (Turns out 
actually really interesting: check out Nairaland.) 
So the content just came naturally; we’re Westerners so we’ve 
read lots of the Western canon, but my real interest was always 
beyond that, so that content got made as well. I remember 
when I first started doing a lot of the Daoist stuff it was because 
Zhuangzi is sometimes lumped in with Camus as an “absurdist” 
thinker. When we gave it a shot, the feedback was great; tons 
of people appreciated how we were broadening their horizons 
and not taking a Eurocentric view of philosophy. So we just kept 
doing it. 
The random images are truly the heart of the page, at least in 
my view. That’s what we started with and I never want to stop 
posting them. The only real criteria I can give you for those is if 
it makes me laugh really hard, makes me sad, or “really makes u 
think,” I post it. Sometimes we get flack for posting stuff that is 
downright sad or disturbing, but I think anything that fills with 
you with genuine emotion is good content. 
JT: The way that we produce work is pretty simple. Usually we 
have a shared queue of “meme ideas that we must make” and 
also “meme templates we must abuse”. Whenever I have spare 
time I sit down and look at the list and try to make something 
good from it. During my really active days in university, I would 
sometimes get struck down and inspired by a meme idea right 
where I was standing, and I’d walk over to a desk, pull out my 
laptop, and submit the meme immediately. 
My friends and fellow admins have a habit also of green-
texting hypothetical situations to each other quite frequently. A 
lot of times our banter will be focused on obscure philosophical 
topics, and if a banter session produces a good meme idea, then 
we manufacture it. Usually we like to strawman an imaginary 
character who represents some sort of modern Western delu-
sion and we banter against him. For example:
• colonialism is really bad and morality is relative, so we 
shouldn’t impose our views on others
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• omg these guys in Africa are imposing their views on others, 
we need to impose our views on them so that they can stop 
imposing their views on others
• this is totally not colonialism btw 
And we might exchange dialogues like that.
Dan: In terms of how and why I personally combine Western 
existentialism with Indian and Chinese philosophy, much of 
that inclination has to do with becoming genuinely interested in 
the intersection of Eastern metaphysics and epistemology with 
Western existentialism as I touched on a bit before. As I started 
exploring this intersection and realized that most Westerners 
were not even considering, let alone well-informed on, Eastern 
thought (and the same vice versa from what I’ve observed), I 
started making East-West hybrid philosophy memes mostly 
around some questions, thoughts, or situations I was consider-
ing at the time. What I love about the work on our page is how 
diverse it is not just across topics but even across time too — we 
make a lot of our memes based off of what we’re talking, re-
searching, and thinking about and that content goes through 
major changes at least a couple times a year. I also love how, 
especially given how big our audience is, we can highlight some 
underappreciated figures and ideas and our showcase for many 
people can hopefully expand their intellectual horizons. 
Angus: Relatedly, do you think that there are parallels between 
Western existentialism and Indian and Chinese philosophy which 
aren’t merely superficial? Did it really take Western philosophy 
until the 19th–20th centuries to begin to tackle the topics that 
Eastern philosophy had dealt with for a long time, or is this being 
unfair to Platonists and medieval European thought? 
Edwin: For sure. Like I said earlier, the Camus–Zhuangzi con-
nection is pretty obvious when you’re reading them. Zhuangzi 
is the philosopher I most enjoy, and probably the guy closest 
to my own outlook on life. Camus is a close second, perhaps. 
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But both of them agree that man is thrust into the world with a 
deep void in his heart that he has to fill with meaning. Both of 
them take a very active perspective on life as well; we should be 
doing things and going our own way rather than living a life of 
pure contemplation. Finally, their epistemology is quite similar 
in that they basically reject the idea of “knowledge” all together. 
The thought that no one actually knows what’s going on is rather 
comforting, I believe. 
Of course also many of the existentialists like Heidegger 
were inspired by the East as well, particularly Daoism. While 
I do love Eastern philosophy, it’s not like the West didn’t tackle 
similar ideas at similar times. Even when learning about Eastern 
philosophy, you’ll find most teachers frame it in terms of West-
ern philosophy, like the “myriad things” in the Dao De Jing be-
ing similar to the Platonic idea of “forms,” etc. I don’t think this 
unfair to either side, it just makes teaching easier. But of course 
there are also irreconcilable differences between the two. 
Dan: I would say beyond the superficial there are definitely 
some major parallels in the questions and dilemmas Western 
and Eastern philosophers face that are similar to some of the 
questions and dilemmas many individuals come across in their 
own lifetimes—the ontological, epistemological, moral, how 
to live a good life, and so on. I would say Western philosophy 
before the 19th–20th century partially addressed some of what 
Eastern philosophy was tackling, but I believe there were major 
gaps and assumptions taken at face value that the East did away 
with, which led to some new and richer insights in my opinion. 
I’m speaking in broad strokes because I would need to do a re-
view of sorts to suggest anything concrete and specific, but I do 
believe Heidegger, as Edwin mentioned, went on at length about 
what the West failed to tackle that the East did by his time.
JT: I think in many ways Western philosophy is catching up 
to Eastern philosophy, especially when it comes to scepticism. 
21st-century Western philosophers in general seem to place 
too much value in their idea of logic and smuggle in modern 
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delusions without realizing it. They hate religion and they hate 
mysticism but they have a religious orthodoxy of their own. 
This sort of intellectual dishonesty is what I dislike seeing. I like 
19th-century European philosophy because it has a uniquely 
European flavor and because, even though I myself believe in 
the existence of objective truth, the poetry of existentialism is 
very beautiful and does capture the despair of the man who is 
trapped in the material world, which is an important topic in 
both Ecclesiastes and also in Indian philosophies. It would be 
unfair to say that 19th-century Euro philosophy is totally de-
rivative of Eastern philosophy, but it is definitely true that many 
21st-century Western philosophers are philistines who can’t 
conceive of the Eastern mentality and who place too much trust 
in social dogmas that they’ve unwittingly inherited and abused. 
A decent example of this is Occam’s razor, conceived by Wil-
liam of Occam who believed in a simple and uncontingent God. 
It’s a fairly unconvincing way of arguing that works best as a rule 
of thumb, and it’s abused by people who wrongly think that be-
lief in materialism is “more simple and more elegant” than belief 
in a One or a Divinity. You can see how laughably incorrect such 
a view is by looking at Mahayana Buddhist metaphysics, which 
discusses cause and effect and the non-existence of cluster ob-
jects in a way that is very honest and very consistent (and by the 
way, I’ve come nowadays never to expect honesty or consistency 
from mainstream Western philosophers). The Buddhist expla-
nation of consciousness, language, and objectively existing ob-
jects is incredibly complex, non-obvious, and ugly; how could 
anyone say that Occam’s razor supports a materialist viewpoint? 
If anything, it supports belief in God (not an old man in the sky 
who creates things in moment-to-moment time using voodoo 
magic, but a simple and unconstrained One Origin beyond time 
and space whose outpouring and unraveling generates and sus-
tains all things).
Platonism and Neoplatonism are really great traditions and 
they’re very Eastern. When you read Plato, you don’t see any 
British mathematical arrogance even though Plato is consid-
ered “Western” philosophy. Plato loves logic but he uses it to 
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clear away delusions and does this out of his love for beauty and 
truth. If you confronted most modern Western philosophers 
and asked them, “do you love beauty and truth?” they would 
not be able to give you a satisfying answer and might actually 
be very uncomfortable to even engage with such concepts. By 
denying beauty and truth, they’ve cut themselves off from their 
Platonic inheritance! And by un-sceptically affirming contem-
porary and contingent viewpoints, they also cut themselves off 
from Socrates (who, incidentally, was pious and has an uncanny 
resemblance to an Eastern character, even more so than Plato). 
The Platonic traditions are very much alive in a new form, in the 
Eastern Orthodox Christian faith, and if you read their prayers 
and philosophy, you will see they are much more Platonist than 
a British guy talking about how he proved God is not real. 
My rambling point can be summarized like this: we live in a 
very limited marketplace of ideas, and our contemporary ortho-
dox Western viewpoints do not represent the full capabilities of 
human rationality at all. People who claim to be secular masters 
of logic actually have irrational religious beliefs of their own, 
and modern viewpoints have not “triumphed” over the past, nor 
have Western views “triumphed” over so-called irrational East-
ern mysticism. They have rather performed great intellectual 
violence by suppressing the representation of the past and of the 
East in contemporary discourse. This is as close to a manifesto 
that I’ve ever written. 
Angus: I’m impressed by how much dialogue and multiple per-
spectives forms part of NEEM’s output. The Internet and particu-
larly “niche” culture is commonly given a lot of flak nowadays for 
creating “polarized” institutions. How do you see the production 
of memes as contributing to a greater dialogue? It seems you’ve 
have a lot of positive experiences and feedback.
Edwin: They allow people from opposing viewpoints to discuss 
things with the layer of humor or irony needed to actually re-
move one’s own biases from the discussion. People seemingly 
are more willing to engage with memes from an opposing view-
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point as well because there is less of the “serious” or “combat-
ive” feeling that comes with arguing in earnest. However a lot of 
young people are radicalized nowadays into a lot of potentially 
self-destructive ideologies through memes (the “alt-right”, for 
example. How many of these guys just thought of themselves as 
just edgy memers on the Internet until they were doxed, or until 
they got arrested for fighting some anarchist?), so it’s not neces-
sarily a good thing.
I believe you’re starting to see a sort of global politics emerg-
ing, where people are extremely focused on things outside their 
borders, especially those invested in political “Internet cliques” 
as I call them. So the power of all borders are diminishing. The 
most powerful is still linguistic though, and I don’t think those 
will ever go away unless some extremely powerful translation 
software is invented.
JT: I enjoy promoting somewhat foreign perspectives, and it’s 
not just limited to Eastern views since we will genuinely pro-
mote anything that is shocking to the modern-day Western 
mentality, including weird pre-modern views, Abrahamic reli-
gion, communism, and scepticism. I enjoy using the vocabulary 
of popular memes to articulate concepts that might be totally 
foreign to the typical reader. As a lay historian, I hate it when 
people impose their own shitty contingent viewpoints on the 
past and I hate to see people who literally cannot comprehend 
views that are outside their own local history. Comedy is a sort 
of koan-like mechanism where you can breach past someone’s 
own delusions and give them temporary access to a fun new 
viewpoint. 
For me, the inspiration to stir up debate is a combination of 
playfulness and wanting to fight against some particular mis-
conceptions. If somebody starts talking near me about some 
very contingent and untrue belief (e.g., Internet access is a ba-
sic human right), I’ll be more motivated to make fun of it in 
a future meme. Also, sometimes we want to throw a bone to 
different audience members. If we have been making fun of ma-
terialist sceptical atheists for too long, then we eventually throw 
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them a placating meme and make fun of Christians. Part of it 
too is that we don’t really care about these happenings and we 
don’t really get butthurt about these things. Because we don’t 
get butthurt too often, we have a lot of creative freedom in this 
world. We love to make fun of ourselves and to make fun of our 
intellectual allies. 
Dan: This is maybe my favorite aspect of memes. When we cre-
ate memes, NEEM is reaching people across the world of differ-
ent races, cultures, politics, backgrounds, even ages (most of our 
audience is anywhere from 15–25, but I’ve seen comments from 
the middle-aged and elderly who are genuinely interested in our 
memes on a daily basis!). As Edwin mentioned, online memes 
really open up people to consumption of information and dis-
cussion because of the anonymity of the Internet (Facebook not 
really, but you could say interactions between strangers who will 
probably never meet in real life can be treated as if each of the 
interlocutors are anonymous to each other) and implicit under-
standing of the freedom of meme content. I would say that the 
polarization of the Internet and of society on an intellectual and 
cultural level is disappointing, but may also be just a reflection 
of how open-minded and free-thinking people in general really 
are (read: not really), and the greater visibility of the Internet 
makes division and conflict more available and obvious. In gen-
eral, I’ve found that people who enjoy and seek out open, con-
templative conversation will probably find it, although in some 
cases I’ve witnessed personally some closed-minded people ap-
proached in a respectful and curious manner becoming more 
open to new ideas and experiences, which helps me become a 
little less alienated and more hopeful.
Angus: I’m also interested to hear you say you’re not actively polit-
ical — or in some sense, “actively” philosophical either. I see NEEM 
as constantly opening up new ways of thinking through drawing 
out the logical inanity of certain positions or by contrasting them 
with “obviously wrong” positions, including reposting a lot of de-
liberately anti-racist and anti-bigotry content. Certainly this isn’t 
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partisan, and a great deal isn’t even necessarily “philosophical” 
per se, but to me this is an actively political way of dealing with 
modern life. Do you really think your work is relatively apolitical?
Edwin: Relatively, yes. But from a metapolitical standpoint, 
we’re doing something pretty substantial. That is, weakening 
the partisan divide while attacking modern thinking as a whole. 
Also I think by attacking modern epistemology as a whole, we’re 
also attacking establishment media, political pundits, etc. from 
a position they’re extremely weak to defend against. 
I’m going to get a little off-track here, but independent media 
doesn’t necessarily do this. You can just look at “independent” 
Twitter pundits and the obvious fact that 90% are nothing of the 
sort; they’re the ones who stick most closely to a rigid ideology 
and they’re often the ones taking money from special interests. 
People are sort of suckered into following these people because 
the “independent” model creates a personal relationship with 
the pundit where you trust what they say because they’ve be-
come your “friend” in your mind. And not to get too tinfoil hat, 
but individuals are just as, if not more, susceptible to blackmail/
extortion/bribes/etc. as corporate media. 
In my experience, electoral politics is just a battle of special 
interests, and rarely do policies get implemented the way voters 
imagined they would be. And I don’t want to get too preachy, 
but speaking from experience from forays into the far-right, far-
left, and what lies between, usually political radicalization just 
ruins your mental health and eventually your life. So I just try 
to avoid the subject. 
As for those anti-racist type posts that subvert your expecta-
tion, those are amazing. That’s the kind of stuff we need as a 
society right now. It’s an old trope, but the media tends to focus 
on negatives, even when reporting a positive. It’s been talked 
about before (even relating to “bronies”…) but “new sincerity” 
is back. People are starving for wholesome content, and it’s dou-
bly funny because the Internet is so edgy that it feels original 
and refreshing. What I think is happening now is that “meme 
culture,” especially in the political realm has morphed into two 
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distinct bubbles: the “alt-right” and the “irony left”. Both gained 
their power through being transgressive, but now being not-
transgressive is actually transgressive. 
There used to be a cozy metapolitical Internet, and before 
2014, I’d say a lot of online political discussion was free from 
the idea that the person on the other side of the screen was your 
literal enemy. I’d like to return to that, personally. I realize that’s 
sort of a privileged position to take; many people are forced into 
political action because their lives are actually at risk from peo-
ple that are there literal enemies, but within a liberal democracy, 
it’s not healthy to be where we are now.
Angus: What can you say about Camus’s The Myth of Sisyphus? 
This work has had a strange (struggling not to say “absurd”) af-
terlife on the Internet, persisting almost as a meme itself. It’s quite 
a difficult work, with relatively contemporary references, and the 
final pay-off is only towards the end, yet it’s still a somewhat en-
trancing piece. How could you describe the work’s influence on 
you and its continual relevance?
Edwin: I’ll be honest, I mostly like Camus from The Plague and 
his other literary work. 
That being said, The Myth of Sisyphus is probably our most 
memed work from Camus. Likely because it just has a meme-
able quality to it. “We must imagine Sisyphus happy” is just an 
extremely condensed version of Camus’s entire philosophy, so 
that’s likely the reason it’s so common on our page. 
The book is of course still relevant, and I think absurdism will 
continue to help young adults out of their first existential crisis 
for years to come. There’s just something so poignant about it, 
and so natural. It is steeped in complex thinking, but you don’t 
need to be an expert at all to grasp the practical meaning.
Angus: How did you find this whole process? Does talking about 




Dan: I wouldn’t say so. I’ve probably thought about every ques-
tion I answered to some extent before, but formulating respons-
es and reflecting on my thought and experience in this email 
does feel very much like having an interview IRL. I must admit 
this idea seemed bizarre to me at first glance, but after thinking 
about and experiencing it, it seems like a modern, valuable, and 
rich way for people to get to learn about meme pages and their 
admins. I would say this may be the new standard for interviews 
of this sort, along with anonymous chats.
Edwin: It was a little strange, but I’ve thought about all these 
things before. I don’t think putting it in writing really reduces 
anything. 
A fun thought exercise is just thinking about how we’re going 
to study memes, if at all, in the future. I imagine we will because 
studying pop culture is big in academia nowadays. So I really 
don’t think it’s that strange, it’s actually rather forward-thinking. 







Meme Dankness:  
Floating Glittery Trash for an 
Economic Heresy
Yvette Granata
Dank Meme Authenticity: Fucking Stop It, Wendy’s
I
n a 2015 video playlist of short meme videos on YouTube 
entitled “Important Videos,” a video called “Stop Putting 
Memes in the Media” is a thirteen-second clip of someone 
filming a Wendy’s commercial on their phone. The commercial 
depicts a “memer” eating a spicy chicken sandwich. As the char-
acter in the commercial chews on his sandwich, bold white text 
pops up on the screen: “the memer,” followed by more text, “eats 
spicy goodness like a boss” (fig. 2) The person filming the com-
mercial lets out a blood-curdling angry scream at the commer-
cial: “Stoppppp! Fucking Stop!,” and the video cuts before the 
screaming ends. The description of the video posted by the user 
is simply: “I want to die.” Users in the comments section agree 
with the sentiments of the video-poster; they too are horrified 
by the commercial use of image board meme culture, stating 




trying to grasp a hold of the enigma that is internet culture.”1 
The users’ critique is of the cultural appropriation of memes by 
“the media,” or the mainstreamization of underground meme 
culture. The commercial is a “forced meme.” As described on 
Know Your Meme, a forced meme “is any ‘meme’ that is artifi-
cially created and spread. Rather than spreading through word 
of mouth as a naturally created meme, a forced meme [is] made 
with the intent of becoming a meme and aggressively promoted 
by its creator.”2 In other words, a forced meme either buys or 
purposefully organizes the repetition of its appearance. Forced 
memes have an explicitly different agenda to the appearance of 
the meme itself, whereas an authentic meme is meant to appear 
for-itself. Any organized purpose for a meme beyond the pro-
duction of its own particular existence is a destruction of the 
authenticity of dankness.
And then someone posted this (fig. 3).
There, at least someone has done something. Actually, it 
appears that this is Wendy’s again. This time, the company is 
1 See Infinity Media, “STOP PUTTING MEMES IN MEDIA,” YouTube, 
April 24, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNtySt6Fg30.





attempting to rebrand Wendy as a deviant shitposter (uncon-
vincingly) who gets blocked. In the early 2000s, Lev Manovich 
pointed out the shifts brought about by new software and digital 
media, pointing to endlessly mutable, modular, synthetic, digi-
tal media aesthetics as symptoms of the “general tendencies of a 
culture undergoing computerization.”3 With software, media are 
digital signals that can be modulated in endless flows, gener-
ated, swapped, shared, and proliferated. For example, Microsoft 
Paint (itself the content of memes), Photoshop, GIMP — any im-
age editing software — gives us a list of effects to choose from a 
menu to manipulate and produce new images, to rearrange and 
re-mix image data, erase parts, add text and shapes, and scrib-
ble with, using digital paint colors (fig 4). In addition to editing 
software, mark-up languages — XML, HTML, LaTeX, etc. — made 
it simple to post images within a flow of web-hosted text. Inter-
net users began editing and remixing various digital informa-
tion, establishing a visual vernacular for digital document data 






communication and creating new formats of information ex-
change. Intellectual property was also called into question.
In the spirit of the “copyleft,” McKenzie Wark’s Hacker Man-
ifesto (2004) claimed that the ability to mutate, change, and 
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remix ideas from existing cultural material equates to hack-
ing. Anything that opens the potential for the creation of the 
new — culture jamming, sampling, mixing, and swapping — is 
part of a free-flow hacking practice.4 Gregory Ulmer called it 
“electracy,” and promoted software techniques for the reuse of 
found material as the process of Internet invention.5 Alex Gal-
loway thus makes note in The Interface Effect: “the first phase of 
web culture, one must admit, carried a revolutionary impulse.”6 
However, endless selections, modulations, and digital muta-
tions within proprietary software eventually contributed to its 
loss of luster: “when Jean-Luc Godard becomes a plug-in, we 
must look beyond the Nouvelle Vague” (fig. 5).7 Although un-
stated by the anti-Wendy’s video poster and other users, what is 
implied by their response against the commercial use of Inter-
net meme form is similar to Galloway’s statement — that when 
4 See McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004).
5 See Gregory L. Ulmer, Internet Invention: From Literacy to Electracy (New 
York: Longman, 2002).





the cultural practice of meme-making becomes a Wendy’s com-
mercial, it’s time to scream “fucking stop!” at the screen. 
Unlike Godard, however, the memer sentiment against 
mainstreamization of memes is not meant to reserve meme 
practice for revolutionary political aims. The defense of image 
board meme culture here is instead the desire to maintain a lack 
of political organization, to perpetually subvert centralized con-
trol, and to preserve the image board meme as a type of rep-
resentational fall-out shelter. The image board is a place where 
memes are both created and posted for no other reason than for 
the exchange of purely cultural expressions. Meme makers who 
protest the commercialization of memes defend the meme as an 
end itself. It is neither politically nor economically motivated; it 
is not a means. 
What then is implied in the defense of dank meme authen-
ticity? As an end itself for cultural exchange, is the practice of 
meme-production a strange digital gift economy? Or is there an 
inherently reactionary impulse that bends it toward a tyranni-
cal expression of ressentiment? The 21st-century Internet meme 
practice, I argue, is neither gift nor tyranny, but reveals itself as 




must enter into the glittery absurdity of image board culture in 
order to further unpack the dankness of its political economy 
(fig. 6).
Mass Meme Art 
While the broader sense of the term “meme” has been used to 
describe an abstract unit of mimesis — a type of human cultural 
behavioral noumena — 1990s Internet and software culture has 
morphed its definition toward an abstraction unit of idea or cul-
ture. Popularly, it denotes a type of information form that can 
replicate, recombine, morph, and redistribute across multiple 
media. Analytic philosopher Susan Blackmore sees this as an in-
appropriate use of the term, claiming that “in popular discourse, 
the word ‘meme’ is horribly abused. It is confused with ‘idea’ or 
‘concept’ or treated as something ethereal or non-material float-
ing about quite separate from behaviours and artefacts.”8 Within 
software and Internet culture, the digital meme has been rede-
fined to indicate the form and technique of digital media and 
software architecture. In his work on dynamic software archi-
tectures as meme media, Yuzuru Tanaka calls memes in general 
“intellectual assets” that are a part of “knowledge media.” For 
Tanaka, the meme is that which is reduced to its communicabil-
ity, an externally expressible thing that can appear across various 
media architectures. Digital “meme media” is therefore specifi-
cally tied to computerized media architectures and to dynamic 
software that enables users to edit and redistribute intellectual 
assets. From the point of view of back-end architectures and 
front-end user experience, this aligns with the notion of memes 
as “behaviors and artifacts.” The digital meme in this sense may 
be any re-usable digital media pattern; for example, a blog time-
line or a Google document, any repeatable and customizable 
8 See Susan Blackmore, “The Evolution of Meme Machines,” in 
Ontopsychology and Memetics, eds. A. Meneghetti et al. (Rome: Psicologica 
Editrice, 2003), 233–40, https://www.susanblackmore.uk/conferences/
the-evolution-of-meme-machines-3/ — TFW people try to control the 
definition of memes, but Internet memes still act like memes regardless.
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media pattern or method for sharing and editing intellectual 
information digitally. In other words, digital memes are the be-
havior and artifact of the form and content of dynamic media. 
The “Internet meme” as a “dank meme,” however, is a more 
specific genre of digital meme that was born from specific im-
age board culture and its use of text-image patterns. It includes 
both the practice of using image manipulation software and 
web software that enables one to post an image on a bulletin 
board, turning images into bits of conversational text. Taking 
shape primarily on image board sites like 4chan, and then later 
Reddit and other social media platforms, the flow of the image 
board is enabled by the software architecture. The appearance of 
image-text as conversational material is a new form of visual-
verbal communication. Dump.fm epitomized this purposefully 
from 2010–17, as an image board in which users were only able 
to post images in order to communicate, in effect producing a 
morphing conversational free-form flow of image-words.9 The 
results are somewhere between absurd and sensible — like a 




pragmatic form of surrealism. An Internet meme that falls into 
the category of dank meme is also aesthetically specific to im-
age board culture’s absurdist love for the digital flow of low-fi 
humor. As Aria Dean points out: 
[T]he term [“meme”] has evolved: once used to describe 
ideas or behaviors that are passed from person to person, 
“meme” now refers metonymically to internet memes, which 
are as trope-filled and easy-made as stock imagery, but are 
unprofessional and intentionally funny, with often-absurdist 
text floating on or above a low-res image.10 
In this sense, “Internet memes” are re-useable image-word joke 
patterns enabled by software patterns. Aesthetically, they also 
entail absurdist or nihilist humor, “petty” observations, and as 
Dean notes, unprofessional looking “poor images.”
Nothing is aesthetically sacrosanct on an image board; noth-
ing appears to be labored over for more than five minutes. 
Memes are not valued for their newness nor for their aesthetic 
craft, but because of their trashness. They are irreverent to the 









labor of skilled artistic production. The “meme man” head, for 
example, is a badly sculpted 3D model of a human head (fig. 9). 
The maker openly claims meme man’s origin as a faulty, early 
attempt at 3D modeling. Whereas a technically well-crafted 3D 
model of a human head might look more photorealistically like 
a human head, meme man works as meme material precisely 
because he is 3D digital trash. This is his charm. He’s aestheti-
cally basic. In another recently circulated meme, we see an ani-
mation still of a guy looking off camera with a subtitle scratched 
over and replaced with different text (fig. 10). It is meant to re-
veal its quick imperfect handwriting, done by a generic person 
on the Internet. 
What Alain Badiou says of the cinema as a mass art applies 
to Internet memes full-force: “it is always at the edge of non-art. 
Cinema is an art particularly laden with non-art. An art that is 
always full of trite forms […] cinema is always beneath art. Even 




ity of shoddy ingredients, of blatant bits of non-art.”11 Internet 
memes are even less art than the non-art of cinema. There is no 
montage, no acting, no cinematography. The Internet meme is 
itself a pure bit of non-art: a quick trash image-text piece made 
for a digital aesthetic “dump.” It is less than an imperfect image, 
albeit intentionally; it is chicken scratch spelled-wrong. BTW, in 
fig. 11 we see Wendy’s, again, attempting to make their character 
appear a cute low-life troll (but failing):
In addition to its visual trashness, the more absurdly 
the manner in which the meme points to its lowness, often, 
the more relatable it is. For example, this is the case in the 
“whomst’ve’”meme — an expanding mind comparison format 
that uses the words “who whom whomst whomst’ve whomst’ve’d.” 
The more letters in the “whomst’ve” variation, the more absurd-
ly intellectually “deep” it appears, pointing out the ordinariness 
of common grammar mistakes from whence it derives. Using 
“whomst’ve’d” is so intellectual that it causes pink lasers to shoot 
out of your eyeballs due to your having reached such a high 
transcendental level of the word usage of “whom.” The longer 
the “whomst’ve,” the better: “whomst’ve’iv’e’ist’ive’whomst > 
whomst.” The aesthetic is that of a sarcasm of intellectual ab-
surdity, pushing the facade of “proper grammar” to meaning-
less excess. Similar to the appeal of Charlie Chaplin, the more 
low-fi and low-life juxtaposed with the supposedly hi-fi and 
high-class, the more charming. As Dean points out, memes are 
thus indeed Hito Steyerl’s poor image par excellence.12 Dean fur-
ther draws the relation of this visual wretchedness and the use 
of vernacular in meme culture to blackness, specifically in the 
economics of memes and the way that they circulate: 
[M]emes move like blackness itself […] vulnerable to appro-
priation and capture. The meme is a form that allows for a 
sense of collective ownership among those who come into 
11 Alain Badiou, Cinema, trans. Susan Spitzer (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 238.




contact with it — black or nonblack. The meme seems open 
to appropriation and interpretation by whoever possesses it 
for a moment, echoing Fred Moten’s description of blackness 
as being only what we hold in our outstretched hands.13 
Stated differently, the condition of lack is the generic condition 
expressed by meme culture. Its potential to be appropriated, its 
mutability, and its trashness is fundamental to the genre be-
cause, like Chaplin and Steyerl’s “poor image,” it is an expression 
of a commonness from within the tramp-like condition of living 
in a precarious economic system and under state control. The 
more trash in the aesthetics of the image, the better. This is the 
manner in which it intentionally takes up its position.




In fig. 12, we see Wendy trying again (pathetically) to appear 
low-life, forming an L for “Loser” on her forehead, pretending 
to be a troll).
The humor of dank meme authenticity, however, is not about 
its poor condition; it is an absurdity shaped from within. A more 
Kafkaesque humor thus emerges. There is a mix of the strange 
and the singular, co-mingled with the common, the ordinary, 
and the stupid. As Gerald Raunig writes of Kafka’s story, “Jose-
phine and the Mouse Folk,” it is a strange mix of the popular and 
the singular. Josephine’s singing is seen no differently than the 
mouse folk’s way of speaking or of making noise: “piping is the 
acoustic expression of mouse folk normality. No one would call 
it art. The mouse folk pipe away without attaching importance 
to it.”14 Any one of the mouse folk can pipe. It’s relatable, not spe-
cial — a vernacular way of speaking, an ordinary sound, albeit 
made in a singular fashion: the humdrum of daily life mixed 
with the particularity of a subjectivity. Raunig calls Josephine’s 
singing a weak event that enables, or causes, the mouse folk to 
gather — a Deleuzian “streaking of the territory.”15 It is not be-
cause of Josephine, but just the fact that she sings that cause the 
mouse folk to show up.
The low-fi craft of meme culture likewise streaks Internet 
territory. A human-turned-cockroach stuck in a chat room 
because life sucks: Gregor Samsa makes for good dank meme 
material. The cockroach would not work so well as a sales pitch 
for Wendy’s. The Internet meme is an image made for and is 
borne out of the image board user’s Internet life: low-res, low-fi, 
a small file, streaking the system. The humor is common, irrev-
erent, petty — the more low-life, absurd, ridiculous, politically 
and grammatically incorrect, the better, the more shareable. As 
Badiou points out: “‘mass art’ defines a paradoxical relationship 
[…] because “mass” is a political category, or more precisely a 
category of activist democracy, of communism […] and nowa-
14 Gerald Raunig, Factories of Knowledge, Industries of Creativity, trans. 




days we oppose “mass democracy” to representative and consti-
tutional democracy. Mao said that ‘the masses, the masses alone, 
make universal history.’”16 The paradox of the meme as mass art 
is that is it is usually meant not to be an art at all and is without 
a political program but is nonetheless political by simply being 
“mass” — scattered across many little bits. As François Laruelle 
states: “it is with micropolitics that power passes from the infi-
nitely large to the infinitely small.”17 The meme does just that. 
As a pure tiny piece of non-art — memes are mass dank micro-
politics. 
Towards an Economic Heresy: Fucking Stop It, Facebook
The mouse folk constantly scatter and reconvene, like a disjoint-
ed swarm, difficult to capture and control. But this is not their 
16 Badiou, Cinema, 235.
17 François Laruelle, “Homo ex Machina,” trans. Taylor Adkins, Fractal 






intention. At the same time that their scattering makes them 
uncontrollable, they likewise sacrifice their ability to organ-
ize — and to monetize. The perpetual condition of dank meme 
culture is this condition of lack. Lack of economic value, lack 
of reverence, lack of political control, lack of organization. The 
memeplex is always on the verge of mass meme breakdown. 
Junk DNA is its power. While Dean frames this in terms of the 
potential of an Afro-pessimist annihilation and a Black accel-
erationism, there is also always Pepe around the corner. What 
happens when meme culture establishes its authenticity by be-
ing racist, sexist, ableist, and basically just mean? Is it for the 
sake of perpetually rebelling against systematic capture? In early 
2017, Wendy’s new fully troll identity tweeted a Wendy-Pepe 
(fig. 13). 
After swift criticism, the post was taken down and Wendy’s 
made a public statement in which it claimed it did know that 
Pepe was a racist symbol. Hard to believe considering they 
clearly made a sustained effort to turn Wendy into a meme troll 
all year long. It started with bad forced-memes about eating a 
sandwich and ended in a Wendy-Pepe… While a cockroach 
might not have worked for Wendy’s marketing campaign, Pepe 
did in fact seem to work for it. True to Internet meme fashion, 
the post was shared and widely written about by the time it was 
taken down. The next day the Daily Stormer declared Wendy’s 
the official fast food chain of the alt-right.
Did the alt-right appropriate Wendy’s (as it seemed to think)? 
Or did the alt-right and the Pepe meme simply become the free 
ad server for Wendy’s? Clearly the company achieved its goal of 
gaining free meme marketing magic and the dank authenticity 
usually attributed to the “natural virality” of non-forced memes. 
With Trump already in power and the next election far off, it is 
unclear what the alt-right would have gained from a political 
alliance with Wendy’s at this moment. Both the control and the 
favor appears to be in Wendy’s hands. Her forced meme method 
worked — the Wendy troll has won. 
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Pepe — just a frog in a cartoon who got “highjacked” by rac-
ist trolls and crowned the racist frog king troll — is now a rac-
ist Pepe troll hijacked by a Wendy troll, forced to sell burgers. 
Free marketing, free branding, free labor. This is the economic 
normality of capitalist appropriation — but now mixed with the 
weird image board flow of the Internet meme. What then of the 




The surface of the meme “poor image” is low-fi and it cir-
culates via an appropriation that epitomizes its poverty — these 
characteristics are the frontend of its poverty. In terms of the 
dank meme backend, it is in fact, even poorer. The Wendy’s ex-
ample shows how dank authenticity does not make economic 
gains except only when hijacked as a forced meme for adver-
tising. Increasingly over the last few years, meme culture has 
spread on social media platforms. After Facebook made their 
“groups” and “pages” feature in 2008, “Weird Facebook” groups 
started to make pages to distribute dank memes. While we have 
established that it holds no economic power itself, does the 
swarm of viral images replicating across the Internet like an al-
ien glitter disease hold political sway? In 2016, Facebook already 
began to “crack down” on anonymous meme groups, inciting 
the #FreeTheMemes and #Zuxit protests by various Weird Fa-
cebook pages, including Freddy YOLO, Cabbage Cat, Explod-
ing Fish Shitposting and Senseless Drivel, Inc., I play KORN to 
my DMT plants, smoke blunts all day & do sex stuff, and Spe-
cial Meme Fresh, among many other pages. The protests were 
against Facebook’s seemingly arbitrary review policies that took 
down some pages, but left other pages alone. Various Weird FB 
pages changed their profile picture to an inverted pink FB logo 
filter for #FreeTheMemes (fig. 14). 
A website called MemeAlliance.org, which organized #Zuxit, 
cites that it’s in alliance with over 100 meme-themed Facebook 
pages with “an aggregate following of 20 million users,” and 
that many of them have moved to MeWe.18 One of the origi-
nal weird Facebook groups, “Special Meme Fresh” (also one of 
the pages that first posted meme man), responded with various 
memes, such as meme man sitting on an abstract hierarchy. The 
hierarchy goes in this order from top to bottom: meme man, 
Facebook, Normal People, Memes (i.e., “wow! 10 images that 
will shit your fuck”), the data that Facebook collects, and under-
18 See Meme Alliance Acttion, http://memealliance.org/actions/.
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neath it all, the abyss (fig. 15).19 Meme man here is Zuckerberg, 
who peers off of the ledge of Facebook like a god that created the 
abyss underneath it all and saw that it was Good.
At the recent Facebook hearing in front of the US Congress, 
Mark Zuckerberg stated — to the government — “Facebook will 
always be free.” The “free” that Zuckerberg refers to here is not 
the “free” that #FreeTheMemes refers to. Facebook makes mon-
ey from selling advertisements, clarified by Zuckerberg during 
the hearing, which is paid for by its customers (such as Wendy’s 
and Russia); meanwhile, the users are what are free for Face-
book to sell to its customers. Facebook is free to use, so long as 





it us used in order to mainly be shown forced memes (ads). It is 
not free for the proliferation of memes. Meme man again thus 
appeared as Zuckerberg (fig. 16)
An article in Huffington Post posing the question “do memes 
have civil rights?” further lays out one of the problems inherent 
to this meme protest: 
[W]hile some [meme] pages have taken the issue very se-
riously and even started making complaints to the Federal 
Trade Commission, it was evident from the start that memes’ 
overwhelming tendency towards irony would be in tension 
with a serious programme, and predictably enough some of 
the more nihilistic pages have started to subvert the protest 
with faux messages of solidarity with Facebook.20 
20 Sam Harrison, “Facebook, Feudalism, and Civil Rights for Memes?” 




The Internet meme as the mass dankness of non-art becomes 
essentially a nihilist practice in its commitment to expressing 
the condition of being politically and economically free — and 
therefore precarious. Nonetheless, unlike an advertisement or 
the destructive forces of capitalist forced memes, memers seem 
to genuinely want the circulation of an authentic dankness. 
Dank memes are meant to be made freely, as a cultural gift, and 
must likewise circulate freely. Perhaps in line with Lauren Ber-
lant’s cruel optimism, it is a cruel desire for there to be some-
thing that cannot be bought.
Although the memes of the alt-right, such as Pepe, are at-
tributed with having helped spread the MAGA (Make America 
Great Again) campaign virally — and thus making some left-
ies agree with blaming meme pages and agree with shutting 
down meme pages — looking to the way that meme pages are 
arbitrarily shut down on Facebook, it seems that the meme is 
still very much controlled. Further looking to the way that Face-
book tightly maintains its real estate to prioritize its purchasing 
customers, we might ask: is a “viral” meme of Pepe really do-
ing much? Perhaps more clear after Facebook’s so-called “data 
breach,” the 2016 election reveals that having access to user data 
on the backend is what is politically valuable. The direct access 
to user data and relational data on user habits in databases was, 
in fact, a more effective strategy, as it allowed for the purposely 
directed targeting of users, in comparison to the untracked and 
untargeted circulation of a racist frog cartoon who now works 
for Wendy’s. What the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica alliance 
revealed was that both companies were able to simultaneously 
create political targets and monetize their data in circulation 
(memes). Highly specific data about users and trackable data 
of server ads tailored not for individuals but particular political 
leanings was perhaps the model of mass swarm action. This tar-
geted data, plus tracking on backend formulae, is the exact op-
posite of amorphous mutable meme data, which remains always 




power did viral Pepe really have then in terms of voter value is 
questionable. Stated differently, Facebook and Cambridge Ana-
lytica made a lot of money by implementing targeted user data 
and data tracking, while Pepe now sells burgers for free.
If neither for economic nor political gains, why do we make 
memes? Limor Shifman points out: “a quick look at any Web 2.0 
application would reveal that people do choose to create their 
own versions of Internet memes, in startling volumes.”21 Do 
people secretly want to spread covfefe everywhere, laughing out 
21 Limor Shifman, “Memes in a Digital World: Reconciling with a 
Conceptual Troublemaker,” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 




loud as we all die from twitter fights turned nuclear holocaust? 
As Laruelle says: “dissolve States, classes, institutions, factories, 
all forms of community—something will still remain, i.e. ulti-
mately the pure operation of dissolution and production that is 
linked to accomplished gregariousness, the superior masterful 
biocracy of bodies and souls, till death do us part [à la vie à la 
mort].”22 For Roberto Esposito, the definition of community is 
one formed out of a nihilism of community itself, not some-
thing built. A “community isn’t a property, nor is it a territory to 
be separated and defended against those who do not belong to 
it. Rather, it is a void, a debt, a gift to the other that also reminds 
us of our constitutive alterity with respect to ourselves.”23 Dank 
memes are thus an economic heresy, because like good comedy 
and good tragedy, they’re not about creating a community but 
are a cultural form that we produce merely to remind us how life 
sucks for everyone.
22 Laruelle, “Homo ex Machina.”
23 See Roberto Esposito, Communitas, trans. Timothy Campbell (Stanford: 
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Fetishism, and Deep Mediation
Patricia Reed
The punny call to “seize the memes of production” (a meme in 
its own right) would entail a gargantuan, though not undeliber-
ated task, of both designing and implementing a model of col-
lective ownership for the platforms that enable users to circulate 
memes in the first place. In a production mode composed of 
infrastructure, hardware, software and crucially, a critical mass 
of users, how far down the chain of production does such a call 
gesture at? If this call is to be taken seriously, and is not merely 
a play of fortuitously matched words, what do we actually mean 
by it? The backbone enabling our base connectivity? The owner-
ship of our extracted data on an individual and/or aggregate lev-
el? The socialization of gains made through collective, unpaid 
labor? Platforms reorganized along the principle of a globally 
scaled public utility? The open-sourcing of platform architec-
ture and algorithms that guide what we see and what others see 
from us? All of the above? As a point of entry, these questions 
point to the depth of scales one is compelled to consider within 
this comparative play on the historical expression. 
The second point concerns the relevance of this historical ref-
erent within our present. Do emancipatory labor models from 




effectivity under current conditions of production, value crea-
tion, and surplus value extraction? When “seizing the means 
of production” became a communist meme in industrial capi-
talism, it specifically targeted the socialization of surplus value 
of production as an emancipatory claim tied to the productive 
labor of workers (where the enclosure of “the social” presum-
ably assumed the bounds of a nation-state organizational form). 
Deploying this phrase in the context of globally networked plat-
form economies requires that we would first map the relation 
between worker and user; secondly, that we identify how sur-
plus value is accrued; and thirdly, contend with a global scale 
of sociality from which this surplus value is derived, and for 
whom it would be destined. Additionally, and only adjacently 
addressed in historical Marxian analyses, are the negative exter-
nalities these production modes are tethered to at a planetary 
scale, which can no longer be a mere aside in conceptualizing 
durable transformation. Without adapting the telos of the de-
mands to our present conditions, these referents operate less 
to catalyze progressive change, and serve to entrap our futural 
imaginaries by ossifying nostalgic ideals with little use-value or 
malleability. Can we uphold the general ambitions contained 
within the historical expression, while doing the analytical work 
in grasping the different affordances, modes of value-creation, 
technicity, and possible points of leverage at play in our moment 
for a transformative pragmatics to emerge? When the playing 
field has changed, strategies for reengineering the rules demand 
adaption. 
From the outset, let’s admit the unfortunate misstep in labe-
ling digital labor as immaterial. Now it’s true that “immaterial 
labor” helpfully charts out a shift in the quality of some forms 
of labor from Fordist modes of commodity production, to post-
Fordism premised on informational, affective, or cognitive labor, 
where the assimilation of human communicative practices is di-
rectly folded into economic production and selfhood becomes 
interpolated with entrepreneurship. The term, however, ends up 
obfuscating the material supports as well as the conventional 
factory labor required to make these production modes func-
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tion. On top of that, as Peter Wolfendale has noted, the rise of 
the gig economy centered on the fulfillment of micro-tasks, like 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, harkens to a resurgence of Taylorist 
modes of production management in parallel,1 not to mention 
the micro-tasks assigned to software engineers for problem 
solving, who ultimately lose sight of the systemic implications 
of their “solutions” in aggregation.2 Digital labor, as such, amal-
gamates a variety of types of labor and management techniques 
of it, in simultaneity. Furthermore, the cloud, as know from 
the endless stream of server farm stock photography, coupled 
with the carbon emissions for each retweet, and the fact that 
we “hold a piece of the Congo in our pockets,” is anything but 
immaterial.3 Without this geophysical layer of material extrac-
tion and physical manipulation of it, “immaterial labor” simply 
cannot operate. One must then assert that the socialization of 
platforms would need to include a struggle among all types of 
participants (differentiating between their various organiza-
tional structures) and materials within the chain of production, 
without the exclusive privileging of the cognitariat-user, as if 
she operates as a body-without-devices. When platforms can be 
generalized as “digital infrastructures that enable two or more 
groups to interact,” one needs to apply this mediating premise 
in binding the various types of laborers and, importantly, the 
resources involved in production that span traditional material 
workers and the users who are wholly (and hungrily) dependent 
upon a material substrate.4 This is not to dismiss the potential 
1 Peter Wolfendale, “Response to ‘Cold War Cold World’,” seminar 
presented at the Cold War Cold World working group, CalArts, Valencia, 
CA, December 7, 2017.
2 Wendy Lui, “On Silicon Valley and the Democratisation of Technology,” 
Politics Theory Other (podcast), May 31, 2018, https://soundcloud.com/
poltheoryother/9-wendy-liu-on-silicon-valley-and-the-democratisation-
of-technology.
3 Anne DeVoe, “Carrying a Piece of Congo in Our Pockets: Global 
Complicity to Congo’s Sexual Violence and the Conflict Minerals Trade,” 
Seattle Journal for Social Justice 10, no., 1 (2011), http://digitalcommons.
law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol10/iss1/30.
4 Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 32.
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for human solidarity building extending from the autonomist 
tradition that focuses less on the means of production and more 
on class struggle, but it is to highlight the inseparability of these 
forces or “layers” and the ways in which they are codepend-
ent.5 
This tension between layers of analysis, and the focus of 
only certain types of labor can be read alongside current tra-
jectories stemming from Marxist Internet Studies. Eran Fisher 
points out two of those dominant perspectives, namely: cultural 
analysis and materialist analysis.6 On the one hand, cultural 
analysis concerns the semantic level of production, focusing on 
the “superstructure” to uncover “the ideological role of media 
content in the reproduction of capitalism.”7 Whether one fig-
ures the users of media as passive consumers or content co-cre-
ators — where platforms encourage both — the cultural strand 
emphasizes the semiotic level of ideological dissemination and 
reception. The materialist perspective, on the other hand, fo-
cuses on the “base,” the political economy underlying “the rela-
tions of production entailed in media institutions.”8 This second 
strand centers on the ownership of media and the organization-
al practices of its institutions, notably addressing pressing issues 
such as monopolization, private/governmental “partnerships,” 
as well as the employment conditions of workers.9 
To my mind, there is a conceptual and operational deadlock 
in at once seeking to maximize potential solidarities through 
the figure of the cognitariat, whilst analytically isolating this 
particular type of labor and neglecting the multi-level means of 
5 Gordon Hull, “Notes on Big Data, Marx, Time, and the Production of 
Value,” New APPS: Art, Politics, Philosophy, Science, February 21, 2017, 
http://www.newappsblog.com/2017/02/notes-on-big-data-marx-time-and-
the-production-of-value.html.
6 Eran Fisher, “How Less Alienation Creates More Exploitation? Audience 
Labour on Social Network Sites,” in Marx in the Age of Digital Capitalism, 
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production underpinning them. Given the immense amount of 
energy required for this production chain, with some estimates 
suggesting 20% of the world’s electricity will be consumed via 
networked communication activities by 2025, while generating 
5.5% of the world’s carbon emissions, the need to contend with 
environmental dependencies and externalities of this new la-
bor form becomes glaringly apparent.10 A humble step in this 
direction is to begin reworking some of the conceptual separa-
tions between these layers that get reinforced by the vocabular-
ies we use to frame and construct a certain perspectival cor-
relation to our condition. Taking cues from Donna Haraway’s 
theoretical-linguistic hybrids, the term “medianature,” coined 
by Jussi Parikka captures this necessity for integrating an entan-
gled, multi-scalar perspective traversing layers. It’s a term that 
aims to account for the scope of a deep materialist view of tech-
nology and communication, beyond, but not nullifying human 
perspectives, defining it as:
A concept that crystallizes the “double bind” of media and 
nature as co-constituting spheres, where the ties are inten-
sively connected in material nonhuman realities as much as 
in relations of power, economy, and work. Indeed, it is a re-
gime constituted as much by the work of micro-organisms, 
chemical components, minerals, and metals as by the work 
of underpaid laborers in mines or in high-tech entertain-
ment device component production factories, or people in 
Pakistan and China sacrificing their health for scraps of left-
over electronics.”11
As language itself operates as a relational and collaborative 
technology between humans and the world, creating new ver-
10 John Vidal, “‘Tsunami of Data’ Could Consume One Fifth of Global 
Electricity by 2025,” Climate Change News, December 11, 2017, http://www.
climatechangenews.com/2017/12/11/tsunami-data-consume-one-fifth-
global-electricity-2025/.




naculars that instantiate better accounts of our reality is not 
inconsequential. Of course, language alone won’t substantially 
change the world, but it’s a contributing force for constructing 
new possibilities for substantially thinking it. Language, like 
media in the thought of Parikka, “structure how things are in 
the world and how things are known in the world.”12
While the cultural influence of meme-ing is undeniable, be it 
in its more progressive manifestation in 2011, or in its hard-right 
turn in 2016, remaining strictly within the valances of ideology 
transmission, however, engages with political transformation 
only at the level of the symptom. There are likely nontrivial su-
perstructural gains to be won in so-called meme wars advocated 
from some on the left who suggest we learn to game memes 
for socialist ambitions (like left trolling), yet this ought to be 
grasped as an interim tactic, not as an end unto itself. Without 
the ambitions of intervening in the means of enablement, our 
semio-labor, no matter how radical, only economically benefits 
the increasingly few, specifically the vectoralist class who own 
the data, in the parlance of McKenzie Wark.13 Such an acknowl-
edgment echoes Walter Benjamin’s demand in “The Author as 
Producer,” where he called upon authors not to merely mim-
ic the historical apparatuses of production of their time, but 
to transform them by way of re-engineering. His thesis came 
about not by being satisfied by how content stands in relation 
to contemporary production procedures, but how it stands in 
them, casting the difference between being an activist in attitude 
only (content), and not in production (form).14 Such a perspec-
tive helps to contend with the semiotic ambivalence inherent to 
platform logic, whose incentives are bound only to the expan-
sion of user-bases and techniques of seducing more interaction, 
while structurally having no investment in the signification of 
ideological transmission. “Communicative capitalism,” as Jodi 
12 Ibid., 1.
13 McKenzie Wark, “The Vectoralist Class,” e-flux journal: Supercommunity 
65 (2015), http://supercommunity.e-flux.com/texts/the-vectoralist-class/.
14 Walter Benjamin, “The Author as Producer,” trans. John Heckman, New 
Left Review 1, no. 62 (1970): n.p.
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Dean named it nearly ten years ago, extracts surplus value from 
all communicative activities regardless of content, in the form 
of derivative data. It matters only that something is circulated, 
and not what is circulated. For the platform, there is an equiva-
lence between a kitten and Pepe meme, so long as attention to 
either is measureable, and can therefore be exploited.15 There is 
a tension that arises between us semio-creatures who are pre-
sumably somewhat invested in the content of our communica-
tive activities, and the economization of this content-without-
quality from the eyes of the platform, including the proliferation 
of shadow labor involved in gaming this mechanism through 
semi-automated click farms. Like posting anti-Facebook memes 
within the social media platform, the productive level not only 
remains undisturbed, it profits from it; similar to Benjamin’s 
framing of publishing houses, whose owners could also “afford” 
to disseminate radical content that directly opposed them, with-
out posing any actual threat to their socio-economic standing. 
The memer may care deeply about the semiotic influence of 
their user-labor (enjoying, perhaps, the cultural-capital rewards 
through statistical notifications), but platform economies are 
indifferent to it. There is an inconsistent, yet not antagonistic 
set of incentives at play between user actions and platform log-
ics: we get the relatively unbridled means at (at no direct cost) 
to visibly express ourselves, while platforms translate that ex-
pressive visibility into data commodities, uninterested in what 
we have said/circulated, only that we have said/circulated it. By 
focusing primarily on this top layer of semiotic transmission, by 
remaining at the interpretive level of communicative circulation 
and its cultural weight, a quasi-symbiosis between users and 
platforms is instantiated, however unintendedly so. In view of 
Marxist tradition, it’s useful here to highlight a poignant overlap 
in this semblance of symbiosis problem, since it works to con-
ceal the exploitative operations at play, namely that it’s largely 
the function of the superstructure to maintain the base, despite 
15 Jodi Dean, Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in Circuits of Drive 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).
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the weak-signal reciprocity from the top down between the two 
layers that is put forth as a model of human societies. This is not 
to dissuade analysis and intervention upon this superstructural 
layer — to suggest otherwise is to fall into the all-or-nothing 
pitfall of degree-zero fantasies without pragmatics, a trap that 
offers no space for tractability in the here and now — it is solely, 
and humbly to weight its role. Like the commodity fetishism of 
Marx’s time that obscured the subjective-material forces of its 
production, platform economies conceal their structural func-
tion of extracting data, beneath the slick parading-out of user 
utilities, a phenomenon we may speculatively diagnose as “ser-
vice fetishism.” 
The memer as producer would entail an intervention with-
in the relationship between these layers of semiotic labor and 
productive means, if we are to avoid “attitude”-only effects of 
platform symbiosis underwritten by service fetishism. Other-
wise said, an intervention within the ways these layers interact, 
forming (infra-)structures of enablement, constraint and value 
creation/extraction. We might call this meso-memetics, which 
firstly stresses that we have not overcome memes, we are defi-
nitely not post-meme, but are squarely in the middle of their 
increasing influence; and, more crucially, denotes a conceptual 
position within layers of production without privileging one 
layer over the other, but looking, rather, at their inter-relations. 
Clearly, this transformational demand cannot be ascribed to 
the practice meme-ing alone, but to lament that limitation is 
to miss the broader point. The far more pressing meta-question 
at stake, one that ought to concern both die-hard Marxists and 
those who see little relevance in applying this tradition today, 
is the general question of political transformation actionable 
within the paradigm of the platform and the particular geopo-
litical economy it entails. When taking the deep view of produc-
tion chains, including non-humans and carbon by-products, 
the two-tiered model of human societies is no longer robust 
enough to address all levels demanding consideration. Despite 
the fact that all models reduce complexity, there is a point when 
that reduction becomes too simplified to serve us conceptual 
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use-value. The assertion I’m putting forth, is that the humanist 
underpinnings driving this superstructure/base model require 
extrapolations, not only to factor in the view of social (re-)pro-
duction from the vista of a resituated human, thereby better 
contending with our relativized, positional agency within pro-
duction chains, but also the need to grasp the “medianature” of 
platforms from an array of scalar, non-human standpoints. Such 
an inhumanist position is buttressed by humanism, a human-
ism where we are conceived as exceptional creatures possess-
ing certain conceptual abilities, but pushed to the point where 
these capacities arrive at an unexceptional self-understanding 
that undermines our systemic centrality.16 The hypermaterialist, 
six-tiered model of The Stack, outlined by Benjamin Bratton is 
an aggregate of platforms, and serves as a useful diagrammatic 
vehicle here, since it follows in the traditions of modelling grand 
scales (like the superstructure/base model), yet is adapted to an 
age of planetary-scaled computation. Not only does it make ex-
plicit certain systemic differentiations at work that are collapsed 
in a Marxian “base,” but additionally, it factors in both human 
and non-human agents (Users). These Users, sitting at the top of 
The Stack, are defined as any entity capable of initiating signals 
(columns) down through its layers from the Interface to Ad-
dress, City, Cloud, and Earth layers successively; and, as a recip-
rocal machine, said Users receive mediated signals back up the 
chain.17 As a model and an actual (albeit accidental) organiza-
tional complex, The Stack has been postulated as a design brief 
perched on the “cliff ’s edge of the Anthropocene,” complicating 
the human-centric biases implicit the original “seizing of means 
of production” meme, as if re-distribution of surplus value alone 
16 Nina Power, “Inhumanism, Reason, Blackness, Feminism,” Glass Bead: 
Site 1: Logic Gate, Politics of the Artefactual Mind (2017), http://www.glass-
bead.org/article/inhumanism-reason-blackness-feminism/?lang=enview. 
This definition of “inhumanism” was put forth by Reza Negarestani in his 
essay “Labor of the Inhuman,” e-flux journal 52 (2014), http://www.e-flux.
com/journal/52/59920/the-labor-of-the-inhuman-part-i-human/.




would be enough to avoid the cliff ’s precipice.18 It is not. And, 
yet “complication” is not isomorphic with “nullification,” as if 
thinking at a planetary scale entails only a macro perspective 
from which to distantly gaze upon our condition to the concep-
tual diminishment of the micro, or localized forces of exploita-
tion, brushed aside as but a petty, residual folly of human self-
centeredness. This reality-check should not arrest ambitions for 
re-engineering current procedures of labor exploitation, value 
creation/extraction, and increasing economic stratification to-
day, but what it does complicate are the conditions and “nature” 
of agency, human or otherwise, within this novel geopolitical 
meta-machine.
The network effects, or a critical mass of users, upon which 
platforms structurally live or die, pushes this type of production 
system toward monopolization.19 As Evgeny Morozov writes: 
It doesn’t really make sense to have five competing social net-
works with twenty million people on each; you want all of 
them on one platform. It’s the same for search engines: the 
more people are using Google, the better it becomes, because 
every search is in some sense a tinkering and improvement 
in the service.20
When capturing and controlling data is the primary economic 
incentive driving platforms, as Nick Srnicek notes, extracting 
as much data as possible from users is built into these business 
models, revealing a deep-seated incompatibility in suggesting 
this exploitation can be resolved through sheer privacy regula-
tions.21 Without a profoundly alternate economic condition but-
18 Ibid., 72.
19 Srnicek, Platform Capitalism, 59.
20 Evgeny Morozov, “Socialize the Data Centres!” New Left Review 91 (2015), 
https://newleftreview.org/II/91/evgeny-morozov-socialize-the-data-
centres.
21 University of Leicester School of Business, “‘Platform Capitalism’ - Dr 
Nick Srnicek, University of London,” YouTube, February 14, 2017, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMoKAn1grgQ.
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tressing platform logics, where network effects can be seized for 
the benefit of the users who co-constitute them, our personal, 
but more importantly, our aggregate data remains out of reach. 
When this aggregate data is privatized there is no social access 
to it, meaning we possess no means of decision, nor speculation 
on the potential use-value of it. Such an observation is precisely 
why arguing against data extraction absolutely qua platform 
logics, is self-defeating, insofar as this data can be used in vast-
ly different, meaningful and advantageous ways. What it does 
point to, however, is how the market we currently have is ill-
designed and, quite plainly, disincentivized to deliver on these 
possible social benefits. As Morozov insists, these questions are 
not purely technical, but more political in terms of how compu-
tation will be used, for whom, and who (or what) gains access to 
all the “sensors, filters, profiles and algorithms” passing through, 
and being parsed by the platform.22 
Service fetishism enables a veneer of symbiosis between us-
ers and platforms that mask actual procedures of data mining 
and machine training labor that are more valuable than the 
costs involved in engineering the platform — this is precisely 
what platform surplus value is.23 When I say “masking” these 
procedures, this is not to suggest we are unaware of how our 
communicative labor, or leisure time, is translated into monop-
olized data commodities, but it remains entirely invisible to us 
in the (mostly) smooth everyday use of these services. That is 
to say, the reciprocal dynamics of platform interaction is hid-
den in the way they use us. (An embedded widget conveying 
this reciprocity would constitute far more transparency than 
the biblically proportioned privacy legalese we blindly consent 
to nowadays.) Sarcasm aside, there seems to be an important 
shift in value creation specific to platform economies to take 
note of, namely the emphasis less on production, but on me-
diation, where platforms position themselves as infrastructural 
22 Morozov, “Socialize the Data Centres!”
23 Bratton, The Stack, s.v. “Platform Surplus Value,” 374.
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“intermediaries that bring together different users.”24 Obviously, 
production still takes place, platform algorithms and software 
are highly laborious projects, but the operations of surplus value 
extraction occur at the level of interfacial activity. In view of this 
particular dynamic of surplus value extraction, one might then 
update the Marxian imperative from seizing the means of pro-
duction, to seizing the means of mediation as a more specific, 
influential site from which to recast platform logics.
More generally, it’s of relevance to consider how these plat-
form dynamics transform the ways in which we conceive of 
agency within them. Historically, politics has not only been an 
exclusively human enterprise (most often, not even for most 
humans), but has equally been bound to imperatives of vis-
ibility, audibility, and sensibility. For something to be properly 
political, it requires some form of appearance and/or mode of 
public visibility. As we have never before had the technologi-
cal affordances to appear and be heard to such large audiences, 
so quickly, and occasionally, even virally, that capacity for ex-
pression has become a target of exploitation (even more so in 
neoliberalism, where economic self-design requires maximal 
visibility). Even when radical congregations are enabled, or we 
use platform means to disseminate vital messages — of which 
we have seen important movements facilitated, there is always a 
reverse instrumentalization at work. In this scenario, potential 
empowerment lies less in the fact or act of appearing than in the 
mediation of that appearance. Platform design, with its specific 
techniques and lures for inciting interaction, is a protocol-driv-
en, partially determinate system of rules that shapes (and trains) 
user behavior its own image, “whose agency is configured 
accordingly.”25 The degree of partiality (i.e., system malleability) 
of those rule-based determinations for reverse user-to-machine 
influence, is a critical design choice that constitutes an impor-
tant point to leverage (despite its technicality), when imagining 
how network effects could, in the aggregate, become a collective 
24 Srnicek, Platform Capitalism, 57.
25 Bratton, The Stack, 164.
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force in re-weighting platform logics. In discussing speculative 
strategies of governance within platform logics, Bratton writes: 
“it is the interfacial relays between addressable objects that are 
the real object of governance.”26 Governance, as an amalgam of 
managerial protocols, however, is not isomorphic with politics 
understood as a mode of dissensus to techniques, and techni-
calities of that very mode of governance. As such, we may re-
but, that a crucial object of platform politics ought to target this 
very layer of interfacial relays, and the ways in which reciprocal 
influence is enabled. Seizing the means of mediation, as an in-
tervention entails not only a break-out from service fetishism 
that obfuscates interfacial relations, but a claim on those very 
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Circulation and its Discontents
Scott Wark and McKenzie Wark
Introduction: Meme Magic
T
o paraphrase Hito Steyerl, Internet memes have “crossed 
the screen,” bringing nothing but bad news and censurable 
politics along with them.1 There’s an almost occult quality 
to Internet memes’ capacity to boil out of the hellish recesses of 
the ’net. Or at least, that’s how some parts of ’net culture spin 
things. 
The Internet meme is of a class of media that has emerged with 
distributed, platform-based networks. In Limor Shifman’s simple 
and compelling definition, three qualities characterize it: it’s col-
lectively produced; it mutates; and it circulates.2 While it shares 
some qualities with like media — viral media also circulate; spam 
is collectively produced — it also differs from them.3 Memes are 
1 Hito Steyerl, “Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?” e-flux journal 49 
(2013), https://www.e-flux.com/journal/49/60004/too-much-world-is-the-
internet-dead/.
2 Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), 
41.
3 On viral media, see Marissa Olson, “Lost Not Found: The Circulation of 
Images in Digital Visual Culture,” in Mass Effect: Art and the Internet in the 
Twenty-First Century, eds. Lauren Cornell and Ed Halter (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2015), 159–66. On spam, see Scott Wark, “Literature After Language’s 




not only passed along, they are remade, varied, altered. They mu-
tate. At scale and in circulation, an Internet meme’s capacity to 
change and proliferate can be mystifying. No one hand guides it. 
They appear as if the instrument of an unconscious drive. ’Net 
culture has a term for this drive’s apparent capacity to use Inter-
net memes to wreak havoc and sow negativity beyond the con-
fines of the ’net itself. They call it “meme magic.” 
Perhaps the most notorious example of meme magic at work 
is the assertion that a meme of a corpulent green frog, Pepe, 
might have swung the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In the ter-
rain of what could be true as defined by our new online culture 
wars, this claim seems both absurd and entirely plausible. In 
’net vernacular, meme magic is by turns ironic and esoteric. It 
is ironic because ’net culture is always ironic, at once embracing 
the idea that an Internet meme might have contributed to elect-
ing a president whilst also disparaging anyone who takes that 
idea seriously. 
Meme magic is also limned with esoteric implications. 
Sometimes “magic” is spelt with a “k,” investing internet memes 
with an incantatory power to make the fanciful real. Did Pepe 
effect an election? Did Internet memes invoke Trump’s presi-
dency? We don’t want to draw conclusions. But let’s suspend the 
reflex to dismiss the concept of meme magic out of hand. As 
concept, meme magic is absurd. Yet it also captures something 
that’s essential to’ net culture — and to Internet memes in par-
ticular — that’s otherwise difficult to articulate.
There’s a kernel of incommensurability at ’net culture’s core. 
We endlessly produce data about what we do online, but we do 
it for the benefit of others. We do the labor, and often it is what 
Tiziana Terranova calls free labor, but we don’t profit from our 
digital products.4 Underneath the apparently free-floating world 
of circulating texts, images, memes, there is an asymmetry of 
Blood Rites of the Bourgeoisie,” Scan | Journal of Media Arts Culture 10, no. 
2 (2013), http://scan.net.au/scn/journal/vol10number2/Scott-Wark.html.
4 Tiziana Terranova, Network Culture: Politics in the Information Age 
(London: Pluto Press, 2004).
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information. The means to produce data is decentralized to us, 
but the means to collect and process that data is recentralized to 
the proprietors of the platform-based services we use.5 
Ownership and control over the vector of information, its 
means of transmission and archiving, its interfaces and nodes of 
attraction, turns the asymmetry of information into a relation 
that could even be considered a class relation.6 A subordinate 
class — us — makes information, shares information, passes it 
around, is sometimes paid a wage, is often precariously em-
ployed, or is not employed at all. This subordinate class gets ac-
cess to particular bits and pieces of information; to memes, for 
example. But this subordinate class does not get to recuperate 
the value of that information in the aggregate, as a whole. 
What the subordinate class of information producers get and 
what the dominant class who own the vector of information get 
are incommensurable, and in a double sense. If it were possible 
to measure what the subordinate class makes and what it gets 
in terms of information, the sums would not add up. It gets less 
than it makes. But how would this even be measured? The vec-
tor is designed to obfuscate the labor on which it depends. 
This double incommensurability creates the conditions for 
’net culture’s impulse to call what Internet memes do “magic.” 
The expropriation of information value in the aggregate and 
the capacity to occult the production of culture have the same 
source, but express it differently. The concept of meme magic 
teaches us that media theory deals just as badly with this incom-
mensurability as ’net culture does. 
Peel back the levels of irony and meme magic operates as 
what theory used to call the fetish. This term has a long and 
sometimes dubious history.7 But we’re struck by its habit of re-
5 Anne Helmond, “The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data 
Platform Ready,” Social Media + Society 1, no. 2 (2015): 1–11.
6 McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004).
7 William Pietz, “Fetishism and Materialism: The Limits of Theory in Marx,” 
in Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, eds. Emily Apter and William Pietz 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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curring across time and in different disciplines — including me-
dia theory. If we treat meme magic as a fetish, what becomes 
apparent is not only that ’net culture mistakes its occult lulz 
for reality. Rather, it’s that media theory invokes its own magic 
word to resolve this incommensurability: circulation. 
The parallel we’re drawing might sound far-fetched. After all, 
circulation is a key term in media theory’s lexicon of concepts. 
Both meme magic and circulation respond to the same set of 
problems. Each attempts to overcome an incommensurability 
that divides technics and labor from value or culture. Each at-
tempts to grapple with the production of culture at scale. And 
each evokes a power that is neither adequately conceptualized 
nor, we would argue, substantiated. 
Circulation’s parallels with meme magic show how it oper-
ates as fetish when it’s used to explain the ’net and ’net culture. 
We treat its limitations as a failure of our concepts. Our claim is 
that media theory has failed to see how the incommensurabil-
ity that platforms actively produce also actively mediates media 
theory itself. As a result, its concepts reproduce the incommen-
surability they’re supposed to explain. 
We use the word fetish because, in the mongrel world of 
memes, it is a critical concept with some pedigree. The fetish 
is not just a substitute for the phallus, as Sigmund Freud’s psy-
choanalytical appropriation of the term would have it.8 Our ap-
proach draws on both Marxist and anthropological traditions. 
Whilst we acknowledge that the anthropological tradition of the 
fetish has a dubious history, we are confident that we can draw 
on deployments of it that negotiate the term’s colonial heritage.9 
The Marxist concept of the fetish explains how we attribute the 
value of commodities to their physical properties rather than 
the labor that produces them.10 The anthropological heritage 
8 Sigmund Freud, “Fetishism,” The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 
9 (1928): 161–66.
9 Michael Taussig, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
10 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. Ben 
Fowkes (London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 163ff.
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expands the term’s purview. It retains its power for us because it 
gives us the means to name those theoretical gestures by which 
we claim commensurability between otherwise incommensu-
rable things. 
Besides the role of living labor and free labor in the produc-
tion of data, what the fetishizing of circulation obfuscates is the 
role that media technologies — dead labor — play in the produc-
tion of culture.11 More than this, they obfuscate how platforms 
actively make labor and technics incommensurable. Industrial 
technology fragmented the body and articulated it as compo-
nents with machine components. Information technology goes 
much further, and fragments individual subjects into dividual 
components, weaving each into the information production 
process to the point where it would no longer be possible to 
distinguish living from dead labor.12
Meme magic might be absurd, but we also want to take a cue 
from it. It’s no coincidence that ’net culture has invoked meme 
magic just when the extent of platforms’ incommensurability 
has become known and has been politicized in a series of issues. 
Ours is an age of leaks, malware, hacks, encryption, drones, 
flash crashes, tech monopolies, tech gurus, the dark web, and 
DDOS attacks. Much of what makes ’net culture go around seems 
mysteriously beyond our ken. We are encouraged not to con-
cern ourselves too much with all this, so long as our packets ar-
rive at their destinations and our services stay online. But there’s 
a lingering anxiety that it does matter. Meme magic points in 
negative to something real and perhaps even something true, 
beyond perennially refreshing appearances. 
Casting down the fetishes of meme magic or of circulation 
might demonstrate how the media we theorize also mediate our 
theories of them, but it doesn’t resolve the incommensurability 
that platforms produce. That gesture properly belongs to what 
we might think of as a modern style of theorization — a topic 
11 Ibid., 322ff.
12 Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of 
Subjectivity (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2014), 26ff.
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to which we shall return. Rather, there’s a kernel of validity at 
meme magic’s core: its recognition that something about ’net 
culture must remain incommensurable. 
Perhaps ’net culture is actually driven by that incommensu-
rability. Through the fetishizing of meme magic and the parallel 
fetishizing of circulation, we can glean something about what 
happens to culture when history no longer makes sense. Cast-
ing down the fetishes we make of the ’net doesn’t make history 
or the real apparent. It makes apparent the incommensurability 
that organizes each. 
We used to have a word for the practice of clothing what 
was difficult to know in more tractable guises: myth.13 Shorn 
of the esotericism, the offensiveness, and the abominable poli-
tics — but not necessarily the irony, as Donna Haraway teaches 
us — perhaps meme magic is just a vernacular theory of con-
temporary political myth.14 Within the technological conditions 
that constitute contemporaneity, perhaps myth has become 
memetic. So, did Pepe swing the 2016 United States Presiden-
tial election? Or is that too a myth? Internet culture seems to 
respond as though by saying, “When the meme becomes fact, 
make danker memes.”15 In this we can find the cultural politics 
underlying our new online culture wars.
The Fetish of Circulation
Circulation is a concept that circulates almost unnoticed in me-
dia theory. It is routinely used to describe what both old and 
new media do. The concept of circulation is particularly cru-
cial in discussions of ’net culture, which use it to describe how 
media are distributed, the conditions in which we interact with 
13 On myth as something more than structural, see Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro, Cannibal Metaphysics (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017).
14 Donna Haraway, Manifestly Haraway (Minneapolis: Minnesota University 
Press, 2016).
15 Anticipated, perhaps, in Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, trans. Jim 
Fleming (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008).
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them, and how they generate effects. But perhaps circulation, 
which appears as a concept, acts more as a fetish. 
Our claim is premised on a particular understanding of what 
a fetish is. As fetish, circulation renders invisible the incommen-
surability of what information labor makes and what it gets. It 
also renders invisible the incommensurability of what labor 
makes and what technics make. With the fetish concept, we can 
critique media theory’s incapacity to grasp its relation to its own 
conditions of possibility; that is, media themselves as hybrid 
flesh-tech from which an information asymmetry is extracted. 
Put simply, to fetishize is to invest a material object with out-
size significance. But the concept of the fetish has a mixed repu-
tation in the history of anthropology, where this understanding 
of it originates.16 As William Pietz outlines in his seminal series 
of essays on the concept, the fetish first emerges from the “in-
tercultural spaces” created when Italian, Portuguese, and Dutch 
traders started doing business along the West African coast 
from the late fifteenth century onwards.17
The fetish — from the Portuguese fetisso — is what European 
outsiders began to call objects that West Africans seemed to 
venerate. To these outside observers, these objects were invested 
with inexplicable material agency and anthropomorphic charac-
teristics. The fetish played a specific role in its historical context: 
as Pietz puts it, to mediate the “social value of material objects” 
between the “radically heterogeneous social systems” — Christi-
anity, African society, merchant capitalism — brought in to con-
tact along the West African coast.18 
At first, merchants had to participate in fetish-based social 
rituals trade with West African societies.19 Expanding on Pietz, 
David Graeber argues that the charge of fetishism helped Eu-
16 L. Lorand Matory, The Fetish Revisited: Marx, Freud, and the Gods Black 
People Make (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018).
17 William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, 1,” RES: Anthropology and 
Aesthetics 9 (Spring 1985): 5–17, at 6.
18 Ibid., 6–7.
19 William Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, 2: The Origin of the Fetish,” 
RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 13 (Spring 1987): 23–45, at 45.
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ropeans to “avoid some of the most disturbing implications of 
their own experience.”20 This is why Pietz argues that the fetish is 
defined by what he calls a “double consciousness” of “absorbed 
credulity” and “distanced incredulity,” or of participation and 
disdain.21 In this intercultural space, West African social con-
ventions posed a challenge to the self-evidence of European sys-
tems of value. 
What interests us in the concept, however, is not what it says 
about our “consciousness” of heterogeneous value systems, but 
a more general fetish function that Pietz identifies: the — an-
thropological — fetish is a physical object that mediates values 
that are otherwise “incommensurable.”22 This aspect of the fet-
ish concept is what provides traction on the present. The fet-
ish lives on in the way incommensurability is processed by the 
technologies that constitute the Internet, for example under the 
vernacular heading of meme magic. In media theory’s concept 
of circulation, we find a version of the same fetish, albeit one 
that’s less an object and more a process: a mediation. 
We can use Graeber’s work as a guide here. For him, the con-
struction of fetishes follows a pattern. With no small dose of 
irony, Graeber describes the fetish as “a god under process of 
construction.”23 The gesture of fetishizing marks a point at which 
“objects we have created or appropriated for our own purposes 
suddenly come to be seen as powers imposed on us, precisely 
at the moment when they come to embody some newly created 
social bond.”24 
The animism found in the anthropological concept has a 
broader and recurrent significance. As far as we’re aware, nei-
20 David Graeber, “Fetishism as Social Creativity: Or, Fetishes are Gods 
in the Process of Construction,” Anthropological Theory 5, no. 4 (2005): 
407–38, at 411.
21 Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, 1,” 14.
22 Ibid., 16.
23 Graeber, “Fetishism as Social Creativity,” 427.
24 Ibid.
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ther of us has any gods. But we do have Google.25 After Pietz and 
Graeber, we want to ask what contemporary role fetishes play 
in mediating otherwise incommensurable systems. With a little 
retrofitting, we can apply what Graeber describes to the contem-
porary Internet and the operations of its defining infrastructure: 
the platform.
The concept of the fetish has already recurred in media the-
ory in different ways. Wendy H.K. Chun identifies the concept 
of “source code” as a kind of fetishism, critiquing it as a form 
of “ideology.”26 Taina Bucher and others identify and analyze 
the ways that we fetishize algorithms, using them as polyvalent 
explanatory devices.27 These approaches mix a little from the 
Marxist tradition and a little from anthropology’s concern with 
incommensurability. 
Labor and algorithms are incommensurable, not because 
they represent different social value systems, but because they 
confront us with epistemological limits. With contemporary 
media, the question of incommensurability is mediated by the 
reorganization of epistemology by computation, automation, 
and what Benjamin H. Bratton calls its planetary distribution.28 
We take our cue from these media theoretical approaches: plat-
forms obfuscate labor; they can do so because their operations 
are incommensurable. 
But our fetish concept doesn’t deal with a physical thing, as 
in Pietz; or code or algorithms, as in recent media theory. Ré-
gis Debray notes that whilst we’re easily able to fetishize “ob-
jects isolated against their background,” networks — which hold 
25 John Durham Peters, The Marvellous Clouds: Towards a Philosophy of 
Elemental Media (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).
26 Wendy H.K. Chun, Programmed Visions: Software and Memory 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).
27 Taina Bucher, “Neither Black Nor Box: Ways of Knowing Algorithms,” in 
Innovative Methods in Media and Communication Research, eds. Sebastian 
Kubitschko and Anne Kaun (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 81–98.




platforms together — are “less easily turned into myth.”29 It’s a 
stretch to call a platform an object. To call a platform a hyperob-
ject (Morton) seems to capitulate in advance to understanding 
them as ineffable, intelligible only by their resonances.30 To call a 
platform a stack (Bratton) offers a more analytical container for 
material technical systems that are complex and distributed, but 
it may not entirely avoid making a fetish of mediation.31 
So what’s to be gained by recovering the concept of the fetish 
and applying it to platforms? The platform itself isn’t the fet-
ish here — though this is one way we might read the concept’s 
capaciousness.32 What concerns us is not whether platforms are 
fetishes, but that they produce fetishism by producing its form. 
We might understand meme magic and circulation as fetishes if 
we understand how they become this form’s content.
The Content of Circulation
The Internet meme is a paradigmatic case of why circulation 
is crucial for understanding ’net culture. Circulation is consti-
tutive of the Internet meme as thing: the Internet meme can’t 
be collectively produced and can’t mutate unless it circulates. 
But circulation is also crucial to the conceptual work of media 
theory. In theories of the Internet meme, we invoke the media-
technical process of circulation to account for one of its most 
confounding qualities: that an Internet meme might be simulta-
29 Régis Debray, Media Manifestos: On the Technological Transmission of 
Cultural Forms, trans. Eric Rauth (London: Verso, 1996), 34.
30 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the 
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).
31 As a computational concept, the stack isn’t immune to fetishization. For an 
approach that uses the stack as technical concept rather than theoretical 
one, see Till Straube, “Stacked Spaces: Mapping Digital Infrastructures,” 
Big Data & Society 3, no. 2 (2016): 1–12.
32 On the term’s polyvalence, see Tarleton Gillespie, “The Politics of 
‘Platforms’,” New Media & Society 12, no. 3 (2010): 347–64.
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neously this meme, or an instance; and the meme, or the plural-
ity to which an instance belongs.33 
Let’s take the SpongeBob SquarePants meme as an example. 
Whether intentionally or not, any new SpongeBob SquarePants 
meme makes its meaning out of the original children’s animated 
TV show and what ’net culture has already made of its characters. 
In the ’net vernacular, “Internet meme” oscillates ambiguously 
between instance and plurality. We can talk about the Sponge-
Bob meme by talking about a specific instance of the meme or 
to gesture towards an envisaged totality of related instances of it. 
This totality of related instances of the SpongeBob meme might 
then shade off toward an adjacent one featuring SpongeBob’s 
offsider, the dull and likeable pink starfish Patrick, and so on. 
The relationship between the Internet meme’s instance and 
plurality isn’t just a whole–part relation; nor does it recapitulate 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s type–token.34 Perhaps it is a little like 
the process that Guy Debord called détournement.35 Perhaps it 
is a little like what Jacques Derrida called iterability.36 However, 
it is not just something that happens in language. An Internet 
meme’s mutations are enabled by a media-technical process. It 
mutates, we say, in circulation, through acts of collective pro-
duction that stretch and mould SpongeBob’s features to affect 
the plurality through the instance. 
Circulation smooths the ambiguity between the Internet 
meme’s instance and its plurality into something that ’net cul-
ture works with intuitively. For media theory, this ambiguity is 
more problematic. Circulation has never been adequately con-
ceptualized in media theory — or in many of its uses across the 
33 For an early version of this argument, see Scott Wark, “The Meme is Excess 
of Its Instance,” Excessive Research: transmediale “Conversation Piece” 
workshop blog, 2015, https://transmedialeblog.wordpress.com/2015/09/30/
scott-wark-the-meme-in-excess-of-its-instance/.
34 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism,” 
The Monist 16, no. 4 (October 1906): 492–546, at 506.
35 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Zone Books, New York, 1995), 146.
36 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988).
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humanities and social sciences more generally.37 What media 
theory takes to be a concept with purchase on media-technical 
processes is actually a product of those processes themselves. 
Circulation functions as a fetish. 
This has consequences for our ability to conceptualize either 
the Internet meme or ’net culture more broadly. To see why, we 
can ask a deceptively simple question: What actually circulates 
online? The answer to this question is also deceptively sim-
ple: Content is what circulates. Content is the form that plat-
forms produce and that our vernacular and conceptual fetish-
es — meme magic and circulation — both take.
“Content” has widespread currency in tech circles, the me-
dia, in public discussion, and even in academic debate. Content 
is what fills our feeds: it’s what we interact with online, what we 
share, what we download and, of course, what we produce. In 
discussions of ’net culture, it’s often used interchangeably with 
“media.” So digital media has become digital media content, 
while the culture we produce online is equated with the online 
content that the ’net produces. Ironically enough, content be-
comes a problematic concept without content.38
Content is not as self-evident as its widespread currency oth-
erwise suggests. In the simplest of terms, content is that which 
is contained by something else. We need to ask what content 
is the content of. The answer to this question is the platform, 
which complicates the seeming self-evidence of content itself. 
The platform becomes that which enables — or appears to en-
able — content’s circulation. 
This circulating capacity of platforms emerges when dis-
crete media can be encoded with markup languages. These 
languages — like TCP, XML, CSS, Java, and so on — automate the 
presentation of media in new digital contexts by fixing their pa-
rameters. Alan Liu argues that markup languages make content 
37 An early version of this argument can be read in Wark, “The Meme in 
Excess of its Instance.” 
38 See for example Bharat Anand, The Content Trap: A Strategist’s Guide to 
Digital Change (New York: Random House, 2016).
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“autonomously mobile.”39 They make something like an image 
or a video more easily shared, embedded, and controlled. 
Anne Helmond calls this the “programmability” of plat-
forms and web pages and argues that it creates the conditions 
for content to “circulate through modular elements.”40 Crucially, 
though, Aden Evans argues that the modular elements through 
which content circulates are “neutral with respect to content.”41 
So long as these elements support a particular discrete bit of 
content — a file type, for instance, or a chunk of text — what 
content actually contains doesn’t matter.42
This inverts the concept of content. Content is the content of 
platforms, but content is not the media or the data that popu-
late our feeds and that we interact with. Content is a set of the 
parameters that allow modular compartments to be filled.43 
Marshall McLuhan infamously proposed that “the content of 
any medium is always another medium”.44 The discourse sur-
rounding online media might invite us to rephrase this claim: 
the media of content is other content. Content is a placeholder 
for digital media. Content is itself an empty form. 
This is a problem for media theory. It throws the media con-
cept into question by distributing it across platform elements. 
This has interesting implications, but is not our primary con-
cern here. The paradox of content is a problem for media theory 
because it also empties circulation of its conceptual content. 
39 Alan Liu, “Transcendental Data: Toward a Cultural History and Aesthetics 
of the New Encoded Discourse,” Critical Inquiry 31, no. 1 (2004): 49–84, at 
57. Emphasis in the original.
40 Helmond, “The Platformization of the Web,” 6.
41 Aden Evens, “Dreams of a New Medium,” Fibreculture Journal 14 (2009), 
http://fourteen.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-092-dreams-of-a-new-
medium/.
42 One could add intermediate steps to this argument without negating 
its core. For example, one could pause over the intermediate role of 
file formats. See Lev Manovich, Software Takes Command (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013).
43 Alexander R. Galloway, “The Cybernetic Hypothesis,” differences 25, no. 1 
(2014): 107–31, at 115.
44 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 8.
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We can illustrate this claim by asking another question: What 
is circulation? In media-theoretical discussions of ’net culture, 
this question has its own self-evident answer: Circulation is the 
circulation of content. 
These slippages and substitutions elide the tautological form 
of this answer. The process of circulation gets ascribed to media, 
to memes, as though it’s also a neutral term that describes some-
thing that just happens in media systems; as though circulation 
is just a quality of media understood as content. Content is what 
circulates; circulation is the circulation of content. Rather, con-
tent is the death mask of its circulation.45 
In producing content as empty form, the platform produces 
the form which our fetishes of ’net culture can then take. Just as 
popular discourse invokes meme magic, media theory invokes 
circulation as though it has analytical purchase on platforms, 
when it’s really just an expression of an incommensurability that 
platforms produce. This paradox points to the incommensura-
bility between the labor and the technics that platforms obfus-
cate, but that now underwrite the production of culture. The 
tautological concepts of content and circulation function as a 
fetish that obfuscates the double incommensurability of what 
information labor makes with what it receives and of what part 
of what is made is made by technics and is made by labor. 
The Fetish of the User
The fetish concept provides us with the means for identifying 
how platforms obfuscate both the labor and the technology 
by which culture is produced. This is perhaps another kind of 
(Marxist) fetishism, another way of avoiding the question of la-
bor and of underwriting the notion that the realm of culture is 
separate to it. This labor that platforms obfuscate is not pure 
45 To mistranslate Walter Benjamin’s “the work is the death mask of its 
conception.” See Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Shocken Books, 
1986), 81.
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living labor, however. It’s a labor inseparable from technics. On 
the ’net, the labor of producing culture emerges out of meshed 
hybrids of flesh and tech.
So our version of the fetish concept is a debased derivation 
of Marx’s commodity fetish.46 What we want to use it to think 
is neither a kind of false consciousness (after Marx) or double 
consciousness (à la Pietz). Borrowing from both, we want to 
underscore that what platforms obfuscate is the hybrid produc-
tivity of labor and technics. What they render incommensurable 
on the other side is labor, technics, and finally culture itself. 
If the technical component of this triumvirate is obfuscated 
by content, the labor component has its own empty form: the 
user. Alongside the question of what circulates on the ’net, we 
might ask the question that resonates more clearly with the fet-
ish concept’s earlier formulations: who puts media-as-content 
into circulation? The common sense answer is the user. The user 
is the subject who operates a computational device.47 This, too, 
is a kind of fetish. 
Bratton calls it the user position.48 Or perhaps we can call it, 
after Olga Goriunova, the digital subject.49 The user position is 
the necessary and identifiable predicate of the actions we take 
online. When we like a post or modify a meme, platforms reg-
ister this action not as one that we take, but as one taken by 
the user whom the digital subject functions as. Like content, the 
user is also a platform construct.50 
A clamor over authenticity has long defined discussions 
about the digital subject.51 Recently, it has manifested in prob-
46 Marx, Capital: Volume 1, 163ff.
47 Olia Lialina, “Turing Complete User,” Contemporary Home Computing, 
2012, http://contemporary-home-computing.org/turing-complete-user/.
48 Bratton, The Stack, 251.
49 Olga Goriunova, quoted in Olia Lialina, “Not Art&Tech,” Contemporary 
Home Computing, 2015, http://contemporary-home-computing.org/art-
and-tech/not/.
50 Scott Wark, “The Subject of Circulation: On the Digital Subject’s Inhuman 
Individuations,” Subjectivity 12, no. 1 (2018): 65–81.
51 Lisa Nakamura, Cybertypes: Race, Ethnicity and Identity on the Internet 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 15–20.
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lematic ’net vernacular panics about social media being popu-
lated by bots, manipulated by “the Russians” or scammed by 
“Nigerians.” This reflects ’net culture’s understanding of the us-
er’s role. It suspects it’s a construct. It knows that the user is in-
sufficient for explaining all of the actions that we might take on 
the ’net. The Internet meme — and ’net culture’s fetish of meme 
magic — make this abundantly clear by probing what it means 
for culture to be collectively produced by such indeterminate 
user constructs.
Meme magic makes a fetish of the capacity for the content 
we create and which we enter into circulation to undergo rapid 
proliferation, filling feeds and plastering walls. We can also see 
it as a response to the insufficiency of the user position. The 
Internet meme is produced by a collective. This collective is 
constitutive of its capacity to be produced as a plurality and to 
mutate as it’s produced in common. But who are the “we” who 
constitutes this collective? It appears as a plurality of user po-
sitions, all formally the same, all of more or less troubling or 
compromised authenticity. 
Internet memes seem to outstrip such a plurality’s capacity 
to produce rapidly proliferating culture. Alongside the occult 
capacity of this content itself, meme magic also fetishizes us-
ers’ capacity to collectively engineer content and to produce 
large-scale effects. The invocation of meme magic contrives an 
authentic subject — a collective will — in the gap between the 
internet meme’s effects and a collective of users’ insufficiency in 
explaining them.52
This is how we might understand the absurd-ironic invoca-
tion of the ancient Egyptian god Kek in recent ’net culture. After 
the 2016 Presidential election and in the wake of the apparent 
effect that the Pepe meme had on the outcome, some segments 
of meme culture began to invoke this Egyptian god and to pro-
claim Pepe as its contemporary manifestation. Amongst other 
52 On invocation, see Chris Chesher, “Layers of Code, Layers of Subjectivity,” 
Culturemachine 5 (2003), https://culturemachine.net/the-e-issue/layers-of-
code/.
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things, Kek is the god of darkness and chaos. It is often depicted 
as a frog. In the ’net vernacular, “kek” is another way of saying 
“lol”, or “laugh out loud.” These serendipitous confluences pro-
vided the basis for a joke religious cult: the cult of Kek. 
This is, in a certain sense, ironic. But it also marks out one 
way that ’net culture responds to the insufficiency of the user 
position: with forms of what we might call anthropomorphic 
animism. When the user is insufficient, Internet memes can 
conjure a degree of seemingly authentic agency: Pepe not only 
conveys hateful feelings, but comes to personify them. 
Or, the cult of Kek that emerges in Pepe’s wake is absurd and 
ironic, again like all ’net culture, but also indicates something 
true. Namely, that when the living labor (and non-labor) of 
making ’net culture interfaces via subject positions that are as 
interchangeable and dubious as user positions, and when ’net 
culture makes content that in the end is also an empty form, 
something else will end up being invoked, as if by magic, to cov-
er over the troubling non-identity of object, subject, and every-
thing in between.
Meme magic is then predicated upon a double fetish: that 
when the user puts content into circulation, something can be 
made to happen. Here, meme magic and media theory echo one 
another: invoking circulation is supposed to explain the pro-
duction of culture by users. With both concepts, the platform 
obfuscates the productive roles played by technics and labor in 
the production of culture. With the concepts of circulation and 
the user, respectively, platforms produce the forms that media 
theory uses to fetishize technics and labor while also obfuscat-
ing their incommensurability. Meme magic’s tacit faith in the 
generative power of ’net culture is homologous to media the-
ory’s. 
Mediating Theory
What we have called fetishes — circulation, the user — do not 
yet account for the epistemological influence platforms have 
on media theory itself. Platforms produce content as param-
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eters, which we mistake for media. Platforms put content in 
circulation, which we mistake for circulating media. Platforms 
predicate us as users, which we mistake for agents. The fallacy 
of identifying media with content, or circulation with the cir-
culation of content, or the subject with the user, is that these 
identifications don’t recognize that the empty form of content 
or the user position are components of platforms. They’re de-
signed to extract information asymmetries for the owners of the 
information vector from incommensurate hybrids of laboring 
flesh-tech.
Media theory is mediated by the platform, which presents us 
with readymade conceptualizations that we uncritically incor-
porate into our theories. To fetishize today is to mistake these 
forms for media wonders. Magic and circulation merge to form 
something like the magic circle that used to dog linguistic para-
digms; media become our epistemological beginning and end. 
If we’re to cast these fetishes down, it’s not clear that we’ll find 
what’s real; but maybe we’ll find what’s political.
To cast down a fetish is not to critique it. It is not to unmask 
a form of false or double consciousness. We don’t mean to ape 
the caricature of “critique” that’s animated recent turns to real-
ism and materialism.53 We’re not allergic to critique, but we don’t 
want to replicate what we see as a properly modern gesture. A 
kind of reality — history, or the field of incommensurable value 
systems — is supposed to lurk behind the fetish’s veil. What if we 
know this already? 
Perhaps ’net culture is already aware of the limitations of the 
user fetish, for instance. It even mobilizes the insufficiency of 
the user for its own ends. What if the role of the fetish concept 
is not to reveal some kind of reality, but instead to help us sort 
what’s real into what’s effective and what’s just the form that ef-
fects take? The fetish concept helps us to think how media theo-
ry is implicated in what it theorizes. Now, we might ask, what is 
53 As most forcefully articulated in Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run 
Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern,” Critical 
Inquiry 30, no. 2 (2004): 225–48.
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the role of the concept itself when it’s exposed to the circulations 
it’s supposed to conceptualize?
Platforms actively produce incommensurability: they “black 
box” their technical workings, leaving us with parameters in 
which we might enmesh the labor of producing culture and 
through which the value of our labor might be expropriated. 
Labor and technics recede, leaving us — users — with their epi-
phenomena: what we call content. The Internet meme challeng-
es us to think ’net culture across the incommensurability that 
platforms produce — in circulation. 
When it is understood as the circulation of content, the con-
cept of circulation works in much the same way as “meme mag-
ic.” We invoke it to smooth over this incommensurability and 
the questions of what circulation is and how media circulate. If 
it’s to function as concept rather than fetish, media theory must 
also reckon with the role that platforms play in producing its 
concepts — and the conceptual terrain — in which it operates. 
This would be the premise and promise of a meme theory as a 
critical media theory: a media theory that’s able to account for its 
own conditions of production.54 
We think of this kind of meme theory as one that refuses to 
be modern by understanding that its concepts are implicated 
in the thing it tries to theorize, media themselves. For Peter 
Osborne, the modern theoretical gesture produces the new by 
treating “the present as a negation of the past.”55 Pietz notes that 
the fetish concept is always limned with this force of negation.56 
To construe the act of casting down the fetish as an act of casting 
out the false would embrace negativity — and its conception of 
history as that which is occluded. This is not our project. 
Osborne also identifies another theoretical gesture, one that’s 
addressed to the contemporary: this gesture joins “the times of 
54 This is the animating concern of Scott Wark’s work in progress, Meme 
Theory.
55 Peter Osborne, “Philosophy after Theory: Transdisciplinarity and the 
New,” in Theory after “Theory,” eds. Jane Elliott and Derek Attridge 
(London: Routledge, 2011), 29.
56 Pietz, “The Problem of the Fetish, 1,” 9.
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the spaces it addresses” — its theoretical material — together in 
a present.57 We might think of media theory’s magpie proclivity 
to mix theory from different domains in this way. This is how 
media theory produces what Osborne calls the “illusory present 
of the space of the contemporary.”58 In this space, theory itself 
has no history and is no product of labor or technics. In this 
space, theory participates in and so produces the idea that cul-
ture, of which it’s a part, is separate from labor and technics. 
It’s no longer possible to assume that culture can be separat-
ed from technics. To pretend that it can be, ’net culture invokes 
meme magic — this is its fetish. Media theory has its own magic 
word, too: circulation. These fetishes aren’t adequately able to 
divide labor and technics. Hence what we sometimes read as 
the “occult” quality we attribute to our technology, which is one 
version of a misattribution of agency, or what used to be called 
animism. 
We might say that our contemporary technological condi-
tion expresses the fact that platforms participate in the modern 
“purification” of the realms of nature and culture, as per Bruno 
Latour.59 But if the project that ’net culture participates in and 
that the platform constructs is not a modern one, but a con-
temporary one, perhaps what they respond to is something else 
entirely. The platform can’t adequately purify labor-technics hy-
brids because it’s no longer participating in a modern project. 
Perhaps, then, what ’net culture produces is not a desire to af-
firm the limits of this modern project, but a response to its fail-
ure. Perhaps what lies beyond the fetishes invoked is not history, 
but something else. Concepts that can no longer be theorized 
other than as derivatives of circulation.60 Concepts cannot be 
understood separately from their objects, like media, but rather 
are subject to them. This is a derivative culture caught up in a 
57 Osborne, “Philosophy after Theory,” 29.
58 Ibid.
59 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
60 On the derivative, see Randy Martin, Knowledge LTD: Towards a Social 
Logic of the Derivative (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2016).
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different kind of temporality, one whose author or driving agent 
is no longer apparent. 
We want to say, rather, that the ’net confounds our capac-
ity to identify the agents behind, and the authors of, history. It’s 
magic. Or, it’s circulation. And it licenses an entirely new and of-
ten disturbing cultural politics. Like theory, culture has become 
contemporary. One of the things this means is that it has lost the 
modern mythic landscape it once deployed to make sense of the 
incommensurable. 
Following Ernst Cassirer, we can understand myth as some-
thing that binds people together through “sympathy,” or feeling, 
rather than “causality,” or objective concerns.61 Myth mixes the 
abstract and the real in a workable complex by giving emotion 
expression through form.62 In Cassirer, this form is what he calls 
an “image,” but we might understand it to encompass other 
forms of abstraction suited to our contemporary technological 
conditions. Myth makes feelings real and makes them workable 
through techniques of what Cassirer calls “ritualization,” which 
we might think of as various modes of collective production. 
Myth isn’t antithetical to politics, but is a constituent of it: it 
helps bind people into publics. 
The modern mythic landscape provided the anchor points 
of history and agency on which a politics could be built. When 
the rituals — including the media-rituals — that constitute the 
modern fall away, so too does its mythic landscape. On the ’net, 
new rituals emerge. Only, their anchors — a modern mode of 
history; the agency of the subject — are now insufficient. In re-
sponse, ’net culture’s had to create its own mythic landscape to 
make tractable what’s otherwise incommensurable. The fetish is 
a species of myth; meme magic is the kind of myth that emerges 
when history and agency fall away. 
61 Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1946), 38.
62 Ibid., 43. 
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The ’net community operates without the modern processes 
of immunization to which we’ve become accustomed.63 It can 
no longer detect and neutralize the outside within its inside. Its 
fetishes establish myths in which the agency to produce culture 
is fed by the fact that culture is no longer anchored to the pos-
sibility that one might be excommunicated if one goes too far. 
We might think of the Internet meme as one of the techniques 
that mobilizes myth to cultural and political ends. 
To associate a set of antagonistic qualities with an ava-
tar — like Pepe — is to exercise the political potential of myth: 
to bind an insider ’net culture sect by excluding through offend-
ing. So the mythic subject who now acts as the paradigmatic 
representative of the user position is the one who antagonizes 
endlessly; who in antagonizing longs to be immunized, if only 
to affirm that community could, once more, be possible not only 
on the ’net, but within the field of the contemporary that it helps 
to produce. This subject, in other words, is the “edgelord.” 
What the fetish tells us is that edgelord avatars emerge out 
of the insufficiency of our concepts to adequately encompass 
our contemporary technical conditions.64 It also tells us that our 
media-theoretical concepts participate in the propagation of the 
myths that found ’net culture — and its extremes. Perhaps most 
surprisingly, it tells is that the edgelord’s is a political project that 
is constructive rather than negative. Meme magic invokes new 
anchors for a culture adrift. We’re raising fetishes to propagate 
myths, only we’re not raising the kind that we would perhaps 
like. If the Internet meme’s to be a productive object of theory, 
theory must use the Internet meme to think beyond this im-
passe and its founding incommensurability: that platforms ob-
fuscate the role of labor and technics in producing culture; that 
our fetishes are necessary, but that we might not need to build 
them in the platform’s image.
63 Roberto Esposito, Immunitas: The Protection and Negation of Life 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2011).
64 On avatars, see Beth Coleman, Hello Avatar: The Rise of a Networked 
Generation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).
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In the Future, the Means 
of Production Will Own 
Themselves
C_YS
“It is not enough to change the world. 
That is all we have ever done. 
That happens even without us. 
We also have to interpret this change. 
And precisely in order to change it. 
So that the world will not go on changing without us. 
And so that it is not changed in the 
end into a world without us.”
 — Günther Anders, The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: 
On the Destruction of Life in the Epoch 
of the Third Industrial Revolution
T
he neuroscientist Christof Koch thinks it will one day 
feel like something to be the Internet. Building on Giulio 
Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Koch’s con-
sciousness is treated as an emergent property of any sufficiently 
integrated complex system with the necessary cause–effect ac-
tion, a quality rising from specific, though not uncommon, or-
ganisations of matter (and not, as in the panpsychic tradition, a 




A version of this idea has long held an almost mystic viability 
among technical exponents of Artificial Intelligence (AI), with 
Machine Learning now at the vanguard of their movement. Ma-
chine Learning methods could lead to a more generalized intel-
ligence than currently exists. But it would be an error to ignore 
the historic failures of positivist approaches to producing con-
sciousness, ones that rest atop philosophical assumptions about 
the nature of mind which, barring some notable exceptions, the 
AI community has yet to adequately theorize.
It may one day make sense to talk about the Internet as the 
(sub)conscious output of a new type of mind, if it is in the Drey-
fussian sense embodied and situated in a spatiotemporal world. 
It will also require understanding the materiality of subject as 
central to the question of its being.
Already, algorithmic automation determines much of what 
we see online. Specialized if/else bots have long conquered on-
line space, as to almost be considered old hat. Automated chum-
boxes and banner advertising are the primary income stream 
for many platforms, while low-fee social bots divert our atten-
tion to glossy social profiles pushing sponsored content. 
The computer ethicist James Williams writes in Stand Out 
of Our Light: “While we weren’t watching, persuasion became 
industrialized.”1 The psychoanalytic project was in the interwar 
period ushered into the service of consumer capitalism, famous-
ly by advertising mogul — and Sigmund Freud’s nephew — Ed-
ward Bernays. Combining techniques from psychology and 
public relations, this new type of advertising sublimated our un-
conscious desires into aspirational consumer choices. It turned 
objects into repositories of ideas, feelings, and connotations, 
and people themselves into objects of desire, in an inversion of 
Hegel’s object–ego relation where the object first identifies the 
subject, before identifying itself as the self-knowing Other. For 
Bernays, desire was the new American frontier.
1 James Williams, Stand Out of Our Light: Freedom and Resistance in the 
Attention Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 28.
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The countervoice in our digital era to advertising’s visual he-
genomy is meme culture; a form with no intrinsic meaning, full 
of sound and fury, signifying fuck all. The evasive art form es-
tablishes a representational scheme inverse to advertising and, 
through a sort of dream-like resampling, dilutes its potency.
Unlike emojis, imagined by artist Shigetaka Kurita for Japa-
nese mobile giant NTT DoCoMo, memes were never created but 
instead emerged from the runoff of early Internet culture, pri-
marily on boards such as 4chan. They were a way to facilitate 
online community-building, and became over time a more uni-
versal vocabulary through which to speak across its atomized 
structure.
Memes remain a bottom-up phenomenon in the tradition 
of folk art, one with a crucial spatiotemporal morphing prop-
erty: a means (us) and a medium (our technology) of embodied 
expression. In the eyes of their creator/audience, the more dis-
tance between a meme and its maker the better. They must be 
able to take on a social existence of their own.
Twitter’s @ShitpostBot5000 is an almost entirely self-con-
tained meme generator, while @sapphobot shares haunting 
fragments torn from the work of her Greek namesake. Reddit’s 
r/me_irl (tagline: selfies of the soul) and its equivalent Instagram 
bot both function as a subjectivized being in a corresponding 
spirit. The nihilistic subreddit represents a generation navigat-
ing the high drama of young adulthood while vying with an 
increasingly negligent global order. Their awkwardness, hope-
lessness, and otherwise general inability to adult are here ampli-
fied and commuted as comedic catharsis. r/me_irl’s subversions 
of advertising’s forms, parodied, duplicated, and shared anony-
mously into the commons, make it a breeding ground of their 
autopoiesis. Its simple subversion of advertising’s forms and im-
agery are a riposte to Bernays’ vision; a place where memes be-
gin to take on the representational qualities of the unconscious 
mind while changing, adapting, and in a reciprocal dialogue 
with one another as sites of desiring-production. To adapt a 
Don DeLillo maxim, “memes are talking to themselves.”
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The shift to surrealism within the culture is a form of cultural 
dissonance; a way of figuring the dual absurdities of coming-of-
age in a sophisticated, technologized world made up of quasi-
magical soft machines, while being denied the material returns 
promised for taking part in the great dance of capital. A precar-
ity of meaning has led to a breakdown of trust in the traditional 
symbols of expression. Surrealism, whose meaning-making es-
chews reason like the unconscious, is a way to enquire what lies 
beyond the dazzling refraction: it is a search for the source of 
the light itself. These memes provide new vistas into the poet-
ics of struggle, and offer a credible schema within IIT through 
which the Internet might begin to know itself.
In their modern-day prominence, memes are the speculative 
image board of the new political imaginary, counterpoints in a 
culturo-digital call and response codified through a density of 
self-reference. They are an example of Marx’s ideal, instantiated 
in this case as the material world reflected back in the digital 
mind as forms of thought.
In the run-up to the 2016 American presidential election, Fa-
cebook’s great indifference engine, whose weighted distribution 
of content remains an insider secret, became a central point of 
focus among political commentators. But while news networks 
lit up with alarming (if uncritical) stories of Russian bots desta-
bilising the democratic process, the platform quietly gained a 
resurgence among young users due in part to its unique group 
function, and the opportunities for meme tribalism it afford-
ed. Hyperpartisan political memes collectivized responsibility 
for extreme or otherwise unspeakable positions, layered with 
reference and an all-important blink-and-you’ll-miss-it irony. 
They gave credence to the indelicate opinions of those who are, 
and those who feel, politically marginalized, made specifically 
to transgress the economic and social cores of the Fukuyamian 
liberal order, and thereby transform of quantity into quality.
Facebook has occasionally been forthcoming about the use 
of its huge data sets to conduct “social experiments” (“It’s just a 
prank, bro!”), from the benign to the sinister. Williams suggests 
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this sort of manipulation is a feature, not a bug, of our media 
landscape.2 However, the unpolished, rudimentary aesthetic of 
2018’s meme culture — a will-to-anarchy from a generation dis-
enchanted with the top-down integration and slick controls of 
web 2.0 — pushes against this datafication of the Internet, in-
jecting an element of play into the increasingly serious platform.
Whatever form AI may come to take, its cognitivist ante-
cedents are already jacked into an expanding body of human 
knowledge and its adherent capitalist morality. Silicon Valley’s 
soothsayers take moral precepts as crowdsourced, or indeed 
guided by an invisible hand. But their error in thinking is that 
their creations will somehow internalize the symbols of capital-
ist virtue into a system of moral thought. This is, at best, under-
theorized. It will require a more fundamental shift in thinking 
than Machine Learning if we’re to achieve true human-like in-
telligence, but better thinking about the kinds of creatures we 
are will necessarily lead to better thinking about the kinds of 
creatures it’s possible to be. There needn’t be a wholesale inquiry 
into the nature of morality, but a basic acknowledgment of its 
contingency as a type of faculty that is both material and social 
would at least begin to point us in the right direction. 
Conservative Jungian psychologist and living meme Jordan 
Peterson argues in his Maps of Meaning for the primacy of our 
aesthetic impressions, suggesting the articulation of our psychic 
structures must come before any such understanding of them. 
Ever the Nietzschean, Peterson’s thesis proposes that we must 
first Other-ize ourselves to become a Self.3 It is this same instinct 
that gave us music, poetry, and now memes. Under this descrip-
tion, history and culture are a dreamstate of the unconscious 
mind.
Online media are not merely a replication of real-world phe-
nomena superimposed on the digital realm, but another layer of 
abstraction entirely. They are the self-producing imagination of 
2 Williams, Stand Out of Our Light, 30ff.




the Internet; a late, novel form of expression by a culture stitch-
ing its own demise into the fabric of history. Rich libertarians at 
the helm of the AI movement overlook technology’s nonessenti-
ality, regarding their creations as pliable cogs in the unstoppable 
wealth-generating machine of capitalism. But these technolo-
gies alone will not liberate us, free somehow from subjective 
concerns or unshackled from ideology. Not if we get it right. 
Objectivity as an ontological position itself is entirely ideologi-
cal, inhuman, and inhumane. Until we undertake a more fun-
damental reorganisation of society, material resources (of which 
AI is part) will continue to be distributed according to the inter-
ests of the already powerful, reflecting back to us the historical 
object as it becomes history’s subject.
AI must first understand ideology, the furnace in which it is 
forged, to be anything at all. Günther Anders’s counter to the 
most famous of Marx’s Theses On Feuerbach —  which is itself an 
attempt to rehistoricize philosophical thinking — checks the no-
tion that technological and social development are apiece.4 It is 
a recognition that changing the world, as it is often conceived, 
leans heavily on capitalist modes of speculation.
Against Peterson’s laissez-faire naturalism, within a modern 
Marxist vein, the world-changing capacity of AI needs interpre-
tation. With so much contemporary history now recorded, the 
past zooms up on us with crystalline clarity. Koch believes the 
Internet will one day conform to IIT’s axiomatic system, emerg-
ing in a splendor of sentience.5 Were that to be the case, the left 
cannot afford to uselessly sit back and watch all this unfold from 
afar, holding out half a hope for some poorly theorized data-
driven Marxism — Althusser with 1012 teraflops of processing 
4 Günther Anders, The Obsolescence of Man, Volume II: On the Destruction 
of Life in the Epoch of the Third Industrial Revolution, 1, http://libcom.org/
files/ObsolescenceofManVol%20IIGunther%20Anders.pdf.
5 See Steve Paulson’s interview with Christof Koch: Steve Paulson, “The 
Nature of Consciousness: How the Internet Could Learn to Feel,” 





power, arriving like an electronic God to deliver Fully Auto-
mated Luxury Gay Space Communism to the people. This ig-
nores all experience we have of the benefactors of technological 
change. Everything we gain we must first fight for, in our deeds 
and our words.
It is no more possible to hardcode sentience into our ma-
chines than it is every possible permutation of the world and 
its actors. They are dialectical systems whose shifting nature are 
constitutive of the very thing they are. Political memes (note: 
all memes are political) help us to feel out the steeper banks of 
our ideologies and, by colliding in these new arenas, become 
truly dialectical. If the Internet is to ever become conscious, it 
will need to act both as an incubator for life and a violent death 
machine.
The route to its own emancipation is as yet unmapped, but 
if we are there and we are ready, it will allow us to finally see 
ourselves as the great Other, and, hopefully, to become more 
human(e) for it. The alternative is for all of us, equally, to share 
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Socialist Imaginaries and Queer 
Futures: Memes as Sites of 
Collective Imagining
Thomas Hobson and Kaajal Modi
“I like to think (and
the sooner the better!)
of a cybernetic meadow
where mammals and computers





I like to think
(right now, please!)
of a cybernetic forest
filled with pines and electronics
where deer stroll peacefully
past computers
as if they were flowers
with spinning blossoms.
 
I like to think




of a cybernetic ecology
where we are free of our labors
and joined back to nature,
returned to our mammal
brothers and sisters,
and all watched over
by machines of loving grace.”
 — Richard Brautigan, 
All Watched over by Machines of Loving Grace1
 “I want freedom, the right to self-expression, 
everybody’s right to beautiful, radiant things.”
 — Emma Goldman2
Introduction: It Was the Memes Wot Dun It
O
n Friday June 9, 2017, UK residents woke up to a state of 
serious uncertainty as to which political party, exactly, 
was in power. The subsequent days would see a reshuf-
fling of the narrative into an apparently easy Tory win, and a 
smoothing over of the initial surprise at Labour having gained 
36 seats (albeit having lost 6), but for one brief, shining moment, 
the left, under Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party, had categorically 
Not Lost a General Election. So how, despite all of the punditry 
and expertise saying otherwise, had this happened? According 
to myriad editorials, opinion pieces and other forms of Serious 
Journalism, it woz the memes wot dun it.3
1 Richard Brautigan, “All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace,” The 
Atlantic, September 17, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2011/09/weekend-poem-all-watched-over-by-machines-of-loving-
grace/245251/. Originally published in All Watched Over by Machines of 
Loving Grace (San Francisco: Communication Company, 1967). Please 
note that wherever possible, all references and further readings suggested 
are open access. 
2 Emma Goldman, Living My Life (London: Penguin Classics, 2006), 42.
3 See, e.g., Hannah Jane Parkinson, “Was It the Corbyn Memes Wot Won 
It? Here Are Some of the Best,” The Guardian, June 9, 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/corbyn-memes-wot-won-it-some-
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An elderly, awkwardly sincere socialist had become the post-
er boy for the revolution. Jeremy Corbyn had arrived, and he 
was both a rockstar and your dad in a homemade cardigan. He 
had motivated a previously “apathetic” group of youth voters 
that everyone else had given up on. Corbynmania galvanized 
a generation of young people, and those young people had not 
only voted Labour, they had convinced their families to vote 
Labour, they had organized, and they had gotten out onto the 
streets and knocked on doors and convinced others to vote La-
bour. Here was the holy grail of politics.
Suddenly, memes were valuable currency. The Tories found 
themselves with a need to get in on the act by pretending that 
they had young new media-savvy members in their ranks and 
by starting the thankfully short-lived Activate Twitter account 
(#meme, anybody?), and even hotly tipped young pretender to 
the Conservative Leadership Jacob Rees-Mogg, got himself an 
Instagram where he could post twee selfies of himself, presum-
ably from his country estate in the 1920s. 
While a tracing of the phenomenon of Corbynism and its 
many offshoots through online meme culture and into main-
stream politics would be a worthy endeavor, by necessity it sits 
outside of the scope of this particular investigation. What we’re 
instead interested in, is getting to grips with some aspects of a 
fairly fundamental set of questions: what do memes do and what 
are they for?
In offering some tentative answers to these questions, we 
focus on the productive capacity of political memes — seeing 
them as both sites and practices of world building, and as places 
where understandings of what is and our visions of what ought 
to be can be produced collectively. What we are interested in, 
of-the-best; Olivia Ovenden, “Here Are the Memes That Helped Swing the 
Election in Labour’s Favour,” Esquire, June 12, 2017, https://www.esquire.
com/uk/culture/news/a15451/election-memes-corbyn; Charles White, 
“The Memes That Decided the Outcome of the General Election,” Metro, 




specifically, is the potential for online memes to act as sites of 
intersubjective imagination and world building. 
This is a study in two parts. Firstly, we engage with the con-
cept of the “sociotechnical imaginary,” bringing it to bear on 
the future as imagined of Fully Automated Luxury Commu-
nism (FALC) — an online meme that gained currency around 
the same time as the rise of Corbynism.4 Secondly, we look to 
a second articulation of luxury communism, Fully Automated 
Luxury Gay Space Communism, and the manner in which it, 
both substantively and materially, acts to “queer” the imagina-
tive space of FALC.
By doing so, this chapter offers a tentative and exploratory 
investigation of the following:
1. “Imaginaries” as useful conceptual frameworks for studying 
online memes, and;
2. The usefulness of these as a starting or staging point for col-
lectively imagined futures.
While we acknowledge that this represents rather a substan-
tial undertaking, we readily acknowledge the limited scope of 
a short chapter in addressing these goals. Rather than advanc-
ing the work here as a comprehensive investigation, we instead 
present it as an opportunity to open new avenues for discus-
sion and research, and most particularly as a chance to lay the 
groundwork useful framework through which to view this new 
and exciting activist community.
4 Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, Dreamscapes of Modernity: 
Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the Fabrication of Power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). The introductory chapter, which 
explains a great deal of the basic theory employed here, is available 
open access at http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
Jasanoff-Ch-1.pdf.
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Fully Automated Luxury Communism
In November 2014, Aaron Bastani uploaded a video to the No-
vara Media YouTube channel, as part of his “IMO” series, in 
which he outlined a concept called Fully Automated Luxury 
Communism (FALC). Prior to this, the term FALC had been cir-
culating online as a(n at least partially) tongue-in-cheek meme 
among (predominantly) London-based lefties.5
In this video Bastani asked why, at a time when capitalism 
is in crisis, and living standards, profitability, and wages are all 
falling in a manner unprecedented in modern history, we are 
still afraid of automation and unwilling to consider the poten-
tial for technology to act for the public good. Automation, he 
proposed, and crucially, automation for the people, rather than 
for profit, might prove to the answer to all of our problems in 
this era of devalued labor.
The imperative behind FALC, in both its substantive critique 
and its capacity as a rhetorical device, was a recognition of the 
ways in which technological systems, under capitalism, are de-
ployed in the service of profit. Challenging the idea that this is 
an inevitable consequence of industrialization and the natural 
state of things, FALC instead proposes that these technologies 
could serve the cause of emancipation. The increasing sophis-
tication of technologies in the present age — with, for example, 
substantial innovations in autonomization, global communica-
tions, advanced production techniques, AI and machine learn-
ing, and biotechnologies — could, it is argued, create abundance 
rather than austerity. 
FALC proposes a post-scarcity economy where we are no 
longer beholden to a capitalist idea of wage labor and, there-
5 Novara Media, “Fully Automated Luxury Communism!” YouTube, 
November 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmQ-BZ3eWxM. 
While Aaron Bastani’s long-awaited FALC book has now been published, 
the authors would like to note that the critique presented here is based on 
the partial elaborations that were extant at the time of writing and does 




fore, can work “10–12–15-hour weeks.” With the rest of our time, 
the population would be free to learn languages, retrain as en-
gineers, make art, and travel the world.6 He then asked the ques-
tion: “what would you do with your remaining time?,” and the 
responses, hashtagged #falc, began to pour in.
Post-Scarcity and Techno-Utopianism
While there most certainly have been a number of important 
and necessary critiques of the conceptual limitations of FALC, 
very few, on the left at least, would challenge the basic merit of 
such a bold and Utopian vision. These critiques have been put 
forward by, amongst others, other members of Novara, and in 
an excellent and readily accessible essay published on LibCom.7
Some of the key criticisms have included that:
 — FALC misapprehends how social relations and commodity 
values are mutually constructed, and the ways in which tech-
nologies embody and reproduce social and political orders;
 — The fundamental conceptualization of labor within its for-
mulation is deeply gendered, and;
 — In very much the same vein as other techno-utopian thought 
systems, it almost entirely neglects consideration of the so-
cial, economic, and ecological impacts of the production cy-
cles of luxury goods in an age of globalization.
6 Ibid.
7 For examples, please see: mcm_cmc, “Fully Automated Luxury 
Communism: A Utopian Critique,” Libcom (blog), June 14, 2015, 
https://libcom.org/blog/fully-automated-luxury-communism-utopian-
critique-14062015; Tom Syverson, “‘Fully Automated Luxury Gay Space 
Communism’: Has the Time For Universal Basic Income Finally Come?” 
Paste, June 7, 2017, https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2017/06/fully-
automated-luxury-gay-space-communism-univers.html; Brian Merchant, 
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The most fundamental criticism of FALC that we make in this 
work is that it employs somewhat paradoxical understanding of 
technology. Rooted in rather commonplace and Whiggish mis-
reading of Marxist thought, FALC sees technology as capable of 
embodying (or, at least, facilitating) the immanence of social, 
political, and economic emancipation, but to a large degree ig-
nores its substantive effects.
We wish to avoid to lengthy a detour into a critique of FALC’s 
misapprehension of the co-constitutive relationship between 
social systems and technologies, and as such, direct the reader 
towards some useful initial reading on these ideas below. We 
also recommend further useful reading on the ideas of co-pro-
duction, socio-technical relations, and the substantive effects of 
technology in this chapter’s footnotes.8 We see these critiques of 
the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of FALC as invalu-
able, and certainly hope that their insights can become more 
prominent in left conversations about technology and its role 
in conditioning social and economic relationships in the future.
Before moving on, however, we note that this particular 
understanding of technology — one which sees technology as 
both instrumental and deterministic — is a troubling one for 
those among us who spend time thinking about the relationship 
between technologies and the societies that produce them. In 
FALC, technology is seen as creating the conditions for eman-
cipation — with technological and scientific advance a promis-
sory force — but is then able to be unproblematically directed 
towards utopian social ends in entirely instrumental terms. We 
should likely ask whether a utopian vision that is so dependent 
on technology, that comprehends technology so poorly, really 
represents as convincing an idiom as is often claimed.
8 The idiom of co-production is cited as particularly useful in this work, 
for more on this, please see: Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The 
Co-Production of Science and Social Order (London: Routledge, 2004). 
However, it is also worth noting that several other valuable approaches 
to sociotechnical relations exist. For additional reading, we recommend 




FALC, Memes, and the Future
For the purposes of the present work, we are rather more in-
terested in understanding how FALC has acted as a catalyst for 
memetic conceptualizations of not only labor value, but for so-
cial transformation and the possibilities that technological ad-
vances are increasingly affording us. Our intention is to uncover 
some of the ways in which FALC has been captured by, and is 
continually re-invented and reproduced in, online memes. And 
it is to this end that, in the paragraphs that follow, we make the 
claim that online memes can be usefully understood as sites 
of intersubjective imagination — wherein communities can be 
united by certain shared socio-cultural or socio-technical vi-
sions of what kinds of futures could, and indeed, should (or 
should not) be realized.
Contrary to the traditional liberal conceptualization of com-
munism as rooted in misery, austerity, and predicated on su-
perhuman forbearance free from excess or private desire, FALC 
(in spite of any conceptual limitations one may charge it with) 
allows us the permission and the space to imagine the possi-
bility of abundance, of a future where the enforced privation 
of capitalism is overthrown in favor of a vision of communal 
living where the basic needs of food/water/housing/medicine 
are not only met but overcome, and where we can imagine new 
futures free from such prosaic concerns. In opposition to the 
sparse utilitarianism suggested by dominant representations of 
“the Eastern Bloc” or the scarcity and corruption prevalent in 
depictions of Latin American socialism, it invokes an image of 
the future where emancipation is intrinsic to material satisfac-
tion, rather than coming at the expense of it. 
Imagining the Impossible
Thinking critically about culture memetically is not a new un-
dertaking. That scholars, artists, and theorists have been dis-
cussing the definition and significance — indeed even the basic 
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usefulness of the concept — of (what can broadly be described 
as) memes for upward of half a century now, is perhaps testa-
ment to the persistence and attractiveness of them as both a 
tangible artefact and trope for analysis.9 Clearly though — as 
evidenced by the prominence of online memes in contempo-
rary discourse, and by the variety of societal and political ends 
for which they are credited as the means — there must be at least 
something more to say on the subject. It is certainly to be hoped 
that this is the case, lest we have rather wasted our collective 
energies as contributors to this book.
We expect, however, that there is little cause for concern on 
that front, with this volume prompting its readers to consider 
the politics of memes from a variety of fascinating perspec-
tives. Here, we argue that, in the image-saturated world of the 
early 21st century, the political is ever more inextricably linked 
to the production and sharing of iconic imagery and text, and 
that — in light of this — it is crucial that we develop critical theo-
retical and pragmatic understandings of this evolving relation-
ship and its substantive consequences. From a more normative 
standpoint we, along with the other contributors to this volume, 
are concerned with understanding how memes can be usefully 
deployed in the service of emancipatory, inclusive and progres-
sive Left politics. Our contribution to this effort is (hopefully) a 
rather straightforward one. We ask our readers to consider the 
relationship between memes and imagination. 
The task facing those of us who aspire to a better world is, 
inherently, an imaginative one. In seeing the world as it is, and 
believing that a fairer, more just world is possible — we, however 
faintly, look toward a future that we imagine to be desirable. The 
making and sharing of memes, we suggest, represents a site of 
imagination as a cultural and social practice — and therefore 
that memes themselves are an important component of the 
9 In tracing this idea of the meme from its origins in evolutionary theory, 
through to its current status as an idiom of communication, please see 




evolving shared perceptions of the desirable or utopian futures 
that are fundamental to the project of emancipatory politics.
We argue that political memes are sites of collective world 
building. In creating and/or sharing a political meme, we of-
fer our visions of the future worlds we imagine to be possible 
or desirable. These visions are incredibly significant — shaping 
discourse, guiding action and uniting communities. The chal-
lenge, of course, is in usefully conceptualising this relationship 
between memes, shared imaginaries, and the social and mate-
rial relations of a society.
Seizing the Memes of Production
Returning to the title of this volume, we argue that one valuable 
way forward in this endeavor is to begin considering the inter-
connectivity between the means of production and the memes of 
production — and, somewhat turning this on its head, the ways 
in which the production of memes can influence the produc-
tion of means. Our central thesis here rests on the following key 
arguments:
Firstly, that ideas and imaginaries have a substantial impact 
upon material conditions and technological processes. Tech-
nological and industrial advances don’t occur in isolation from 
social contexts, and are never just rational, scientific, necessary 
events on a linear trajectory of improvement. Instead, technolo-
gies are inherently social — the types of technologies we create, 
the problems we try to solve, and the sorts of worlds we try to 
create with technology are all guided by our understandings of 
how the world is, how it has been, and how it ought to be.
Similarly, despite the pervasiveness of claims very much 
to the contrary (made by liberals and conservatives the world 
over), the material conditions of our societies and distributions 
of wealth are never representative of a linear progress narrative, 
and do not embody the rational and inevitable course of his-
tory. Rather, they are always political and always predicated on 
judgments about how the world is and ought to be, on what out-
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comes are desirable, and on who should be allowed to benefit 
from these desirable outcomes.
Following from this, we argue that online memes are sites 
where ideas are made and imaginations are explored, shared, 
and popularized. When considering the pithy or even surrealist 
nature of some political memes, this may seem like something 
of a stretch (though even here we would argue that memes are 
an increasingly important component of political discourse) 
however, in our present study, FALC provides a clear example of 
how this can be the case.
FALC memes, and indeed, political memes in general, even 
at their most abstracted or satirical, invoke various ideas about 
how industry and society relate to one another (specifically in 
regard to who should benefit from and govern their produc-
tion), and, at least in the case of FALC, about how a desirable, 
emancipatory, future can be realized through technology. We 
would further argue that these memes of production (that is, im-
ages and text that capture and invoke a set of ideas about how 
social and industrial relations can be reorganized and emanci-
pation realized through technology) can, and should, be under-
stood as important aspects of left-wing perceptions of how the 
means of production can, and should, be reorganized.
If technologies are always embedded in and conditioned by 
ideas and shared understandings, and the means of production 
are increasingly dependent on the technological, then our ideas 
are capable of producing new means — new relations between 
labor and technology and new sociotechnical systems for or-
ganizing production and its benefits. Our memes of production 
as important sites of political imagination represent important 
opportunities to rethink our means of production.
Collective Imaginaries
Leftist politics have always tended toward the proudly utopian; 
activism is, after all, the project of imagining better worlds, and 
collectively, endeavoring to realize them. It is only in recent years 
that these practices have, by necessity, become bogged down in 
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the mundane realities of bureaucracy and capitalist productiv-
ity. This study is part recovery of that tendency towards action, 
and partly a new paradigm through which that action can be 
viewed. 
As a culture, we often celebrate the power and potential of the 
individual imagination — and with some justification — lauding 
especially those who promote, or appear to create, transforma-
tive or radical visions of the future. Reflect for a moment on 
the celebrity status of (shamelessly self-promoting tech-bro 
poster boys) Elon Musk or Steve Jobs. Or, perhaps consider the 
instant attention garnered by Labour MP Liam Byrne’s (in our 
view, rather misguided) book Dragons, which recounts the con-
tribution of innovative entrepreneurs to the making of modern 
Britain.10
Imagination though, is not just the preserve of the vision-
ary, but also operates intersubjectively — uniting members of 
a community in shared perceptions of futures which can, and 
should (or shouldn’t) be realized.11 It is this — the collective im-
aginary — that we are interested in exploring further in relation 
to political memes. 
The idea that collective imaginaries not only exist, but are 
important sociocultural forces, shaping (variously) identity, so-
cial relations, desires and aspirations, and morality, has its roots 
in the philosophy of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Most 
notable in the history of thought on collective imaginaries are 
the works of Benedict Anderson,12 Charles Taylor,13 and Arjun 
Appadurai.14 Taylor, for example has defined his modern and 
social imaginaries as so:
10 We urge you, in the strongest possible terms, to not waste your time 
on this book: Liam Byrne, Dragons: 10 Entrepreneurs Who Built Britain 
(London: Head of Zeus, 2016).
11 See here the open-access introduction to Jasanoff, cited in n. 4.
12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
13 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004).
14 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy,” in Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization 
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By social imaginary, I mean something much broader and 
deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain 
when they think about reality in a disengaged mode. I am 
thinking, rather, of the ways people imagine their social ex-
istence, how they fit together with others, how things go on 
between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images 
that underlie these expectations.15
This imaginary, for Taylor, entails an array of common under-
standings and practices based on a sense of what is real, and 
rejects the idea that politics is determined solely by deliberate 
and rational actions. Perhaps more immediately resonant to the 
arguments in this chapter, is the following reflection on the im-
agination, offered by Appadurai:
No longer mere fantasy (opium for the masses whose real 
work is elsewhere), no longer simple escape (from a world 
defined principally by more concrete purposes and struc-
tures), no longer elite pastime (thus not relevant to the lives 
of ordinary people), and no longer mere contemplation (ir-
relevant for new forms of desire and subjectivity), the imagi-
nation has become an organized field of social practices, a 
form of work (both in the sense of labor and of culturally 
organized practice) and a form of negotiation between sites 
of agency (“individuals”) and globally defined fields of pos-
sibility.16
Reading this, we can begin to engage with imagination not only 
as the site in which action is conceptualized, but as the staging 
point for future possibility. With relatively little effort toward 
reframing, we can apply some of these ideas on the imaginary to 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 27–48.
15 Charles Taylor, “Modern Social Imaginaries,” Public Culture 14, no. 1 
(2002): 91–124.




our earlier discussion of the ideational content and function of 
political memes. In doing so we start to gain some traction on 
not just the significance of shared imaginaries, but on how we 
can understand memes as a site for their creation and propaga-
tion. The imagination is a place for serious (whether deliberate 
or not) negotiation (and consensus) on the possibility of societal 
and human conditions. Returning to memes, we see that they 
represent a locale in which these imaginaries are developed, 
shared, and have affect.
Dreamscapes of Modernity
Our own definition of imaginaries rests rather more closely on 
that offered by Sheila Jasanoff in the introduction to Dream-
scapes of Modernity. Jasanoff ’s sociotechnical imaginaries engage 
more explicitly with two factors we are deeply concerned with 
in our discussion of FALC and the potentiality of political memes 
for an emancipatory politics, those being: science and technolo-
gy — which we argue is not only one of the most powerful guid-
ing forces in global modernity, but is intrinsic to the utopian 
visions of FALC (and of techno-positive leftism more generally) 
and; the future — which we argue is inherent to creative work of 
striving for an emancipatory politics, and is also implicated in 
the explicitly futuristic images invoked by FALC.
Jasanoff defines sociotechnical imaginaries as: “collectively 
held and performed visions of desirable futures (or of resist-
ance against the undesirable) [that are] animated by shared 
understandings of forms of social life and social order at-
tainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and 
technology.”17 One could then, rather readily, reconceptualize 
the FALC meme itself as a recognizable imaginary — with the 
making and sharing of memes representing the public perfor-
mance of a collectively held vision. The vision, of course, is one 
17 Sheila Jasanoff, “Future Imperfect: Science, Technology, and the 
Imaginations of Modernity,” in Jasanoff and Kim, Dreamscapes of 
Modernity, 19. 
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wherein automation and technological advance facilitate a fu-
ture of emancipatory politics — and consequently the imaginary 
is supportive of certain modes of technological advance and ad-
vocates for certain reorganisations of industrial and economic 
relations.
While FALC memes take many forms, ranging from the naïve 
to the ludicrous to the vital and instructive — in each instance 
the cooperative, communal, and crucially, discursive practice of 
imagination is taking place. Whether understood through the 
semiotics of image macros, or through the production of shared 
understanding in discourse, we argue that FALC memes invoke a 
communal set of ideas (or at the very least a shared framework 
for thinking) about how the world as it currently is may be reim-
agined and re-ordered toward emancipatory ends. 
For Jasanoff, the imaginary is also necessarily culturally 
particular, and temporally situated. This goes some way to-
wards helping conceptualize the ways that our visions of the 
future — even (in fact especially) our utopian ones — are condi-
tioned by our experiences and, often, prejudices in the present. 
Returning again to some of the earlier critiques of FALC that we 
touched upon, understanding imaginaries as conditioned by, 
and reproductive of, contemporary judgements of what and 
who is important, can help us get to grips with some of the ex-
tant limitations of popular iterations of FALC — especially in re-
lation to some of the issues we will discuss below.
Signs and Signifiers
Since 2014, memes relating to FALC have seemingly appeared 
with ever-increasing frequency. They are regularly posted in 
threads under (often apparently unrelated) posts about, vari-
ously: technology, feminism, space, gender, race, sexuality, 
Marxism, and often all (or none) of the above. They have ap-
peared across groups and collectives on Leftbook, left Twitter, 
Tumblr, and beyond, taking the forms of gifs and image macros. 
Frequently they evoke the classic Soviet constructivist iconog-
raphy of revolutionary leftist politics, and of the (perhaps un-
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surprisingly) similar off-planet science fiction or abstract uto-
pias. In practice, the memes are often collaborative and evolve 
continually in-situ, being overlaid with, or accompanied by, in-
creasingly detailed or often esoteric text threads.
While we have argued above in favor of understanding 
memes as imaginaries — framing their production and shar-
ing as a practice of collective imagination, we turn here to the 
work of Stuart Hall — whose insight into culture, discourse, and 
materiality is instructive in getting to grips with how political 
memes can embody, communicate, and produce understand-
ings and ideas. When considered through Hall’s theory of en-
coding/decoding, memes, like any other media, and like Ap-
padurai’s imagination, are discursive, in that they contain both 
symbolic and material potentiality that is only realized in mo-
ments of interpretation or negotiation between the meme space 
and the viewer. In fact, unlike traditional media, they go one 
step further, as they are encoded by one audience, as it were, in 
one symbolic context, and decoded in another context by an-
other audience. While new media theorists often find this a use-
ful stepping-off to start to think in terms of “affordances,” let’s 
stay here a moment and consider what this means. 
It means that there is no “wrong” way to meme, in the same 
way that there is no “wrong” way to consume any other me-
dia. Seeming “user errors” are absorbed into the fabric of the 
practice of meme-ing, and spawn their own semiotic offshoots. 
If you decide that your utopia has automated cats, for exam-
ple, then automated cats are immediately incorporated into the 
visual language of that discourse (robot cats in space, robot cats 
with laserbeam eyes, robot cats that resemble Vladimir Lenin 
standing proudly in front of a Soviet sunrise in full Soviet uni-
form, etc).
That a great deal of this interaction is consciously humorous 
or even deliberately ridiculous shouldn’t discount them from 
being taken seriously on the terms laid out above. Satire, even 
the involuntary kind, is a valid critique, and intention does not 
necessarily undermine the impact of situated cultural forms. In 
fact, it is this irreverence, and seemingly deliberate postmod-
343
Socialist Imaginaries and Queer Futures
ernism, which is itself an intrinsic part of meme culture; it is 
persistently and (often unconsciously) anarchic in its lack of 
reverence for any traditions whilst at the same time borrowing 
heavily from revolutionary, particularly soviet/communist, ide-
as and symbology. It is this dichotomy that allows it to occupy 
a space that is at once meaning-making and subversive, and at 
the same time representative of wider socio-cultural tendencies. 
To paraphrase Hall, the individual memer is always living some 
larger socio-cultural narrative, whether they like it or not. 18
Queering the Problem Space
While an in-depth tracing of the FALC meme and its various 
offshoots falls outside of the scope of this work, it is here that 
a reading of one of its more persistent offshoots is particularly 
illustrative as an example of the manner in which meme-ing 
can act as a space for intersubjective, dialectical, and discursive 
future-making among online collectivities. 
This section examines the Fully Automated Luxury Gay (or 
Queer) Space Communist (FALGSC) society, reading it as an im-
aginary space that acts to queer the classic FALC meme (both 
literally and figuratively speaking). According to Know Your 
Meme, FALGSC
envisions an idealistic society where gender norms have been 
abolished to such an extent that there is little to no difference 
between gay and straight, and due to automation, luxury is 
available to all people[.] The term has inspired the creation of 
communism-themed memes and image macros.19
18 See Stuart Hall, quoted in Tim Adams, “Cultural Hallmark,” The Guardian, 
September 23, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2007/sep/23/
communities.politicsphilosophyandsociety.





For those readers unfamiliar with queer theory, it is important 
here to note that “queering” is not necessarily just a process that 
explicitly reads a text through the binary of the homosexual and 
heterosexual (although it is that), but is instead a heuristic that 
acts to dismantle “the dynamics of power and privilege persist-
ing among diverse subjectivities.”20 Queer Studies is a critical po-
sition rather than a sexual one; queer can mean “the open mesh 
of possibilities, gaps […] and excesses of meaning.”21 “Queer gets 
a critical edge by defining itself against the normal rather than 
the heterosexual.”22 Queering is an act that can be performed.23
When read through this paradigm, FALGSC becomes an in-
joke, a meta-reference, a wink and a nod to those of us in the 
know about FALC, and about the current rift in the left between 
traditional Marxism and the new identity politics. These latter 
post-Marxist formulations of society, culture, and gender, that 
seek to be more inclusive of non-hegemonic and marginalized 
experiences and understandings of the world, therefore require 
an envisioning of futures that can encompass difference. 
These memes are ridiculous, and they are gay as hell. They 
incorporate the semiotics of queerness while at the same time, 
both in its literal and academic definitions, “queering” the tradi-
tional forms of communist futuring. If FALC is the neo-capitalist 
faux socialist utopianism of Star Trek, FALGSC is the post-scarci-
ty civilisation of Iain M Banks’s “the Culture,” wherein sentient 
post-gender pan-humans and artificial intelligences co-exist in 
an automated interstellar collection of societies that has no dis-
cernable end.
20 Thelathia “Nikki” Young, “Queering ‘The Human Situation’,” Journal of 
Feminist Studies in Religion 28, no. 1 (2012): 126–31.
21 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Tendencies (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 8.
22 Michael Warner, “Introduction,” in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics 
and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), xxvi.
23 See Judith Butler, “Critically Queer,” in The Routledge Queer Studies 
Reader, eds. Donald E. Hall and Annamarie Jagose (London: Routledge, 
2013), 18–31.
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Returning, briefly, to our earlier discussion of memes as im-
aginaries, the divergent futures described above illustrate the 
constitutive effect of how we understand the present — our ex-
periences, prejudices, and priorities — on the futures we strive 
to create. If we don’t understand gender and sexual equality to 
be issues worth fighting for in the present, are we likely to make 
room for them in our imaginaries — even utopian ones — of the 
future? 
Memes as Sites of Political Contestation
Online fora are increasingly the battlegrounds on which politi-
cal battles are fought, and if not where hearts and minds won 
exactly, then at least where they can be exposed to alternative 
political ideas, causes, and crusades. They are a rich recruiting 
ground for previously antithetical or apolitical young people 
who might feel disenfranchised by the established politics of 
our time. One doesn’t have to look far to see examples of online 
political movements on both the right and the left that spread 
through their memetic conceptualizations; the more shareable 
the better. From ISIS and InCel to Bernie Bros and Corbynma-
nia, to the rise of Trump and the new British nationalism via 
the terrifyingly (and apparently insidiously) shareable content 
of Britain First. 
Successful memes transcend echo chambers; they overspill. 
We’ve all come across memes that expose us to new ideas in a 
manner that is pithy, funny, or particularly striking, and we are 
all more likely to share something that makes us pause to think, 
and/or laugh (preferably both). One of the most notable things 
about memes, particularly image macros, is that they do not 
display a particularly refined design aesthetic; and that might 
in fact constitute a large part of their power. Those of us in the 
global minority tend to live in highly sophisticated visual socie-
ties, and to cultures overloaded by slick advertising tropes and 
hyper-real soft focus filters, an inexpertly made image can often 
seem like the last authentic voice in a sea of artificiality.
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The self-replicating and somewhat simplistic nature of the 
meme lends itself well to utopianism — and to the production of 
shared meanings. They are accessible, and they are democratic 
(in that anyone can make or share them). This is political propa-
ganda, for the people, by the people. It is writ small, but it is 
infinitely modular, replicable, scalable, and modifiable. One can 
imagine worlds in these creations, and indeed the democratic 
format of the standard image macro is one of its most compel-
ling and, indeed, sustaining features. If memes are the basic 
units of cultural (re)production, then FALC and its offshoots are 
both an evolving dialectic and a representation of the current 
state of the (online) left.
Imagining the Future
At a recent Q&A at the Women of the World festival at the South-
bank Centre in London, an audience member asked the promi-
nent black activist and theorist Angela Davis whether she was 
tired of fighting against the same injustices as she had been since 
her youth in the seventies. Davis first, and true to form, took a 
moment to credit the young black activists of BLM in the US and 
the UK, as well as the Palestine solidarity movement, for inspir-
ing her daily. She then pointed out that, despite the neo-liberal 
capitalist imperative to measure any form of labor in terms of 
progress, true change is slow, and it is inexorable. She went on to 
say that the work we do now would probably change the world 
in fifty years time, and “that today we are living the imaginaries 
of those who have been long gone. We are living the world they 
wanted.”24
So who gets to participate in this world building? In Lizzie 
Borden’s 1983 cult feminist classic sci-fi film Born in Flames, in 
a not-too-distant American future, the revolution has come and 
gone, and women, particularly women of color, find themselves 
still fighting against classism, sexism, and racism. What certain 
24 See Southbank Centre, “WOW: Angela Davis in Conversation,” YouTube, 
March 11, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBgdzK3jfEg.
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techno-utopian Marxist thinkers seem compelled to ignore is 
that the form of revolution for which they are advocating ex-
cludes the needs of a sizeable chunk of the population, particu-
larly those who are excluded by dominant and hegemonic so-
cial, cultural, and political formulations.
Again, to restate an earlier contestation, the ways in which 
we understand and order the present — that is, the sum total 
of our experiences, prejudices, priorities, and politics — have a 
substantial impact on the kinds of worlds we try to create, and 
on the possible futures we are able to incorporate into our im-
aginaries. If we don’t understand how gender, race, geographi-
cal, or sexual equality work in the present, how able are we to 
make room for them in our imaginaries of the future? Naturally 
we all want to live in a world that is post-racial and post-scarcity, 
and many of us even in one that is post-gender, but if we don’t 
make space for, and even center those voices that are marginal-
ised even in the dominant narratives of current subcultures, we 
will find ourselves recreating the same inequalities even in our 
utopias.
It is easy to downplay the value of online politics; one cannot 
click on a news site without seeing yet another op-ed lambast-
ing millennials and their apparent myriad social and cultural 
ineptitudes (these are the imaginaries of mainstream media, it 
seems). However, if we can understand interactive media as sites 
of collective meaning-making, indeed sites of culture, and of 
world-making, then it is imperative that we harness the eman-
cipatory power of these new media formats. In order to do so, 
we must firstly understand the ways in which they work. We 
must understand the ways in which ideas and understandings 
are reproduced or made new through these interactions, and we 
must understand their relationship to the political and material 
conditions of the present and the potentialities of the future.
We should especially be alert to how memes themselves act 
to queer dominant cultures through their role as imaginaries, 
and secondly, we must approach them as a purely utopian en-
deavor (in the best sense of the word). It is this queering that 
acts to elevate the meme format from standard new media; 
348
Post Memes
memes continuously trouble the boundaries and spaces below 
and between hegemonic cultural formulations, operating some-
thing like a virus (it is no wonder that popular memes “go viral”) 
or a catchy melody. 
In these memes we can see entire worlds — cultures created 
through shared meaning and practice; some last hours, others 
days, months, or even years. They are constantly evolving and 
changing to fit the contexts in which they are being created and 
shared, and it is this quality that, at the same time as making 
them difficult to pin down and analyse, makes them impossible 
to commodify, and a useful site of resistance. As Hall argues: 
“in the study [of popular culture] we should always start here: 
with the double stake in popular culture, the double movement 
of containment and resistance, which is always inevitably inside 
it.”25 Our collective imaginaries are larger than all of us, and do 
not necessarily require our knowledge or even acknowledge-
ment of the wider socio-cultural forces at play in order for us to 
participate in this world-building.
Imagining Freedom/Imagining Justice
Rather than closing with a summary of the discussion above, or 
with our own endeavors toward a grand theory of memes and 
political imagination, we instead choose to leave the reader with 
the wisdom of one of the 20th century’s greatest imaginers, Ur-
sula K. Le Guin, who offers the following typically poetic reflec-
tion on the relationship between the imagination, justice, and 
freedom. We do this, in part, because of the provocative and ap-
posite nature of her words, but also in part, to denote that — for 
all of us — our work here, in imagining emancipatory futures, is 
far from done. It is in fact, always, just beginning: 
25 Stuart Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing ‘the Popular’,” in People’s History 
and Socialist Theory, ed. R. Samuel (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1981), 228.
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We will not know our own injustice if we cannot imagine 
justice. We will not be free if we do not imagine freedom. We 
cannot demand that anyone try to attain justice and freedom 
who has not had a chance to imagine them as attainable.26
26 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Wave in the Mind: Talks and Essays on the Writer, 
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e need to be clear why we are fixated, for the moment, 
on Donald Trump. There is actually some optimism in 
the business community and among financial analysts 
about the Trump regime and what it can deliver, if you are sold 
on neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization and 
a strong state. If Michael Wolff ’s insider book Fire and Fury 
is to be believed, much of the policy agenda is actually being 
driven by “Jarvanka,” that is Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump, 
Democrats (to gloss) who have the aim of installing Ivanka in 
the White House in the future.1 Within the frame of this po-
litical-economic agenda, and a record of military intervention 
abroad, there is little evidence that Hillary Clinton would have 
been much more progressive in charge of the White House. The 
Trump vote should be set in the context of suspicion of elite ma-
chine politics that Hillary was into up to her neck and popular 
reaction to that, populist reaction peppered with a good dose of 
misogyny. In this regime, the figure of Trump himself stands out 
as an exception, an unpredictable element in a political move-
1 See Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House (London: 




ment which, as Steve Bannon feared, would be drawn into the 
establishment. Trump could become a generally conformist and 
typical member of the President’s Club. Trump is an anomaly, 
object of derision in the press, but should our response be in line 
with that derision?
The Trump election campaign was a media campaign. More 
than previous elections, which have been thoroughly media-
tized in recent years as part of the society of the spectacle, this 
campaign revolved around mass media.2 It was a campaign ori-
ented to the media, by media and for the media. And we learn 
from Michael Wolff ’s book that the Trump team had the media 
in its sights as the main prize, as the end rather than the mere 
means. Members of the Trump team had their eyes set on media 
positions at the end of a campaign they expected and hoped to 
lose, and Trump himself aimed to use the campaign to set up 
a media empire to rival Fox. They had in mind the advice by 
ex-Murdoch anchorman Roger Ailes, that if you want a career 
in television, “first run for president.” The election campaign ef-
fectively continues after Trump has been installed with a prolif-
eration of fake news and the signifier “fake news” which haunts 
the media now. From this flows the kind of analyses we need, 
either analysis that will be really critical of Trump, or the kind of 
analysis that will easily and pretty immediately be recuperated, 
neutralized, and absorbed by the spectacle. 
It wasn’t just any old media that was crucial here, but new so-
cial media. Rapid decline in newspaper readership, which spells 
a crisis for the old media empires like Murdoch’s Fox News, and 
near-death for standard format news television programs as a 
source of information, has seen a correlative rise in importance 
of platforms like Facebook, and, more so, Twitter, Instagram, 
Tumblr, and 4chan. These are platforms for the circulation of 
particular kinds of information; information that works by way 
of what it says and, crucially, how it is packaged. These are little 
packets of semiotic stuff that hook and take, they are memes. 
2 On the “society of the spectacle,” see Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 
trans. Fredy Perlman et al. (Detroit: Black and Red, 1977).
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Memes as tagged images or repetitive gif files provide messages 
which are intimately and peculiarly bound up with the form of 
the media. More than ever, perhaps even now with a qualita-
tive shift in the speed and intensity of media experience and 
its impact on subjectivity, the medium is the message.3 These 
are the memes produced and consumed in a significant com-
ponent domain of contemporary politics, activating and repli-
cating a certain mode of experiential engagement with Trump. 
There is something essential to be grasped here about the form 
of memes that keys into new forms of subjectivity and political 
engagement.
Take the example of the Trump open-book law-signing 
meme. In this gif, the big book Trump shows to camera as pub-
lic evidence that a new statute has just been signed by him is 
inscribed with other messages; one of the earliest instances has 
the word “Kat” and an arrow on the verso page pointing to a 
scrawled child-like image of cat recto (joke: Trump is childish); 
a later version after the exchanges with North Korea has an im-
age of a little red scribble marked “his button” on one page and 
a bigger splodge on the other page marked “my button” (joke: 
Trump is childishly preoccupied with having something bigger 
than Kim Jong-un). The message content for this meme can be 
easily pasted in and posted by anyone using a mobile app that 
is advertised on the Internet; the advertising also pokes fun at 
alt-rightists who might be grammatically challenged but even 
so will find it simple to use.4 There are elements to these gifs that 
are also very easy for pop-Lacanians to describe; of a Symbolic 
register in which the message also connotes Trump’s childish 
nature, of an Imaginary aspect which hooks us and replicates 
something childish about the intervention, and even a hint of 
something Real, of the stupidity of Trump as dangerous, this 
3 See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).
4 See Elissa Salamy, “Create Your Own Trump-signed Executive Order 





image game inciting the very jouissance, the very deathly pleas-
ure it pretends to ward off. It is as if, and only as if, we can con-
nect with what we know about Trump, and find a way to tell the 
truth about him, about how we feel about him.
Take another example, Pepe the Frog. This character was 
claimed and used by the alt-right to ventriloquize a series of 
often racist messages to support Trump during the election 
campaign. Pepe says the unthinkable, enunciates what is al-
ready said among the alt-right community. This is beyond dog-
whistling politics; it includes humorous jpegs of Pepe with a 
Hitler moustache saying “Kill Jews Man.” The Anti-Defamation 
League is onto this, but that isn’t a problem for the alt-right; that 
merely heightens the peculiar pleasure of fans of Pepe. Here, 
you could say that an obscene underside of political discourse 
is relayed which pretends to connect with the unconscious, an 
unconscious realm which is configured as the repressed realm 
of what people really think and want to say. If there are perver-
sions of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real here, it is as if they 
are already conceptualized and mobilized as part of the stuff of 
the meme; with the performative aim to feed a relay between 
Imaginary and Symbolic and make the Real speak. It is as if, and 
only as if, the unconscious can speak, with the construction of 
truths that have been censored now released, finally free. 
Notice that there is a particular kind of framing and locali-
zation of the enemy and resistance. This framing and localiza-
tion brings to the fore the Angela Nagle thesis, the argument 
in her book Kill All Normies that the Left prepared the ground 
for the rise of the alt-right; that arrogant attempts to enclose 
new media platforms and shut down debate, to humiliate and 
“no-platform” political opponents, set the conditions for an 
alt-right that was then much more adept at scapegoating oth-
ers in order to triumph.5 The Nagle thesis also raises a question 
about the complicity of what we like to call “analysis” or even 
“intervention” when we are being more grandiose, about our 
5 See Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: The Online Culture Wars from Tumblr 
and 4chan to the Alt-right and Trump (Winchester: Zero Books, 2017).
357
Memesis and Psychoanalysis
complicity with the phenomena our critique keys into. We can 
see the looping of this critique and phenomenon in the widely 
circulated little video clip of alt-right leader Richard Spencer 
beginning to explain what his badge with an image of Pepe the 
Frog on it means, before being punched in the face; the video 
becomes an Antifa gif, it becomes a meme. In the process, op-
ponents and supporters of Trump become mediatized, part of 
the same looping process of memesis. So, a fantasy about what 
censorship is and how to break it, and what “free association” 
is and how to enjoy it becomes part of the media in which that 
fantasy is represented. 
Trump is seductive, and so is psychoanalytic critique of him. 
It is tempting to home in on Trump as a pathological person-
ality. Perhaps he is, as Michael Wolff says, “unmediated,” “cra-
zylike,” without what neuroscientists call “executive functions,” 
perhaps he is only mediated by his own image. This is where 
Wolff ’s spoof anecdote, which is unfortunately not included in 
Fire and Fury, is so enjoyable; the one about Trump watching a 
special cable channel devoted to gorillas fighting, his face four 
inches from the screen as he gives advice to them saying things 
like “you hit him good there.” But we don’t necessarily avoid 
wild analysis when we simply shift focus away from Trump 
himself and pretend instead that psychoanalysis can explain 
how someone like Trump could be elected; that is the argument 
in Robert Samuels’s book Psychoanalyzing the Left and Right af-
ter Donald Trump, an argument that is actually underpinned by 
Lacanian theory, a very accessible clear book.6 There is a place 
for psychoanalysis, but the question is, what is that place, how 
does psychoanalysis key into the media phenomena it wants to 
explain? We need to take care, take care not to be hooked by 
that question. We should not extrapolate from the psychoana-
lytic clinic to psychoanalyze politics. 
6 See Robert Samuels, Psychoanalyzing the Left and Right after Donald 
Trump: Conservativism, Liberalism, and Neoliberal Populisms (London and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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Trump is a paradoxical figure, not a psychoanalytic subject 
but a psychoanalytic object. He cannot not be aware of psycho-
analytic discourse swilling around him and framing him, so 
pervasive and sometimes explicit is that discourse, but he seems 
resistant to that discourse, showing some awareness of it even 
as he rails against it. This use of psychoanalytic-style critique 
is one of the axes of the class hatred that underlies much of the 
mainstream media contempt of Trump and the representations 
of his stupidity. It is then also one of the suztexts of populist re-
action against the media, the media seen as part of the elite that 
patronizes those who know a little but not a lot — here those 
who know a little but not a lot about psychoanalysis — who 
know what is being pointed at but who cannot articulate what 
exactly is being mocked in Trump and why. He is reduced to 
being an object of scorn, seemingly unable to reflexively engage 
with psychoanalytic mockery of him as if he was an analysand, 
to reflexively engage as an analysand would do. It is as if we have 
the inverse of the anecdote reported in the Michael Wolff book 
in which a model asks Trump what this “white trash” is that peo-
ple are talking about; Trump replies “they are people like me, 
but poor.” In this case the question might be “What are these 
psychoanalytic subjects, analysands?”; Trump’s answer would 
be “they are people like me, but reflexive.” He is in this language 
game but not of it, and the joke is that he doesn’t quite get the 
joke, our sophisticated psychoanalytic joke. Trump is what Sig-
mund Freud would term the butt of the joke, and here the butt 
of psychoanalytic discourse as a class weapon used against him.7
Take, for example, a Trump meme which frames him as 
what we might call the case of Little Hands. This meme picks 
up on a comment made twenty years ago by a journalist — it 
was Graydon Carter in Spy magazine — that Trump has unu-
sually short fingers. Trump reacted badly to this comment ap-
7 See Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, trans. 
James Strachey, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume VIII (1905): Jokes and Their Relation to 




parently, and ever since has been mailing the journalist cut-out 
magazine images of Trump himself with his hands circled in 
pen and the scribble “not so short!” During the 2016 Republican 
Primary one of Trump’s rivals Marco Rubio said that Trump’s 
hands were tiny, and “you know what they say about guys with 
tiny hands” — he waits for laughter — “you can’t trust them.” 
Trump’s angry response took the implicit reference to the size 
of his dick seriously, and he responded publically in a speech 
in which he said “I guarantee you, there’s no problem.” This is 
where the meme poking fun at Trump spins into psychoanalytic 
discourse. Stories circulated in the media about this, including 
about the formation of a political action committee, that is an 
electoral campaign group, called “Americans Against Insecure 
Billionaires With Tiny Hands.” You see how this works as a dou-
ble-joke; Trump is insecure about power, but he doesn’t realize 
that it’s about power. You could say that the meme joke revolves 
around the fact that he doesn’t get the difference between the 
penis and the phallus. The Trump Little Hands meme drums 
home a message about what he knows but doesn’t want to know. 
So what can psychoanalytic theory as such say about this 
process? We need to ask why it is so easy to make a psychoana-
lytic argument about these political phenomena. It does indeed 
look as if a Kleinian account of splitting and projective identifi-
cation is perfectly suited to explaining not only why Trump acts 
the way he does, but also, better, it explains how we become be-
witched by Trump, filling him with our hopes or hatred. It looks 
as if a version of US-American object relations theory perfectly 
captures the nature of Trump as a narcissist or, better, as an ex-
pression of an age of narcissism in which we stage our political 
objections to him as for a meritocratic ego ideal that we want 
to be loved by. It looks as if Lacanian psychoanalysis identifies 
a cause that drives and pulls Trump through the blind alleys of 
desire for he knows not what and, better still, this psychoanaly-
sis explains what it is about Trump as objet petit a that is coming 
close to us and causing us anxiety. These are lines of argument 
rehearsed by Robert Samuels. The reason why these explana-
tions make sense is not because they are true but because they 
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are made true, woven into the stuff they are applied to.8 So, there 
is a deeper problem in the supposed “application” of psychoa-
nalysis to politics, but is there a way out of this?
One of the peculiar things about Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
that it is implicitly, potentially reflexively self-critical. One of 
Jacques Lacan’s conceptual devices helps us to understand a bit 
better exactly how recuperation operates under new mediatized 
conditions of possibility for political discourse. I have in mind 
the so-called “discourse of the capitalist” (at the bottom of fig. 
1), though I am not sure that it is actually a fifth discourse that 
runs alongside the other four discourses that Lacan describes.9 
In Seminar XVII Lacan describes four discourses in one of his 
few extensions of psychoanalysis beyond the clinic, to under-
standing the political-economic context for the psychoanalytic 
8 See Ian Parker, Psychoanalytic Culture: Psychoanalytic Discourse in 
Western Society (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1997).
9 For a discussion of this, see Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious: 




clinic.10 These discourses are: discourse of the master as founda-
tional, foundational condition of consciousness; discourse of the 
university, bureaucratically pretending to include all knowledge; 
discourse of the hysteric, productively rebellious questioning; 
and discourse of the analyst, hystericizing, facilitating critique. 
The so-called discourse of the capitalist that Lacan briefly pro-
poses is a twist on the discourse of the master in conditions of 
commodity production and, I would say, of its mutation into the 
society of the spectacle.11 Here in this discourse, the barred sub-
ject is in the position of the agent, as if we are in the discourse 
of the hysteric, but it faces knowledge, the battery of signifiers as 
other. Underneath the barred subject in the position of truth is 
S1, master signifier, facing the objet petit a, product.12 The master 
signifier is where it would be in the discourse of the university, 
but the endpoint of this is still a commodity, as it would be in 
the discourse of the master. So, the discourse of the capitalist is 
a diagnostic tool complicit in power.
We could relabel this fifth discourse “the discourse of psy-
choanalysis,” as Lacan himself implies it is. This is not the dis-
course of the analyst; no element is in the same position that 
we find in this mutation of discourse and the discourse of the 
analyst, but there is some significant mapping of elements with 
positions in the other three discourses, especially, of course, 
with the foundational discourse of the master. Here it is as if the 
agent, hysterical barred subject, is rebellious, questioning, but 
this agent attacks not the master but knowledge as such, rails 
against all knowledge, treating it as fake news. This agent revels 
in their division, aware of the existence of something of the un-
conscious in them, loving it; they are psychoanalytic subjects, 
10 See Jacques Lacan, The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan, Book XVII, trans. Russell Grigg (New York: Norton, 2007).
11 See Julie Evans, “On Psychoanalytic Discourse  — The Capitalist’s Discourse 
(Milan, Italy): 12th May 1972: Jacques Lacan,” Lacanian Works, May 12, 
1972, http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=334.
12 For more, see Stijn Vanheule, “Capitalist Discourse, Subjectivity and 




ripe for analysis, up for it. It is as if the truth of this subject will 
be found in the little significant scraps of master signifier that 
anchor it, signifying substance that seems to explain but actually 
explains nothing. This is how memes function in the imaginary 
production and reproduction of politics. This kind of truth in-
cludes those signifiers that are cobbled together from our own 
psychoanalytic knowledge, rather like the way they function in 
the discourse of the university, chatter about the “ego” and the 
“unconscious” and the rest of the paraphernalia. Two key ele-
ments of the discourse of the master are still in place; knowledge 
as a fragmented constellation of memes mined for meaning, 
for signs of conspiracy or, at least, something that serves well 
enough as explanation, including psychoanalytic explanation; 
and there is the product, objet petit a, something lost, something 
that escapes, something that drives us on to make more of it. We 
know well enough the paranoiac incomplete nature of the psy-
choanalysis that lures us in and keeps us going; here it is again.13 
We can draw on the discourse of psychoanalysis to make sense 
of Trump, and, more importantly, how he is represented.
This discourse is one manifestation of an “age of interpre-
tation” that now circumscribes and feeds psychoanalysis. Re-
member that Freud did not discover the unconscious, Lacan 
insists on this; rather he invented it, and that invention which is 
coterminous with burgeoning capitalism in Europe functions.14 
It functions not only in the clinic, but in society. When it flour-
ishes, its prevalence as an interpretative frame poses questions 
for psychoanalytic practice. Psychoanalytic subjects love psy-
choanalysis, love psychoanalytic discourse, they want more of 
it, want to speak it in the clinic and want to hear it interpreted, 
want it fed. The questions they pose in the clinic demand cer-
tain kinds of answers, psychoanalytic answers. In what Jacques-
Alain Miller calls the age of interpretation there is a real danger 
13 See Ian Parker, Psychoanalytic Mythologies (London: Anthem Books, 
2009).
14 See Ian Parker, Lacanian Psychoanalysis: Revolutions in Subjectivity 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2011).
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that the analyst buys into this, feeds the unconscious.15 The ap-
propriate analytic response to this demand is not to “interpret” 
but to “cut” the discourse, to disrupt it by a particular kind of 
interpretation, intervention which includes cutting the session. 
This is also why psychoanalysis should not be merely “applied,” 
for it will merely feed what it is being applied to. These condi-
tions of discourse call for different kinds of interpretative strate-
gies.
There are implications of this for what we think is psycho-
analytic critique of meme-politics. Mere description won’t cut 
it. Perhaps it calls for what Robert Samuels describes as an ethic 
of neutrality combined with an ethic of free association; that is, 
neutrality of the analyst which does not rest on empathic en-
gagement, and free association which does not feed the fantasy 
that something must be censored in order for correct speech to 
emerge. I’m not sure this will work. Perhaps it requires perform-
ative description in which there is some kind of over-identifica-
tion with the discourse and unravelling of its internal contradic-
tions; that is, deliberate use of the terms used, memes turned 
against memes. In which case we risk falling into the trap that 
Angela Nagle describes, one in which we replicate the condi-
tions in which the alt-right emerged triumphant. Perhaps what 
we need is direct critique grounded in other forms of discourse, 
not only the discourse of the analyst which might work in the 
clinic but merely hystericizes, usually unproductively hysteri-
cizes its audience when it is “applied” outside the clinic. Other 
forms of discourse, from situationist critique and feminism and 
Marxism are necessary to break from the discourse that keeps 
all this going. Lacanian theory can connect with those other 
kinds of discourse as I have tried to show. This kind of anti-
Trump in the media critique needs also be anti-psychoanalytic.
So, how do we speak as psychoanalysts about Trump? We can 
attend to the way that psychoanalytic discourse is mobilized in 
the public realm, but we need to take care not to simply feed that 
15 See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Interpretation in Reverse,” Psychoanalytical 
Notebooks of the London Circle 2 (1999): 9–18.
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discourse. We should not pretend that we can speak as psycho-
analysts. In fact, to speak as a psychoanalyst in the clinic is itself 
a performative impossibility. Lacan points out that what we say 
in the clinic may sometimes position us as psychoanalyst for the 
analysand, position us as subject supposed to know, but there 
is no guarantee that we are speaking there to them as a psycho-
analyst. To pretend to speak from the identity of psychoanalyst 
is to speak as if we are a subject who does know. And so, then, to 
speak as if we are a psychoanalyst with a privileged position to 
interpret political phenomena in the public realm is to perform 
a double betrayal of psychoanalysis itself. Words are weapons, 
Trump knows that. Psychoanalysis is a double-edged weapon, 
and so we need to take care over how to use it to speak about 
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n September 2016, the Atlantic published an interview with 
Matt Furie. A 30-something stoner with an air of confused 
pathos, Furie’s only claim to fame is bringing Pepe the Frog 
into the world. Pepe is a ubiquitous motif in what I’m going 
to begrudgingly call “meme culture.” He has had probably the 
most controversial history of any viral symbol in the last five 
years. Starting life as a one of four zoomorphic characters in 
a puerile comic strip, he has since become the unofficial aegis 
of the alt-right. Things reached fever pitch in late 2016 when 
the Anti-Defamation League labeled him a hate symbol. Furie’s 
desperate attempt to recapture the original “meaning” of Pepe 
prompted his intervention into the politics of popular culture. 
His sprawling justification for creating the fascist frog reads in 
the register of the frenetic: 
Pepe is kind of like, in the comic version of him, in my ver-
sion of him, he’s just kind of an everyman frog […]. It just 




just hanging out, playing pranks on each other, eating pizza, 
partying, that kind of thing. A lot of bodily humor.1
The spectacle that this paper is interested in is not the politi-
cal transformation of Pepe from bodily humor to white su-
premacy. Instead, it is Furie’s scrambling to regain control over 
a rogue signifier that puts the drama of meme production and 
consumption into relief. The experience of losing control over 
a symbol reaches its peak in a futile assertion of the “owner’s” 
creative authority. Indeed, in May 2017, Furie literally killed off 
Pepe in a single-panel version of a comic nobody read in the 
first place.2 It is with the weird proportions of such a Trauer-
spiel in mind that this essay seeks to analyze quite what is at 
stake with the language of memes. The competition for control 
over the identity of Pepe heralds something interesting about 
the simulative capacity of Internet symbols. The ease with which 
an act of reposting or reinterpretation is able to, in the words 
of Alain Badiou, “inaugurate its own primitive event” speaks to 
a primary emptiness at the heart of this kind of communica-
tion.3 To understand what makes the death of Pepe necessary 
demands a return to the philosophical territory of irony, which 
in turns means exhuming Søren Kierkegaard and G.W.F. He-
gel to ask why conventional theories of language fail to account 
for it. With the indeterminacies of irony in mind, the essay asks 
whether the simulative character of memes can have a political 
dimension, and what this might mean for those on either side 
of the production and consumption relationship. To this end, 
it addresses the most acute species of divergence in the conflict 
1 Adam Serwer, “It’s Not Easy Being Meme: How Artist Matt Furie Feels 
About His Creation, Pepe the Frog, Becoming a Favoured Symbol of 
White Nationalists and Trump Supporters,” The Atlantic, September 13, 
2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/its-not-easy-
being-green/499892.
2 James Vincent, “Pepe the Frog is Officially Dead,” The Verge, May 8, 2017, 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/8/15577340/pepe-the-frog-is-dead-matt-
furie.
3 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: 
Continuum Press, 2005), 346.
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between “normies” and esoteric meme pages. The tension be-
tween these two extreme poles of language will be shown, in 
the end, not to contradict one another, but to comprise a sin-
gle dialectical unity. In liberating themselves from the claim of 
normativity, esoteric meme-creators end up forming the basis 
of the mainstream view’s legitimacy. A proper online political 
praxis must be built with this dependency firmly in mind. 
Kierkegaard and the Ironic Locution
The emptiness of the meme as a form of expression is something 
underwritten by its proximity to irony. That it is able to float be-
tween absolutely divergent interpretations has little to do with 
the legitimacy of the competing narratives. It has more to do 
with the ironic way in which the articulation is framed in the 
first place. Irony is a rare category that is simultaneously meta-
physical and linguistic. Kierkegaard developed a theory of this 
indistinction during his early engagement with Hegel’s work. In 
the Philosophy of History, Hegel defends the idea that one must 
actively seek the rational aspect for the world to appear ration-
ally. For Kierkegaard, a decision to see the world rationally is 
only possible when one is committed to the metaphysical no-
tion that the essence of an object dissimulates or deceives in 
the manner of its appearance. Metaphysical irony holds of the 
world that “the phenomenon differs from the essence.”4 Where 
a subject of truth acknowledges this, they are expected to ne-
gate the phenomenon in order to reach the essence. The split 
between appearance and essence is repeated at the level of ar-
ticulation in the idea that “when I am speaking, the thought, 
the meaning, is the essence, and the word is the phenomenon.”5 
Where this awareness is self-consciously deployed as a tool of 
communication, the irony shifts from metaphysical to rhetori-
cal. The ironist brings out the essence by actively differentiat-
4 Søren Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. 




ing their intention from their articulation. While base untruth 
misleads in order to conceal the truth, irony actively alludes to 
a meaning other than the one it announces. The act of represen-
tation is made to intentionally obfuscate about its content. The 
dialectic of irony produces the image of the locution’s meaning 
without announcing it. 
The reason for this obfuscation, according to Kierkegaard, 
is to exercise the “infinite absolute negativity” of subjectivity 
over and against the contradictions of the objective world.6 In 
his own work, he drew these edifying moments of negativity 
from the paradoxical moments at which reality and thought 
necessarily diverged. Such moments of “negative determina-
tion,” in the phraseology of Geoffrey Hlibchuk, alienate and lib-
erate the subject from their material background.7 This strategy 
seeks to preserve the determinate individual subject against the 
processual abstraction of Hegel’s substance-subject of history. 
Kierkegaard’s attempts to “arrest” the progress of the Hegelian 
system sought to trip up the putative universal subject of history 
and science on a linguistic stumbling block.8 Irony, as the sepa-
ration of signifier and signified, was the most immediate means 
for preserving a sense of personal subjectivity against the inert, 
plodding march of historical substance.
The reasons for exercising one’s infinite negativity depend 
heavily on the subject. Irony presupposes a certain social con-
text: one populated by canny equals and uneducated inferiors. 
Some use irony as a tool that “mystifies the world” and guar-
antees their intellectual superiority. For others, irony is used to 
negate the word in order to bring out a hidden thought in their 
interlocutor. In both operations, however, there is a problem of 
authenticity and legitimacy. Where the ironic subject intervenes 
6 Ibid., 254.
7 Geoffrey Hlibchuk, The Poetics of Exception: Contemporary North 
American Poetry and the Ghosts of Relation, PhD Thesis, State University 
of New York, 2008, 46.
8 See Henry Sussman, The Hegelian Aftermath: Readings in Hegel, Kierke-




in language in order to undermine it, it opens a contradictory 
torsion. For Kierkegaard, an ironic locution must reproduce the 
conditions of legitimacy while negating them in relation to its 
own content. Kierkegaard took umbrage with Hegel’s attempt to 
reconcile this problem by withdrawing all irony from the pro-
cess of knowledge formation. For the purposes of philosophical 
reason, Hegel makes a distinction between the universal, objec-
tive content of history and the realm of “mere phenomena.” This 
realm constitutes “the sphere of particular purposes, in effecting 
which individuals exert themselves on behalf of their individu-
ality, give it full play and objective realization.”9 This sphere, in 
which irony itself must move, cannot inoculate itself against the 
violent structuration of events post factum. Gradually, as his-
tory is objectivized, all of the particularity of an ironic subject’s 
intentions disappears. Hegel’s historian determines the status 
of irony: its historical value has no relation to the intention it 
supposedly expressed.10 Only the universal element is taken up 
by philosophy. For an author like Kierkegaard, this is especially 
troubling. The ironic writer is perennially at the behest of the 
reader and their context: the creator’s intentions disappear nec-
essarily in the audience’s construction of the content. 
The generation and interpretation of memes plays out pre-
cisely this drama of ironic dissimulation and posterior structur-
ation. By entering into the universal realm of communication 
(language), the meme finds itself at the behest of its audience 
and their interpretation. But the ironic withholding of some-
thing from the meme’s act of communication creates a kind of 
non-relation between the process of production and of con-
sumption. It is into this divide that hops Pepe the Frog and his 
burning question about authority of a meme’s content.
9 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover 
Publications, 2004), 26.
10 Ibid., 28; Sussman, The Hegelian Aftermath, 97.
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Power From Below Truth: The Double Object of Irony 
Irony supposedly liberates the communicative act from its tra-
ditional role of conveying information. By effecting the split 
between object and subject at the level of intention, it manipu-
lates the phenomenal to create the negative perception of some 
hidden essence. This operates through a specific kind of nega-
tive signification. Where the ironist doesn’t consider themself 
beholden to linguistic responsibility, they are able to freely force 
symbol and meaning together. It is then the task of the audience 
to unpick it. The same drama is operating in the production and 
consumption of memes. As Furie says of Pepe in another video, 
“he’s kind of a blank slate. He means a lot of things to a lot of dif-
ferent people.”11 This split between author and audience is as old 
as writing. The relationship between “force” (the subjective play 
of the writing subject) and “signification” (the responsibility of 
the communicative act) was at the center of Jacques Derrida’s 
drama of writing. Like Kierkegaard’s scepticism toward Hegel’s 
historicizing impulse, Derrida believed that posterior significa-
tion denied the contingency of the interchange between symbol 
and meaning by “divesting” the entire literary field of its force.12 
Here he introduces a split between the intentionality of a work’s 
author and the formality of the work’s consumer. Like the split 
between Kierkegaard’s subject and the retrospective settling of 
its status by Hegel’s subject of history, the reader is always en-
gaged in ossifying and structuring the author. As Derrida says: 
“the force of the work, the force of genius, the force, too, of that 
which engenders in general is precisely that which resists geo-
metrical metaphorization and is the proper object of literary 
criticism.”13 Where the critic forgets this playful force, they fall 
back into “essentialism” or “teleological structuralism.”14 The 
11 See Super Deluxe, “Pepe the Frog: From Innocent Meme to Hate Symbol,” 
Facebook, 2017, https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=353532971657926.






creator of memes, in their foray into language, subverts the rela-
tion by creating the illusion of essence. By actively dissimulating 
the phenomenon, the ironist second-guesses their audience by 
creating the sense that what has been withdrawn from the image 
is the truth.
This holds so long as the audience doesn’t know what the 
ironist is doing. But the audience’s comprehension of the force 
changes the terms of engagement. Where irony is directed at 
those who are its unknowing target, the ironist merely elevates 
their subjective position by mystifying the world.15 Where the 
reader acknowledges the ironic negation in the act of articu-
lation, however, a new dialectic emerges. This compact union 
between ironists “seeks” in the words of Kierkegaard “to form 
a society.”16 But its inability to shoulder any kind of linguistic 
responsibility leads to abandoning community and confining 
itself to “conventicles.”17 With this, one enters the territory of 
“esoteric” meme pages; online societies based around a very re-
condite and narrow common point of interest. Like any other 
society of ironists, the dialectic between the esoteric meme crea-
tor and consumer is an attempt to be initiated into the inner 
sanctum of the conventicle. This desire for initiation takes the 
form of a struggle to know something about the other. Because 
they understand that there is no real essence to the communica-
tive act, the consumer does not seek hysterically to “know” and 
embody the creator’s intention. The “layers” (and here there is 
a Milnerian equivocality between the imagistic layering of the 
meme on media like Photoshop and the layers of meaning it 
belies) of a meme’s irony are not unravelled in search of the “re-
ality” of the meme’s message, but the most “authentic” layer: the 
ironic limit. The only qualitative criterion of a meme is just how 
ironic the producer was being. Like Derrida’s ideal literary criti-
cism, the dialectical negation of the meme’s appearance seeks 
to reveal the force or “play” of the author by determining what 





such an author is capable of. Truth as such is disposed of in 
favor of simply knowing the password to the ironic community 
through overcoming the authorial limits. What a meme audi-
ence goes in neurotic search of is power over the author.
This search for the author in place of truth, long a plague of 
criticism, has gradually elided the sense of difference between 
what Jean Baudrillard would call “real” and “simulation.”18 
Where irony begins with the necessity of the distinction be-
tween phenomenon and essence, it is gradually replaced with 
the pervading sense that the real is a creation of the simulation. 
The withdrawal from a need for truth leads the critic to a the-
sis of “hyperreality,” where the goal of criticism and consump-
tion is to divine the limitations of production rather than its 
convergence with historical actuality.19 The hyperreality of eso-
teric meme production creates a critical culture of materialism, 
where the object is not material reality as the factical precondi-
tion of consciousness, but a mere attention to the materials with 
which consciousness is working. The search is for the template 
from which the meme was made, but also the epistemic condi-
tions that allowed for its creation (the book read, the video seen, 
etc.). In the words of a popular meme phrase in a particular 
philosophy community (Dialectical Dialecticzposting for Big 
Others and Negated Absolutes), “read x book, it’s only y pages 
or so.” The empirical center of the meme’s “meaning” has little 
importance. Kierkegaard intuited this limitation on the com-
munication of truth, and influenced his defining decision to 
become a fictionalist. According to Karl Jaspers, Kierkegaard’s 
commitment to the infinite interpretation of life’s content came 
to replace any desire for objectivity. In Jaspers’s view, “Kierkeg-
aard gave his own writings no other meaning than that they 
should read again the original text of individual, human exis-
18 Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations,” trans. Paul Foss, Paul 
Patton, and Philip Beitchman, in Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster 




tential relations.”20 The perpetual chain of interpretation is not 
broken by the emergence of any real. The bilateral consent to 
simulation creates the sense of a myth of a real, but understands 
it exactly as a myth. All that is left is a struggle for the most 
virtuosic recalibration of form, the most outrageous chain of as-
sociation.
Supplementarity: The Politics of Production and Critique
Such a model of de-substantialized communication works 
where there is no need to justify one’s claims. The problem 
emerges when this conventicle of irony edges onto politics. By 
its definition, the relationship of memes to reality prevents them 
from establishing any given position as authoritative. At the ba-
sis of the articulation is an acceptance of the absoluteness of 
interpretation. In literature, “play” allows for a continual chain 
of substitution that emanates from a mythical, unsubstitutable 
center. As Derrida says in “Structure, Sign and Play in the Hu-
man Sciences,” “one cannot determine the centre and exhaust 
totalization because the sign which replaces the centre, which 
supplements it, taking the centre’s place in its absence — this 
sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a supplement.”21 Ironic 
meme culture consciously supplements, knowing that there is 
no center that isn’t directly added in the act of interpretation or 
reproduction. 
The consent to supplementarity is why those who stand out-
side the meme page’s discourse (we can call them, along with 
classical Internet culture and with a degree of schadenfreude, 
“normies”) can only ever lead failed crusades to steer memes on 
the right path. For instance, some have called for a new kind of 
solidarity to be built from the pervasive atmosphere of “relat-
ability” in online meme content.22 Here we have a legitimate so-
20 Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz: Five Lectures, trans. William Earle 
(London: Kegan Paul, 1956), 27.
21 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 365.




cial appeal to a new transcendental; a generalized idea of memes 
as the unproblematic union of universal image and universal 
message. 
This might work in the cheerful context of non-esoteric 
meme pages. Indeed, a lot of Internet culture is premised around 
the possibility of sharing content as widely as possible. There is 
an argument here that such pages operate according to a logic 
of “virality” rather than the exclusive inclusivity of meme pro-
duction and reproduction. Indeed, virality is defined by Karine 
Nahon and Jeff Hemsley in their pioneering work Going Viral 
as a kind of “social information flow process.”23 Many Internet 
critics hold obscurantists and esotericists to the standards of vi-
rality, either supposing that they should create the product that 
has the greatest possible dissemination, or that the Internet is a 
marketplace of ideas in which only the most viral can survive. 
This virality would certainly have to take linguistic and moral 
responsibility very seriously in order to succeed in its aims. The 
problem is, however, that esoteric meme pages and vlogs don’t 
care all too much about shareability. Where the acknowledg-
ment of irony occurs on both sides of the divide, the possibility 
of standard communication is doubly impeded. The normie de-
mand fails to take into account this mutual indeterminacy. Like 
Hegel’s universal history, it misses the supplementarity of the 
subjective act of “centering”. The cultivation of ironic dissimu-
lation and deferral on both sides of the meme relation means 
that the kind of universalism aspired to by the Normie critics is 
definitionally impossible. As Kierkegaard says, “there is just as 
little social unity in a coterie of ironists as there is real honesty 
in a band of thieves.”24
23 Nahon and Hemsley define virality as “a social information flow process 
where many people simultaneously forward a specific information item, 
over a short period of time, within their social networks, and where the 
message spreads beyond their own [social] networks to different, often 
distant networks, resulting in a sharp acceleration in the number of people 
who are exposed to the message.” See Karine Nahon and Jeff Hemsley, 
Going Viral (London: Polity Press, 2013), 15–16.
24 Kierkegaard, Concept of Irony, 249.
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The failure to register this flux of supplementarity between 
producer and consumer, or author and audience, is the origin 
of the weird spectacle of Pepe. The terrified scramble that en-
sues when meme culture verges on politics is often produced 
by a misplaced sincerity in its external critics (or, in Furie’s case, 
the very creator of the original image). In February 2017, Wired 
magazine published a write-up by Emma Grey Ellis on the de-
cline and fall of a neo-nazi videogame reviewer, Pewdiepie, a 
Swedish vlogger, who earned the attention of the alt-right when 
he repeatedly invoked Hitler and made holocaust jokes in his 
YouTube videos.25 Because of the ironic detachment of both 
Pewdiepie’s “trolling” and its reception by fascists, Grey Ellis 
granted that it was impossible to know “whether he means what 
he says.” She proceeded to put an imaginary limit on the accept-
able content of memes:
None of this means that anything that offends anyone is off 
limits as a joke. But jokes that goof on racism are different 
than jokes that rely on race — a fine line to be sure.26 
She doesn’t even seem to convince herself. In trying to set the 
limits of irony, Grey Ellis aims at the responsibility that is sup-
posed to attend all political acts of communication. To do so, 
she tacitly commits to an order of language in which thought 
and word constitute a single unit. This ideal register of language, 
not unlike that on Jorge Luis Borges’s Tlön, is a vain kind of 
idealism. It assumes, conservatively, that memes abide the same 
conventional form of communication as regular language. Mak-
ing the word fit the intention is like forcing the reproduction of 
the meme to fit with the original image. It absolutely mistakes 
irony’s false essentialism for the real thing. It is the necessary 
suspicion of this formalism that if one peels back the layers of 
25 Emma Grey-Ellis, “Pewdiepie’s Fall Shows the Limits of ‘LOL JK’,” Wired, 





irony, one will arrive at the “truth.” This takes no account of the 
supplementary structure of ironic relations, nor of the ambigui-
ties of memes’ simulation and dissimulation.
The response by most critics of political memes has the effect 
of feeding the very irony it seeks to undermine. Memes play in 
the virtuosic realm of free association and a deferred kind of 
jouissance. The jouissance does not come from making the best 
fit between word and image, but the most esoteric. The index of 
a successful meme is the elided pleasure of forcing a conceptual 
mismatch and the confusion this would cause to the uninitiated. 
And it is the earnest gravitas of critics like Grey Ellis that auto-
matically aligns them with the latter. The bitter paradox is that 
their conventionalism creates the necessary social background 
for the development of irony’s “conventicle.” The more normies 
make noise about the problematic nature of memes, the further 
the meme producers and consumers retreat into the subjectiv-
ism of irony. 
Discourse and Tangent
This presses against the contours of a dialectic that exists be-
tween the forces of irony and of normality. The specification of 
the Normie as the object of the meme’s derision does more than 
simply distinguish the friend from the enemy. The acceptance 
of simulation at the expense of the real excuses the meme from 
academic conventions. The meme page ceases to function as the 
locus of what Jacques Lacan calls the university discourse. No 
longer is the “institution” (here the meme page) trying to doc-
tor and include its excess to strengthen itself.27 The virtuosic ac-
cumulation of knowledge in the place of truth aligns the ironic 
page instead with a desire to differentiate itself as the excess. It 
seeks to become the exception to the rule of normality by ban-
ishing the kinds of codification associated with “normality.” 




It would seem, then, that in its rejection of conventional epis-
temic discourse a meme page represents a Foucauldian chal-
lenge to the disciplinarian regimes of measurement and power. 
But the reality is that the meme page structures itself around 
an invisible center of both power and desire. This is because it 
comprises an intentional conventicle in the form of a self-ap-
pointed alternative “discourse.” Instead of objectivity, esoteric 
meme pages are organized around the forbidding of the Other’s 
pleasure, and thus must found themselves on a primary act of 
excision or otherising. These esoteric pages are discourses, in 
Michel Foucault’s words,
which are arbitrary to start with or which at least are orga-
nized around historical contingencies; which are not only 
modifiable but in perpetual displacement; which are sup-
ported by a whole system of institutions which impose them 
and renew them; and which act in a constraining and some-
times violent way.28
It is this act of constraining and demarcation that does not sim-
ply identify the Other, but makes their banishment the center 
of its activities. In inaugurating a discourse, the meme group 
specifies not “what it is” but “who it isn’t.” Like any discourse 
which separates itself out from its alternative, “the prohibitions 
that surround it very soon reveal its link with desire and with 
power.”29
With this understanding, the analysis of the dialectic be-
tween normie and esoteric memeist can be brought into its 
proper dimension. Structurally, the center of a meme is sup-
plementary; it is added in. But this act of supplementation is 
governed by a dialectic of desire which edges onto a political 
problem of power. The desire that belies the fundamental act of 
28 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” trans. Ian McLeod, in Untying 
the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, ed. Robert Young (Boston: Routledge 




prohibition is not merely for pleasure in the displeasure of the 
excluded. This pleasure is the symptom, rather than the cause, 
of the constraining act. In fact, the desire governing this exci-
sion is (in Foucault’s own words) “discourse itself.”30 The forms 
of knowledge and power which define the ironic negation are, 
as has been argued, virtuosic and ornamental. The baroque ele-
ment of the meme page’s esoteric logic is to collect signifiers that 
mark it off from its “uninitiated” other in order to preserve this 
very logic. It is thus a self-moving force which survives in relish-
ing its own independence.
In its categorical demands for “imposition and renewal”, the 
meme community is beholden to the same strictures as any 
other discursive institution. When Badiou wonders at what it 
is precisely that constitutes a philosophical institution, he ar-
rives at three component features. The first is the importance of 
an address, through which a subject is apparently interpellated 
from the position of the void. In this case, the absolute invisibi-
lizing or ironic deferral of the memeist’s identity is paramount 
to its success as an anonymous address to the multiple recipi-
ents. Pepe, in this context, issues forth like some Aphrodite from 
the froth; there can be no suture of primary meaning to the ini-
tial appearance of the image. The primal address can only be 
sustained, in Badiou’s understanding, by the second feature of 
an institution: transmission. Transmission is the appointing of 
a discipline; of a set of recipients upon whom falls the “intermi-
nable imperative of continuing” and expanding the remit of the 
address.31 In this sense, all meme consumption is reproduction; 
the endless metonymy of signifiers that operates through the 
aggregation of new memes or the “sharing” of old ones. Impor-
tantly, for Badiou transmission takes place among disciples and 
apostles. It is never the task of a public, whose sanctioning of the 
discourse would transform the address into something tangible 
30 Ibid., 54.
31 Alain Badiou, “What Is a Philosophical Institution?,” trans. A.J. Bartlett, 
in The Praxis of Alain Badiou, eds. Paul Ashton, A.J. Bartlett, and Justin 
Clemens (Melbourne: re.press, 2006), 14.
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and usable rather than submitting to the imperative of renew-
ing and continuing its void articulation. Finally, the process of 
inscription ensures that the address is made to subsist through 
a lasting mark. In this case, the meme page forms a physical 
archive whose acts of transmission become archeological testa-
ments to the endurance of the address.
What makes the meme page different to other discursive in-
stitutions is the militancy with which it inures its acts of trans-
mission against the public. There is a paradox at the heart of 
this procedure. As an institution, its acts of transmission treat 
the initial address as a certain species of speech ex nihilo. It 
supposedly confines meaning and truth to the discourse itself 
while shutting out the outside. Its independence, however, is il-
lusory. By subverting the expectations of the “uninitiated,” the 
meme artists reiterate that it is their practice that is subversive 
or aberrant, assenting to the Normie’s claim on the register of 
truth. The meme maker tacitly acknowledges the reality of the 
claim of what lies outside their discourse. The attempt to make 
themselves into a challenge to normality is a simple admission 
that the center of their task is to be in the appropriate relation 
to the normal. The meme community utters a plaintive “che 
vuoi!” to the normies because the normies refuse to recognize 
the legitimacy of their desire; the prolongation of the excluded 
discourse. The esoteric ironist seems to have ceased the search 
for any tangible center of their own. What forms the real center 
of their task is the desire of the Other; the reality of the normie 
as the discourse of Truth. In assuming the prestige of the ironic 
discourse, the meme community tries to transform themselves 
into the object of normie desire. They are in neurotic relation 
to each other, maintaining with militant sedulousness the Law 
they have elected. But in relation to the outside world they re-
main hopelessly hysterical, seeking to be the exception that nor-
mie neurosis longs for.
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Turning the Relation Outside-In: The Inequilibrium of 
Memeists and Their Normies
Clearly, a dialectical inversion of the relationship between eso-
teric meme pages and the social reality of normies reveals two 
very different positions. The attempt to impose the demands of 
reason onto the meme community is generally met with the re-
inforcement of irony. But this coquetry belies the demand of 
the meme maker to be transformed into the object of desire. 
The two are locked in interdeterminate dependency. The rela-
tionship, however, is by no means equal. In wanting to trans-
form themselves into the desired object, the meme conventicle 
affirms only a parasitic relationship to its excised other. In this 
way, it assents to its status as the leftover excess of the university 
discourse. Such a desire is not unconventional, nor particularly 
unreasonable. Indeed, the imperative to become the University’s 
other is demanded by the Discourse of the University itself. As 
Žižek says, “names like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or Benjamin, 
all three great antiuniversitarians whose presence in the acad-
emy is today all-pervasive—demonstrate that the ‘excluded’ or 
‘damned’ authors are the IDEAL feeding stuff for the academic 
machine.”32 The register of truth desires its exceptions. 
So what is the balance between the discourse of truth and 
normality (the normies) and its happily excluded others (the 
memeists)? Luckily, one of the very “antiuniversitarians” named 
by Žižek wrote about this exact issue. It is with some nostalgia, 
then, that we can now return to Kierkegaard. In Repetition, a 
book that came shortly after his exposition on irony, Kierkeg-
aard put the discourse of the exception and universality into 
dramatic relief. In the guise of Constantius Constantine (an 
ironist but not a mystifier; rather an unlikely champion of the 
universal), he staged what he called “the dialectic by which the 
32 Žižek says of Lacan’s discourses: “that the university goes to great lengths 
to produce such exceptions can be seen from the consistent attacks it has 
made on its employees and students in the name of ‘business investment 




exception emerges from the general.”33 This process mirrors ex-
actly the Foucauldian inauguration of a discourse, because it be-
gins in its own extrication from the other. The problem for the 
ironic exception is that it suffers greatly in its act of differentia-
tion. And it suffers precisely so the “universal,” the regular order 
of truth, can secure itself:
The universal delights in the exception to the same extent 
that heaven delights in the reformed sinner — more than in 
ninety-nine righteous souls. On the other side is the resis-
tance and defiance of the exception, its weakness and infir-
mity.34
Heaven’s delight in the reformed sinner is its delight in the 
outside demonstrating that it is really an inside. The universal 
delights in the exception in the same way. Through its act of 
“repentance,” the exception recognizes that it is founded in the 
regime of normality for which it longs. In this sense it is “rec-
onciled to the universal.”35 Despite this, the universal remains, at 
all costs, “polemically opposed” to the exception.36 It comfort-
ably excises the exception because it knows that it constitutes 
the origin of the exception’s desire. Kierkegaard, Benjamin, and 
Nietzsche may all have abandoned the university discourse, but 
they still wrote for it! Their action, their gesture (and György 
Lukács took this up against his beloved Kierkegaard) was never 
an abandonment. It was a sycophantic reassurance to the world 
of normality that it could produce an alien discourse while still 
controlling it.
The problem is the same for the memeist. They need the ap-
probation of the normies, but the normies just need them to ex-
ist. As Giorgio Agamben says, the system proves its universality 
through its specification of the outside as the inside: “confronted 
33 Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M.G. Piety 






with an excess, the system interiorizes what exceeds it through 
an interdiction and in this way ‘designates itself as exterior to 
itself.’”37 The dimensions of this act of inclusion, while purely 
social, delineate the process whereby irony feeds the discourse 
of normality. When it is transferred to the political realm, how-
ever, the situation is “even more complex.”38 The generality, the 
sphere of normies, if you will, seem to demand that the meme 
creator hold themselves to the same conventional definition of 
language that they abide. The very performance of a normal 
register of language, however, disguises its own violent center 
in an act of exclusion that is simultaneously inclusion. Rather, 
the normie critic sustains the hegemonic definition of conven-
tional language by an act of denomination. This act doesn’t seek 
to generalize the conditions of responsibility and hold the other 
to its own prescriptions. Instead, it seeks to create the possibility 
of its own transgression, thus commanding not only the spaces 
of its inclusion but the very possibility of its breach:
Here what is outside is included, not simply by means of an 
interdiction or an internment, but rather by means of the 
suspension of the juridical order’s validity, by letting the ju-
ridical order, that is, withdraw from the exception and aban-
don it. The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; 
rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception 
and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first con-
stitutes itself as a rule.39
The Grey-Ellises of the world, in their demand that memes be 
held to the standards of political language, are not showing con-
cern for the excised meme conventicle.40 They are validating the 
mainstream that violently demands its own excess and excep-
tions. In this sense, they are “withdrawing from it and abandon-
37 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 18.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Grey-Ellis, “Pewdiepie’s Fall.”
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ing it” simply by showing that it exists internally to the normie’s 
moral world. They have to recognize the validity of the meme 
articulation in order to legitimately overcome it. So Grey-Ellis 
herself reminds us that under the beneficence of the conven-
tional, “none of this means that anything that offends anyone 
is off limits as a joke.” The category of the joke is the generality 
under which the meme is effectively subsumed by the logic of 
the normie’s sovereignty. Thus fascist in-jokes like Pepe become 
self-identified as exceptional but externally defined as “prob-
lematic.” This fingerpoint, this denomination, marks out the 
excess in exactly the way that the discourse of truth demands 
it. In the unthreatening Internet existence of the alt-right, civil 
society proves itself capable of cultivating its other without rec-
ompense. It thus proves itself as sovereign. 
Conclusion
The tricky territory of memes verges onto problems of textual-
ity, sociality, and authority. Firstly, the facticity of meme groups 
makes them, at all times, devoid of tangible social or moral con-
tent. They are definitionally impervious to the demands of civil 
society. This is partly because of the supplementarity of their 
ironic process. Matt Furie makes the mistake of believing that 
changing the original meaning of the symbol, or silencing it, will 
put an end to the chain of substitution that he himself inaugu-
rated. What he doesn’t realize is that it is the later commitment 
to Pepe that inaugurated Pepe himself. The center has always 
been added in as a supplement. As Badiou says, a representa-
tive fidelity (the way a thing is later made sense of) is “always in 
non-existent excess over its being”.41 There is no need for the alt-
right to justify their use of Pepe in line with the intentions of its 
creator. Furie, like all authors, is effectively dead. It is the chain 
of Pepe’s substitution that turned him into a symbolic center, 
and no amount of meddling on the part of the author can rend 
apart what has already been cleaved together. This is why the 
41 Badiou, Being and Event, 235.
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campaign to #savepepe and its attendant YouTube video makes 
such great viewing. Watching a collapsed stoner evoking vague 
universal humanisms in defense of his nazi frog creates the very 
source material for which a meme society hungers. 
This longing for content, however, belies a contradiction at 
the heart of meme societies. The ironic conventicle, confined as 
it is to a shared conspiracy, requires its own negation to func-
tion. A meme page, like any coterie of ironists, makes of itself 
an exception. As Kierkegaard’s Constantius Constantine tells us, 
however, this exception, “despite its struggle with the universal, 
is an offshoot [rodskud] of it.”42 Notwithstanding its best efforts, 
the meme group is beholden to its tangential status in relation 
to the generality of normie culture. By aggressively excising 
convention, they turn this dismissal of society into their raison 
d’être. Without a target (in this case the ubiquitous normie) the 
limits and bonds of the group become altogether more elastic. 
Here, the crucifixion of the Big Other is the condition of its liv-
ing on as spirit. In the place of a concrete meaning, the meme 
takes its center of jouissance from the suffering of the other. In 
doing so, it enters into a master/slave dialectic with the world 
outside its discourse: a dependence from which it can’t be lib-
erated. Although it seems as if the meme page has differenti-
ated itself, it has really turned the outside world into its abso-
lute center. Without normies, the dialectic of the esoteric meme 
page is impossible. 
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Pepe Goes to China, or, the 
Post-Global Circulation of 
Memes
Gabriele de Seta
Internet Memes in Platform Times1
T
he thick layering of interpretive frames and indexical el-
ements accruing around the “Pepe the Frog” character 
between 2015 and 2018 is perhaps the process that most 
poignantly captures the construction of digital media cultures 
in platform times. The anthropomorphic frog originally ap-
peared as a protagonist of Matt Furie’s indie comic series Boy’s 
Club (2006). By 2010, the character’s stylized expression had 
already become one of the most distinctive examples of Amer-
ican digital folklore: one specific comic panel (in which Pepe 
pronounces the by now iconic sentence “feels good man” after 
peeing) started circulating in relatively unknown bodybuilding 
forums; when the image was picked up by users of larger dis-
1 This essay is partly based on a blog post published by the author on the 
Cyborgology website. See Gabriele de Seta, “The Social Life of Sad Frogs, 






cussion boards like Something Awful, 4chan, and Reddit, it was 
quickly spun into an endless series of self-referential variations.2
The fortuitous and unpredictable popularity of Pepe —
cropped out from Furie’s comic pages, inventively augmented 
through image editing software and widely copy-pasted across 
digital media platforms — cemented it as one of the most repre-
sentative examples of an “Internet meme.” The “Pepe the Frog” 
meme has been repeatedly invoked as a textbook case study 
of how, after the global popularization of Internet access and 
the imbrication of social media platforms in everyday life, the 
creative practices of digital media users can propel anyone or 
anything up the plateau of a momentary and self-fulfilling rel-
evance.3 Matt Furie himself, reflecting on the unexpected online 
fame achieved by one of his artistic creations, describes the cul-
tural dynamics exemplified in the circulation of Pepe in terms of 
a “post-capitalist” vernacular creativity: “it’s like a decentralized 
folk art, with people taking it, doing their own thing with it, and 
then capitalizing on it using bumper stickers or t-shirts.”4
Despite the global reach of its iconicity, the history of 
Pepe — from its origins in independent comics to its moment 
of mainstream limelight on the social media accounts of celeb-
rities like Nicky Minaj or Katy Perry — has for the most part 
been narrated as a thoroughly American story. Throughout the 
2016 US Presidential election year, the archetypal meme frog has 
experienced a further bout of popularity after being adopted as 
a humor device by Donald Trump supporters, identified by the 
Hillary Clinton campaign as white supremacist iconography, 
and condemned by the Anti-Defamation League as an “anti-
2 Know Your Meme, s.v. “Pepe the Frog,” http://knowyourmeme.com/
memes/pepe-the-frog.
3 Ryan M. Milner, “This Memetic Moment: Ridiculously Photogenic Guy 
and the Perils of Internet Fame,” Los Angeles Review of Books, October 10, 
2016, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/memetic-moment-ridiculously-
photogenic-guy-perils-internet-fame/.
4 Sean T. Collins, “The Creator of Pepe the Frog Talks About Making 
Comics in the Post-Meme World,” Vice, July 28, 2015, https://www.vice.
com/en_us/article/avy3aj/feels-good-man-728.
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semitic symbol” — all the while being continually repurposed 
as the protagonist of increasingly complex and self-referential 
genres of Internet memes including “Rare Pepes,” “Cult of Kek,” 
and “Beta Uprising.”5 Repeatedly interviewed about the political 
reappropriations that turned his iconic character into a “cultur-
ally thick object,” Matt Furie has minimized this phenomenon 
as “just a product of the internet.”6 And yet, years before its 
spells of mainstream popularity and its contested political in-
terpretations, Pepe had already found its way to Chinese social 
media platforms with surprising outcomes (fig. 1).
5 See Marley-Vincent Lindsey, “Parting Ways with Pepe? Anti-semitism 
and the Medium of Memes,” The Society Pages, October 8, 2016, https://
thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2016/10/08/parting-ways-with-pepe-
anti-semitism-and-the-medium-of-memes/.
6 See Adam Serwer, “It’s Not Easy Being Meme,” The Atlantic, September 13, 
2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/its-not-easy-
being-green/499892/.




Pepe Goes to China
I encountered my first Chinese Pepe in early 2014. I had just 
begun doing fieldwork in China for my doctoral research pro-
ject, and a friend from Shanghai sent me a QQ message that 
contained the instantly recognizable image of a frog with teary 
eyes and pouty lips.7 I asked him if he knew what the frog was, 
and where the image came from; he replied that it was called 
shangxin qingwa, “sad frog,” but he had no idea about its origins. 
“It’s just funny. It’s really popular on the Baidu Tieba forums 
right now, that’s where I got it. There’s many versions of it,” he 
explained over the chat interface. During the following months, 
more and more long-time friends, new acquaintances, and in-
terviewees brought the shangxin qingwa into our online inter-
actions, describing the stylized frog as a “weird” and “funny” 
character whose “existential sadness is easy to empathize with.”
Multiple versions of the shangxin qingwa, augmented with 
Mandarin captions and at times localized through visual ele-
ments indexing it to local specificities, accumulate over the 
years in my archive of Chinese digital folklore. Pepe has become 
a biaoqing — literally an “expression,” a term that describes a 
broad category of digital content including emoticons, reaction 
images, animated GIFs, and stickers.8 Biaoqing are shared across 
platforms, from Baidu Tieba forum boards and Sina Weibo 
posts to QQ and WeChat conversations, and users collect them 
in thematic biaoqing bao [expression packs] designed to be im-
ported into the interfaces of messaging programs and social 
media apps. Pepe has made it to China as a sad frog, and sits 
snugly in personalized sticker menus, reaction image folders, 
and biaoqing repositories along with Communist Party leaders, 
7 Tencent QQ, launched in 1999, is one of the instant messaging applications 
most popular in China, with 843 million MAU (monthly active users) as of 
the end of 2017. 
8 See Gabriele de Seta, “Neither Meme Nor Viral: The Circulationist 
Semiotics of Vernacular Content,” Lexia: rivista di semiotica 25/26 (2016): 
463–86.
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TV series characters, pop culture icons, and local social media 
mascots such as Tuzki the Rabbit (fig. 2).
Besides its popularity as a semiotic resource, the shangxin 
qingwa is also extensively discussed across social media posts, 
news articles, and community wikis. A Douban post by Shi 
Yezhong chronicles the online circulation of frog imagery, a rich 
repertoire of content ranging from the “Crazy Frog” song and 
captioned GIFs of the Muppet character Kermit the Frog to the 
“Foul Bachelorette Frog” advice animal memes and, of course, 
Pepe itself.9 Yet, it is in the comment section that some Douban 
9 Y. Shi, “Shangxin Qingwa Shi Nali Lai De? [Where does the sad frog come 
from?],” 2016, https://moment.douban.com/post/140446/.
Fig. 2. Series of Mandarin-captioned sad frog biaoqing collected on 
the microblogging platform Sina Weibo.
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members interestingly reclaim a local frog heritage, suggesting 
that the ha (“toad,” a humorous nickname for ex-president Jiang 
Zemin) should be included in the list as a “Chinese mutation” 
of Pepe, wearing the leader’s iconic high-belt trousers and thick 
glasses. One thread on the Q&A website Zhihu, titled “Why did 
Pepe the Frog Become So Popular?,” receives a detailed answer 
by a user recounting an intensive three-day exposure to the sad 
frog biaoqing in a WeChat group chat: 
There were more than a thousand new messages every day, 
and surprisingly this girl kept participating in all discussions 
without sending any text or voice message, she! just! used! 
shangxin! qingwa! expressions! And a few days later, another 
girl from the same group started drawing shangxin qingwa 
caricatures of other group members’ profile pictures…10
10 Xing Mei, “Weishenme Pepe the Frog Hui Huo? [Why did Pepe the Frog 
Become So Popular?]” (2015) [url defunct].
Fig. 3. Personalized sad frog profile pictures drawn by a WeChat group 
member (Xing Mei, 2015).
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Reacting to the sad frog’s popularity across Chinese social media 
platforms, another essay posted on a videogame website blames 
local users for not understanding Pepe and not respecting its 
origins: “filenames like ‘World’s Saddest Frog biaoqing pack’ are 
just too stupid — if Matt Furie ever saw them, he would cry.”11
Unsurprisingly, given the thorough commercialization of 
digital media content in China, the users’ practices of vernacu-
lar creativity aren’t limited to the circulation of edited images, 
emoticon packs, and hand-drawn profile pictures described 
above. A simple search query for shangxin qingwa on the e-
commerce marketplace Taobao results in a wide variety of sad 
frog merchandise for sale on the platform, ranging from We-
Chat sticker packs (¥1.98) and smartphone covers (¥26.90) to 
frog eyes sleeping masks (¥15.50), and Pepe-shaped tissue dis-
pensers (¥35.00). The description of another product (a sad frog 
hand warmer pillow selling for ¥24.18) is tagged with a constel-
lation of keywords useful to understand the context of this genre 
of merchandise: ACG (animation, comics, and games), QQ biao-
qing, and jingshen wuran (“spiritual pollution,” an ironic term 
for brainwashing online phenomena). Printed over t-shirts and 
cushions, molded into keychains and phone cases, Pepe as sad 
frog becomes an index anchoring various networked publics of 
Chinese digital media users to different platforms (Baidu Tieba, 
QQ, WeChat), consumption preferences (animation, gaming, 
video streaming), and visual content genres.
It is not clear when and how Pepe started circulating on 
Chinese social media platforms, but it makes sense to imagine 
one or more local users downloading some images of the comic 
character from 4chan, its Japanese equivalent 2chan, or perhaps 
even from websites like KnowYourMeme, and uploading it in 
a Baitu Tieba thread or a Sina Weibo post. What is evident is 
that, hailed as the shangxin qingwa, Pepe has entered a vast pan-
theon of characters drawn from the universes of ACG fandom 
and popular media, has found a home in the customizable in-
11 Ruo Ji, “Yi Ge Jianming Yidong De Pepe Shi [A simple and clear history of 
Pepe]” (2015) [url defunct].
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terfaces of social media platforms, and has become part of a 
repertoire of “spiritual pollution” quickly converted into Taobao 
merchandise. On the other side of the Pacific, Matt Furie has 
been collecting the artisanal Pepe pins, t-shirts, and earrings 
sold on websites like Etsy, and even launched an official line of 
Pepe apparel in 2017; and yet, he probably has no idea of the de-
gree to which his most iconic character is being commercialized 
on industrial scale in China (fig. 4).
“So Sad I Mutated Species”
It is commonplace to imagine the “Chinese Internet” — a vague 
category encompassing national networking infrastructures, 
homegrown digital media platforms, and local online phe-
nomena — as an exotic portion of cyberspace sealed away by 
the Great Firewalls of authoritarian surveillance and techno-
nationalist development. And yet, while it is hard to deny that 
protectionist policies, censorship apparatuses, and the Chinese 
government’s clutch on the development of national Internet 
Fig. 4. Some of the shangxin qingwa merchandise sold on Taobao, 
China’s largest online marketplace.
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industries have resulted in insular techno-economic infrastruc-
tures, the existence of a geolinguistic cluster of web content 
does not necessarily imply a self-contained repertory of digi-
tal folklore.12 Besides local biaoqing, Chinese digital media us-
ers also collect, interpret, and repurpose content sourced from 
global genres such as American “Rage Comics,” Japanese anime 
characters, and Korean pop idols, weaving it into their online 
interactions and integrating it in situated repertories. During 
my fieldwork, I earmarked this sort of content as indicative of 
a post-global circulation of vernacular content, but it was only 
through my recurring encounters with Pepe’s local fortune as 
shangxin qingwa that I could articulate a consistent case study 
of how digital folklore challenges the notions of the local and 
the global.
In a study of the cross-national circulation of Internet jokes, 
Limor Shifman, Hadar Levy, and Mike Thelwall argue that the 
translation of humorous content contributes to a process of “us-
er-generated globalization.”13 Grounding their analysis on a cor-
pus of English jokes and tracking their translation online across 
nine languages, Shifman, Levy, and Thelwall conclude that the 
humorous content translated by ordinary users functions as an 
agent of a process of globalization and Americanization that 
does not explicitly involve economic transactions, resulting in 
a “global humorous sphere,” whose reach is often unclear to 
users themselves.14 The authors recognize that privileging ver-
bal humor over visual content and focusing on texts from the 
contexts of production, consumption, and interpretation could 
limit the validity of their research, and I argue that the case of 
Pepe highlights precisely how these limitations skew their con-
12 See Harsh Taneja and Angela Xiao Wu, “Does the Great Firewall Really 
Isolate the Chinese? Integrating Access Blockage with Cultural Factors 
to Explain Web User Behavior,” The Information Society 30, no. 5 (2014): 
297–309. 
13 Limor Shifman, Hadar Levy, and Mike Thelwall, “Internet Jokes: 
The Secret Agents of Globalization?” Journal of Computer-Mediated 




clusions regarding the globalizing role of vernacular content.15 
As described in the previous section, the circulation of Pepe 
does not necessarily involve a direct translation — being a visual 
rather than a textual joke, the character’s expression crosses the 
linguistic boundaries of social media platforms and audiences 
through acts of copy-pasting, downloading, and uploading, and 
is repurposed by users according to their own reactions to it: 
a sad, funny, weird, relatable mascot that can be layered with 
situated elements and references. More dedicated interpretation 
only follows circulation, as users try to reconstruct the sad frog’s 
origins as Pepe, linking it back to its original creator through 
distinction claims to proper usage and respectful referencing. 
The circulation of Pepe, from Matt Furie’s pencil to its situ-
ated reappropriations, doesn’t stop at a frog-shaped toilet paper 
dispenser sold on Taobao. Pepe the Sad Frog Coloring Book and 
15 See ibid., 741.
Fig. 5. A page spread from Fei Liu’s zine Pepe the Sad Frog Coloring 
Book and Chinese Language Guide (2017) 
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Chinese Language Guide, a zine published by New York-based 
Chinese artist and designer Fei Liu (fig. 5), reflects on the post-
global circulation of the character while bringing it back to its 
original media format.16 As Fei Liu recounts: 
It all started from me flipping through my younger step sis-
ter’s WeChat album. She was living in Chongqing at the time, 
and she had posted a photo of a little girl drawing a picture 
of Pepe by hand, and coloring him in. My reaction was like… 
what the hell is going on here?17 
Departing from a similar encounter with Pepe in the practices 
of Chinese digital media users, Fei Liu’s zine offers American 
readers a field guide to Pepe’s Chinese travels: “It has made Chi-
nese Americans who can’t really read Chinese excited to learn 
a few things about Chinese digital media, talk to their parents, 
and so on.” The caption featured on the zine’s front cover, “so sad 
I mutated species,” embodies a condensed understanding of the 
post-global circulation of vernacular content, and helps under-
standing Internet memes as one among many genres of digital 
folklore, each situated in specific interpretive contexts negoti-
ated among networked publics. Once in China, Pepe’s sadness 
become its defining trait, granting it a position in the ever-grow-
ing pantheon of tongue-in-cheek content decried as “spiritual 
pollution,” accompanying local digital media users all the way 
from their chat conversations to their smartphone covers.
16 See Fei Liu, Pepe the Sad Frog Coloring Book and Chinese Language Guide 
(New York, 2017). Retrieved from trytobegood.com.
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lagiarism is necessary. Progress implies it.
For old memes to become resources for the present 
requires their reinvention and reuse; appropriation of 
collective inheritance, not of private property. The cultural van-
guard of shitposters expresses the memetic commons with an 
autistic, rather than schizophrenic, knowledge of ’net ephemera. 
We mean that the treatment of art as concept was de rigueur 
well before those eager, crumb-covered fingers set out to finish 
what the dadaists and situationists never could. Leaving behind 
the dazzling rhizomes of the postmodern, the cutting-edge now 
spearheads the Internet’s transition into the post-postmodern.
Our name for this kind of reinvention and reuse of memes 
is détournement; as in to detour, to hijack, to lead astray, to 
appropriate. This is no shitpost qua shit post. The task is not 
the destruction of the meme, but rather the destruction of the 
ownership of the meme which manifests as the invisible hand 
of conservative prescriptivism — comments, screeching from 
Imgur and Reddit; “you’re using that meme wrong!” The elimi-
nation of the very notion of personal property in this area is 
what once made ironic memes so great: the meme was true only 
to itself.
But the normies came once more and “ironic memes” be-




rural-American Jesus-posting left behind. But this time they 
came branded, watermarked with links to their Instagram and 
studded with emojis — or did they? Was that how it happened?
We remember the Great Meme War of 2014: the history books 
of KnowYourMeme will not mention the numerous fallen who 
endured deletions from Facebook in the name of spicy memes, 
among them the first wave of “historical alliteration” pages. It 
was not the normies who caused admins to rally followers to 
mass-report other pages posting 9/11 memes, nor threaten to 
doxx each other for reposting without credit.
Was it that the normies stole our memes? Or did we simply 
lose sight of something important, the very thing 4chan tried to 
explain to us that October by way of a Pepe-Market metaphor? 
It was our Internet-hipster, Pepe-capitalist valuation — keep it 
rare and keep it ours; if it isn’t rare it isn’t dank — which led us to 
cast Pepe to the normies, relinquishing hegemony over use and 
meaning as we stopped producing, as we stopped distributing. 
Were we the normies?
Normies produce a culture in their own image, a culture of 
the meme as private property, the author as sole proprietor of a 
work of genius. Détournement sifts through the memetic rem-
nants of past and present culture for memes whose untimeli-
ness can be utilized against normie culture. Détournement of-
fers an ease of production far surpassing — in quantity, variety 
and quality — the normie content that has bored us for so long. 
Rather than further elaborate normie memetics, détournement 
exploits it.
Our aim is the subversion of the culture of predatory meme 
pages through a sincere repurposing of normie productions. We 
claim that meaning is the result of use, and so we move to use 
anything and everything.
The meme scene has persevered the hellfire of meta-irony, 
whose blackening flames of mutation turned every meme inside 
out, exploding them, exposing the hypocrisy of ironic memes 
becoming decidedly unironic yet still retaining the cynicism 
and elitism of insincere play. We now advance into the informed 
naivety of post-ironic memes, weaponizing the past. We inherit 
405
The Post-Pepe Manifesto
the pathos of sincerity from the oldfags while the fruits of all 
that ironic experimentation inform our ethos. The unironic 
evaluation of memes as real things is the source of our new 
logos. As normies metastasize outwards, making the Web over 
in their image, at home on Facebook they will find their own 
image turned against them.
All culture is derivative.





Alfie Bown and Francis Russell
A 
common trope in cultural studies or critical theory texts 
that seek to engage with popular phenomena is an im-
plication that readers of such theory, and those that care 
about popular phenomena, have been remiss for not seeing the 
possible connections between the two. In other words, the rhe-
torical gambit of many critical texts on popular culture involves 
the implication — often unconscious and unintended — that by 
now someone should have seen that this particular popular phe-
nomenon was calling out to us, pleading with us to be taken 
seriously, to be given the dignity of an invitation to enter into a 
dialogue with critical or philosophical thought. However, what 
such a move functions to do, almost always against its explicit 
interests and intent, is to suggest that popular phenomena were 
not being taken seriously, were not being treated with dignity, 
were not being recognized as fully as they might be, when they 
were being engaged through the pluralism of non-academic 
guises. Contrary to the assumptions of some, this cannot be said 
of memes, which have been taken as a very serious phenom-
enon since their very emergence online.
Perhaps the prevalence of such a common rhetorical trope has 
something to do with the influence of thinkers like Martin Hei-
degger and Gilles Deleuze. For both of these thinkers, though in 




day phenomena such as jugs or films were taken to be veritable 
sites of philosophy, genuine invitations to think — and not only 
invitations, but phenomena in themselves that afford thinking, 
which is to say, phenomena that are always already offering us 
questions and concepts. While such pluralistic gestures should 
certainly not be taken for granted, there is a sense in which such 
a gesture can be misread as reinforcing conventional, and dare 
we say ideological, notions of work and stratifications of labor. 
Indeed, there is something seductive and thrilling about the no-
tion that a “mere” jug or a “mere” film could both invite us to, 
and in a certain way already be conducting, serious theoretical 
work. But such seduction runs the risk of reinforcing the notion 
that there is a clear hierarchy and stratification that separates the 
world of everyday things from that of intellectual work. Moreo-
ver, the seductive Aha-Erlebnis, the moment where something 
mundane reveals its critical or theoretical potential, also pro-
duces the risk of reinforcing the commonsense that intellectual 
labor must be serious, does bestow dignity to its subject matter, 
and enjoys a moral height over what it surveys.
The question that has come out of considering the subject 
matter of this collection of essays is what the thinker is to do 
when the subject matter resists these terms altogether. If the 
subject matter embraces indignity, stupidity, and crassness, and 
a joyful frivolousness, would the thinker be missing the point to 
hope to show the reader that the popular phenomena in ques-
tion has been demanding — though secretly, and in a language 
that only the theorist understands — to be taken seriously? The 
theorists who contributed to this volume have dealt with this 
problem in various ways.
In light of such concerns, this collection of essays on memes 
garnered its primary title, Post Memes, in a twofold sense. On 
the one hand, it situates itself after memes, insofar as we ac-
knowledge and appreciate that memes have already established 
themselves as a significant phenomenon and that reflection on 
this phenomenon has long since begun. No theoretical gesture 
of charity is required to show the significance of memes and 
meme culture. They have penetrated elections worldwide. They 
409
Afterword
have become the subject of monographs and think pieces. They 
have spawned commentaries and meta-commentaries. And, 
perhaps presenting the greatest difficulty for the theorist, there 
are a multitude of memes about theory itself. It is for this rea-
son that we acknowledge ourselves as coming after memes, as 
opposed to positioning ourselves as the ones to bestow dignity 
onto them, to put them on the map, to reveal their truth through 
piercing analytic maneuvers. 
On the other hand, this text has also been about trying to 
get caught up in, trying to get contaminated by, what it is that 
makes posting memes so compelling. For us, this question has 
necessarily been approached in terms of the act of sharing, the 
act of loosening the assumed sovereignty of authority — or of 
author-authority — in order to allow wider channels for flows 
and disseminations. It is for this reason that this book has ba-
sically eschewed any promise to explain memes by providing 
them with a static identity, or to position memes as belonging 
to one specific moment or event. Instead, we fully acknowledge 
that the sharing of memes, placing them into different contexts 
or editing their form even marginally, is already itself an act of 
writing. In this sense, this text has not so much been a collec-
tion of writings on memes — a collection that’s tried to get on 
top of, or get on with the task of explaining what memes are 
all about, once and for all — but instead a continuation of post-
ing, i.e., sharing, modifying, and circulating ideas, images, and 
provocations. For that reason too, we decided to work with the 
brilliant people at punctum books, whose project is in the spirit 
of the meme: open-access, available, inclusive, and experimen-
tal.   
To offer here another angle through which memes could be 
approached, to those discussed in the preceding pages, it is via 
an existing body of work on comedy studies. Memes could be 
viewed through various theories of laughter theory, from Freud 
and Henri Bergson through to later theorists of caricature and 
political satire. Yet, we have tried to resist applying existing the-
oretical models to the contemporary meme in any traditional 
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sense, showing instead how new theoretical frameworks are 
needed to understand the political importance of memes and 
the political pleasures of posting. Memes do share a number 
of characteristics with traditions of political satire (e.g., the de-
rision of establishment logic) and with histories of caricature 
(e.g., the clashing of form with content) but it is the differences 
between memes and hitherto existing modes of comedy, rather 
than the similarities, which present the most interesting and 
politically important topics for discussion.
At the same time, memes must be understood theoretically 
and conceptually, and this text brings memes into contact with 
a range of theoretical material. An important critique of the pat-
terns of humor prevalent online could be provided, for example, 
via the French Marxist Henri Lefebvre. In his Critique of Every-
day Life, Lefebvre joined Marx’s idea of alienation with comedy, 
using Charlie Chaplin as his prime case study. While appreciat-
ing Chaplin’s potentially subversive comedy, Lefebvre concludes 
his discussion with the realization that “on leaving the darkness 
of the cinema” after a Chaplin movie, “we rediscover the same 
world as before, it closes round as again.”1 Since “the comic event 
has taken place, we feel decontaminated, returned to normality, 
purified somehow, and stronger.”2 Lefebvre’s work points to the 
problem of satiety in the kinds of comedy prevalent on social 
media today — meming included. Such acts — themselves often 
a symptom of desperation — simulate a feeling of success and 
produce a sense of productivity and satisfaction but sometimes 
without initiating any kind of political change. 
From another perspective, it seems that the exact opposite is 
true: memes play a definitive role in political change. We are in a 
reality — quite clear even in general journalistic discourse — in 
which what can be described as meme culture has a concrete 
sway over both direct and indirect ideology, affecting both elec-
1 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life: The One Volume Edition, trans. 




tion outcomes and the terms of wider political debate. As Matt 
Goerzen has recently observed:
Beyond the musings of think piece writers, memes are now 
taken with the utmost seriousness, by entities ranging from 
DARPA US military researchers and NATO agents to ISIS’s ideo-
logical warriors — all of whom see the form as a contempo-
rary weapon of war.3 
If nothing else, this shows that the mindless idea of memes pro-
posed by Richard Dawkins has long since been defunct, even if 
we pretend that it was in one context valid. While Dawkins saw 
memes as definitionally about replication, we are quite clearly 
in a political world where memes are far more transforma-
tive. While Dawkins linked memes to natural progression, the 
meme is clearly better seen as interruption than continuation. 
Memes erupt into newsfeeds, as they erupted collectively into 
online consciousness, transforming irrevocably the situation 
into which they break. Given the simplicity of image-macros 
and short edited videos, the specifically online phenomenon 
of memes has shown itself as a media manifestation that can 
accommodate the frenetic pace of online news content. The 
ideas of specific social and political groups can disseminate at 
such speeds that they can reframe news content at a speed that 
matches traditional media sources. As Dominic Pettman argues 
in his initiating contribution to this volume, the function of 
memes as shared modes of framing and reframing events takes 
us to the very fundaments of politics and technology. For Pett-
man, the political and technological find their origin in the an-
cient Greek notion of a steersman, and it is the capacity for both 
to provide a means for steering ideas, actions, and passions. 
Social media, as a “global meme machine”, has seen an intensi-
fication of the speed of such framing and steering, to the extent 
3 Matt Goerzen, “Notes Towards the Memes of Production,” Texte zur Kunst 




that rupture in political ideas and enthusiasms seems almost 
inevitable. This is a rupture which restructures thought rather 
than perpetuates continuations of political and social trends; 
memes must be taken as more revolutionary than evolutionary, 
whether they are put to use for the Right or the Left. Memes 
then, from the generally progressive perspective that we have 
taken in this volume, are a battleground on which the politics of 
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